The court held in that case that the words "tourist court or motor court" was included by the word "hotel." I have not found any decision anywhere in the United States to the contrary.

So, under this decision, if Mrs. Murphy ran a tourist home or tourist court or motor court, she would be included within the meaning of the word "hotel" as used in this act.

And, at the same time, I would like to put in the record at this. point an extract from the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, Camp Walden v. Johnson, reported in 163 Atlantic Reporter, second series, at page 356, which defines a tourist home as a residence in which temporary guests are received for the purpose of a temporary stay.

(The extracts referred to are as follows:)

PURDY V. MOISE

((S.C.-1953) 75 S.E. 2d 605)

"In determining the first question, we are confronted with a dearth of decisions on the subject by reason of the fact that 'motor courts' or 'tourist courts' are relatively modern terms not found in the law dictionaries but used to denominate such institutions or places of business herein described and exist by reason of the demand by the transient public, who utilize the automobile principally as a means of transportation and therefore have need for convenient, temporary lodging."

"It is argued by appellants that under the generally accepted meaning of the words 'tourist court' and 'motor court' one could not have under consideration a hotel. The generally accepted meaning of words used in statutes or ordinances are to be accepted unless such words have a well recognized meaning in law; if so, they are presumed to have been used in that sense, Coakley v. Tidewater Construction Corp., 194 S.C. 284, 9 S.E. 2d 724; Powers v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 180 S.C. 501, 186 S.E. 523. The word 'hotel' does have a well recognized meaning in law which under its terms are such as to encompass that of 'tourist court' or 'motor court.' The services rendered to the public may be of wide variances but such variances are in the method of quality rather than the character of such services."

CAMP WALDEN v. JOHNSON

((1960-Maine) 163 A. 2d 356)

"Does the term 'tourist camp' have a common and accepted meaning among people of this state? It undoubtedly has such a meaning. The state of Maine with its varied scenery and recreational facilities has for many years attracted tourists from all parts of the country. The increase in automobile transportation and the improvement of our highways has made our lakes, seashore, and countryside more accessible not only to our own citizens but also to myriads of visitors from other states. Many enterprising citizens, recognizing the requirement of living or housing accommodations on the part of those temporarily away from home, have found it profitable to construct so-called camps or cabins to provide such accommodations. Structures of this type were erected in many parts of the state, some more elaborate than others. Some owners provided but one cabin or camp, others provided many. The main purpose of these camps or cabins is to provide temporary sleeping or housing accommodations, and any other service rendered to the guest is merely incidental thereto. The terms 'tourist camp,' 'tourist cabin,' ‘overnight camp,' and ‘overnight cabin' have been interchangeably used by the public as the accepted designation of the type of building used for such a purpose. A group of such buildings is generally spoken of as a 'tourist camp.' Likewise, a residence in which temporary guests are received for the same purpose is commonly known as a 'tourist home." "

Senator ERVIN. I will go back to the people who are covered by the North Carolina license tax law.

In addition to those already named are restaurants, people who operate cotton compressors to compress cotton into bales, people who operate places where billiard and pool tables are used, and people who operate bowling alleys. Even people who operate music machines would be exercising the powers of government under this strange theory. The same observation applies to people who operate bagatelle tables and merry-go-rounds. Under this theory, the Congress could pass a law to require a merry-go-round to alter its course and go in the opposite direction from that in which it is accustomed to go. That shows how ridiculous this theory is.

Others who pay license taxes are manufacturers and producers and bottlers and distributors of soft drinks, cotton buyers, people who sell cotton on commission, people who operate packinghouses, newspapers which engage in newspaper popularity contests, persons in dry cleaning plants, hat blockers, operators of barbershops and shoeshine parlors, newsdealers on trains, people who operate soda fountains and soft drink stands, people who sell pistols, people who sell pianos or organs or radios, people who deal in installment paper, and tobacco and cigarette retailers and jobbers, launderers, people who engage in outdoor advertising, people who advertise on motor vehicles, people who make loans, brokers who negotiate loans, automobile salesmen, wholesale supply dealers, people who operate service stations, people who sell motorcycles, emigrant employment agents, people who solicit labor for employment, plumbers, heating contractors, electricians, and people who are engaged in the business of issuing or selling or delivering trading stamps.

North Carolina even puts a process tax in the form of a license fee on people who are convicted of crimes in the courts of the State. And so the criminals who are convicted would be exercising a part of the power of the State under this strange theory.

