At this conversation I agreed to be retained, and was informed you were also to be retained. Subsequently after I met you, I informed you of this conversation, and you had a conversation yourself with Mr. MacVeagh, as the result of which you wrote him a letter, of which you furnished me a copy, and which is as follows: "706 WALNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA, October 28, 1881. "MY DEAR SIR: After we parted last night Mr. Bliss advised with me as to our fees in the star-ronte cases, as you said we should do. "We have arrived at the following result, and agreed that I should promptly communicate it to you, so that we may have your immediate action while you have the anthority to act. "First. We now request you to pay us each twenty-five hundred dollars for the services thus far given. "Second. That your successor may be informed of the understanding between us, and be prepared to fulfill your engagement with us. I repeat here what was expressed last night as to the rate of compensation to be allowed us, while we are in of these cases; and that was, we are to be paid each a hundred dollars a day while occupied in the cases, either out of court in the preparation of them or in conrt in the trial and argument of them, together with our expenses. I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, "Hon. WAYNE MAC VEAGH, "Attorney-General of the United States, &c., Philadelphia." Mr. MacVeagh emphasized his substantial concurrence with these views by sanctioning the payment to me of an itemized bill of $6,000 for fifty-two days' services, in Washington and elsewhere away from New York, and of intermittent services in New York-a bill, by the way, which you informed me he stated he regarded as very moderate. As to facts "relating to the reasonableness of compensation, it is probably not proper for me to refer to anything further except the matter to which I made general reference in my conversation with Mr. MacVeagh, and which I have since brought to your attention more or less formally. The district attorney of the United States at New York received by law a salary of $6,000 a year, and the Government pays his assistants and clerks salaries amounting to some $25,000 to $30,000 a year, besides furnishing office, stationery, &c. The district attorney also receives 2 per cent. in all collections in revenue cases. The latter item prior to 1875 amounted to a large sum annually. Whenever the district attorney appears for any officer of the Government sued individually, he is entitled under the law to be paid such further sums as are certified by the district or circuit judge of the United States to be "just and reasonable." The district attorney at New York is most frequently called upon to appear for the collector of the port, against whom thousands of suits are brought yearly. But he also appears for the postal officers, for the officers of internal-revenue, and for officers of the Army and Navy. In all these cases he makes up accounts which are certified by the circuit or district judge who tried the case as just and reasonable." I was district attorney at New York from 1873 to 1877, and presented many such accounts. From an abstract in my possession of such bills, the originals of which are on file in the Treasury and other Departments, I call your attention to a few as showing what rate of compensation the judges of the United States have deliberately and repeatedly certified as reasonable and proper for one of the counsel employed in the star-route cases. These rules, I may say, did not differ in my case from those certified in behalf of my predecessors and successor. Thus in the summer of 1873 Hon. D. A. Smalley, the district judge of Vermont, who during his incumbency of the office tried a large number of cases in New York, certified as "just and reasonable" an account containing the following charges, all in cases against the collector of the port tried before him: For services in the case of Societe, &c., vs. Bronson, three days' trial, $500; in Chapon rs. Smythe, seven days' trial, $1,500; in Hutton vs. Schnell, ten days' trial, $1,500; in Leng rs. Grinnell, three days' trial, $300; in Watson vs. Barney, two days' trial, $250; in Ogden rs. Draper, one day's trial, $300. These services were all within about thirty days. In 1875 the present circuit judge, Wallace, certified "as just and reasonable" an account in Fowler vs. Schell (two days), $200; Same vs. Arthur (two days), $500; Lackey vs. Arthur (four days), $500; Reeknagel vs. Murphy (four days), $500; Davies vs. Arthur (one day), $250. In 1876 the same judge certified in Furman vs. Arthur (three days), $400; Unkart rs. Arthur (four days), $400; Rhiems vs. Arthur (two days), $250. These are the only items in which the number of days are specified in a bill amounting to $2,450. In a bill immediately following are items, respectively, of $500 for two days, $300 for three days, $300 for two days, $200 for one day, and late in the same H. Mis. 38, pt. 2-17* year the same judge certifies $100 for one day, $350 for two days, $250 for one day $250 for two days, $200 for one day. Judge Shipman, of the Connecticut district, certified in the same year $500 for each of two days, $200 for one day, $500 for three days, $1,000 for two days, $200 for one day, $300 for two days, $100 for one day, $350 for three days, $700 for three day, $200 for one day, $100 for one day. Judge Shipman certified other similar bills at the same rates. Judge Blatchford, now of the Supreme Court, certified in the same year, in different cases, items of $350, $350, $250, $500, and $300, but I have no record of the number of days covered. The amounts certified varied in the different cases according to the intricacy of the cases, and to some extent the amount involved. The times I have given was the length of the trial, and the preparation was of course considered in arriving at the allowances, though that was known to be made chiefly by the salaried clerks and assistants. You will perceive that though the rates vary they are in no case less than $100 a day, and these allowances were certified as "just and reasonable" to an officer drawing a salary of $6,000 a year. I trust what I have said will enable you to fully answer the resolution of the Senate as far as I am concerned. If, however, you desire any further information, I shall be in Washington early in the coming week and will furnish it. Your obedient servant, Hon. