§ 13. A passport, or safe-conduct, may, for good reasons, he revoked by the authority which granted it, on the general principle of the law of nations, that privileges may always be revoked, when they become detrimental to the State. A permission granted by an officer may, for this reason, be revoked by his superior, but, until so revoked, it is as binding upon the successor as upon the party who issued it. The reasons for such revocation need not always be given; but permissions of this kind can never be used as snares to get persons or effects into our power, and then, by a revocation, hold the persons as prisoners, or confiscate the property. Such conduct would be perfidy toward an enemy, and contrary to the laws of war.'

§14. Any violation of the good faith and spirit of such instruments entitles the injured party to indemnity against all injurious consequences. Persons violating these instruments are also subject to punishment by the municipal laws of the State by which they are issued. Section twenty-eight of the Act of Congress, approved April 30th, 1790, provides that if any person shall violate any safe-conduct or passport, duly obtained and issued under the authority of the United States, such person so offending, on conviction, shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined at the discretion of the court. If a soldier or subordinate officer should violate a passport, or safe-conduct, issued by his superior, he would, probably, also be subject to be punished for the military offence under military law by a court-martial.2

§ 15. Safe-guards are protections granted by a general or other officer commanding belligerent forces, for persons or property within the limits of their commands, and against the operations of their own troops. Sometimes they are delivered to the parties whose persons or property are to be protected; at others they are posted upon the property itself,

that paroled prisoners of the Confederate States who asked for passports as citizens of the United States, and against whom no special charges were pending, would be furnished with passports upon application to the Department of State in the usual form.

1 Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. i. p. 163; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 101; Garden, De la Diplomatie, liv. vi. § 16; Bello, Derecho International, pt. ii. cap. ix. § 4; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome v. pt. iv. ch. xi.

2U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. i. p. 118; Brightly, Digest of Laws of the U. S., p. 41.

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as upon a church, museum, library, public office, or private dwelling. They are particularly useful in the assault of a place, or immediately after its capture, or after the termination of a battle, to protect the persons and property of friends from destruction by an excited soldiery. Violations of such instruments are usually punished with the utmost severity. A guard of men is sometimes detached to enforce the safety of the persons and property thus protected. Such guards are justified in resorting to the severest measures to punish any violation of the safety of their trust. Article fifty-five of the rules and articles of war of the United States, approved April 10th, 1806, provides that, 'whosoever, belonging to the armies of the United States employed in foreign parts, shall force a safe-guard, shall suffer death.' A safe-guard is a particular kind of passport or safe-conduct, and is to be construed according to the rules of interpretation applicable to such instruments.1

§ 16. A cartel is an agreement between belligerents for the exchange or ransom of prisoners of war. The actual existence of a war is not essentially necessary to give effect to cartels, but it is sufficient if they are entered into prospectively and in expectation of approaching hostilities; for the occasions for them may just as naturally arise from a view of approaching events, and parties may contract to guard against the consequences of hostilities which they may foresee. Both belligerents are bound to faithfully observe such compacts, and a cartel party sent under a flag of truce to carry into execution the provisions of a cartel, is equally under the protection of both. Good faith and humanity,' says Wheaton, ought to preside over the execution of these compacts, which are designed to mitigate the evils of war, without defeating its legitimate purposes. By the modern usages of nations, commissaries are permitted to reside in the respective belligerent countries, to negotiate and carry into effect the arrangements necessary for this object. Breach of good faith in these transactions can be punished only by withholding from the party guilty of such violation the advantages stipulated by the cartel; or, in cases which may be supposed to warrant such a

1 Garden, De la Diplomatie, liv. vi. § 16; U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. ii. p. 366; U. S. Army Regulations of 1857, §§ 769-773; Heffter, Droit International, § 142; Dunlop, Digest of Laws of U. S., p. 381.

resort, by reprisals or vindictive retaliation.' In the United States such compacts are not deemed treaties in the sense of the Constitution. A cartel for the exchange of prisoners, between the United States and Great Britain, in 1813, was ratified by the American Secretary of State (May 14th).'

§ 17. A cartel ship is a vessel commissioned for the exchange or ransom of prisoners of war, or to carry proposals from one belligerent to the other, under a flag of truce. Such commission and flag are considered to throw over the vessel, and the persons engaged in her navigation, the mantle of peace; she is, pro hac vice, a neutral licensed vessel, and her crew are also neutrals; and so far as relates to the particular service in which she is employed, she is under the protection of both belligerents. But she can carry no cargo, and no ammunition or implements of war, except a single gun for firing signals. This is regarded as a species of navigation which, on every consideration of humanity and policy, should be conducted with the strictest regard to the original purpose, and to the rules which are built upon it, since, if this mode of intercourse be broken off, it will be followed by calamitous results to individuals of both belligerents. It is, therefore, said by high authority, that cartel ships cannot be too narrowly watched; and that both parties should take care that the service should be conducted in such a manner as not to become a subject of jealousy and distrust between the two nations. The authority to commission a cartel ship is supposed to emanate from the supreme power of the State, but it may be issued by a subordinate officer, in the due execution of a public duty. When a cartel ship appears to have been employed in the public service, and for the purposes of humanity, it will be presumed that the commission under which she acts was issued by the sanction of the councils of the State, until renounced by the sovereignty from which it is supposed to emanate. Thus, a cartel, granted by the commander of the British forces, at Amboyna, to a Dutch

1 Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 3; the 'Carolina,' 6 Rob., P. 336; La Gloire,' 5 Rob., p. 492; the 'Mary,' 5 Rob., p. 200; Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, § 275; Garden, De la Diplomatie, liv. vi. § 16.

