ment: that the transaction between Mr. Kellogg and Mr. Price had taken place on the 18th day of July, 1879 (I think it was the 18th; it was the 17th, 18th, or 19th), and at the time of our discussion we were in the month of December, 1882. I replied that it was true that the statute of limitations barred the transaction of the 18th of July, 1879, which transaction was, according to the affidavit I had before me, a delivery to Mr. Kellogg by Mr. Price of five drafts upon the Post-Office Department of $3,000 each, and a promissory note of $5,000. These five drafts were payable quarter by quarter as the quarter's pay should accrue due on the routes from Corpus Christi to San Antonio, and ran through the years 1880 and 1881-I do not remember exactly how far, but very far down. And these drafts and that promissory note, according to the affidavits, had been delivered to Mr. Kellogg in consideration of his getting increase and expedition upon certain routes. The order for the increase and the expedition upon these routes we regarded as fraudulent. They had been already, by the grand jury, found to be fraudulent when an indictment had been found against Brady and Price for conspiracy to defraud the Government through the instrumentality of those orders of increase. I replied to Mr. Bliss, that although that first transaction was barred by the statute of limitations, yet, the payments upon the orders came within the prohibitions of the law, and those payments were not barred. The discussion became very excited, and probably more emphatic than it would have been in our cooler moments. The Attorney-General heard us through, and called upon Mr. Ker for his opinion, and Mr. Ker's opinion coincided with mine. The Attorney-General then said, at the suggestion of somebody or of his own motion, I do not remember which, that Mr. Woodward should take the affidavit that I had and put himself in communication with Mr. Price and get a fuller affidavit. I ought to say, in that connection, that Mr. Bliss objected to the affidavit that I had, because it was not sufficiently full and complete, and because he believed Mr. Price could testify to a great deal more; he believed Price guilty, and felt that he ought to be prosecuted under the indictment pending against him. In obedience to that order of the Attorney-General, Mr. Woodward put himself in communication with Mr. Price, and subsequently produced the affidavit which the chairman has shown me here, and which bears date the 29th of December, 1882. The conference with the Attorney-General closed with the understanding that Mr. Woodward should put himself in communication with Mr. Price, get from him a statement of all that he knew, put it in the shape of an affidavit and submit it to the Attorney-General, and then if the AttorneyGeneral thought it was sufficient, and that, under the circumstances, it was proper that Mr. Price should be subpoenaed as a Government witness, he would say so. We were done with the question. It had gone to our superior. On the 29th of December, 1882, this affidavit was made, and Mr. Woodward informed me at the time that he had given it to the Attorney-General; and a few days later, I don't know how many, probably two or three, I received a communication from Mr. Woodward, as did the other counsel, informing us that the AttorneyGeneral had concluded to accept Mr. Price as a witness. Then, for the first time, Mr. Price became available as a witness for the Government. In this connection I may correct an error of my brother Ker. He has stated in his testimony that when the indictment was found against Mr. Kellogg, Colonel Bliss left the case in anger. The indictment against Mr. Kellogg was not found until some time in April, although the grand jury acted upon the subject in February.

Mr. KER. What do you call finding the indictment?

The WITNESS. Presenting it to the court.

Mr. KER. That is another thing. Presenting it is one thing, and finding it is another. They find the indictment when they find it.

The WITNESS. Well, I should like you to find it until it is presented. Mr. KER. Well, at all events, that was what I meant.

The WITNESS. I am not speaking of your intention-I am speaking of the use of technical language. Mr. Ker is in error with regard to that, and I think he will admit that he is.

Mr. KER. What is that that you want me to admit ?

The WITNESS. Mr. Bliss was in New York, if I am not mistaken, at the time the Attorney-General acted upon the affidavit presented by Mr. Woodward. Am I right?

Mr. BLISS. Yes; it was acted upon on Monday, and I got back Monday night.

The WITNESS. He had gone to New York on Friday, I presume, as usual, and got back on Monday night. When he returned he found that the Attorney-General had acted upon the affidavit of Mr. Price presented by Mr. Woodward, and he was met with a communication from Mr. Woodward stating that Mr. Price had been accepted as a witness. I think that communication came to us while we were at our lunch.

Mr. BLISS. I received mine at my house after I got back.

The WITNESS. I don't know how that was, but the conversation that took place between us upon the subject was on the day of Mr. Bliss's return or the day after, when we were at our lunch at recess.

By Mr. FYAN:

Q. Whom do you mean by "us"?-A. I refer to the consultation between counsel.

Mr. BLISS. I think you are wrong, Mr. Merrick.

