What is a violation of laws relating to the slave trade.-Under the slave trade act of 1794, providing for a seizure in case of preparing a vessel, or of causing her to sail for the purpose, etc., in violation of the statute, it was held that it was not necessary, in order to incur the forfeiture, that the vessel should be completely fitted and ready for the sea, but that as soon as the preparations have proceeded so far as to clearly manifest the intention, the right of seizure attaches. The Emily, 9 Wh., 381 (1824). See, also, The Wanderer, 1 Sprague, 515.

The court where the seizure was made, and not where the offense was committed, has jurisdiction of proceedings in rem for an alleged forfeiture; but if seizure is made on the high seas, or within the territory of a foreign power, jurisdiction was conferred on the court of a district where the property is carried and proceeded against. The Merino, 9 Wh., 391.

The original jurisdiction in such cases and at the time the above cases were decided, belonged to the district courts, but it seems now, by the subdivision under consideration, to be vested in the circuit court, where the same doctrine would be applicable.

See, also, in case of The St. Jago, 9 Id., 409, where the claim of seamen for wages, on a voyage in violation of the slave trade acts, out of the proceeds of the forfeited vessel, was rejected.

The exclusive power over the importation of slaves is vested in congress, and State courts could at no time exercise any jurisdiction in cases of a violation of the laws prohibiting the slave trade, except such as was authorized by congress. See act March 3, 1819; May 10, 1800; January 1, 1808; U. S. Constitution, Art. 1, § 9; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19, How., 393.

Suits on debentures.-Eighth. Of all suits by the assignee of any debenture for drawback of duties, issued under any law for the collection of duties against the person to whom such debenture was originally granted, or against any indorser thereof, to recover the amount of such debenture. [See § 3039 ] 2 Mar., 1799, c. 22, s. 80, v. 1, p. 687 (688).

Patent and copyright suits.-Ninth. Of all suits at law or in equity arising under the patent or copyright laws of the United States.

8 July, 1870, c. 230, ss. 55, 106, v. 16, pp. 206, 215. 16 Feb., 1875, c. 77, 8. 2, v. 18, p. 314.

Subject-matter confers jurisdiction.-Under this provision, similar to one in the eleventh section of the judiciary act of 1789 (1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 79), it is not necessary that either plaintiff or defendant should be an inhabitant of the State where the suit is brought, in order to confer jurisdiction on the circuit courts. It is only necessary in such cases to give jurisdiction, that the writ be served personally upon the defendant in the district in

which the suit is brought. Allen v. Blunt, 1 Blatch., C. C., 480 (1849); Ogle v. Ege, 4 Wash., C. C., 584.

It would appear necessary under the act of 1875, and section 739 of the Revised Statutes, for service to be made in the district where the suit is brought, except, perhaps, in certain cases.

(See post, §§ 739 to 742.)

As to the practice in equity cases see Robison v. Campbell, 3 Wh., 212; United States v. Howland, 4 Id., 108; Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet., 433; Goodyear v. Providence Co., 2 Fisher, 499.

When subject-matter does not confer jurisdiction.- Where the question in controversy does not arise out of any patent or copyright laws, or depend upon any construction of them, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts depends upon the residence of the parties, as in case of contracts between the patentee and other parties, relating to the assignment or use of a patent or an interest in it. Wilson v. Sanford, 10 How., 99; Hartshorn v. Day, 19 Id., 211; Goodyear v. The Union Rub. Co., 4 Blatch, C. C., 63; Goodyear v. Day, 1 Id., 565; Burr v. Gregory, 2 Paine, C. C., 426 (1827), which was a bill filed for the specific performance of a contract relative to the transfer of an interest in a patent right, and where the circuit court held that the subject-matter did not give jurisdiction.

But where an assignment of the whole interest of the patentee in the patent to certain States is duly made and recorded under the provisions of the patent laws, the assignee may bring suits in the circuit courts for infringement of the same in such States. Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall., 205.

Nor can a State impose any restrictions upon the rights of a patentee secured by a patent, to vend his invention. The power of congress to legislate on the subject of patents is exclusive. McClury v. Kingsland, 1 How., 206; Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sum., 541; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall., 425.

