pired. This case excited the intensest sympathy for the husband of the accused, and gave rise to a thousand speculations as to the nature and extent of the crime. When the trial came on, the Court-House was crowded to overflowing, and the interest of the spectators was eloquently expressed by the anxiety of their countenances, and the deep hush that pervaded the hall. The fact of guilt on the part of the defendant could not be contested. The act, for which she stood indicted, had been committed in the presence of several witnesses, and of course, the only question was, to what class of crimes the offence belonged. If it was pronounced murder of the first degree, the life of the wretched prisoner would be the forfeit, but, if manslaughter, she would merely be punished by confinement in the gaol or penitentiary. The legal contest was long and able. The efforts of the counsel for the prosecution were such as might have been expected from a powerful and learned man engaged in a case of deep and general interest; yet Mr. Clay not only succeeded in saving the life of his client, but excited in her behalf such a degree of pity and compassion, by his moving, eloquence, that her punishment was mitigated to the lowest degree permitted by the law. In the management of this case, Mr. C. convinced his fellow citizens, that he was not only profoundly versed in the criminal laws of his country, but that he was skilled in the science of human nature, and knew the home of every weakness and passion.

Another criminal case, in which Mr. Clay was engaged shortly afterward, is said to have been scarcely less interesting. It was tried in Harrison County. Two Germans, father and son, had been indicted for murder, and Mr. C. was employed to defend them. The deed of killing was proved to the entire satisfaction of the Court, and was considered an aggravated murder. The whole of

Mr. C.'s efforts were consequently directed, not to the entire exculpation of the defendants, but to the saving of their lives. After a warm and unintermitted struggle of five days, he succeeded. The Jury found a verdict of manslaughter. Not satisfied with this signal triumph, Mr. C. moved an arrest of judgement, and, after another day's contest, prevailed in this also, and, of course, the prisoners were discharged, without even the punishment of the crime of which the Jury had found them guilty. During the whole of this long trial, an old, ill-favoured German female, who was the wife of the elder prisoner and the mother of the younger, had been sitting in one unvaried posture, watching the countenances of the Jury, and listening to the spirited contest of the counsel, though she probably understood little of the language in which it was conducted. After the success of the final motion for an arrest of judgement, a gentleman, who had been observing her, approached where she sat, and whispered in her ear, that her husband and son were acquitted. Her sudden rapture broke over all restraint. She threw up her arms in a wild excess of joy, and ran to Mr. Clay, and, clinging with desperate strength to his neck, almost smothered him with her kisses. The young advocate, no doubt, would willingly have dispensed with these tokens of female favour; but the hearts of the spectators were so touched and purified by the contemplation of the happiness they witnessed, that, if a smile rested for one moment upon the lip, it was a smile, not of derision, but of sympathy and kindred joy.

Whilst we were making inquiries in relation to the cases in which Mr. Clay distinguished himself, during the early part of his legal practice, we were, several times, referred to that of a Mr. Willis, a citizen of Fayette County, who, as was supposed, had committed a mur

der, under circumstances of peculiar cruelty and coldbloodedness. From representations made previous to the trial, Mr. C. consented to undertake his defence, and, by a mighty effort, succeeded, in almost direct defiance of testimony, in creating a division of the Jury as to the nature of the defendant's crime. This was the object at which he specifically aimed. At the next session of the Court, the Attorney for the Commonwealth moved for a venire facias de novo, in other words, a new trial, which was granted by the Court. Mr. Clay made no opposition to this motion, but reserved all his strength for the argument before the Jury. When his turn came for addressing them, in reply to the arguments of the Attorney for the Commonwealth, he rose, and commenced with assuming the position, that, whatever opinion the Jury might have of the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, it was too late to convict him, for he had been once tried, and the law required, that no man should be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence. The Court was startled at this assumption, and peremptorily prohibited the speaker from proceeding in the argument to maintain it. Mr. Clay drew himself proudly up, and remarking, that, if he was not to be allowed to argue the whole case to the Jury, he could have nothing more to say, made a formal bow to the Court, put his books into his green bag, and, with Roman dignity, left the hall, followed by his associate counsel. The consequence was as he had foreseen. He had not been at his lodgings more than five or ten minutes, when he was waited on by a messenger from the Court, requesting his return, and assuring him, that he should be permitted to-argue the case in his own way. Instantly he made his re-appearance in the Hall, pressed, with the utmost vehemence, the point he had before attempted to establish, and, on the ground that his client

had once been tried, prevailed on the Jury to give him his liberty, without any reference whatever to the testimony against him. Such a decision could not now be obtained in Kentucky, and, at the period in question, was obviously contrary to law.

We have found, from an examination of the court records, in Fayette and the neighbouring counties, that, in trials for capital crimes, Mr. Clay was almost uniformly the advocate of the defendant. We know but one exception, and this grew out of his public relations. It appears, that he had made an effort to procure the office of prosecuting attorney for one of his friends. The Court, however, would not give it to this friend, but were willing to confer it on Mr. Clay himself. The latter felt a strong repugnance to the appointment, but consented to accept it, from a belief, which afterwards proved correct, that he should be able to transfer it to his friend in a short time. While in the discharge of the official duties of this station, he appeared at the bar against a man accused of a capital offence. The defendant was a negro slave-a proud and faithful servant-and one, who had never been accustomed to the degradation of corporeal chastisement. During a temporary absence of his master, however, he was placed under the charge of a young and passionate overseer, who, for some slight or imaginary offence, struck him rudely with a horse-whip. The spirit of the slave was instantly roused, and, seizing a weapon that was near him, he laid his overseer dead upon the spot. This offence, if the perpetrator had been a white man, would have been so clearly a case of manslaughter, that the counsel for the prosecution would have contended for nothing more. It had all the distinguishing characteristicks of manslaughter, having been committed in a moment of sudden exasperation, and without the shadow

of previous malice. The negro, however, stood indicted for murder, and it belonged to Mr. Clay, as counsel for the Commonwealth, to sustain, if possible, the indictment. In order to this, he contended, in a long, subtle, and elaborate argument, that, although a white man, who, in a fit of rage on account of personal chastisement killed his assailant, would be guilty of manslaughter and not murder, a slave could plead no such mitigation of a similar offence, inasmuch as it is the duty of slaves to submit to punishment. We have not a doubt, that this argument was directly opposed to the true spirit of the law. Perhaps a slave is bound by law to submit to chastisement -but does not the law require a white man to submit to the same thing, rather than take life? Certainly. Even manslaughter is punishable with imprisonment. The particular law, which distinguishes manslaughter from murder, has no reference to the duties of the offender, but has its whole foundation in the indulgence, which has been thought due to those weaknesses and passions of human nature, which lead to the violation of duties. Every man, who, in a moment of excitement, takes life to revenge a personal indignity, is guilty of a wrong—the white man no less than the slave. The law of manslaughter inquires only as to the fact of the existence of the excitement at the time the deed is perpetrated-and its provisions are as valid in behalf of the slave, as of any other member of the community, unless it can be shown, that the endurance of the wrongs and miseries of slavery annihilates the darker passions, instead of fostering and unchaining them, in all their wildness and strength. Mr. Clay was successful in his argument, notwithstanding the invalidity of his positions. By his strong and plausible reasonings, and the exuberance and felicity of his illustrations, he wrought so completely upon