that if a right is not founded upon contract, or secured by the Constitution, it may be taken away by a State law, however long it may have been exercised. See, also, Livingston v. Moore; 1 Bald., 424.

Jurisdiction in equity--when citizenship not regarded.Where a bill is filed in the circuit court to stay proceedings at law in the same court, the equity suit is auxiliary to the action at law, and may be maintained without regard to the citizenship or alienage of either party to the record, and although the court may not have jurisdiction over the parties for other relief. St. Lukes Hospital v. Barclay, 3 Blatch., 259; Simms v. Guthrie, 9 Cr., 19; Dunn v. Clark, 8 Pet., 3. See, also, Lorman v. Clark, 2 McLean, C. C., 568, where the court held, that the circuit courts of the United States derive their jurisdiction, as well in chancery as at law, from the Constution and laws of the Union; that the laws and usages of a State, which at law constitute a mode of procedure in the circuit courts, derive their force from their adoption by congress; that a State cannot enlarge or restrict the equity jurisdiction of said court; that in States having no courts with chancery powers, the chancery powers of the circuit courts are the same as in other States; that if local law or local usage originates a new right, it may be enforced by the courts of the United States, sitting within the State, by the exercise of a common law or chancery power as the case may require; and that the law of the State may be enforced by the exercise of the chancery powers of the circuit court.

If a right is created and a remedy prescribed to enforce it by the State law, and the remedy prescribed is substantially consistent with the ordinary modes of proceeding on the chancery side of the federal courts, that remedy should be pursued. Bodley v. Taylor, 5 Cr., 191; Lewis v. Marshall, 5 Pet., 470; Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet., 20. See also where the United States filed a bill in chancery--United States v. Howland, 4 Wh., 108 (1819). As to equity jurisdiction in other cases, see Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How., 565; Barber v. Barber, 21 Id., 591; Green v. Creighton, 23 Id., 104; Freeman v. Howe, 24 Id., 460; Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall., 632; Payne v. Hook, 7 Id., 425. The United States courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of the States in equity cases. Breeden v. Lee, 2 Hughes, 484.

Jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of State laws.—A circuit court may, in a proper case in equity, enjoin a State officer from execuiting a State law in conflict with the Constitution or a statute of the United States, when such execution will violate the rights of the complainant; but where the State is concerned it should be made a party, if it can be done. If it cannot be done, the court may proceed to a decree against the officer of the State in all respects as if the State was a party to the record. A State can be made a party only by shaping the bill expressly with that view, as where individuals or corporations are intended be put in that relation to the case. Osborne v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wh., 738; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How., 331; State Bank v. Choop 16 Id., 369; Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black., 436; Ohio L. & T. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How., 432; Mechanic's Bank v. Debolt, 18 Id., 380; Davis v. Gray, 16, Wall., 203; 18 Int. Rev. Rec. 149.

Jurisdiction to enforce or grant relief under State laws.Since the Illinois statute of February 16, 1874, was enacted, the United

States circuit courts of that State have jurisdiction, in proper cases, of actions of forcible entry and detainer provided for by that statute, as such action, is a "suit of a civil nature," within the meaning of the act of congress of 1789. Wheeler v. Bates, 6 Biss., 88; Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet., 195; Lorman v. Clark, supra. And the same doctrine would be applicable to the act of 1875. And so far as the nature or subject-matter is concerned it has cognizance of an action under a statute of a State, authorizing the recovery of money lost at play, horse-racing, etc. Grant v. Hamilton, 3 McLean, C. C., 100; and of a case between citizens of different States, for the partition of lands under the statutes of the State. Ex parte Bidde, 2 Mason, 472. So, of an action against a sheriff for an escape. Mewster v. Spalding, 6 McLean, 24. So, for the enforcement of a lien on lots fronting on streets for improvement of streets. Fritch v. Creighton, 24 How., 159.

So, of a suit in equity to restrain the unlawful use of its process and of an action of replevin for writings and documents of value. Gibbs v. Usher, 1 Holmes, 348. .

Jurisdiction in case of trusts-alimony, etc.-The jurisdiction of the federal courts in a State and Territory as courts of equity, is ample to enforce trusts under the Constitution and laws of the United States, although the statutes of the State or Territory may have abolished trusts. Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How., 558. See, also, for the recovery of alimony previously decreed. Barber v. Barber, 21 Id., 582.

