its lines along these post roads, or stop the use of them after they were placed there, nevertheless, the company receiving the benefit of the laws of the State for the protection of its property and its rights is liable to be taxed upon its real or personal property as any other person would be."

So where a corporation is chartered by the United States, its property may be taxed by the State in which it lies. Thus the Union Pacific Railroad was taxed upon its road bed and other property within Nebraska. This tax was upheld, the court saying: "It cannot be that a state tax which remotely affects the efficient exercise of a Federal power is for that reason alone inhibited by the Constitution. To hold that would be to deny to the States all power to tax persons or property. Every tax levied by a State withdraws from the reach of Federal taxation a portion of the property from which it is taken, and to that extent diminishes the subject upon which Federal taxes may be laid. The States are, and they must ever be, co-existent with the national government. Neither may destroy the other. Hence the Federal Constitution must receive a practical construction. Its limitations and its implied prohibitions must not be extended so far as to destroy the necessary powers of the States, or prevent their efficient exercise." 43

$468. Patents and copyrights.

On this principle should be regulated the power of a State to tax patents and copyrights granted by the United States; and it should be held to be outside the power of a State, under the taxing power, to impede the exercise of the right, but quite within its power to tax the property which is the result of the right.

On this ground it was held in New York that the patent itself could not be taxed, though tangible property which was the fruit of the exercise of the right might be taxed.44

43 Railroad v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 30, 21 L. ed. 787.

44 People v. Assessors, 156 N. Y. 417, 51 N. E. 269, 42 L. R. A. 290 (see

$469. Double taxation.

Double taxation is forbidden, it would seem, by a constitutional provision requiring taxes to be in proportion to the value of the property; 45 and it is expressly forbidden by some States. 46 But in the absence of some express provision of law, while there will be a presumption against such an interpretation of a tax act as would lead to double taxation, it can be no objection to a clearly imposed tax that it results in double taxation.47

Even if double taxation is expressly forbidden, this provision extends only to taxation of the same property twice in a single State; no law of one State can affect the legal right of another, and therefore there is nothing to prevent the same property being taxed by as many States as can get power over it. Thus the property and franchises of a corporation may be held and exercised in several States; and the value of them gives to the shares of stock their entire value. These shares may be in one State while the owner is domiciled in another. If all these States are different, the same property may be taxed four times without infringing the Constitution; the constitutional limitations extend only to double taxation in the same jurisdiction.48 "No doubt it would be a great advantage to the country and to the individual states if principles of taxation could be agreed upon which did not conflict with each other, and a common scheme could be adopted by which taxation of substantially the same property in two jurisdictions could be avoided. But the Constitution of the United States does not go so far." 49 Double taxation of this

People v. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70, 53 N. E. 685, 45 L. R. A. 126); Com. v.

Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 151 Pa. 265, 24 Atl. 1107.

45 Burke v. Badlam, 57 Cal. 594; Com. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R.,

150 Pa. 234, 24 Atl. 609.

48 Cal. Polit. Code, § 3607.

47 Toll Bridge Co. v. Osborn, 35 Conn. 7.

48 Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511, 29 L. ed. 240; San Francisco v. 63 Cal. 470.

Fry,

49 Holmes, J., in Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, 732, 47 L. ed. 669.

sort, however unjust, cannot be declared illegal unless it is contrary to some express constitutional provision.50 "It is doubtless a hardship for him to pay taxes on the same property in two States. But the Massachusetts tax, even if valid, could not divest this State of its jurisdiction. The laws of Rhode Island are paramount in Rhode Island, and all the inhabitants of the State are subject to them without regard to the laws of any other State." 51

§ 470. Separate taxation for State and local purposes.

The expenses of both State and local government must be met by taxation. This may be done in one of two ways: A single tax may be levied, either by the State or by a local taxing district, and the proceeds of the tax may be distributed to the various governmental agencies; or a separate tax may be levied by each political body which is to spend it. The latter is the method commonly adopted; and in most States, therefore, corporations pay a tax to the State and another to the counties or cities in which they own property or do busi

ness.

Such separate taxation, though it may be laid upon the same property in the same State, is not double taxation, and is in no way objectionable.