The WITNESS. Colonel Bliss then said that if that was the case, if Price was to be accepted, he would retire from the star-route cases. I told him I thought that was very unwise and injudicious, and that I regarded it as a breach of duty. What else was said about it I do not remember, except this: Said he, "I will continue through the rest of the session of to-day, but I will not be in court after to-day." He did remain during that day, and that night Mr. Ker and I prepared to go on with the testimony the following day, and for the exigency of Mr. Bliss's absence; and we went into court next day and Mr. Bliss remained out.

Mr. BLISS. Have you looked at the record? I was in court next day. The WITNESS. I do not think I can be mistaken about that.

Mr. BLISS. Look at the record.

The WITNESS. I will look at the record.

By the CHAIRMAN:

Q. What case was being tried at that time?-A. This was the second trial of the Dorsey-Brady case.

Mr. BLISS (referring to the record). The record shows that on Tuesday, the 2d of January, I was in court; on Wednesday, I think, I was out of court; on Thursday the record shows that Mr. Bliss opened the proceedings of the court.

The WITNESS. That is all right, then. The one day that Mr. Bliss remained out of court appears by the record to have been January 3, and on Thursday, January 4, he was in court again.

Mr. BLISS. And opened the proceedings.

The WITNESS. On January 3 (my memory being refreshed by that record) I stopped at the Post-Office Department to see Mr. Bliss, and found him preparing his papers for the purpose of leaving the case. I closed the doors in order to have a private conversation with him, and I there urged upon him many considerations of public interest, as well as other considerations personal to himself, that I thought ought to induce him to remain where he was and not pursue the rash course, as I regarded it, that he contemplated. He said he felt that he had been badly treated by the Attorney-General and by the counsel, because of this matter having been acted upon in his absence. He made no complaint whatever in reference to the indictment of Mr. Kellogg. He did not give that as a part of his grievance at all, but said that he had been treated with a want of consideration and courtesy by the AttorneyGeneral and the other counsel, in the fact that this matter had been acted upon whilst he was absent from the city. I distinctly remember my reply, which was in substance this: "At the meeting of counsel with the Attorney-General, when we discussed the subject, it was agreed that this matter should be given in charge to Mr. Woodward, who was directed to put himself into communication with Mr. Price, prepare an affidavit embodying all that Price knew, and submit it to the AttorneyGeneral, who was then to take action upon it by himself, without the intervention of any of the counsel; and I have not since that day seen the Attorney-General, nor spoken to him upon the subject; nor would I have felt privileged to do so had I desired. Therefore, you cannot feel that you were treated with any discourtesy whatever by either the counsel or the Attorney-General. Now, return to the case and let us work on harmoniously." I regarded at that time (although I want to avoid the expression of opinions and do not intend to express any) Mr. Bliss's. presence in the case as very important. It was understood by the publie that he was the special representative of the administration.

Then, too, he is one of the best of workers and the most efficient man in the management of voluminous and tangled papers that I have ever met with in my life, and he was doing his work in the case with great ability.

Mr. STEWART. You converted him?

The WITNESS. He returned to the court the next morning.

Mr. BLISS. Mr. Merrick, should you not say at this point, in justice to me, that I said that my understanding was different from yours as to the conclusion reached at the conference with the Attorney-Generalthat I supposed it was understood that after Mr. Woodward should have got a new statement from Price, I should have an opportunity to examine it in order to see whether it met the objections that I had made to the affidavit you had, and that you said that was not your understanding.

The WITNESS. I think Mr. Bliss's statement is correct, and should supplement what I have said on this point.

By the CHAIRMAN:

Q. At the interview between the Attorney-General and the counsel, to which you have referred, did the Attorney-General give you his conditional decision in reference to this matter, and was it understood that if the affidavit met the views suggested, then the Attorney-General was to decide the matter?-A. The Attorney General so indicated, to the best of my recollection. The interview, as I have said, was a little heated, and the Attorney-General said to us once or twice, "Gentle

men, you must be calm," and my impression is that he said to us at that time (if I am wrong I trust that either Mr. Ker or Mr. Bliss will correct me, as they are both present) that whoever was guilty in these transactions must be punished, and he agreed with my view, that a public functionary who had been guilty, not only of criminal conduct, but also of a breach of trust, more richly deserves punishment than a mere private individual.

Mr. BLISS. He did say that; to which I replied that he must remember that by accepting Mr. Price he was relieving Brady, who was also a public official. I think, Mr. Merrick, you are right in thinking that the Attorney General indicated that his tendency was to accept Mr. Price as a witness. I do not think he said so, but I think he indicated that tendency.

The WITNESS. I think it is probable that I replied to Mr. Bliss's statement (if such a statement was then made-I do not now recall it) that he was wrong in saying that the acceptance of Mr. Price relieved Mr. Brady, for the reason that, in my judgment, it only involved Mr. Brady the more deeply, and, in fact, Mr. Brady was subsequently indicted on Mr. Price's testimony. Was there one or were there two indictments found against Brady on Price's testimony, Mr. Ker?

