under the law of nations, of the transfer of their country and of their allegiance. Their political power under the Federal Constitution and the laws of the United States, resulted from the admission of Florida into the Union as a State, and the political rights of citizenship of the United States thereby acquired were determined and limited, with respect to age, sex, colour, and condition, by our institutions and laws. It must also be remarked that a man may become a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of any particular State, or may become a citizen of a particular State without being a citizen of the United States.1

§14. The laws of a conquered country,' says Lord Mansfield, 'continue in force until they are altered by the conqueror; the absurd exception as to pagans, mentioned in Calvin's case, shows the universality and antiquity of the maxim. For that distinction could not exist before the Christian era, and in all probability arose from the mad enthusiasm of the crusades.' This may be said of the municipal laws of the conquered country, but not of its political laws, or the relations of the inhabitants with the government. The rule is more correctly and clearly stated by Chief Justice Marshall, as follows: On the transfer of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory; -the law, which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force until altered by the newly created power of the State.' This is now a well settled rule of the law of nations, and is universally admitted. Its provisions are clear and simple, and easily understood; but it is not so easy to distinguish between what are political and what are municipal laws, and to determine when and how far the constitution and laws of the conqueror change or replace those of the conquered. And in case the government of the new State is a constitutional government, of limited and divided powers, questions necessarily arise respecting the authority, which, in the absence of legislative action, can be

1U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. viii. pp. 256, 257; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. R., 644.

exercised in the conquered territory after the cessation of war, and the conclusion of a treaty of peace. The determination of these questions depends upon the institutions and laws of the new sovereign, which, though conformable to the general rule of the law of nations, affect the construction and application of that rule to particular cases.1

§ 15. It seems to be a well settled principle of English law, that a country conquered by British arms becomes a dominion of the king, in right of his crown, and therefore necessarily subject to the legislature,—the Parliament of Great Britain; that the king, without the concurrence of Parliament, may change a part or the whole of the political form of the govern ment of a conquered dominion, and alter the old, or introduce new laws into the conquered country; but that all this must be done subordinate to his own authority in Parliament, that is, subordinate to legislation; and that he cannot make any change contrary to fundamental principles; that he cannot, for instance, exempt the inhabitants of the conquered territory from the power of Parliament, or the laws of trade, or give them privileges exclusive of his other subjects. Thus, Ireland received the laws of England by the charters and commands of Henry II., John, Henry III., Edward I., and the subsequent kings, without the interposition of the Parliament of England. The same is said of Wales, Berwick, Gascony, Guienne, Calais, Gibraltar, Minorca, etc. So, of New York; after its conquest from. the Dutch, Charles II. changed its constitution and political government by letters patent to the Duke of York. If the king comes to a kingdom by conquest, he may change and alter the laws of that kingdom; but if he comes to it by title and descent, he cannot change the laws of himself without the consent of Parliament. The constitutions of most English provinces, immediately under the king, have arisen not from grants, but from commissions to governors to call assemblies. In 1722, Sir Philip Yorke and Sir Clement, Wearge reported on the assembly of Jamaica's withholding

1 Rex. v. Vaughan, 4 Burr R., 2500; Calvin's Case, Coke R., pt. vii; Am. Att'y. Gen❜l. v. Stewart, 2 Meriv. R., 154; Sprague v. Stone, Doug. R., 38; Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 Vesey R., 482; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, i Cowp. R., 165; Smith v. Brown, 2 Salk. R., 666; Evelyn v. Forster, 8 Vesey R., 481; Clark, Colonial Law, p. 4; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. xvi. p. 158; Burge, Commentaries, vol. i. pp. 31, 32; Morley, Digest of Indian Cases, pp. 169, 170.

the usual supplies, that if Jamaica was still to be considered a conquered island, the king had a right to levy taxes upon the inhabitants; but if it was to be considered in the same light as the other colonies, no tax could be imposed on the inhabitants but by an assembly of the island or by an act of Parliament.' They considered, says Lord Mansfield, the distinction in law as clear, and an indisputable consequence of the island being in the one state or in the other. Whether it remained a conquest, or was made a colony, they did not examine. A maxim of constitutional law, as declared by all the judges in Calvin's case, and which such men, in modern times, as Sir Philip Yorke and Sir Clement Wearge, took for granted, will require some authorities to shake. But, on the other side, no book, no saying, no opinion has been cited, and no instance in any period of history produced, where a doubt has been raised concerning it.'