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER, Attorney-General. GEORGE BLISS. The letter to Mr. James, referred to in this letter to the AttorneyGeneral, was written at a time when Mr. James, as I recollect, was sued for his action as postmaster in using the Yale lock, and, as was claimed, violating a patent. He wrote me about it, and I wrote him a personal letter, and that letter was shown to Mr. MacVeagh, and, as I am informed, that was Mr. MacVeagh's first knowledge of me. The fact is that after I was district attorney I was employed by the Government in some important cases, and carried them through and made what was regarded as a rather brilliant success; but the Government haggled over my bill and paid me inadequately, and I quit, and declined after that any Government retainers, simply for the reason that I did not want to do any more Government business on such terms. In connection with what I say in this letter to the Attorney-General about the rate of compensation being talked over at Long Branch, it is right for me to say that since the letter was written, on some consideration and some examination of papers, I am satisfied that I perhaps ascribed more of the conversation about compensation to that interview, and less to subsequent interviews, than I ought to have done; the subject did, in fact, come up at several interviews. I say there that it was my impression at the time that the statute did not give the Attorney-General authority to agree absolutely upon the compensation beforehand; but my impression now, from an examination of the statute, is that it not only gives him that right, but makes it his duty to do so. As to what I say in this letter of the interview at which it was arranged that Mr. Brewster and I were to be retained, at which time I was under the impression that the Attorney-General could not make an absolute agreement, I find that I had a subsequent interview with Mr. MacVeagh about the 10th or 12th of October, about a month after the interview at Long Branch, in which also the question of compensation was a matter of discussion. I cannot say definitely now what occurred at the one interview and what at the other; but I do say that in conversation between us it was arranged that the terms which I have named were the terms on which I was to be employed and paid. Mr. Brewster had not been at Long Branch, so the question as to compensation thus became a matter of more or less conversation between him and me and we considered and agreed that should be arranged definitely, particularly as it appeared likely that Mr. MacVeagh was to go out of office, though Mr. Brewster had not at that time the remotest idea of coming in as Attorney-General. We wanted to have the matter settled, and to have it made in some way a matter of record, so that there should not be any subsequent trouble about it. We had a meeting at Mr. Brewster's house in Philadelphia, and the question of compensation had been brought up, and Mr. MacVeagh had said to us, "You and Brewster talk the matter over;" and the letter of Mr. Brewster to Attorney-General MacVeagh, dated October 28, 1881, was written after we had talked the matter over. The committee will perceive that Mr. Brewster in his letter makes no difference between the rate of compensation for services, whether they are performed at home or away from home, but in my conversation with Mr. MacVeagh there was a very marked line drawn between those two cases. I notice that in this connection Mr. MacVeagh refers to a letter to Acting Attorney General Phillips, which he says we must have seen, and which seems to show that there was no agreement as to our fees. I never saw or heard or dreamed of that letter, until I read it in the copy of the printed testimony which you were kind enough to give me after I was examined here the first day. I have always supposed that it was a recognized thing that there was a contract agreed upon and made with the Attorney-General of the United States at the rate I have stated. Q. You mean with Attorney-General MacVeagh?-A. Yes, sir; and I do not hesitate to say that if I were dealing with a private client, where it would be possible to establish the claim in court, I am perfectly confident that it could be established. Mr. MacVeagh would not naturally remember the whole of this matter in so great detail as I would; but I had felt so badly treated by Mr. Devens, the former AttorneyGeneral, in this matter of compensation, and had experienced the way the Government generally acts in such cases, that I was determined that I would not have anything to do with this employment unless I had an agreement as to the rate at which I was to be paid, and I have always considered that I had such an agreement, and I think so now. Q. Did you at that time change your mind and consider that the Attorney-General had a right to make a contract?-A. I had by that time changed my mind. Q. You remarked a while ago that at Long Branch you and the Attorney-General thought he had no right to make a contract ?—A. Well, it was assumed that he had no such right. Q. Then at this interview at Philadelphia you had changed your mind?-A. As I have already said, I went and looked at the statute, and the statute seemed to me not only to give him the right very clearly, but to make it his duty to make an agreement. It rather seemed to me to impose that obligation upon him. Q. Did Attorney-General MacVeagh agree to that view?-A. I did not discuss that question with him at all. Here is what the statute says: The Attorney-General shall ". Q. I am not speaking about the law now, I am speaking about the facts.-A. Well, I am going to call attention to the statute. It provides that, "The Attorney-General shall, whenever in his opinion the public interest requires it, employ and retain in the name of the United States such attorneys and counselors-at-law as he may think necessary to assist the district attorneys in the discharge of their duties, and shall stipulate with such assistant attorneys and counsel the amount of compensation." Now it looks to me as if that law makes it the duty of the Attorney- Q. Now, I want to get you back to what I was asking about.-A. All Q. This letter that you have just read is dated on the 28th of October, is it not?