for things, which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes, should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them. A vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease, and in less time, teach the true signification of many terms, especially in languages of remote countries or ages, and settle truer ideas in men's minds of several things, whereof we read the names in ancient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalists, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of this way: and he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess, that he has a clearer idea of apium, or ibex, from a little print of that herb or beast, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them. And so no doubt he would have of strigil and sistrum, if instead of curry-comb and cymbal, which are the English names dictionaries render them by, he could see stamped in the margin, small pictures of these instruments, as they were in use amongst the ancients. Toga, tunica, pallium, are words easily translated by gown, coat, and cloak; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits amongst the Romans, than we have of the faces of the tailors who made them. Such things as these, which the eye distinguishes by their shapes, would be best let into the mind by draughts made of them, and more determine the signification of such words, than any other words set for them, or made use of to define them. But this only by the by. § 26. 5. By constancy in their signification. FIFTHLY, If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, and definitions of their terms are not to be had; yet this is the least that can be expected, that in all discourses, wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same word constantly in the same sense: if this were done (which nobody can refuse without great disingenuity) many of the books extant might be spared; many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end; several of those great volumes, swoln with ambiguous words, now used in one sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow compass; and many of the philosophers' (to mention no other) as well as poets' works, might be contained in a nut shell.

§ 27. When the variation is to be explained. BUT after all, the provision of words is so scanty in respect of that infinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to suit their precise notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forc

ed often to use the same word in somewhat different senses. And though in the continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, there can be hardly room to digress into a particular definition, as often as a man varies the signification of any term; yet the import of the discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it but where that is not sufficient to guide the reader, there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and show in what sense he there uses that term,

:

BOOK IV.

OF KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION.

CHAP. I.

OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.

1. Our knowledge conversant about our ideas.

SINCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them.

§2. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.

KNOWLEDGE then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive that these two ideas do not agree? when we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from, the three angles of a triangle? (1)

(1) The placing of certainty, as Mr. Locke does, in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, the bishop of Worcester suspects may be of dangerous confequence to that article of faith which he has endeavored to defend; to which Mr. Locke answers, † fince your lordship hath not, as Į remember, fhown, or gone about to fhow, how this propofition, viz. that certainty confifts in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of two ideas, is opposite or inconsistent with that article of faith which your lordship has endeav ored to defend; it is plain, it is but your lordship's fear, that it may be of dangerous confequence to it, which, as I humbly conceive, is no proof that it is any way inconfiftent with that article.

In his 24 letter to the bifhap of Worcester.

§3. This agreement fourfold.

BUT to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this agreement or disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts:

Nobody, I think, can blame your lordship, or any one else, for being concerned for any article of the Christian faith; but if that concern (as it may, and as we know it has done) makes any one apprehend danger, where no danger is, are we, therefore, to give up and condemn any propofition, because any one, though of the first rank and magnitude, fears it may be of dangerous confequence to any truth of religion, without showing that it is fo? If fuch fears be the measures whereby to judge of truth and falsehood, the affirming that there are antipodes would be still a heresy ; and the doctrine of the motion of the earth must be rejected, as overthrowing the truth of the scripture; for of that dangerous confequence it has been apprehended to be, by many learned and pious divines, out of their great concern for religion. And yet, notwithstanding those great apprehenfions of what dangerous confequence it might be, it is now univerfally received by learned men, as an undoubted truth; and writ for by some, whose belief of the fcripture is not at all questioned; and particularly, very lately, by a divine of the church of England, with great ftrength of reafon, in his wonderful ingenious New Theory of the Earth.

The reason your lordship gives of your fears, that it may be of fuch dangerous confequence to that article of faith which your lordship endeavors to defend, though it occur in more places than one, is only this, viz. That it is made ufe of by ill men to do mischief, i. e. to oppose that article of faith which your lordship hath endeavored to defend. But, my lord, if it be a reason to lay by any thing as bad, because it is, or may be used to an ill purpose, I know not what will be innocent enough to be kept. Arms, which were made for our defence, are fometimes made ufe of to do mischief; and yet they are not thought of dangerous confequence for all that. Nobody lays by his sword and pistols, or thinks them of such dangerous confequence as to be neglected, or thrown away, because robbers, and the worst of men, sometimes make use of them, to take away honest men's lives or goods. And the reason is, because they were defigned, and will serve to preserve them. And who knows but this may be the prefent cafe? If your lordship thinks, that placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas be to be rejected as false, because you apprehend it may be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith: on the other fide, perhaps others, with me, may think it a defence against error, and so (as being of good use) to be received and adhered to.

I would not, my lord, be hereby thought to set up my own, or any one's judgement against your lordship's. But I have said this only to show, whilst the argument lies for or against the truth of any proposition, barely in an imagination that it may be of confequence to the supporting or overthrowing of any remote truth; it will be impoffible, that way, to determine of the truth or falfehood of that propofition. For imagination will be fet up against imagination, and the stronger probably will be against your lordship; the strongest

1. Identity, or diversity.

2. Relation.

3. Co-existence, or necessary connection.

4. Real existence.

imaginations being usually in the weakest heads. The only way, in this cafe, to put it past doubt, is to show the inconfistency of the two propofitions; and then it will be seen, that one overthrows the other; the true, the falfe one.

Your lordship says, indeed, this is a new method of certainty. I will not say so myself, for fear of deserving a fecond reproof from your lordship, for being too forward to affume to myself the honor of being an original. But this, I think, gives me occasion, and will excufe me from being thought impertinent, if I ask your lordship, whether there be any other, or older method of certainty? and what it is? For, if there be no other, nor older than this, either this was always the method of certainty, and fo mine is no new one; or elfe the world is obliged to me for this new one, after having been fo long in the want of so necessary a thing as a method of certainty. If there be an older, I am sure your lordship cannot but know it; your condemning mine as new, as well as your thorough insight into antiquity, cannot but satisfy every body that you do. And therefore to fet the world right in a thing of that great concernment, and to overthrow mine, and thereby prevent the dangerous confequence there is in my having unreasonably started it, will not, I humbly conceive, misbecome your lordship's care of that article you have endeavored to defend, nor the good-will you bear to truth in general. For I will be answerable for myself, that I fhall; and I think I may be for all others, that they all will give off the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of ideas, if your lordship will be pleased to show, that it lies in any thing else.

But truly, not to afcribe to myself an invention of what has been as old as knowledge is in the world, I must own, I am not guilty of what your lordship is pleased to call starting new methods of certainty. Knowledge, ever fince there has been any in the world, has confifted in one particular action in the mind; and fo, I conceive, will continue to do to the end of it. And to ftart new methods of knowledge, or certainty, (for they are to me the fame thing) i. e. to find out and propose new methods of attaining knowledge, either with more ease and quickness, or in things yet unknown, is what I think no body could blame: but this is not that which your lordship here means, by new methods of certainty. Your lordship, I think, means by it, the placing of certainty in something, wherein either it does not confift, or else wherein it was not placed before now; if this be to be called a new method of certainty. As to the latter of these, I shall know whether I am guilty or no, when your lordfhip will do me the favor to tell me, wherein it was placed before which your lordship knows I profeffed myself ignorant of, when I writ my book, and fo I am ftill. But if starting new methods of certainty, be the placing of certainty in fomething wherein it does not confift; whether I have done that or no, I must appeal to the experience of mankind.