License taxes are also collected in North Carolina from people who have marble yards, people who manufacture ice cream, people who run branch or chain stores, people who are wholesale distributors of motor fuels, people who use patent rights and formulas in thir business, and junk dealers. I think that a junkyard is a proper place to leave the theory that the State is responsible for the action of everybody who is taxed by the State-be it a State license tax or a franchise tax or an ad valorem tax.

I would like this list to be printed at this point in the record. (The list referred to follows:)

TAXATION-LICENSE TAXES-STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

General Statutes of North Carolina, 105-33. Taxes under this article.—(a) Taxes in this article or schedule shall be imposed as State license taxes for the privilege of carrying on the business, exercising the privilege, or doing the act named, and nothing in this article shall be construed to relieve any person, firm, or corporation from the payment of the tax prescribed in this article or schedule: Provided, the obtaining of a license required by this article shall not of itself authorize the practice of a profession, business, or trade for which a State qualification license is required.

105-34. Amusement parks.

105-35. Amusements-traveling theatrical companies, etc.

105-36. Amusements-manufacturing, selling, leasing, or distributing moving picture films or checking attendance at moving picture shows.

105-36.1. Amusements-outdoor theaters.

105-37. Amusements-moving pictures or vaudeville shows-admission. 105-37.1. Amusement-forms of amusement not otherwise taxed.

105–38. Amusements-circuses, menageries, wild west, dog and/or pony shows,

etc.

105-39. Amusements-carnival companies, etc.

105-40. Amusements-certain exhibitions, performances, and entertainments exempt from license tax.

105-41. Attorneys at law and other professionals (physician, veterinary, surgeon, osteopath, chiropractor, chiropodist, dentist, oculist, optician, optometrist, any person practicing any professional art of healing for a fee or reward, engineer, land surveyor, architect and landscape architect, photographer, canvasser for any photographer, agent of a photographer, members of partnerships, corporations engaged in real estate, public accountants, mortician, embalmer) but exempts persons engaged in healing who confine their practices to prayer or spiritual

means.

105-41.1. Bondsmen.

105-42. Detectives.

105-43. Real estate auction sales.

105-44. Coal and coke dealers. This applies to dealers or peddlers in coal who sell in quantities of not more than 100 pounds.

105-45. Collecting agencies.

105-46. Undertakers and retail dealers in coffins.

105-47. Dealers in horses and/or mules.

105-48. Phrenologists.

105–48.1. Itinerant photographers, their agents and employees.

105-49. Bicycle dealers.

105-50. Pawnbrokers.

105-51. Cash registers, adding machines, typewriters, refrigerating machines, washing machines, etc. (lists 17 specific types of machines including vacuum cleaners and coal stokers).

105-52. Sales of sewing machines.

105-53. Peddlers of spices, flavoring extracts, toilet articles, soaps, insecticide, proprietary medicine and household remedies, peddlers of fruits, vegetables, or products of the farm, except certain foods produced by the individual vendor. 105-54. Contractors and construction companies.

105–55. Installing elevators and automatic sprinkler systems.

105-56. Repairing and servicing elevators and automatic sprinkler systems. 105-57. Merchantile agencies.

105-58. Gypsies and fortunetellers.

105-59. Lightning rod agents.

105-60. Hotels.

105-61. Tourist homes and tourist camps.

105-62. Restaurants.

105-63. Cotton compresses.

105-64. Billiard and pool tables.

105-64.1. Bowling alleys.

105-65. Music machines.

105-65.1. Merchandising dispensers and weighing machines.

105-66. Bagatelle tables, merry-go-rounds, etc. This regulates also those operating hobby horses, shooting galleries, skating rinks, and swimming pools. 105-67. Security dealers.

105-68. Cotton buyers and sellers on commission.

105-69. Manufacturers, producer, bottlers, and distributors of soft drinks.

105-70. Packinghouses.

105-71. Newspaper contests.

105-72. Persons, firms, or corporations selling certain oils.

105–74. Pressing clubs, drycleaning plants, and hat blockers (105–73, repealed). 105-75. Barbershops.

105-76. Shoeshine parlors.

105-77. Tobacco warehouses.

105-78. Newsdealers on trains.

105-79. Soda fountains, soft drink stands.

105-80. Dealers in pistols, etc. (105-81, repealed).

105-82. Pianos, organs, victrolas, records, radios, accessories.

105-83. Installment paper dealers.

105-84. Tobacco and cigarette retailers and jobbers.

105-85. Laundries.

105-86. Outdoor advertising.

105-87. Motor advertisers.

105-88. Loan agencies or brokers.

105-89. Automobiles, wholesale supply dealers, and service stations.

105-89.1. Motorcycle dealers.

105-90. Emigrant and employment agents.

105-90.1. Same, hiring or soliciting labor for employment in State having similar law.

