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which the Government was paying a large sum of money to have it expedited or increased-then, as you increase the number of routes, which you find to correspond with each other in these particulars, the aggregation, it seems to me, carries with it an increased presumption or inference of guilt which makes a case of that kind very much stronger than any case based on a single route could be, and makes a case which I think you have fairly a right to ask a jury to pass upon and convict the parties. I took that view of these cases very strongly, because (though not of counsel) I bad had occasion to know a great deal about the Tweed case in New York. There had been attempts there to convict what was known as the "Tweed ring" on single transactions, but they had almost all failed. Mr. Tweed himself was tried once or twice. Finally the prosecuting counsel took up a case where they alleged that Mr. Tweed on successive days had passed, or permitted to be passed, sixty or seventy fraudulent warrants. Each one of those warrants taken by itself, as was argued at that time, was perfectly consistent with the idea that Mr. Tweed was innocent in passing them; but when you found him on succeeding days going in with these sixty or seventy or eighty fraudulent warrants, the coincidence of all these facts coming together carried conviction to any unprejudiced mind of guilt on his part, and also in that case (though there was other evidence) carried conviction to the jury. My view with reference to the Dorsey cases was precisely of that general nature. I therefore said that that was a strong case. I say now that it was a strong case, just as far as we had any strong case. Of course, when you can prove actual payments of money, that presents another and stronger feature; but you can rarely expect to be able to prove anything of that kind by anybody who does not stand in the position of being almost in pari delicto, or at any rate in a suspicious position. Where one man swears that he paid money to an official, there being no other evidence of the subject, you can hardly expect to secure conviction; while such testimony as that in connection with other evidence such as I have described is important and very frequently conclusive. I felt, and still feel, that the Dorsey case was just in that position. We could get this aggregation of cases and show this coincident action on the part of the accused officials as to a number of routes, and then when we had succeeded in thus establishing the conspiracy, we would be able to put in evidence the only proof that we had of the actual payment of money, to wit, Mr. Walsh's statement.

Now, passing from that, I will answer further your question as to what I did. At Long Branch Colonel Cook raised the question of proceeding by information. He had a case, I think from the 5th of Dillon, at least a decision of Judge Dillon's, on that subject. It was rather a new idea to me, though I had proceeded by information myself in other cases in New York. The idea was not, as I recollect it now, to apply the information to the case of the Prescott and Santa Fé route. That case was supposed to be in such a shape that it could come promptly before the grand jury, and the witnesses were near at hand and could be got without much delay or expense to the Government. The question of the information came up more particularly at that time with reference to the Dorsey case. In that case it was clear that the witnesses, who were scattered all over the country, could be brought here only at considerable expense and after considerable delay, and the question was whether we should proceed by information in that case. At first my ideas were against it. Subsequently, on reading Judge Dillon's decision and talking the thing over and recollecting some of my own experience, I was rather inclined to favor it. We left that conference, after it had

lasted two days, with the understanding that the other gentlemen would return to Washington, and that the Prescott and Santa Fé case was to be got ready; that Mr. Walsh was to be communicated with as to the question I had raised about his consenting to become a defendant, and to be named as a co-conspirator, and that that case was to be proceeded with by indictment. As to the Dorsey case, it was to be next taken up and got along with as fast as possible, and the question of proceeding by information in that case was to be inquired into, and, if possible, we were to proceed in that way. Subsequent to that, I went back to New York, and I there took up very carefully the question of proceeding by information, and I found it involved in more difficulties than I had anticipated. While in New York, I learned by telegraph that the grand jury of that term of court here had been adjourned. It was a surprise to me. I knew nothing about the circumstances under which it occurred, and I know nothing about the disputed facts as to how it came about, but at all events we found ourselves with the grand jury having adjourned. The question of the statute of limitations was at all times one that we had to keep in view. The contracts on those routes had been made to commence in July, 1878. Many of Mr. Brady's orders, or most of the orders which were considered suspicious, had been made within a year or a year and a half of the making of the contracts— say in the first two years of the contracts. In one point of view the overt act which undoubtedly governed the question of the running of the stat ute of limitations was Mr. Brady's order for increase or expedition, and therefore we kept in view all through the cases the three years from that time, and were desirous of getting our indictments, if possible, within those three years; though I never felt and do not now feel that the statute of limitations barred proceedings in such cases. I think that in most of

the cases the statute of limitations has not yet barred proceedings, because it seems to me that whenever any one of these parties, in pursuance of the prior fraudulent order of increase or expedition, took his quarterly pay, as he did once in three months, in that action of his you had then and there a new overt act which you could count as in connection with the conspiracy, and from which the statute of limitations could be dated. But, of course, there was something to be said upon the other side of the question, and therefore we endeavored to avoid being thrown down upon that theory. When I got to New York, as I have said, I devoted myself at once to careful examination of the question of proceeding by information, and on the 19th of September I wrote Mr. MacVeagh the following letter:

Hoa. WAYNE MCVEAGH,

Attorney-General:

SEPT. 19, 1881.

