Mr. Nix. But what I can't understand, Mr. Brower, is by what authority again other than what you have mentioned we have relinquished by what authority was the bombing ordered in Cambodia? I still don't understand it. There is nothing in article 20 in my view that gives any authority to bomb Cambodia, and your discussions of it had not changed anything, so far as I am concerned.

Mr. BROWER. The authority of course is fundamentally founded in the Constitution, as I have said. The authority of the President as so carried out does not conflict with

Mr. Nix. But you have not said where in the Constitution.

Mr. BROWER. I believe

Mr. Nix. Article 2 you mentioned.

Mr. BROWER. It is the powers of the President under article 2 as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive in the exercise of our foreign relations.

Mr. Nix. Do you have any authority, any decisions of the courts, the Supreme Court of this country, in interpreting your reference to mean what you attribute to it?

Mr. BROWER. Well, as I indicated previously, I think decisions and particularly decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to a certain extent offer little solace to either side in this discussion because these are questions which, when they arise in specific terms, are ordinarily treated as political questions.

Now, when you speak, Mr. Chairman, of authority, I anticipate that you are also asking whether or not there is specific congressional authorization, and perhaps I should address myself to this briefly.

The war powers as they are described of the U.S. Government are shared powers under the Constitution, they are shared by the executive branch and the Congress in ways which are not always very clearly delineated. They have been traced to some extent by historical experience.

Now the President in any important decision that he makes in the area of military activities and foreign affairs is and must be aware of the fact that Congress, too, has a role to play. Now the fact is that there is in force and has been for 2 years or more fairly restrictive legislation governing the activities that the U.S. Armed Forces may undertake with respect to Cambodia. Those restrictions have been closely adhered to, they have been fully honored, and the administration has been acting entirely within the limits of what has been proscribed by the Congress.

Now, when you say "authority," I recall that one reason there are lawyers and law schools, and courts is because on many questions, and particularly on important constitutional questions, it is not possible for anyone to flip open a book and say: "Here is the answer. Here is the case on all fours. There is no further question." Of course there is room for scholarly, intellectual, and political difference on these issues, but I think that the opinion expressed by the administration, and carefully reported, and the statement submitted by Secretary Rogers' testimony last week across the way, spells out a case showing that the President does possess the authority to conduct these activities in Cambodia, and I think that is at least tangentially confirmed by the

scholarly study that Congress itself has done and by statements that have been made in a judicial environment.

Mr. Nix. I would assume, Mr. Brower, that the State Department studied this matter, because it took a period of time from the end of January 1973, until April 30, 1973, for them to issue a statement covering this point, so they must have gone to graduate school on it. Mr. BROWER. I would say we did a careful job, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nix. I am sure you did.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Brower, apparently the State Department is basing its judgment first on the Constitution and the right of the President to conduct the bombing, but the main thing, as I understand it, is the violation that has occurred under article 20 of the Paris agreement where the North Vietnamese have brought in large numbers of troops. Is that correct?

Mr. BROWER. If there were an effective cease-fire in Cambodia at the present time, the air strikes would not be going on.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I would like to ask Mr. Hummel, getting away from the constitutional authority, because I think that this is going to be a long, drawn out discussion, I wonder if you could give us some information on the situation as you see it with the different groups participating in Cambodia, and if the Lon Nol Government is defeated what the effect will be on the entire Indochina area.

Mr. HUMMEL. As the chairman's opening statement indicated, the Khmer insurgent groups are divided into at least three, and possibly more, factions. There is little unity among them. Some of the Khmer insurgent groups claim loyalty to Prince Sihanouk. A sizable group of Khmer insurgents was originally a group that were insurgents against Sihanouk's Government, and do not like him at all, and presumably would not wish to have him back.

A third much more loose category are people who may have started life as bandits and/or people in the political arena without clear affiliation.