Paroles of prisoners of war are sacred obligations, and the national faith is pledged to their fulfilment. And cartels are of such force that the sovereign power cannot annul them. (United States ex re Henderson v. Wright, 2 Pittsb., p. 440.)

vessel, was held by Sir William Scott to be valid for the protection of the vessel from capture and condemnation.1

§ 18. The rights, immunities, and duties of cartel ships, have been matters of discussion and judicial decision in prize courts. Sir William Scott gave a very elaborate opinion on this subject, in the case of the 'Daifjie' (3 Rob., 141). With respect to the character of the ships employed in such service, he says it is generally immaterial whether they are merchant ships, or ships of war, but there may be extreme cases in which the nature of the ship might be material; as, if a fire ship was to be sent on such service to Portsmouth or Plymouth, though she had prisoners on board, she would undoubtedly be an unwelcome visitor to a naval arsenal, and her particular character might fairly justify a refusal to admit her.' He was also of opinion that the cartel protected such ships, not only in trajectu, adeundum et redeundum, but also in going from one port to another to be fitted up and to take prisoners on board, although the passage of ships from one port to another of the enemy is liable to suspicion. Moreover, that a vessel going to be employed as a cartel ship is not protected, by mere intention, on her way, for the purpose of taking on herself that character when she arrives. When it is necessary to send to another port for vessels for such purpose, it is proper to apply to the enemy's commissary of prisoners for a pass or special safe-conduct. The principal question to be decided in such cases, is that of intention; if the vessel is actually commissioned and employed as a cartel ship, if she is fitted out and conducts herself, in every respect, as a cartel ship, she is protected as such; but if she is acting fraudu lently, she is liable to condemnation. Imprudence and negligence do not constitute fraud.

§ 19. The present usage of civilised nations is, as already

1 Duer, On Insurance, vol. i. pp. 539, 540; the 'Carolina,' 6 Rob, p. 336; the Venus,' 4 Rob., p. 355.

A cartel ship may not trade, or carry a cargo, under pain of the confiscation both of ship and cargo ('La Rosine,' 2 Rob., 372), but if appointed before the breaking out of war, will not necessarily be condemned, for having taken a cargo on board since the war commenced.The 'Carolina,' suprà.

Enemies carried on a cartel ship by their own consent must not engage in any act of hostility whilst on board.-The Mary,' 5 Rob., 200.

As to a cartel ship being a neutral licensed vessel, see Crawford 7. William Penn, Peters Circ. C.R., 106.

stated, to exchange prisoners of war, or to release them on their parole, or word of honour, not to serve against the captor again for a definite period, during the war, or till properly exchanged. But it was formerly the frequent practice for the State to leave to every prisoner, or at least during the war, the care of redeeming himself, and the captor had a lawful right to demand a ransom for the release of his prisoners. This practice gave rise to certain rules with respect to the interpretation of the particular agreements of this kind. As the captor was held responsible for the treatment of his prisoner, he could not divest himself of this responsibility by transferring him to another; but, having agreed with his prisoner concerning the price of his ransom, he could transfer this right to a third party, for the agreement then becomes a perfect contract, binding upon both parties, and the right to receive the price may be transferred by the captor to whomsoever he pleases. If the prisoner should die before being set at liberty, although the price of the ransom should have been agreed upon, it was not held to be due from his heirs; but if he had obtained his liberty at the time of his death, good faith would require the payment of the price agreed upon. If he should be retaken by his own party after making the compact of ransom, but before its execution, it would not be due, because he was not set at liberty in virtue of the agreement. If he has concealed his rank and character when making the agreement as to the price of ransom, he is guilty of fraud, and, on its discovery, the captor is justified in annulling it. If he has agreed to perform any particular act, if not inconsistent with his duty to his own State, as a consideration for his release, he is bound to perform it, and he is deserving of punishment for a neglect or refusal to fulfil his promise. At one time, the wealth to be amassed by the ransom of prisoners of war was one of the greatest inducements to military service, and curious instances of the importance which was attached to this consideration occur in history. Thus, when the Maid of Orleans was to be brought to her disgraceful trial, the advisers of the measure thought it right to pay her captors, whose property she had become, a sum equal to what it was supposed they might be able to make by her ransom.1

1 Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 110; Martens, Recueil de Traités.