So, where a bill in equity is necessary in order to have a construction of orders, decrees, and acts made or done by a federal court, it was held that the bill therefor was properly filed in federal court, even though the parties who were interested in having the construction made, would not, from want of proper citizenship, be entitled to proceed by original bill of any kind in said court. Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall., 609.

So, it may entertain jurisdiction in an equity proceeding against an administrator, where that is proper under the received principles of equity, even though the suit could not be maintained under the laws of the State. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall., 425.

Jurisdiction concurrent with State courts.-The circuit court has no power to restrain or interfere with a suit prosecuted and pending in a State court, by enjoining the further prosecution of such suit, but such circuit court in executing a jurisdiction vested in it, may, in a case of which it has cognizance, act upon parties who are suitors in a State court, in relation to the same subject-matter, so far at least, as to compel their submission to such judgment as said court may render in the case. The City Bank of New York v. Skelton, 2 Blatch., C. C., 14; Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wh., 193: Dann v. Clark, 8 Pet., 1. See, also, case of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall., 503. And where a cause was removed from a State court to a circuit court of the United States, under the act of March 2, 1867, it was held that said court was invested with jurisdiction to pass upon and determine the controversy, though that court could not have taken original cognizance of the case. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. (2 Otto), 10. See, also, The Schooner Wave, 2 Paine, 131; Chaffin v. City of St. Louis, 4 Dill., C. C., 24.

If a party had a remedy in a State court by mandamus, it does not oust the jurisdiction of the circuit court to issue the writ where it is necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction. City of Wheeling v. Mayor of Baltimore, 1 Hughes, 90.

The federal courts are prohibited, except in certain cases in bankruptcy, from granting the writ of injunction to stay proceedings in any court of a State. See § 720 and Chaffin v. St. Louis, supra; Moore v. Holliday, 4 Dill., 52; Rogers v. The City of Cincinnati, 5 McLean, 337.

In cases of conflicting grants.-Under the provision of the Constitution (Art. 3, §2) which provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies "between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants from different States," it was held that the circuit court of Vermont had jurisdiction where one party claimed land under a grant from the State of New Hampshire, and the other under a grant from the State of Vermont, though at the time of the first grant Vermont was a part of New Hampshire. The Town of Parolet v. Clark, 9 Cr., 292 (1815). So, it was held, that the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States extended to a controversy between citizens of Kentucky, claiming lands, exceeding five hundred dollars in value, under different grants, the one issued by the State of Kentucky, but upon warrants issued by the State of Virginia and locations founded thereon, prior to the separation of Kentucky from Virginia, and the other by the State of Virginia. The court further held, that it was the grant which gave the title and jurisdiction. Colson v. Lewis, 2 Wh., 377 (1817). See, also, The Bank of the United States v. Devereaux, 5 Cr., 61 (1809).

SEC. 2. Removal of civil actions.-That any suit of a civil nature at law or in equity, now pending or hereafter brought in any State court, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States or treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority,/or in which the United States shall be plaintiff or petitioner, or in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States, or a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, or a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects, either party may remove said suit into the circuit court of the United States for the proper district; and when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually

interested in such controversy may remove said suit to the circuit court of the United States for the proper district.

Classification of the different grounds of removal.-This section gives a right of removal of "any suit of a civil nature at law or in equity," involving over five hundred dollars; first, on account of the subjectmatter or character of the suit; and second, on account of citizenship.

On account of the subject-matter or character of the suit it provides for removal:

1. In cases arising under the constitution or laws, or treaties of the United States; and,

2. In cases in which the United States shall be plaintiff or petitioner. In respect to citizenship it provides for removal without regard to the subject-matter of suits:

1. In cases where there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States; or,

2. In cases where there is a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants from different States; or

3. In cases where there shall be a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects.

* *

As to the nature of the suits that may be removed. The language of the statute is, "that any suit of a civil nature * where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars," etc.

This embraces suits on contracts or for torts, as well as suits in equity, whether regularly brought in the State courts or not, and it has been held to include a suit pending in a State between a land-owner, and a corporation seeking to appropriate his private property under the right of eminent domain, although the suit was not regularly instituted in the State court, but was brought there under the provisions of the statutes of the State from an appraisement of the land by commissioners appointed for that purpose. West v. Aurora, 6 Wall., 139 (1867) under the judiciary act, the language of which is similar, in this respect, to the act of 1875. Patterson v. Boone Co., 3 Dill., C. C., 465.