DEAR SIR: It should be a very grave matter which would lead me to intrude upon yon in the present complication. But I have made up my mind that it is very doubtful whether we can proceed by information. If so, and as the Statute of Limitations rans as to our best case-in one view of it-early in October, it seems to me that there should be a speedy conference and agreement as to what should be done. Colonel Cook writes me that our engagement for to-morrow is postponed because of Mr. Brewster's engagements. I write now to say that as we got at him only through you, I think we should meet him as soon as possible, and that I will go any where to do it. After we get together and under weigh it will not, I think, be necessary to trouble with such details.

Your ob'd't servant,

GEORGE BLISS.

I pursued that examination and went into it very elaborately, getting one or two rare English books upon Conspiracy, and came to the concluH. Mis. 38, pt. 2—11*

which the Government was paying a large sum of money to have it expedited or increased-then, as you increase the number of routes, which you find to correspond with each other in these particulars, the aggregation, it seems to me, carries with it an increased presumption or inference of guilt which makes a case of that kind very much stronger than any case based on a single route could be, and makes a case which I think you have fairly a right to ask a jury to pass upon and convict the parties. I took that view of these cases very strongly, because (though not of counsel) I bad had occasion to know a great deal about the Tweed case in New York. There had been attempts there to conviet what was known as the "Tweed ring" on single transactions, but they had almost all failed. Mr. Tweed himself was tried once or twice. Finally the prosecuting counsel took up a case where they alleged that Mr. Tweed on successive days had passed, or permitted to be passed, sixty or seventy fraudulent warrants. Each one of those warrants taken by itself, as was argued at that time, was perfectly consistent with the idea that Mr. Tweed was innocent in passing them; but when you found him on succeeding days going in with these sixty or seventy or eighty traudulent warrants; the coincidence of all these facts coming together carried conviction to any unprejudiced mind of guilt on his part, and also in that case (though there was other evidence) carried conviction to the jury. My view with reference to the Dorsey cases was precisely of that general nature. I therefore said that that was a strong case. I say now that it was a strong case, just as far as we had any strong case. Of course, when you can prove actual payments of money, that presents another and stronger feature; but you can rarely expect to be able to prove anything of that kind by anybody who does not stand in the position of being almost in pari delicto, or at any rate in a suspicious position. Where one man swears that he paid money to an official, there being no other evidence of the subject, you can hardly expect to secure conviction; while such testimony as that in connection with other evidence such as I have described is important and very frequently conclusive. I felt, and still feel, that the Dorsey case was just in that position. We could get this aggregation of cases and show this coincident action on the part of the accused officials as to a number of routes, and then when we had succeeded in thus establishing the conspiracy, we would be able to put in evidence the only proof that we had of the actual payment of money, to wit, Mr. Walsh's statement.

Now, passing from that, I will answer further your question as to what I did. At Long Branch Colonel Cook raised the question of proceed ing by information. He had a case, I think from the 5th of Dillon, at least a decision of Judge Dillon's, on that subject. It was rather a new idea to me, though I had proceeded by information myself in other cases in New York. The idea was not, as I recollect it now, to apply the information to the case of the Prescott and Santa Fé route. That case was supposed to be in such a shape that it could come promptly before the grand jury, and the witnesses were near at hand and could be got without much delay or expense to the Government. The question of the information came up more particularly at that time with reference to the Dorsey case. In that case it was clear that the witnesses, who were scattered all over the country, could be brought here only at considerable expense and after considerable delay, and the question was whether we should proceed by information in that case. At first my ideas were against it. Subsequently, on reading Judge Dillon's decision and talking the thing over and recollecting some of my own experience, I was rather inclined to favor it. We left that conference, after it had

