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rule on which the decision was founded has been changed.(a)

§ 632. They also carry this principle of comity so far as to adopt the local laws of real property as ascertained by the decisions of state courts, whether those decisions are grounded on the construction of a statute of the state, or form a part of the unwritten law which has become a fixed rule of property.(b) Although this branch of the rule does not, strictly speaking, fall within the general object and scope of this work, it is deemed advisable to allude to and illustrate its application, and the reasons upon which it is founded, in this connection. The case of Jackson v. Chew(c) will serve as an illustration of the application of the rule, and the general principles upon which it is grounded. The question involved in that case was, whether certain words used in a will of one Medcef Eden were words of limitation, or whether the devisee under the will took an estate in fee, or an estate in tail under the will. New York having abolished estates tail, the supreme court and the court for the correction of errors in that state had decided repeatedly that the clause in question in the will did not create an estate in tail, but was to take effect as an executory devise. It was urged on the argument in this cause, that the principle of adopting the construction of state courts only applied to the construction of statutes. But it was held that the rule had been extended to other cases, and that there could be no good reason assigned for not applying it as well to the rules of construction growing out of the common law as

The statutes of

(a) See also 1 Pet. R. 349, 368, 662, 664; 3 id.

64; Minor v. Bank of Alexandria, 2 id. 18, 85, 65, 270; 4 id. 1, 124, 398; 5 id. 264, 505; 6 id.

102, 124, 151, 283, 291, 369; 7 id. 1, 222, 404, 453, 469, 596.

(b) 12 Wheat. 153.

(c) Ibid.

the statute laws of the state, when applied to the title of lands. That such a course was indispensable and necessary in order to preserve uniformity, otherwise, the peculiar constitution of the judicial tribunals of the states and of the United States would be productive of the greatest mischief and confusion. That there was the same necessity and fitness in preserving a uniformity of decision in the one case as in the other.

633. So, too, in another case,(a) the question arose upon the interpretation of a clause in a will which had received a judicial construction by the supreme court of Pennsylvania. It was urged that this was not one of those cases where the decision of the state courts, upon questions of local law, established rules of property which the United States could not disturb. But the court held that the question was one of so much doubt, that they were disposed upon this point, to acquiesce in the decision of the supreme court of that state,(b) that the word "heirs" in the will was to be construed as words of limitation.(c)

§ 634. The rule of construing statutes of other countries according to the judicial decisions of these countries, has also been adopted and applied where English statutes, such as the statutes of fraud and limitation, have been adopted into our own legislation. The known and settled construction of statutes by English courts have been either considered as silently incorporated into our own acts, or have been received by our judicial tri

(a) Daly v. James, 8 Wheat. R. 495.

(b) Smith v. Folwell, 1 Bin. 546.

(c) See also Waring v. Jackson, 1 Pet. R. 571; Davis v. Mason, 1 Pet. 505; Le Grand v. Darnall, 2 Pet. 670; Inglies v. Trustees of S. Snug Harbor, 5 Pet. 127; Hind v. Vattier, 5 Pet. 398; McKeene v. De Lancey's Lessees, 5 Cranch, 22; Polk's Lessees v. Wendall, 9 Cranch, 87; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 197; Blight's Lessees v. Rochester, 7 Ibid. 535.

bunals with all the weight of authority.(a) In like manner the construction which British statutes had received in England, at the time of the separation of this country from the British empire, have been considered as accompanying the statutes themselves. But although our courts very much respect subsequent decisions by the English courts, yet such subsequent decisions are not regarded as decisive, nor are they admitted by our courts as conclusive. So, too, if the English courts vary their construction of a statute which is common to both countries, our courts, however much they may respect such decisions, do not hold themselves bound to fluctuate with them.(b)

§ 635. In the courts of chancery in those states where there are separate courts of law and equity, such courts usually adopt the construction that may have been put upon a statute by the courts of law. (c) The chancellor of this state(d) held, that where a construction is to be put upon a statute which has been recently passed, where the supreme court has given a judicial construction to it, that construction would be followed, if not clearly wrong, by the court of chancery, so that different rules of construction might not prevail in the courts of law and equity in relation to the same statutory provision. Blackstone has laid down the general rule also, that there is not a single rule of interpreting laws, whether equitably or strictly, that is not applied equally by the judges in the courts both of law and equity. That the construction must in both be the same, or if they differ, it is only as one court of law may happen to differ from another.

(a) Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Peters' R. 18.

(b) 5 Pet. R. 264.

(c) 1 Pet. C. C. R. 188; Lessees of Talbot v. Simpson.

(d) 5 Paige R. 80; 1 Pet. C. C. R. 188.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA.

§ 636. We have remarked, in a previous chapter, that a statute is the best expounder of itself. In the present chapter we shall proceed to a consideration of the rules which govern in construing a statute by a reference to other statutes relating to the same subject-matter, and the influence which one part of a statute ought to have in the construction of other parts of the same statute; that is, of clauses upon other clauses in the same act, or, in other words, the doctrine of statutes in pari materia. Statutes which are in pari materia, are those which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. The word par must not, however, be confounded with the word similis. It is used in opposition to it, as in the expression, magis pares sunt quam similes, intimating not likeness merely, but identity. Thus the English laws concerning paupers and their bankrupt acts, are construed together as if they were one statute, and as forming a united system-otherwise, the system might, and probably would be unharmonious and inconsistent. Such laws are in pari materia.(a)

§ 637. The whole system of legislation upon the subje cmatter may be taken into consideration, in order to aid in the construction of a statute relating to the same

(a) United Society v. Eagle Bank, 7 Conn. R. 469.

subject-matter; hence other statutes in pari materia, whether they be repealed or unrepealed, may be consiered. Thus, in order to ascertain the true construction of the statute of 1784, c. 24, (a) relative to certain children not named in a will, who, by the act, were to have a portion of the estate of the parent assigned, as though the parent had died intestate, resort was had to the act of 12 Wm. 3, c. 7, of which provincial act the former act was a revision; and the court held, that to discover the true meaning of the statute, it was the duty of the court to consider other statutes in pari materia, whether they are repealed or unrepealed.

§ 638. So, too, where one statute was undoubtedly under the consideration of the legislature when passing another, the former ought, though long since expired, to be taken into consideration in construing the latter statute, and that for the reason that it is a rule in the construction of statutes, that all which relate to the same subject, notwithstanding some of them may have expired, or are not referred to, must be taken to be one system, and construed consistently, and the practice has always been so.(b)

§ 639. That several acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to be taken together, and comprised in the construction of them, because they are considered as having one object in view, and as acting upon one system, has been declared in several cases. (c) Chancellor Kent says, the object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention; and it is to be inferred,

(a) Church v. Crocker, 3 Mass. 21.

(b) Bac. Ab. Stat. II. 244; see also Thayer v. Dudley, 3 Mass. R. 296; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. R. 248, 254; Menden v. Worceser, 10 Pick. 235; Sloop Elizabeth, Paine C. C. R. 11.

(c) Rex v. Loxdall, and The Earl of Ailesbury v. Pathison, 1 Burrows, 447; Doug. R. 27.

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