station. He was told that pushing the car forward would put the motor in motion. With this knowledge, and with the intent to start the motor, he assisted in pushing the car forward. The risk of having the motor suddenly start was obvious, and whatever danger attended the movement of the car as the result of the motor being put in motion was voluntarily assumed by the plaintiff in undertaking to push the car at the command of his foreman. With respect to the rotten cross-ties as a participating factor in causing his injury, the plaintiff does not positively allege the railroad company's knowledge of them, but seeks to impute notice because they had operating, without having any lights thereon to warn plaintiff of its presence. It appeared that another trolley car was coming in the opposite direction, from one to four car lengths east of the mogul car, and that the headlight from this approaching car obscured objects not in the direct line of it. The court held that whether, in the absence of a red light on the mogul car, and in the rain, with the glare of the headlight of the approaching car in his face, it was negligence in plaintiff to fail to see the mogul car, was a question for the jury. Plaintiff recovered a verdict for $20,000, there was a compulsory remittitur of $5,000, and judgment was rendered for $15,000. On appeal the judgment was held excessive, and the court having hitherto refused to affirm judgments for more than $10,000 for the loss of a leg, the judgment would, on plaintiff filing a remittitur of $5,000, be affirmed for $10,000, otherwise reversed and remanded. Kinney v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., - Mo. 169 S. W. 23 (1914). Rehearing denied. VI. Miscellaneous. A. Hand Car on Logging Road Track hands were being carried on hand cars from one point to another on defendant's logging road, which road and then up grade on the other side. ran down grade, describing a curve, As the car on which plaintiff's in testate was riding reached the bottom of the grade it left the track and decedent was thrown to the track and almost instantly killed. The negli gence alleged was that the hand car was "old, worn out, defective, and in want of repair to such an extent that the whole mechanism, running gear, braces, boxing, and bed were loose and rickety, rendering said car unsafe, and making it extremely dangerous for persons to ride upon it." It appeared that just after the accident one of the brasses upon the boxing of one of the front wheels of the hand car was picked up by one of the workmen, it having fallen out just before or at the time the car left the track. It was contended that it was error to admit evidence that the boxing came out on the ground that it had not been proved that the car was defective in any way as alleged in the complaint, but the court held there was evidence tending to show the car was out of repair and that the evidence objected to was relevant to the issue. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. Rosellini v. Salsich Lumber Co., 71 Wash. 208, 128 Pac. 213 (1912). B. Struck by Push Car in Tunnel. An injury to plaintiff, an employee engaged to push a small car used to carry concrete and other material in a tunnel being constructed under a river by defendant, caused by being struck by another car which came from been in that condition for several days. He was a track hand, and his duty was to repair the tracks. The duty to make necessary repairs imposed the duty to discover the condition of the track which would require the repair to be made. The plaintiff's means of knowledge were greater than the company's as the latter's knowledge came from the former's inspection. Besides, it is to be doubted that the condition of the ties was any part of the cause of the injury. From the plaintiff's description of the manner of receiving the injury, the sudden starting of the engine of the motor car was the primary and sole cause of his injury. behind while plaintiff was pushing his car, was held to be due solely to the negligence of fellow-servants, and it was error to submit the case to the jury on the theory that defendant had failed to provide a safe working place and had also failed to promulgate proper rules, there being no evidence whatever to support either theory. The sole fact proved was that the men in charge of the rear car ran into the car ahead, but the cause of the collision was not shown. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. Fitzgerald v. O'Rourke Engineering Const. Co., 211 N. Y. 65 (1914) rev'g 148 App. Div. 893 (1911) mem. C. Striking Against Bolt on Car. Defendant corporation, in connection with its manufacture of fire bricks, operated a tramroad, on which a hand car was operated to transport men and material. Plaintiff was a laborer in defendant's employ and while assisting the foreman, under his direction and supervision, in operating the hand car, was injured. The car was propelled by levers operated by hand, plaintiff being at the rear end working a lever, while the foreman and another laborer were working a lever at the front end. The brakes were connected with rods, extending up from underneath to the platform of the car, and were there attached to a plate or pedal, and the brakes were operated by a pressure of the foot upon the pedal, which caused the brakes to apply im mediately to the wheels of the car. Plaintiff alleged that, under the foreman's direction, they were propelling the car with unusual speed, when the foreman, without warning, suddenly sprang with all of his weight and force upon the pedal, causing sudden application of the brakes, and stopping of the car with such abruptness that plaintiff, who was holding onto the handle bar, was caused to fly up in the air, and he came down with such force that his hip joint came in contact with considerable violence with an iron bolt in the framing, bruising the flesh and ligaments around the hip joint, affecting the bones of his hip, causing great pain and suffering, as a direct result of which his hip was stiffened and his earning capacity permanently impaired. The negligence of the foreman was alleged to amount to gross negligence. Plaintiff recovered a verdict for five hundred dollars. The contention that the verdict was flagrantly against the evidence was not sustained. Plaintiff was substantially corroborated by the other laborer on the car, and the foreman did not seriously contradict their testimony. While the foreman said that he did not know that anyone was hurt at the time of the injury, he did remember that he stopped the car very suddenly, and that plaintiff complained at the time of being hurt. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. Charles Taylor Sons Co. v. Hunt, Ky., 173 S. W. 333 (1915). W. J. E. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. v. O'CONNOR. [SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 24, 1914.] 232 U. S. 508, 58 L. Ed. 703. 