lasted two days, with the understanding that the other gentlemen would return to Washington, and that the Prescott and Santa Fé case was to be got ready; that Mr. Walsh was to be communicated with as to the question I had raised about his consenting to become a defendant, and to be named as a co-conspirator, and that that case was to be proceeded with by indictment. As to the Dorsey case, it was to be next taken up and got along with as fast as possible, and the question of proceeding by information in that case was to be inquired into, and, if possible, we were to proceed in that way. Subsequent to that, I went back to New York, and I there took up very carefully the question of proceeding by information, and I found it involved in more difficulties than I had anticipated. While in New York, I learned by telegraph that the grand jury of that term of court here had been adjourned. It was a surprise to me. I knew nothing about the circumstances under which it occurred, and I know nothing about the disputed facts as to how it came about, but at all events we found ourselves with the grand jury having adjourned. The question of the statute of limitations was at all times one that we had to keep in view. The contracts on those routes had been made to commence in July, 1878. Many of Mr. Brady's orders, or most of the orders which were considered suspicious, had been made within a year or a year and a half of the making of the contractssay in the first two years of the contracts. In one point of view the overt act which undoubtedly governed the question of the running of the statute of limitations was Mr. Brady's order for increase or expedition, and therefore we kept in view all through the cases the three years from that time, and were desirous of getting our indictments, if possible, within those three years; though I never felt and do not now feel that the statute of limitations barred proceedings in such cases. I think that in most of the cases the statute of limitations has not yet barred proceedings, because it seems to me that whenever any one of these parties, in pursuance of the prior fraudulent order of increase or expedition, took his quarterly pay, as he did once in three months, in that action of his you had then and there a new overt act which you could count as in connection with the conspiracy, and from which the statute of limitations could be dated. But, of course, there was something to be said upon the other side of the question, and therefore we endeavored to avoid being thrown down upon that theory. When I got to New York, as I have said, I devoted myself at once to careful examination of the question of proceeding by information, and on the 19th of September I wrote Mr. MacVeagh the following letter:

Hon. WAYNE MCVEAGH,

Attorney-General:

SEPT. 19, 1881.

DEAR SIR: It should be a very grave matter which would lead me to intrude upon yon in the present complication. But I have made up my mind that it is very doubtfl whether we can proceed by information. If so, and as the Statute of Limitations

as to our best case-in one view of it-early in October, it seems to me that there should be a speedy conference and agreement as to what should be done. Colonel Cook writes me that our engagement for to-morrow is postponed because of Mr. Brewster's engagements. I write now to say that as we got at him only through you, should meet him as soon as possible, and that I will go anywhere to do it. After we get together and under weigh it will not, I think, be necessary to trouble with such details.

I think we

Your ob'd't servant,

GEORGE BLISS.

I pursued that examination and went into it very elaborately, getting one or two rare English books upon Conspiracy, and came to the conclu. H. Mis. 38, pt. 2-11*

sion that we could proceed by information unless there was something in the local law of the district which forbade it. That turned upon the question whether conspiracy was an infamous crime. That question I looked up carefully, historically and otherwise, and I prepared a very elaborate brief upon the subject, of which I have a copy here, and which, as the committee will see, contains 32 printed pages.

From time to time I consulted with Mr. Brewster on that subject. I went over to Philadelphia several times, saw him and Mr. MacVeagh, and discussed that question with them. In connection with that, it became necessary to determine whether the law in the District of Columbia presented any other question than was presented in the ordinary forum or in the forum where I was in the habit of practicing, and that ques tion I referred to Colonel Cook as the local counsel here, and was assured by him that he thought that under the local law there was no difficulty whatever with reference to proceeding by information We went on. We got notice of a motion to strike the information from the files of the court and we prepared ourselves to meet it, and after I had prepared my brief, though it was rather outside of the scope of my portion of the case, I looked somewhat into the local Paws of the District and became a good deal alarmed at what I found there as bearing upon the information, and' I wrote Colonel Cook on the 31st of October as follows:

OCT. 31, 1881.

DEAR SIR: Our motion is for Thursday, and I will be ready. Have telegraphed Brewster.

Unless there is something in your local laws to the contrary, we are all right. I am afraid of this. How do you get along with U. S. v. Cross, 1 McArthur, 149? Isn't the syllogism police court has jurisdiction of all crimes not misdemeanors? If this is not an infamous crime the police court has primary jurisdiction. If it is infamous, then an information cannot be granted.

Yours, truly,

Col. W. A. COOK.

GEORGE BLISS.

I also wrote Mr. Brewster the following letter on the same day:

Ост. 31, 1881.

DEAR SIR: I have telegraphed you our hearing is fixed for Thursday. I expect to leave here on the "limited" Wednesday, and hope to pick you up and go on together. I have heard from time to time that we were to be beaten by some local laws in local decisions applicable only in the District of Columbia, and have become anxious

about it.

Look at United States v. Cross, 1 McArthur, 149, and see if it has elements of trouble for us.

Cook has always told me there were no local difficulties or decisions, and I have put the examination of them upon him.

Yours, truly,

GEORGE BLISS.

Hon. B. H. BREWSTER.

We came down here to the argument. We had a very elaborate ar gument, and were beaten, on the ground that there was a peculiarity in the local law of the District of Columbia which made a conspiracy within the statutes here an infamous crime, aud that an information could not be filed in such a case, however it might be in other cases. Of course we were subjected to considerable criticism because of the result of that proceeding. I did not think anybody was to blame; I thought

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