The power behind all this has from the beginning been North Vietnamese. In 1970 Sihanouk was deposed by a well-supported and thoroughly popular action, and the Government was changed to a republican form under Lon Nol. At that point there were five North Vietnamese divisions ringing Phnom Penh. It was a North Vietnamese effort. Since that time the North Vietnamese have used a facade of attempting to make it appear that this is a civil war and have progressively introduced Khmer units trained in various places, but the North Vietnamese are still engaged to the extent of 8,000 North Vietnamese combat troops in combat with the government forces. The artillery and rocket units have been mentioned, all of the logistics come through a North Vietnamese pipeline, and there are cadres of North Vietnamese with virtually all of the Khmer insurgent units.

So, under these circumstances the Lon Nol Government has had a very difficult time. Its communications and its economic life have been badly disrupted. The situation is not nearly as bad, however, as I think one would assume from reading the somewhat sensational press reports. For instance, it is very seldom mentioned-I have not seen it

mentioned for a long time in the press-that the main road that connects the major seaport of Kompong Som with Phnom Penh is open and has been open for a number of weeks, and convoys are going back and forth on that road.

Now as to the consequences for the Government of Cambodia, and the consequences for the area of an American failure to support the government of the Khmer Republic, I would like to make a number of points. For instance, in the first place an American failure to support the legitimate government of Cambodia would seriously endanger the North Vietnamese cease-fire; it would directly affect the viability of the rather fragile arrangements that are now being worked out in connection with the Vietnam cease-fire agreement. This would be a serious blow to peace in the world, not merely our area.

American failure to continue to support would undoubtedly encourage the North Vietnamese to further violate article 20, and would encourage the North Vietnamese to continue and probably step up their activities to topple the government of the Khmer Republic, and the Communist side might very well succeed in this.

I would also point out that American failure to support would materially endanger the success of the negotiations that will take place later this month between American officials and North Vietnamese officials the negotiations that Ambassador William Sullivan went to Paris to arrange for last week. This is an extremely crucial time in the observance of the cease-fire arrangement, and in the construction of viable arrangements that can result finally in peace for this very troubled area.

I would suggest that precipitate American action by the legislative branch that might preclude the possibility of American continued support for Lon Nol would not in any way assist those negotiations and, in fact, would seriously endanger them.

Finally, I would like to point out that American failure to support the legitimate government in Cambodia could have seriously destabilizing effects on other countries in the area, in the immediate area, the neighboring countries of Indochina and other countries in Southeast Asia. Also, I think, it could have some worldwide impacts if it is felt that the United States does not have the will to follow through to take the steps that seem to be necessary in order to achieve a final peace in Indochina. There could be an undermining of confidence in American purpose, and an undermining of confidence that countries now have in us in our vision, in our purpose, in our objectives and this could I think have long-term repercussions in that their confidence would no longer be so strong.

I don't know if I have answered the thrust of your question, sir. Mr. BROOMFIELD. Pretty well. How about the POW question, the missing in action, would that also have an adverse effect on probability of receiving an accounting of those missing in action too?

Mr. HUMMEL. And any deterioration in the implementation of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement would, of course, as you suggest, have serious repercussions in that the other side would no longer have the inducement, would no longer perhaps feel the obligation, to follow through what is written in the agreement about tracing people who are missing in action, about the search for air crash sites, for graves,.

and about the interviewing of local populations that many Americans want to see take place in the tracing of the missing in action.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Is it not true that Dr. Kissinger is presently working with Russian officials to try to bring out a negotiated settlement in Cambodia?

Mr. HUMMEL. I don't think I wish to state precisely what Dr. Kissinger has discussed-I believe he has returned now to Washingtonhas been discussing in the Soviet Union, but I am certain that the topics we are addressing here were also brought up in his conversations.

Mr. RIEGLE. Would the gentleman from Michigan yield for a point of information?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Yes.

Mr. RIEGLE. Several time you used the phrase "legitimate government of Cambodia." What is the legal basis for ascribing legitimacy to that particular government?

Mr. HUMMEL. First of all, there is not any other government in existence in the country. Sihanouk claims to have a government, but it is a government in exile, and I don't see how anyone would consider it legitimate.

Mr. RIEGLE. No elections or anything of that kind?