105-91. Plumbers, heating, contractors and electricians.

105-92. Trading stamps. (Every person, firm, or corporation engaged in the business of issuing, selling, and/or delivering trading stamps.)

105-93. Process tax.

105-96. Marble yards.

105-97. Manufacturers of ice cream.

105-98. Branch or chain stores.

105-99. Wholesale distributors of motor fuels.

105-100. Patent rights and formulas.

105-101. Tax on document seal affixed by officers.

105-102. Junk dealers.

105-102.1. Certain cooperative associations such as irrigation associations. mutual telephone associations, mutual canning associations, and mutual farm breeding associations.

Senator ERVIN. Before ending my discussion of the so-called public accommodations section of the bill, I wish to call attention to subsection (b) of section 204 on page 16. This subsection provides thatin any action commenced pursuant to this title by the person aggrieved, he shall, if he prevails, be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the cost. It seems that what is sauce for the legal goose ought to be sauce for the legal gander. If Congress is going to permit an individual plaintiff who wins a lawsuit under the public accommodations provision of the bill the privilege of recovering his attorney's fee, it should likewise provide that the individual operator of an alleged place of public accommodation who wins the suit ought to recover his attorney fee of a losing plaintiff. Certainly the Department of Justice ought not to ask for an unequal law in a bill which it asserts is intended to secure equality.

The Department of Justice is evidently trying to implement an unprecedented recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and to stir up additional litigation in the so-called desegregation field by including this provision in the bill.

On January 14, 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States by a divided Court handed down a decision in the case of The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Robert Button, Attorney General of Virginia. This case is reported in 9 L. ed. 2d 405.

So far as I can determine, it was held for the first time in any American jurisdiction by a majority of the Court in this particular that certain corporations; namely, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and its subsidiaries, could practice law through attorneys chosen and controlled by them. This particular decision is apparently contrary to every other decision ever handed down in any American jurisdiction. All other decisions say that corporations cannot practice law and that only individuals can perform such function. The basis for such holding is that only indi

viduals can be properly subjected to the discipline of the Court and discharge the duties of officers of the Court.

This decision goes even further. It holds that attorneys chosen and controlled by the NAACP and its subsidiary organizations have a constitutional right under the first amendment to the Constitution to practice barratry, champerty, and maintenance, and even to solicit employment, and that any laws of Virginia which could interfere with such conduct on the part of lawyers chosen and controlled by the NAACP and its subsidiary corporations are null and void under the first amendment. Under this decision, lawyers chosen and controlled by the NAACP and its subsidiary organizations are exempt from punishment under the criminal statutes and disciplinary proceedings by State bars to which all other lawyers are subject.

The record in the Button case further discloses that the lawyers chosen and controlled by these organizations receive compensation for their services at the rate of $50 a day rather than upon a retainer basis. This being true, they do not receive payment unless they stir up or participate in litigation.

The record in the Button case also shows, in substance, that the NAACP and its subsidiary organizations reserve the right under their contracts with these lawyers to impose their policies upon these lawyers in the trial of cases which are ostensively brought for private individuals. These contracts provide in essence that when the policies of these organizations conflict with the interest of the individuals for whom these lawyers nominally appear, the lawyers are bound to follow the policies of these organizations rather than the interest of the individual litigants.

These things being true, subsection (b) of section 204 of this bill indicates that the Department of Justice is desirous of assisting these organizations in having their attorneys chosen and controlled by them compensated by the operators of places of public accommodations rather than by these organizations.

An exceedingly able dissent was filed in the Button case.

Before I close my discussion of the so-called public accommodations provisions of the bill, I wish to point out that such provisions are clearly unconstitutional under the interpretation which has always been placed upon the 14th amendment.

I read from 12 American Jurisprudence, under the subject of constitutional law, a part of section 455, at pages 103 and 104. Here is what it says:

The general rule is firmly settled by authoritative decisions that the constitutional guarantees against the impairment of privileges or immunities operate only to inhibit impairment of such privileges and immunities by action of the States themselves. The prohibitions of the 14th amendment and of article 4, section 2 have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals. Hence, these clauses in no wise affect the conduct of individual persons. In all cases where the Constitution seeks to protect the rights of the citizens against discriminative and unjust laws of the State by prohibiting such laws, it does not denounce individual offenses, but the abrogation and denial of rights for which it clothes Congress with the power to prescribe a remedy.

The next sentence is as plain a statement as is to be found in any law book ever published:

The 14th amendment, therefore, does not authorize direct legislation by Congress to regulate the conduct of citizens among themselves, even though such individual conduct abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.