-A. I think it is. Q. You had then changed your mind in relation to the right of the Attorney-General to make a contract or agreement?—A. I had then examined the law and made up my mind that the Attorney-General had a right to make an agreement. Q. Had Attorney-General MacVeagh changed his mind on that subject?-A. I have said that I had no conversation with him on the subject. I do not remember that at either interview the question of his power in that matter came up, but the conversation at Long Branch proceeded, on my part, on the theory that he had not the power to make an absolute binding contract, and I supposed he had the same view. Q. I understand that. Now, you say that you regarded the agree ment with you as an absolute contract after you and Mr. Brewster had communicated with Attorney-General Mac Veagh ?-A. I so regarded it. Q. Did you see Mr. MacVeagh's letter to Acting Attorney-General Phillips, of October 31, three days later than the date of the letter which you have just read?-A. No, sir. Q. You have read Mr. MacVeagh's evidence?-A. I have read that letter here; I never saw it before. Q. It appears that he did not concur with you as to his power to make a contract?-A. I presume not; I never saw that letter before. Q. It appears, then, that the Attorney-General did not regard that as a contract?-A. I do not know whether he did or not. The letter which I have read was written asking for certain things, among them $2,500. I promptly got the $2,500, paid on account. I never heard of any dissent from that letter. I remember, though, that there was a correspondence of Mr. Brewster with the Attorney-General. I consider that prior to that time I had my verbal contract with him, which was substantially the same, except that Mr. Brewster had, I think, by inadvertence, failed to put in a proviso that there should be less compensation when we were performing service at home than when we were called away from home. Q. You understood it to be a contract entered into between you and the Attorney-General?-A. Yes, sir. Bear in mind that I was not present when this letter was written by Mr. Brewster. Q. I understand that; but at that time you understood that the statute authorized the Attorney-General to make a contract, and when you made this proposition, and it was accepted, you understood that to be a contract, and understood that you were employed at a specific sum?— A. At some of the interviews prior to the 25th of October, or as the result of all the interviews, I so understood; but not at Elberon did I consider that there was any contract made, because I proceeded upon the idea that there was no authority to make it, and that, therefore, there had not been any made. Q. And you always so understood, up to the time you read this letter in the evidence here?-A. Oh, no; after I got back from Long Branch I looked at the statute and came to the conclusion I have stated. Q. That is not the point. ployed at a specific sum until you read Mr. MacVeagh's letter in his You always understood that you were emtestimony here the other day? A. Yes, sir; I would have sworn to it right along. Q. Mr. Brewster was the Attorney-General?-A. Not at that time. Q. But afterwards?-A. Afterwards. Q. This letter of Wayne MacVeagh, dated October 31, was on file in the Attorney-General's office, was it not?-A. I do not know; I never saw it. Q. Did you have any conversation with Attorney-General Brewster afterwards as to whether that proposition had been accepted?-A. No, sir; I never had any conversation of that kind with him, but I told him time and again that I was employed under a contract. Q. I want to call your attention to Mr. MacVeagh's letter to Mr. Phillips, printed on page 39 of the record, which reads: 402 WALNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA, October 31, 1881. MY DEAR SIR: I beg to inclose you a letter I have received from Messrs. Brewster and Bliss, special counsel in the star-route cases. Considering the professional standing of these gentlemen, I have no doubt you will agree with me in thinking it proper to pay them the fees they now ask; but they are doubtless aware that you cannot bind the Government to any contract in the matter which would control the action of my successor when appointed. I think, however, it would be proper for you to say that you recognize fully the gravity of the cases in their charge, the very great amount of labor connected with their prosecution, and the entire reasonableness of their expectation that the Department will compensate them fairly and justly for the industry, zeal, and ability it knows they will devote to the matter in question. Of course, I only offer these suggestions for your consideration and decision, for you are acting Attorney-General, and I am only awaiting the appointment of my successor, but I thought you would be glad to know my views on the subject. Sincerely yours, Hon. SAMUEL F. PHILLIPS, Acting Attorney-General. WAYNE MACVEAGH. Q. You say you had never seen that letter until you read it here ?— A. I never saw that, never heard of it, never dreamed of its existence, until after my examination here the first day, when the chairman was kind enough to give me the testimony previously taken, and I saw that letter in Mr. MacVeagh's testimony. By Mr. STEWART: Q. That letter of Mr. MacVeagh's was addressed to the Solicitor-General? A. Yes, sir. I never heard of it before; it was a revelation to me. By Mr. FYAN: Q. Did you ever make any new contract with Mr. Brewster, as Attorney-General?-A. No, sir; I never made any new contract with him. Q. Then you were acting under what you supposed to be a contract made with Mr. MacVeagh when you and Mr. Brewster were engaged as counsel in these cases?-A. Yes, sir. By the CHAIRMAN: Q. Please state what you understood to be that contract, and the rate of compensation for which it provided? Mr. STEWART. He has already stated that. A. I understood that I was to have $100 a day during all the time that I was absent from my home on business connected with these cases, and that I was not to be required to travel nights. Then, I understood that as to services rendered at home at my office it was impossible, from the nature of the case, to make any bargain beforehand, but that I was to be paid for such services what was fair and proper, the amount to be left substantially to the Attorney-General for his decision at the time or |