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AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN W. ROBINSON

The affiant, John W. Robinson, says: I am 66 years old, live in Jefferson County, Ky., near Shiveley (post office). I have spent most of my life in the Regular Army; am now a retired sergeant of the Ordnance Department.

Back in 1928, when I was employed with the Reserve Officers' Training Corps of the Louisville Male High School, I got to know Capt. R. N. Holmes, then adjutant of the One hundred and Thirty-eighth Field Artillery. Holmes had been a sergeant of artillery in the Regular Army, and he asked me to help his matériel caretakers and so I began to help along with this work, trying to get the Government property into proper condition. Finally I practically took over the matériel caretaker work of the first battalion, where George James had been caretaker and, on April 1, 1929, George gave me a power of attorney to endorse his checks; and later, when his brother, Richard, was appointed in his place, Richard gave a similar power on April 4, 1930. In this work I continued with the approval of the adjutant and the battery commander, under whom I worked direct, until December 16, 1933. Captain Holmes died a little later.

I knew just how to do this work, and did it when I was off duty from the school, and kept the property in better serviceable condition that it had been when I first got into it. All of us were just trying to keep the equipment and all Government property in tip-top shape, and I am sure that all the time I worked at it, the matérial was in fine order. I was employed by the battery commander to perform the work that I did while working with the One Hundred and Thirtyeighth Field Artillery.

I never did know, and never did have any dealing with the disbursing officer at Frankfort. His name was Lusse.

STATE OF KENTUCKY,

County of Jefferson, ss:

JOHN W. ROBINSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me by Sgt. John W. Robinson, this the 4th day of March 1940.

[SEAL]

My commission expires July 16, 1940.

F. A. GULLEDGE, Notary Public.

CHARLES S. LADINSKY AND MOE KANNER

SEPTEMBER 30, 1940.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House and ordered to be printed

Mr. KENNEDY of Maryland, from the Committee on Claims, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. R. 10285]

The Committee on Claims, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 10285) for the relief of Charles S. Ladinsky and Moe Kanner, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendments are as follows:

Page 1, line 7, strike out the amount "$3,000" and insert "$2,500”. Page 1, lines 7 and 8, strike out the language "represents reimbursement for the" and insert "shall be in full settlement of all claims against the United States growing out of".

Pages 1 and 2, strike out all the language of the bill starting with the word "Said" in line 11, page 1.

At the end of the bill add:

: Provided, That no part of the amount appropriated in this Act in excess of 10 per centum thereof shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $1,000.

The purpose of the proposed legislation, as the bill is amended, is to provide for the payment of the sum of $2,500 to Charles S. Ladinsky and Moe Kanner, both of St. Louis, Mo., in full settlement of their claims against the United States on account of the forfeiture to the United States of a bail bond conditioned upon the appearance in court of one John A. Rosenfeld.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

John A. Rosenfeld was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on the charge of using the mails to

defraud. On January 23, 1939, Rosenfeld entered a plea of nolo contendere, and was released on bail in the sum of $1,500 pending imposition of sentence.

Rosenfeld requested an extension until February 6, 1939, and his request was granted upon the condition that a new bond in the sum of $3,000 be furnished. The new bond, with the claimants, Charles S. Ladinsky and Moe Kanner, as sureties, was filed.

According to the record, Rosenfeld failed to appear on February 6 and his bond was declared forfeited. He was arrested in Chicago, returned to St. Louis, and sentenced on March 6, 1939, and thereafter incarcerated.

On the same day, the motion for judgment against the sureties was presented to the court, and on March 8, 1939, the court vacated the forfeiture, conditioned upon payment by the sureties of costs in the sum of $100.

On appeal, the circuit court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the cause with directions to enter judgment against the sureties for the full amount of the bond, on the ground that the willful default of the principal precluded remission of the penalty.

On March 19, 1940, the sureties' motion for a rehearing was denied by the circuit court of appeals, and thereafter the Supreme Court denied their petition for a writ of certiorari, and the amount of the bond was paid into court.

