Opinion of the Court.

DOWS & Another v. JOHNSON.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF IOWA.

Submitted January 7th, 1884.-Decided January 21st, 1884.

Jurisdiction.

When the value of the matter in dispute in this court is less than $5,000 the court is without jurisdiction of the cause, although an amount more than $5,000 may have been involved below. Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165, approved and followed.

Motion to dismiss. Case also submitted on the briefs.

Mr. Henry S. Monroe for plaintiffs in error and against the motion.

Mr. Samuel F. Chapman and Mr. W. F. Sapp for defendant in error and for the motion.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. We have no jurisdiction in this case. The suit was brought by Dows & Co. to recover damages for the unlawful conversion of ten thousand bushels of corn, the value of which, according to the findings, did not exceed $6,000. With interest added to this sum from the date of the alleged conversion until the judgment, the most that could have been recovered, upon the special finding, was $6,360. A judgment was in fact rendered for $2,430. The matter in dispute in this court is the difference between these two sums, or only $3,930. In Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165, it was settled that our jurisdiction depends on the value of the matter in dispute here, and as that in the present case is less than $5,000, it follows that the suit must be dismissed; and it is so ordered.

Dismissed.

Opinion of the Court.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OMAHA v. REDICK.

IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.

Submitted December 17th, 1883.-Decided January 21st, 1884.

Error-Jurisdiction.

When the plaintiff below in open court, by permission of court, remits all of the verdict in excess of $5,000 and judgment is entered for that sum and costs, the writ of error will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Action below to recover penalty for taking usurious interest. On the trial verdict was rendered for the plaintiff for $6,013.32. Plaintiff

"thereupon in open court offered to remit from the amount of said verdict the sum of $1,013.32, and the court, upon due consideration thereof, allowed said remitter, and ordered the same to be duly entered of record, and thereupon it was ordered and adjudged by the court that the said plaintiff have and recover from the said defendant, the First National Bank of Omaha, the sum of five thousand dollars with costs of suit, etc."

Plaintiff brought the cause here by writ of error. ant in error moved to dismiss.

Defend

Mr. John I. Redick for himself in support of the motion.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This motion is granted on the authority of Thompson v. Butler, 95 U. S. 694, and Alabama Gold Life Insurance Company v. Nichols, 109 U. S. 232.

Dismissed.

Opinion of the Court.

UNITED STATES v. GRANT.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

Submitted December 17th, 1883.-Decided January 21st, 1884.

Appeal Court of Claims-Statutes.

An act which directs the Court of Claims to reopen and readjudicate a claim, and in case it finds a further amount due that the same shall be a part of the original judgment, confers no right of appeal from the final action of the court under it; and if the time for the right of appeal from the original judgment has expired before appeal from such final action is claimed and taken, the appeal will be dismissed.

Motion to dismiss an appeal from the Court of Claims.

Mr. W. Hallett Phillips for the motion.

Mr. Solicitor-General and Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Simons against.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. Grant & Co. sued the United States in the Court of Claims on the 2d of December, 1868, and on the 6th of December, 1869, recovered a judgment for $34,225.14. On the 5th of January, 1883, the following act was passed by Congress:

"Be it enacted

That the Court of Claims be, and it is hereby, directed to reopen and readjudicate the case of Albert Grant and Darius Jackson upon the evidence hereto

fore submitted to the said court in said cause and if said court in such readjudication shall find from such evidence that the court gave judgment for a different sum than the evidence sustains or the court intended, it shall correct such error and adjudge to the said Albert Grant such additional sum in said cause as the evidence shall justify, not to exceed fourteen thousand and sixteen dollars and twenty-nine cents; and the amount by readjudication in favor of the said Albert Grant shall be a part of the original judgment in the cause recorded in the fifth Court of Claims report, page eighty."

Under this act Grant, on the 13th of January, 1883, applied

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Opinion of the Court.

to the court to re-examine the case and to render a judgment nunc pro tunc for the additional sum of $14,016.29. Upon this application, the court, on due consideration, found that the original judgment was given for a different sum than was intended, and that, "in order to correct such error and adjudge to said Albert Grant such additional sum in this cause as the evidence justifies, he should receive a further sum of $14,016.29," and on the 11th of June, 1883, a judgment for that amount was rendered. From this judgment the United States took an appeal, which Grant now moves to dismiss on the ground that no appeal lies from an order or judgment entered in such a proceeding.

In our opinion, this motion should be granted. The act of Congress, in its legal effect, is nothing more than a direction to the Court of Claims to entertain an application to correct an error in the entry of one of its former judgments. The readjudication ordered is to be upon the old evidence, and, if an error is found, the correction is to be made, not by rendering a new judgment, but by amending the old one. The language is, "and the amount by readjudication in favor of the said Albert Grant shall be a part of the original judgment." As, when the act was passed, an appeal from the original judgment was barred by lapse of time, we are satisfied it was the intention of Congress to make the action of the Court of Claims upon this readjudication final. Certainly the old judgment is not opened to an appeal by the readjudication, and there is nothing to indicate that the new part of the judgment can be separated from the old for the purposes of review here. By the correction the new judgment was merged in the old.

The motion to dismiss is granted.

Opinion of the Court.

PEUGH v. DAVIS.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

Submitted January 7th, 1884.—Decided January 21st, 1884.

Appeal-Supersedeas.

If a court in session and acting judicially allows an appeal which is entered of record without taking a bond within sixty days after rendering a decree, a justice or judge of the appellate court may, in his discretion, grant a supersedeas after the expiration of that time under the provisions of § 1007 Rev. Stat., but this is not to be construed as affecting appeals other than such as are allowed by the court acting judicially and in term time.

Mr. M. F. Morris and Mr. J. T. Crittenden for appellant.

Mr. A. G. Riddle for appellee.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This is an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, rendered on the 30th of October, 1882. At the foot of the decree as entered is the following:

"And from this decree the complainant, Samuel A. Peugh, prays an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which is allowed."

No bond of any kind was executed under this allowance until the 10th of May, 1883, when Mr. Justice Miller granted a supersedeas and took the necessary security for that purpose. He at the same time signed a citation. On the same day another citation was signed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the District. Davis, the appellee, now moves to vacate the supersedeas because no appeal was perfected within sixty days after the rendition of the decree appealed from, and also to dismiss the appeal.

In Kitchen v. Randolph, 93 U. S., at 92, it was held that—

"The service of a writ of error or the perfection of an appeal within sixty days, Sundays exclusive, after the rendering of the judgment or the passing of the decree complained of, is an