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the court is bound, or professes, to protect that possession from the process of other courts. Whenever the litigation is ended, or the possession of the officer or court is discharged, then other courts are at liberty to deal with it according to the rights of the parties before them, whether those rights require them to take possession of the property or not.”
When the action of a State does not oust jurisdiction in bankruptcy.-A decree of a State court enjoining a corporation from further prosecuting its business, on the ground of insolvency, and appointing a receiver, does not oust the jurisdiction of the district court to adjudge the corporation bankrupt. In re The Independant Insurance Co., 2 Low, 97; 1 Holm., 103.
Where courts have concurrent jurisdiction, as a general rule, the court in which the action is commenced is entitled to retain it. Thus where property was held by a marshal, under process from a federal court, it was held, that it could not be taken from him by process from a State court of concurrent jurisdiction. Freeman v. Clark, 24 How., 450. See, also, Buck v. Colbath, supra.
The district court cannot annul decisions of a State court. -The district court sitting in bankruptcy, cannot annuì a judgment of a State court. In re Dunn, 11 Bank Reg., 270. Nor can it aid as a court of error to revise its own decisions in a confiscation case. The United States v. Six Lots, 1 Woods, 234.
But they have authority to devise modes of proceeding, which shall enable them to carry into effectual execution any law which they are called upon to administer, when the Supreme Court, has not by its rules provided for the mode of proceeding. The Epsilon, 6 Ben., 378.
The Bankrupt Act of 1867 was repealed in 1879.
Sec. 564. Certain seizures cognizable in any district into which the property is taken.-Proceeding on seizures for forfeiture of any vessel or cargo entering any port of entry which has been closed by the President in pursuance of law, or of goods and chattels coming from a State or section declared by proclamation of the President to be in insurrection into other parts of the United States, or of any vessel or vehiche conveying such property, or conveying persons to or from such State or section, or of any vessel belonging, in whole or in part, to any inhabitant of such State or section, may be prosecuted in any district court into which the property so seized may be taken, and proceedings instituted; and the district court thereof shall have as full jurisdiction over such proceedings as if the seizure was made in that district. [See 2 $5301, 5317.]
13 July, 1861, c. 3, ss. 4, 5, 9, v. 12, pp. 256, 257, 258.
When the records present a.case on the instance side of the court for forfeiture under a statute, it cannot be condemned as prize; and if it shows a prosecution exclusively as prize, there cannot be a condemnation as for a statutory offense. United States v. Weed, 5 Wall., 62; The Brig Caroline, 7 Cr., 496; The Samuel, 1 Wh., 9; The Mary Anne, 8 Id., 380; Jecker .. Montgomery, 13 How., 498. See also The Ouachita Cotton, 6 Wall., relating to the power of the President to license commercial intercourse in case of insurrection; The Venice, 2 Id., 258, libelled as prize; Cappell v. Hall, 2 Id., 542, the President had no power to authorize commercial intercourse within the lines of occupation of United States forces; The Hampton, 5 Id., 372, acts of 1861 and 1863, to protect liens, etc., refers to captures jure belli; The Reform, 3 Id., 617, what was not a license, etc.
Sec. 565. May proceed in prize causes.-Any district court may, notwithstanding an appeal to the Supreme Court, in any prize cause, make and execute all necessary orders for the custody and disposal of the prize property, and in case of an appeal from a decree of condemnation, may proceed to make a decree of distribution, so far as to determine what share of the prize shall go to the captors, and what vessels are entitled to participate therein. [See & 4637.] 30 June, 1864, c. 174, s. 13, v. 13, p. 310.
SEC. 566. Trial of issues of fact. The trial of issues of fact in the district courts, in all causes, except cases in equity and cases of admiralty and maratime jurisdiction, and except as otherwise provided in proceeding in bankruptcy, shall be by jury. In causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction relating to any matter of contract or tort arising upon or concerning any vessel of twenty tons burden or upward, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and at the time employed in the business of commerce and navigation between places in different States and Territories upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting the lakes, the trial of issue of fact shall be by jury when either party requires it.
24 Sep., 1789, c. 20, s. 9, v. 1, p. 76; 26 Feb., 1845, c. 20, v. 5, p. 726.
The act of 1845, provides as follows: “The district courts to have the same jurisdiction in matters of contract and tort, arising in, upon, or concerning steamboats and other vessels of twenty tons burden and upwards, enrolled and licensed for coasting trade, and employed in commerce and navigation upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting them, as is possessed by those courts in cases of the like vessels employed upon the high seas, or tide waters, within admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. The remedies, forms of process, and modes of proceeding, to be the same as in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and the maritime law of the United States to constitute the rules of decision, the same as in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; saving, however, to the parties the right to trial by jury, and saving also, the right of any concurrent remdey at common law, or by the State laws." Act February 20, 1845; 5 Stat. at Large, 726; 1 Bright, 25.
The constitutionality of this act was affirmed in the case of The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How., 443.
Trial by jury.-Under the provisions of the act of 1845 it has been held that parties have a right to enter into a stipulation, waiving a trial by jury in the district court, and to submit their case to the court to try it on an agreed statement of facts. Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall., 40.
Construction of the acts of 1789 and 1845.-In the case of The Hine 0. Trevor, 4 Wall., 555 (1866), which was a well considered case, involving a construction of the acts, the court held:
1. That the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts is not limited to tide water, but extends wherever vessels float, and navigation successfully aids commerce.
2. That the admiralty powers of the district courts of the United States, by the ninth section of the act of September, 24, 1789, is co-extensive with the grant in the constitution, as to the character of the waters over which it extends.