So it has been held, under similar provisions of former acts, that suits by attachments could be removed. Barney v. Globe Bank, 5 Blatch., 107.

And suits in replevin, Beecher v. Gillett, 1 Dill., 308; Dennistown v. Draper, 5 Blatchf., 336; Gibbs v. Usher, 1 Holmes, 348; and in ejectment, In re Turner, 3 Wall., Jr., 260; Torry v. Beardsley, 4 Wash., C. C., 242; Allin v. Robinson, 1 Dill., 119.

And in equity to reform an insurance policy. Charter Oak Co. v. Star Ins. Co., 6 Blatch., 208; or annul a will, etc. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. (2 Otto), 10. And a special statutory proceeding to confirm a tax title. Parker v. Overman, 18 How., 137.

In suits for torts, see Vannevar v. Bryant, 21 Wall., 41. See, also, Fouvergue v. New Orleans, 18 How., 470.

So suits involving the constitution of the bankrupt act. Connor v. Scott, 3 Cent. Law J., 305; s. c. See, also, Payson v. Dictz, relating to removal

by assignee in bankruptcy on the ground of citizenship. 5 Chic. L. N., 434. And a suit in a State court to restrain or stay execution of a judgment of the State court may be removed if the requisites of amount and citizenship exist. Watson v. Bondurant, 2 Woods, C. C., 166.

The value of the matter in dispute.-It is not sufficient that the matter in dispute equals five hundred dollars, but it must exceed that amount. Walker v. United States, 4 Wall., 163.

And this amount is to be determined by the claim made in the petition, declaration, or bill. Gordon v. Longest, 16 Pet., 97 (tort); Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How., 198; Bennett v. Butterworth, 8 Id., 124; Payton v. Robertson (a case of replevin), 9 Wh., 527; United States v. McDowell (a suit on penal bond), 4 Cr., 316; Postmaster-General v. Cross (same) 4 Wash., C. C., 326; Hartshorn v. Wright (suit in ejectment), 1 Pet., C. C., 64; King v. Wilson (to restrain illegal taxes), 1 Dill., 555.

It is, however, sufficient if the amount in dispute exceeds five hundred dollars at the time of the application for the removal. And interest may be computed on the obligation sued on in case interest is due thereon and claimed, in determining the amount in dispute. Merrill v. Pelly, 16 Wall., 338; Bank, etc. v. Daniel, 12 Pet., 52; McGinnity v. White, 3 Dill., 350.

The subject-matter of the suit must necessarily be something of pecuniary value, and capable of a pecuniary estimate. The language of the act necessarily excludes all criminal cases, and it has been held to exclude all controversies relating to the custody of children or the right to personal freedom. Lee v. Lee, 8 Pet., 44; Barry v. Mercien, 5 How., 103; Sparrow v. Strong, 3 Wall., 97; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10 (1875); Pratt v. Fitzhugh, 1 Black, 271; De Kraft v. Barney, 2 Id, 704; Green v. United States, 9 Wall., 655; Rison v. Cribbs, 1 Dill., 181.

An adverse party cannot defeat the right to a removal, after it has become complete, by a release, or an amendment of his declaration or bill, making his claim less. Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How., 198; Green v. Custard, 23 Id., 484; Roberts v. Nelson, 8 Blatchf., 74.

In an agreed statement of facts in the nature of a special verdict the plaintiff's claim was admitted by the defendant, except $3,134.20: Held, that that sum was the amount actually in dispute, although the judgment was for $5,000, and the cause was dismissed in the Supreme Court for want of jurisdiction. Tintsman v. National Bank, 100 U. S., 6.

What is a suit arising under the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.-Where the right of removal depends, not upon citizenship, but upon the subject-matter of the suit, it must be a matter "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority."

The act of 1875, follows the Constitution in respect to original jurisdiction, as well as the removal of causes.

To justify a removal under this section, the suit must involve rights depending and a disputed construction concerning the Constitution or laws, or some treaty of the United States; and the petition for the transfer of the suit should state the facts and indicate the questions arising therein which are claimed to give the federal court jurisdiction of the case, in order that