§ 16. The right of the king to change the laws of a conquered territory, after the war, results, according to the decisions of English courts, from his constitutional power to make a treaty of peace, and consequently to yield up the conquest, or to retain it upon whatever terms he pleases, provided those terms are not in violation of fundamental principles. But the President of the United States can make no treaty without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, and his authority over ceded conquered territory, though derived from the law of nations, is limited by the Constitution and subordinate to the laws of Congress. It, however, is well settled by the Supreme Court, that, as constitutional commander-in-chief, he is authorised to form a civil or military government for the conquered territory during the war, and that when such territory is ceded to the United States, as a conquest, the existing government, so established, does not cease as a matter of course or as a consequence of the restoration of peace; that, on the contrary, such government is rightfully continued after the peace, and till Congress legislates otherwise; but that the President may virtually dissolve this government by withdrawing the officers who administer it; provided, he does not thereby neglect his constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' He is bound, for

1 Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp. R., 205; Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 1 Cowp. R., 165; Ĉallett v. Lord Keith, 2 East. R., 260.

example, to prevent the landing of foreign goods in the United States out of any collection district and without the payment of duties, and to do this he must employ the constitutional means at his disposal. He may do this through the government which he had established during the war, by the right of conquest, and which existed when that conquest was ratified by peace, or, if he dissolve that government, the constitutional obligation remains to be performed by other means. So long as that government continues, with the express or implied sanction of the President, it represents the sovereignty of the United States, and has the legal authority to enforce and execute the laws which extend over such territory. Congress may, at any time, put an end to this government of the conquered territory, and organise a new one; or it may permit the people of such territory to form a constitution, and admit it as a new State into the Union. The power of Congress over such territory is clearly exclusive and universal, and their legislation is subject to no other control or limit than the stipulations of cession and the Constitution. But, connected with these general rights and powers of Congress, there are also obligations and duties. These are to be ascertained from the law of nations, the stipulations of cession, and the principles of the Federal Constitution. But so long as neither Congress nor the President direct otherwise, the government established during the war, and existing on the restoration of peace, continues with the implied consent of both. The right inference,' says Mr. Justice Wayne, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court, 'from the inaction of both, is, that it was meant to be continued until it had been legislatively changed. No presumption of a contrary intention can be made. Whatever may have been the cause of delay, it must be presumed that the delay was consistent with the true policy of the government.' California and New Mexico were acquired by conquest, confirmed by cession. During the war they were governed as conquered territory under the law of nations, and in virtue of the belligerent rights of the United States as the conqueror, by the direction and authority of the President, as commander-in-chief. By the ratification of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, on May 20, 1848, they became a part of the United States, as ceded conquered territory. The civil

governments, established in each during the war, and existing at the date of the treaty of peace, continued in operation after that treaty had been ratified. California, with the assent and co-operation of the existing government, formed a constitution, which was ratified by its inhabitants, and a State government was put in full operation in December, 1849, with the implied assent of the President, the officers of the existing government of California publicly and formally surrendering all their powers into the hands of the newly constituted authorities. The constitution so formed and ratified was approved by Congress, and California was, on September 9th, 1850, admitted into the Union as a State. New Mexico also formed a constitution, and applied to Congress for admission as a State; the application was not granted; but on September 9, 1850, New Mexico and the part of California not included within the limits of the new State were organised into Territories, with new Territorial governments, which took the place of those organised during the war, and existing on the restoration of peace.1

§ 17. It seems to be a well-established rule of the law of nations, that, on the cession of a conquered territory by a treaty of peace, the inhabitants of such territory are remitted to the municipal laws and usages which prevailed among them before the conquest, so far as not changed by the constitution or political institutions of the new sovereignty, and the laws of that sovereignty which proprio vigore extend over them. This leads us to inquire, first, whether the municipal laws in force prior to the conquest, and suspended or changed during the war, are revived ipso facto by the treaty of peace; and, second, what laws of the new sovereignty are considered as extending over the acquired territory immediately on its cession, and without any special provisions to that effect, either in the laws themselves, or, as enacted by the legislative power. It has already been shown that, according to the decision of the English courts, the laws of the conquered

1 Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp. R., 204; U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. ix. pp. 446, 452, 453; Cross et al. v. Harrison, 16 Howard R., 164; Dunlop, Digest of Laws of U. S., pp. 1238-1250; Brightly, Digest of Laws of U. S., pp. 105, 693, 890; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. R., 393.

By a conquest, the conqueror acquires nothing but a temporary right of possession, and government, over the territory conquered, until a pacification, and cannot, in the meantime, impair by any transfer the rights of the former sovereign.-Clark v. United States, 3 Wash. C. Ct., 101.