3. That the act of February 20, 1845, is a limitation of the powers granted by the act of 1789, as regards cases arising upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting them, in the following particulars: It limits the jurisdiction of the district courts to vessels of twenty tons burden and upwards, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and to vessels employed in commerce and navigation on the lakes and navigable waters connecting the same. It provides for a trial by jury, and the jurisdiction is not exclusive, but is made expressly concurrent with such remedies as may be given by the State laws.
4. The grant of original admiralty jurisdiction by the act of 1789, including, as it does, all cases not covered by the act of 1845, is exclusive, not only of all other federal courts, but of all State courts.
5. The statutes which attempt to confer upon State courts a remedy for maritime torts strictly in rem., are void, for the reason that they are in conflict with the act of Congress.
6. Such statutes do not come within the saving clause of the ninth section of the act of 1789, concerning a common law remedy.
7. This rule does not prevent the seizure and sale, by the State courts, of the interest of any owner or part owner in a vessel, by attactment or by general execution, when the proceeding is a personal action, to recover a debt for which he is personally responsible.
8. Nor does it prevent any action which the common law gives for obtaining a judgment in personam, against a party liable in a marine contract 62
or a marine tort. See, also, the case of The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall., 411; The Lottawanna, 21 Id., 558; and The Revenue Cutter No. 1, Brown's Ad., 76.
The judiciary act of 1789 conferred exclusive original admiralty jurisdiction upon the district courts, not only upon the high seas, and bays and rivers navigable from the sea, but upon the lakes and waters connnecting them. And the fact that a maritime tort was committed in foreign waters, did not defeat the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States. The Eagle, 8 Wall., 15.
Jurisdiction above tide water. The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the district courts is not limited to the high seas and tide water, but extends to all lakes and navigable waters where commerce is carried on between different States and Territories, or with foreign nations; and the act of congress of February 20, 1845, extending the jurisdiction in such cases to the lakes and navigable waters connecting them, is consistent with the constitution of the United States. The Genesee Chief, 12 How., 443.
The case last cited overruled the case of The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wh., 423, and the case of The Steamboat Orleans, 11 Pet., 175, where the doctrine of the limitation of admiralty jurisdiction to tide water was maintained. Following the doctrine in case of The Genesee Chief, are Fretz v. Bull, 12 How., 466; The Eagle, 8 Wall., 15; The Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Id., 522.
Sec. 567. Transfer of records to district courts when a territory becomes a State.- When any territory is admitted as a State, and a district court is established therein, all the records of the proceedings in the several cases pending in the court of appeals of said territory at the time of such admission, and all records of the proceedings in the several cases in which judgments or decrees had been rendered in said ter- . ritorial court before that time, and from which writs of error could have been sued out or appeals could have been taken, or from which writs of error had been sued out or appeals had been taken and prosecuted to the Supreme Court, shall be transferred to and deposited in the district court for the said State. [See $ 704.]
22 Feb., 1847, c. 17, s. 1, v. 9, p. 128; 22 Feb., 1848, c. 12, s. 2, v. 9, p. 212.
Jurisdiction as affected by a change of territory.-When Florida was a Territory, congress established courts there in which cases appropriate to State and federal jurisdictions were tried indiscriminately. Florida was admitted as a State of the Union in March, 1845. The constitution of the State provided that all officers civil and military, then holding their offices under the authority of the United States, should continue them
until superceded under the State constitution. But it did not continue the existence of courts created by congress as part of the Territorial government. In 1815, the legislature of the State passed an act, for the transfer of all cases from the federal to the State courts, except those cognizable by the federal courts. And in 1847, congress provided for the transfer of these, to the federal courts. It was held, in a case where the territorial court took cognizance of a libel case in 1846, that the court acted without any jurisdiction. Benner v. Porter, 9 How., 253 (1850). Su in case of an indictment. Simpson 0. The United States, 9 ld., 578.
And where a case was pending in the Supreme Court of the United States, on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Wisconsin, at the time of the admission of Wisconsin as a State into the Union, it was held, that the jurisdiction of said court ceased with said admission, that provision was made by the act of Congress admitting the State into the Union, for a transfer, from the territorial courts, to the district court of the United States, of all causes appropriate to the district court, but none for causes cognizable by the State tribunals; that by the admission of the State of Wisconsin as a State, the Territorial government ceased to exist, and all the authority under it, including the laws organizing its courts of justice, and providing for the revision of their decisions, in the Supreme Court of the United States; and that said courts had no further authority or jurisdiction in the cases before them. McNulty v. Batty, 10 How., 72 (1850).
In case of retrospective acts of Congress.--Where Congress had passed an act admitting a State into the Union but omitted to provide by such act for the disposal of cases pending in the Supreme Court of the United States, on writs of error to the courts of said State, it was decided, that Congress had power to pass a subsequent act, making provision for such cases. Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall., 160.
The court say: “It is well settled that where there is no direct constitutional prohibition, a State may pass retrospective laws, such in their operation as may affect suits pending, and give a party a remedy which he did not previously possess, or modify an existing remedy, or remove an impediment in the way of legal proceedings, * * * . “The truth is, says Chief Justice PARKER,' in Fowler v. Essex Bank, 10 Mass., 245, “there is no such thing as a vested right to do wrong, and the legislature which in its acts, not expresly authorized by the constitution, limits itself to correcting mistakes and to providing remedies for the furtherance of justice, cannot be charged with violating its duty or exceeding its authority,'such acts are of a remedial character and are the peculiar subjects of legislation.”
SEC. 568.-District judge shall demand and compel delivery of records of territorial court.-It shall be the duty of the the district judge, in the case provided in the preceding section, to demand of the clerk, or other person having possession or custody of the records therein mentioned, the delivery thereof, to be deposited in said district court; and,