1. Carriers-Right to Rely on Statements of Forwarding Agent. A carrier receiving a car of goods from a shipper engaged in combining small shipments belonging to various persons in order to obtain carload rates, may in the absence of anything to indicate false billing, rely on the shipper's statements that the car contains emigrant movables, valued at a low figure in order to obtain a special rate. 2. Principal and Agent-Right of Carrier to Assume Authority of Forwarding Agent. A carrier may in the absence of notice to the contrary, rightfully assume that a person engaged in forwarding in carload lots small consignments of several owners in order to secure carload rates, has authority to agree on terms of shipment, and is not bound by private instructions or limitations on his authority. Digest, p. 726, and Am. Neg. Rep. Digest, pp. 202-204. I. Validity of Release of Valuation. A. To Obtain Lower Rate. Plaintiff shipped certain household goods, to the weight of 3,750 pounds. While the goods were on a float in a slip, and before the plaintiff had time to take charge of them, the float sank, the cause thereof not being apparent. As a result the goods were either partially or wholly destroyed. Those that were not wholly destroyed were refused by plaintiff and were then placed in a warehouse, where they were subsequently entirely destroyed by fire. Suit was brought against the initial and terminal carrier, but was dismissed as to the initial carrier. It appeared the goods were shipped under a contract releasing the liability $5 per 100 pounds. Indorsed on the bill of lading signed by the shipper was the clause that the consignor of the property had the option of shipping the same at a higher rate without limitation as to value in case of loss or damage from causes making the carrier liable, but had agreed to the specified valuation because of the lower rate for trans 3. Carriers-Loss of Goods-Agreed Value-Limiting Liability. If a shipper in order to obtain a low transportation rate, describes in a bill of lading the contents of a car as emigrant movables,' ," and in a printed portion their value is released to ten dollars per hundredweight, there is a sufficient valua tion in the absence of anything to show rebating or false billing, and the carrier is liable only to the extent of such declared value for the destruction of the goods. Error brought by the defendant, the Great Northern Railway Company, to the Supreme Court of Minnesota to review a judgment of that court (see 118 Minn. 223, 126 Minn. 359), in favor of the plaintiff, Gertrude O'Connor, in an action to recover the full value of an interstate shipment of household goods under a valuation released to a low figure in order to obtain a reduced freight rate. Reversed. For plaintiff in error-E. C. Lindley (M. L. Countryman, on the brief). For defendant in error-C. D. O'Brien (James Mattimore, and T. P. McNamara, on the brief). portation. On the trial the jury returned a verdict against defendant for $1,600. The appellate division affirmed a judgment entered on the verdict. In reversing the same, the court held that a contract between a carrier and shipper limiting the liability of the carrier to a value agreed upon for fixing the rate for transportation, was valid, and not within the purview of the federal statute known as the Carmack Amendment; that the contract in question did not provide for exemption from liability, but fixed the measure of liability for damage or loss, whether from negligence or otherwise, based on the agreed value; and that the contract was conclusive as against the shipper, although the loss or damage might have been due to negligence. Boyle v. Bush Terminal R. Co., 210 N. Y. 389 (1914), rev'g 151 App. Div. 551 (1912). Plaintiff shipped certain household goods over defendant's line, some of which were lost in transit. The bill of lading contained terms and description which were explained as follows: "One box household goods, weighing 200 pounds at owner's risk; released value five dollars on the hundred weight in case of loss or damage." In revers ing a judgment for the plaintiff for the Plaintiff delivered an automobile valued at £800 to an express company at London to be packed and forwarded to S, and there delivered to a steam. STATEMENT OF FACTS. The Boyd Transfer Company of Minneapolis in addition to its regular transfer business acted as a forwarder by railroad. By collecting from different shippers small lots of goods sufficient in the aggregate to fill a car, it secured carload rates, and out of the difference between carload and less than carload rates it made a profit and at the same time was enabled to offer better rates to the small shipper. How this difference between the two rates was divided between owner and forwarder does not appear in the record. At the time of the shipment referred to in this case, the railroad company had four rates on household goods (including emigrant movables), which vary, both according to the weight and value of the shipment, as follows: Less than carload lots (value not stated) ...$3.00 per cwt. Less than carload lots (not to exceed $10 per cwt.).... 2.00 per cwt. ship company. The express company did so and received the transportation company's bill of lading to its order. While the automobile was being unloaded from the boat upon its arrival, by stevedores employed by the steamship company, the sling broke and the automobile fell into the river. The only question was as to the liability of the steamship company. Its bill of lading contained a stipulation that the agreed value of the package shipped did not exceed $100, on which basis the freight was adjusted, and that the carrier's liability should in no case exceed that sum, unless a value in excess thereof was specially declared and stated therein, and such extra freight as might be agreed upon paid. A decree was directed in favor of the plaintiff against the stevedoring company and the express company, but dismissed the petition against the steamship company. In reversing the decree of the court below as to the stevedoring company and the express company, and in directing that the libel against them be dismissed, but that judgment be awarded against the steamship company for $100, the court held that the stipulation as to value agreed upon for 1.60 per cwt. 1.00 per cwt. the purpose of fixing the rate charged, Reid B. Burden of Proof as to Considera tion. Plaintiff brought an action against defendants to recover $652.50 damages for injuries to a carload of bananas. The answer of defendants set up that by the terms of the bill of lading issued by one of the defendants and accepted by the plaintiff, it was stipulated that if there was any loss or damage, the amount thereof was to be computed on the value of the property, the same being the invoice price thereof at the time and place of shipment, which value and invoice price was $202.95. The bill of lading did contain a limitation of liability to the invoice price |