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same in reference to any other naval agent of that Government.
A few specifications may help to confirm the above statement, and may possibly be of some historical interest.
The Alabama cost £47,500 as delivered by the builders; her naval equipments and other incidental expenses required an additional sum of £13,437 8s. 7d., and she was supplied with £20,000 as a cruising fund, and for pay of officers and men. No remittances were made to her while cruising, and Captain Semmes drew no bills, so that the entire expenditure on account of the Alabama, from the time her keel was laid until she sunk off Cherbourg, was £80,937 8s. 7d., and I do not believe any vessel of her class was ever built and kept two years in commission for less.
The expenditure on the Florida, up to her arrival in Brest, September, 1863, had been in cost, £35,950, other expenses, £9,678 4s. 9d., or total expenditure to that date, £15,628 4s. 9d. The foregoing figures do not include the amount which may have been expended while she was in Mobile, and does not include her cruising fund, which was supplied by arrangements with the Treasury when she left Mobile.
The gross expenditure in the purchase and all the expenses of the Shenandoah's cruise was £53,715 10s. 9d.
The foregoing accounts are of course exclusive of the cost and expenses of the tenders, but they include the cost of everything supplied to the vessels named. In regard to the tenders, it may be stated that if taken in the aggregate, they much more than recouped their cost by the successful voyages made through the blockade, and by their subsequent sale after they had completed the original service for which they were bought.
It is true that the Agrippina did not sell at her cost price, and the freight she earned on her last homeward voyage from Bahia did not make up the deficit; but the Laurel must be credited with a large sum on account of inward freight to Charleston. She then brought out between 600 and 700 bales of cotton, and was sold at cost. The other naval tender made several successful voyages through the blockade, and was then sold for more than two-thirds of her cost. Looking at those transactions, therefore, from a commercial point of view, it may
be affirmed that the Confederate cruisers were not set afloat or maintained in an extravagant manner.
Official dispositions of Holland, Brazil, Spain, Portugal, France, and
Great Britain to the Confederate States. — The position assumed by Mr. Seward at the beginning of the Civil War.—The policy of the British Government.—English feeling in favour of the North.–Facts about slavery in America.—English sympathy transferred to the South.-Lack of courtesy and dignity in United States representatives.- The Alabama Claims.-Synopsis of the negotiations respecting those claims.-Position of the British Government in regard to them.—The three rules of the Treaty of Washington.-A possible application of them to the United States.
THERE was one result of the Confederate naval operations in Europe which Mr. Davis and his Cabinet could not have foreseen, and to which they had no purpose to contribute when it was determined to attack the enemy's commerce from across the sea. It doubtless often occurred to them, as it did to many others, that questions of belligerent rights and neutral duties would arise, and that the United States would become involved in complicated discussions with foreign Powers, which might in some way or other be helpful to the cause of the South. As the war progressed, and they beheld the arrogant pretensions of Mr. Seward, and the haughty offensive and dictatorial tone in which he urged them, it was thought that he would very probably draw upon himself and upon his country something more than
diplomatic reproofs. Perhaps some even thought that Europe would tire of the long contest, and the harassing interruption of trade with the Southern States, and would intervene, either by force or persuasion, to stop the war and restore the normal conditions of commerce.
But among all the various hopes or surmises which may have been discussed at Richmond, or which stirred the minds of the Southern people, no one ever dreamed that Great Britain would be selected as the chief object of Mr. Seward's malice, and that she—ever more yielding to the United States than any other Power with which there was a controversy, and always more restrictive than France, especially in the treatment of Confederate cruisers—would have been selected to pay the penalty of recognising the Confederate States as belligerents, and to recoup to the United States a portion of the losses inflicted by the war. whose ports were visited by Confederate cruisers was so restrictive and exacting as Great Britain, and no Government more cautious and reserved in granting privileges or permitting official courtesies to Confederate commanding officers or diplomatic agents which could be construed into an admission of anything beyond the merest belligerent rights.
Perhaps it would be well to give a few examples of the action of some other Powers and the privileges granted to Confederate cruisers in their ports.
Holland. - The Sumter was the first Confederate vessel that got to sea. She was down among the windward West India Islands in July-August, 1861, and visited during those months two ports of the Dutch possessions, namely, St. Anne's, Curaçoa, and Paramaribo. She was permitted to remain at the first port eight days, and at the second eleven days. At both
places she was allowed to obtain coal and other supplies, and she was received and treated by the authorities in every respect as a national ship-of-war. Mr. Seward remonstrated, and in one of his despatches in February, 1862, he directed the United States Minister at the Hague to call attention to the subject of the intrusion of piratical American vessels seeking shelter in the ports of the Netherlands and their colonies ;' but the Dutch Government was never induced to withdraw the recognition of belligerent rights conceded to the South, or to treat Confederate ships-of-war otherwise than those of the United States.
Mr. Pike, the Minister of the United States at the Hague, insisted that the vessels of the Confederate States were ' piratical craft,' or, at best, he said, they could only be looked upon as 'privateers,' and therefore should be excluded from ports of the Netherlands. Baron van Zuylen, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated the views of his Government, as follows:* The vessel armed for war by private persons is called a " privateer.” The character of such vessel is settled precisely, and, like her English name (privateer) indicates sufficiently under this circumstance that she is a private armed vessel-name which Mr. Wheaton gives them (“ Elements of International Law,” ii., p. 19). Privateering is the maritime warfare which privateers are authorized to make for their own account, against merchant-vessels of the enemy by virtue of letters of marque, which are issued to them by the State. The Sumter is not a private vessel ; is not the property of unconnected individuals—of private ship-owners. She therefore cannot be a privateer ; she can only be a shipof-war, or ship of the State, armed for cruising. . It cannot be held, as you propose in your despatch of the