Mr. HUMMEL. Elections have been held in Cambodia after the deposition of Sihanouk, and under the republican framework of the government of the Khmer Republic, and this we consider and the majority of nations consider to be the legitimate successor government of the previous one.

I think, if I am not mistaken, the ratio of countries that recognize the government in Phnom Penh as opposed to those that recognize Sihanouk in exile in China is about 80-odd for the former government in Phnom Penh as opposed to 30-odd who say they recognize Sihanouk. Mr. RIEGLE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Nix. Mr. Wolff.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Hummel, if I understood you earlier in your remarks you said under no circumstances would we introduce ground combat troops into Cambodia. Did I hear correctly?

Mr. HUMMEL. Pardon?

Mr. WOLFF. If I heard your testimony earlier correctly you said that we would not introduce ground combat troops into Cambodia. Mr. HUMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. WOLFF. Now just a moment ago you went through a listing of what would happen if America failed to support the legitimate government of Cambodia, and among other things you said it would jeopardize world peace, that it would have a destabilizing effect on other nations, that it would have a worldwide impact, that it would undermine confidence in America. If all of those things happen, and if the American national interest is so greatly involved in Cambodia as you have just spelled out, why would we not use ground troops?

Mr. HUMMEL. For one thing there is an explicit congressional prohibition against the use of ground forces there.

Mr. WOLFF. Are you opposed to that?

Mr. HUMMEL. No, sir, I am not. We have no intention of asking for a lifting of that prohibition, and we are living within all of the congres

sional restrictions that have been placed on American activities in Cambodia, and we are not requesting that any of these restrictions be.

removed.

Mr. WOLFF. How can you support that congressional prohibition and yet at the same time say American failure to support the legitimate government of Cambodia would have all of these dire consequences, including jeopardizing world peace?

Mr. HUMMEL. Because what we are doing, sir, is appealing to this body not to place the restrictions upon American activity that might have these deleterious results. We are not addressing at this moment beyond what I have said, the contingency that I hope will not arise that this body and the other body might take action that effectively prohibits our support of Cambodia.

Mr. WOLFF. May I suggest, Mr. Hummel, that your rhetoric in defense of the bombing of Cambodia sounds to me as if we were concerned about an invasion of Florida or something of that drastic

nature.

Now Secretary Rogers didn't go that far at all, he simply said in his statement that the U.S. air strikes in Cambodia do not first of all represent a commitment of any kind of the United States to defend Cambodia but merely a meaningful interim action to bring about compliance with the Vietnam agreement.

I am concerned that with the rhetoric you have put forth to this committee that you are going to be trapped by your own rhetoric. Now suppose it happens that the bombing does not bring about a compliance with the agreement, and there is no indication that it has so far. What happens then?

Mr. HUMMEL. Secretary Rogers said the other day, and I have his full statement yesterday before the Senate Appropriations Committee-he said, and I quote in part, and this is addressing the subject of the destabilizing effect:

New relationships are developing in Asia which could provide the basis for long-term stability. These relationships are still fragile and the transition to stability is a delicate process. A sudden reduction in the American commitment to this process could sacrifice the progress already achieved. Lack of implementation of the Paris Agreement would certainly be interpreted as just such an act. This is the context solely of Cambodia, his full statement was addressing Cambodia.

I would not wish it to appear that I am saying, as you seem to imply, Mr. Wolff, that the dire consequences for world peace and stability might include the eruption of a third world war as a result of American failure to act. I did not intend to make any such drastic predictions, but I think I have a legitimate point.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Hummel went down a long list of consequences that would flow if America failed to support the Government of Cambodia, and you tied it into all of the things that I recited, and I think more as well. It just seems to me that this ties the national interest of the United States to the Lon Nol government in effect, which I personally find quite incorrect. Do you tie the national interests of the United States to the Lon Nol government?

Mr. HUMMEL. No, sir. We have said repeatedly, and a number of Government officials have said that we are not wedded to any particular Cambodian government. We want to see a cease-fire, and we want