In the report of the Attorney General, it is stated that from the opinion of the district court vacating the judgment of forfeiture, it appears that the sureties took steps to apprehend the fugitive, and incurred several hundred dollars in expenses and loss of considerable time in their efforts to produce the defendant, which efforts were successful. It is also revealed that the sureties were offered the full amount of the penal sum of the bond and all of their expenses by the wife of the defendant to drop their search for him, but they refused said offer.

According to the opinion of the Attorney General, the prosecution was not prejudiced by the defendant's default, except that additional expenses were incurred by the Government, which expenses the Department estimates to amount to $500.

Your committee has, therefore, deducted the amount of $500 from the amount of relief sought, and the bill in its present form provides for the refund of the sum of $2,500 to the claimants, which action has the approval of the Department of Justice.

Appended hereto is the Department's report, together with other pertinent evidence.

Hon. AMBROSE J. KENNEDY,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., September 17, 1940.

Chairman, Committee on Claims, House of Representatives,

Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This acknowledges your letter of August 28, 1940, requesting my views concerning the bill (H. R. 10285) to reimburse Charles S. Ladinsky and Moe Kanner in the sum of $3,000 for the loss sustained by then: as sureties on a forfeited bail bond in a criminal proceeding in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

The files of this Department show that John A. Rosenfeld was indicated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on the charge of

using the mails to defraud. On January 23, 1939, Rosenfeld entered a plea of nolo contendere, and he was released on bail in the sum of $1,500 pending imposition of sentence. Rosenfeld requested an extension until February 6, 1939. His request was granted upon the condition that a new bond in the sum of $3,000 be furnished. The new bond, with Charles S. Ladinsky and Moe Kanner as sureties, was filed. Rosenfeld failed to appear on February 6, and his bond was declared forfeited. Rosenfeld was arrested in Chicago, returned to St. Louis, and sentenced on March 6, 1939, and thereafter incarcerated. On the same day, the motion for judgment against the sureties was presented to the court, and on March 8, 1939, the court vacated the forfeiture, conditioned upon payment by the sureties of costs in the sum of $100. On appeal, the circuit court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded the cause with directions to enter judgment against the sureties for the full amount of the bond, on the ground that the willful default of the principal precluded remission of the penalty. United States v. Rosenfeld et al. (109 F. (2d) 908). On March 19, 1940, the sureties' motion for a rehearing was denied by the circuit court of appeals, and thereafter the Supreme Court denied their petition for a writ of certiorari, and the amount of the bond was paid into court.

From the opinion of the district court vacating the judgment of forfeiture, it appears that the sureties took steps to apprehend the fugitive; that they incurred several hundred dollars in expenses and loss of considerable time in their successful efforts to produce the defendant; and that they were offered the full amount of the penal sum of the bond and all of their expenses by the wife of the defendant to drop their search for him, which offer was refused. It does not appear that the prosecution was prejudiced by defendant's default, except that additional expenses were incurred by the Government, which are estimated at $500.

In view of the foregoing consideration, if the bill were amended to provide for reimbursement in the sum of only $2,500, I should find no objection to its enact

ment.

Sincerely yours,

[Copy]

ROBERT H. JACKSON,
Attorney General.

ST. LOUIS, Mo., March 8, 1939.

Received of Moe Kanner and Chas. S. Ladinsky, sureties, one hundred dollars. Costs on bond forfeiture, Case No. 20720, C., U. S. A., v. Jno. A. Rosenfeld, et al. $100.

JAMES J. O'CONNOR,

Clerk United States District Court, R. J. D., Mo.

[Copy |

ST. LOUIS, Mo., July 31, 1940.

Received of Moe Kanner and Chas. S. Ladinsky, sureties, two thousand nine hundred dollars.

Account, bond forfeiture, case No. 20720, C., U. S. A., v. Jno A. Rosenfeld, et al.

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DEAR MR. DYER: I have your letter of August 20, enclosing a copy of the proposed relief bill which you ask me to endorse.

My opinion should clearly indicate my views. If it does not, I am much ashamed. You are at liberty, of course, to use that opinion in presenting the matter to the committee and use this letter if you desire.

While I recognize the accuracy of the opinion of the court of appeals in holding that I was without power under the statute to set aside the forfeiture, my opinion should clearly indicate that I did not think the forfeiture should be exacted. As

II. Repts., 76-3, vol. 6- -32

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