Mr. KER. Only one.

By the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Was the acceptance of this affidavit of Mr. Price's in any way conditional upon the fact that it would or would not affect Mr Kellogg?-A. I do not understand the question.

Q. Was that question discussed before the Attorney-General?-A. Whether it would affect Mr. Kellogg or not?

Q. No; whether the Price affidavit should be rejected or received for the reason that it would or would not involve Kellogg. Did the Attorney-General express any opinion as to that?-A. Well, I do not know whether he expressed any opinion upon that subject at that time or not, but the subject of Mr. Kellogg being implicated in this criminality and his indictment has been frequently talked of by the Attorney-General and he has uniformly said that no matter who or what he was, if he was guilty he should be prosecuted.

By Mr. FYAN:

Q. What was the object of accepting Mr. Price as a witness?-A. The object of accepting Mr. Price as a witness was to have an indictment against Mr. Kellogg. That was the only subject discussed, except the incidental consequences of accepting Price's statement; Mr. Bliss said he thought that its acceptance, while it involved Mr. Kellogg, would relieve Mr. Brady. I thought differently; I thought it would involve Mr. Kellogg, and also involve Mr. Brady more deeply.

By the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Was anything said with regard to the impropriety of indicting a Senator, owing to its effect upon the party majority in the Senate at that time?-A. I do not think that anything whatever was said upon that subject, Mr. Chairman, at that time. Something has been said upon that subject at other times by myself. Other persons may also have spoken of it, but what I have said myself I can testify to. When I got that affidavit and Mr. Price was accepted as a witness, for reasons that I deemed sufficient I directed Mr. Ker to go before the grand jury. Mr. Bliss had theretofore been before the grand jury as the representative of the Government. In this case I directed Mr. Ker to go, and directed

him to qualify by getting a commission, which would justify him in getting an appointment from the district attorney.

Mr. BLISS. Which he did not do.

The WITNESS. That was my direction; and I said to Mr. Ker that I wanted it understood distinctly that I had no personal or political feeling about this matter, and that I deemed it best, as there was no possibility of any statutory bar running between the middle of January (the time when I ordered him to go before the grand jury, I think) and the 4th of March, the end of Mr. Kellogg's term as a Senator, it would be better (whilst giving the evidence at once to the grand jury, so as to let them determine upon what they would do in the matter) not to bring down the presentment until after the 4th of March. Am I right, Mr. Ker?

Mr. KER. That is correct.

The WITNESS. I had previously said, in July, I think, or in August, as I had been accused very bitterly and virulently by Mr. Kellogg and others of pursuing him out of political and personal ill-will, and of having a design as a Democrat to withdraw him as a Republican from the Senate at a time when the majority was so close that the withdrawal would embarrass his party and perhaps change the political complexion of the body, that although I intended that Kellogg should be indicted before the statute could operate as a bar, yet I did not propose that he should be tried until after he should have ceased to be a Senator. And I will say to the committee that, whilst I thought he ought to be indicted, I did not think, as the time was so short, and in view of all that had been said upon the subject and the influences that had been brought to bear upon the jury, that it was expedient to have a trial of the case until after the 4th of March, when he would retire from the Senate.

Mr. BLISS. We were engaged in the other trial, and could you have tried Kellogg?

The WITNESS. We were in the trial and could not have done it; but, independent of that, even could we have tried the case at that time, Í should have said no, because the fact of his position as a Senator would have had some influence with the jury and of course others would have been interested in not having him convicted. Now, I want to say one other thing in this connection. I have said to the committee, in answer to their inquiries, that I had nothing whatever to do with the finding of these indictments by the grand jury, and that I had nothing to do with the preparation of the evidence in cases to go before the grand jury, but I stated at the same time that there was one exception which would be explained later. That exception is the Kellogg case. It is the only case in which I had anything to do with the testimony that was to be laid before the grand jury or with directing an indictment, and I had to do with that case for the reason that, in my conversation with Mr. Walsh, as I stated yesterday, the fact of Kellogg's criminality came directly before me, was immediately presented to me, and I felt that I could not, without being guilty of a serious official delinquency, fail to notice it and to have it properly passed upon by a judicial tribunal. That was the only case in which an indictment, or in which no indictment, was found, in which the guilt of an individual was brought distinctly before me, except in the case that I tried.

By the CHAIRMAN:

Q. State why it was that you caused Mr. Ker to appear before the grand jury in the Kellogg case ?-A. Mr. Walsh was to be a witness before the grand jury. Mr. Walsh and Mr. Bliss were not friends; or