The property of a corporation is especially fitted for taxation by the State as a whole. Its real estate and tangible personalty may well be taxed locally; but its capital stock, franchises and good will, which often constitute the greater part of its property, are best assessed and taxed as a single unit. This assessment of the entire body of property of a corporation can best be done by the State.

§ 471. State boards of valuation.

In the case of a corporation doing business and owning

50 Griggsry Const. Co. v. Freeman, 108 La. 435, 32 So. 399; State v. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484; Dyer v. Osborne, 11 R. I. 321, 23 A. R. 460. 51 Durfee, C. J., in Dyer v. Osborne, supra.

property in many parts of the State, and especially in the case of a public service corporation, a State board is often provided to assess the value of the property, whether for State or for local taxation. In finding the facts as to value such a board acts in a judicial capacity, and so long as it acts within its authority its finding of facts cannot ordinarily be attached in another court unless in the regular course of appeal.52

Thus in assessing the value of railroad property the valuation of the Board of Equalization (subject to appeal as provided by law) is conclusive in the absence of fraud; and this is constitutional. "The true cash value of the plaintiff's property in the state of Indiana in the year 1891 was a question of fact, the determination of which, for the purposes of taxation, was given to this special tribunal,—the state board. Whenever a question of fact is thus submitted to the determination of a special tribunal, its decision creates something more than a mere presumption of fact; and, if such determination comes into inquiry before the courts, it cannot be overthrown by evidence going only to show that the fact was otherwise than as so found and determined. Here the question determined by the state board was the value of certain property. That determination cannot be overthrown by the testimony of two or three witnesses that the valuation was other than that fixed by the board. It is true such testimony may be competent, and was received in this case because, taken in conjunction with other testimony, it might establish fraudulent conduct on the part of the board sufficient to vitiate its determination. It is not, however, contended by counsel that there was any actual fraud on the part of that board; that the individual members thereof deliberately violated the obligations of their oaths of office, and intentionally placed upon the property of the plaintiff a valuation which they knew. to be grossly in excess of that which it in fact bore, and did

52 Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490; La Salle & P. H. & D. R. R. v. Donoghue, 127 Ill. 29, 18 N. E. 827.

so with the purpose of making the plaintiff bear a larger share of the burden of the support of the state government than it rightfully should.” 53

In framing its rules and making its assessment the Board of Equalization is presumed to have acted fairly,54 and it has the right to compute the value of the capital stock in the first instance.55 If, however, the action of the board is fraudulent, its action may be reviewed by the courts; 56 and so if it exceeded its jurisdiction, as by acting under an erroneous interpretation of law and thereby taxing property which was not legally taxable.57

§ 472. Foreign corporations.

A foreign corporation is in general, as has been seen, taxed on all tangible personal property in the same manner as a domestic corporation; and it is properly and legally treated like any other owner of property, and taxed upon all tangible property, real or personal, situated within the jurisdiction of the taxing power.58 It is, of course, always a question whether a foreign corporation comes within the language of a statute which imposes a tax; for such statutes are often so phrased as to exclude foreign corporations. A statute sub

53 Brewer, J., in Pittsburgh, C. C. & S. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 38 L. ed. 1031.

54 Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill. 602.

55 Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb, 81 Ill. 556.

58 State Board of Equalization v. People, 191 Ill. 528, 61 N. E. 339, 58 L. R. A. 513.

57 Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490; La Salle & P. H. & D. R. R. v. Donoghue, 127 Ill. 29, 18 N. E. 827.

58 W. U. Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067; Atlantic & P. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 47 L. ed. 995; Armour Packing Co. v. Savannah, 115 Ga. 140, 41 S. E. 237; Griggsry Const. Co. v. Freeman, 108 La. 435, 32 So. 399; Blackstone Mfg. Co. v. Blackstone, 13 Gray (Mass.), 488; Attorney-General v. Bay State Mining Co., 99 Mass. 148, 96 A. D. 717; Boston Loan Co. v. Boston, 137 Mass. 332; British Comm. L. Ins. Co. v. Commissioners, 31 N. Y. 32; People v. Barker, 141 N. Y. 118, 35 N. E. 1073, 23 L. R. A. 95.