When a suit cannot be sustained.-A suit between citizens of the same State cannot be sustained in the circuit court, as arising under the patent laws of the United States, where the defendant admits the validity and his use of the plaintiff's letters patent, and a subsisting contract is shown governing the rights of the parties to the use of the invention. Hartzel v. Tilghman, 99 U. S., 547.

Act of February 16, 1875-Jury.-The act of February 16, 1875, § 2, provides that when sitting in equity for the trial of patent causes, the court may impanel a jury of not less than five nor more than twelve persons, and submit to them such questions of fact arising in the cause, as the court may deem expedient.

(See post, p. 236.)

The same doctrine applies in case of suits relating to copyright. Where the author of a manuscript entered into a contract with certain publishers, by which the former gave the latter the exclusive right to print and publish the same, and the latter was to pay the former a fixed sum for each copy of the work sold; and the publishers secured a copyright of the book in their names, with the assent of the author, who subsequently

revised the work and secured, himself, a copyright of the revised edition, and applied for an injunction to the circuit court of the United States to restrain the publishers from further sales, etc., it was held, that the subjectmatter did not give the court jurisdiction, as the suit was based upon a contract made between the parties, and not upon the copyright laws of the United States. Pulte v. Derby, 5 McLean, C. C., 328 (1852); see, also, Bourcicault v. Hart, 13 Blatch, 47, where it was held, that the author of an unpublished play, not copyrighted, was entitled to an injunction against one who publishes it, but that the subject-matter would not give jurisdiction to the circuit court.

Restraint by injunction.-The power of the courts to restrain by injunction unauthorized publication of manuscripts, or books, was ample under the ninth section of the act of 1831. Fulsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 113; Bartlett v. Crittenden, 4 McLean, 300; Id., 32; Bourcicault v. Fox, 5 Blatch., 97. And this jurisdiction is now by the Revised Statutes vested in the circuits courts. Bourcicault v. Hart, 13 Id, 47. And an appeal can be made to the Supreme Court, without regard to the amount in dispute. Rev. Stat., § 699.

Jurisdiction in case of claim for damages.-Damages may be recovered by action at law, by patentees, assignees, or grantees of exclusive rights, under the patent laws, and the circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in such cases; and they may have a remedy by injunc tion on the equity side of the court. Brown v. Shannon, 20 How., 56. Act of 1863, § § 14-17, (5 U. S. Stat. at Large, 117). Day v. Hayward, 20 How., 208, where it was held that process must be personally served within the district, if the defendant be an inhabitant of another State. The jurisdiction attaches in all cases where rights are claimed by virtue of a patent, and there is denial of original invention by the patentee. Potter v. Muler, 2 Fisher, Pat. Ca., 465; Potter v. Wilson, Id., 102; where injunctions were made perpetual and there was a decree for an account. Goodyear v. Providence Rubber Co.. Id., 499, where it was held that the patent was broader than the invention of the original patentee; Burr v. Duryee, 1 Wall., 531; O'Riley v. Morse, 15 How., 112; Battien v. Taggart, 17 Id., 83.

Discretion of the court in granting.-Circuit courts of the United States have discretionary power to entertain a bill to enjoin infringements of a patent, before a judgment at law sustaining the patent has been had. Cochrane v. Duner, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 780. But to warrant the granting of an injunction, pendente lite, in behalf of a patent which has not been established at law, on the ground that it has been acquiesced in, the infringement must be a palpable one. Burleigh Rock Drill Co. v. Lobdell, 1 Holmes, 450; Guttapercha Co. v. Goodyear Co., 3 Saw., C. C., 542.

Suits against national banks.-Tenth. Of all suits by or against any banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under any law providing for national banking associations.

3 June, 1864, c. 106, s. 57, v. 13, p. 116.

The national bank act.-In Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall., 498, it was held, that, under the provisions of the national bank act of 1864, (Revised Statutes, Tit. 42), it was indespensable, in an action by a receiver against the stockholders of a bank, where the bank fails to pay its notes, that action on the part of the comptroller of the currency, touching the personal liability of the stockholders must precede the institution of any suit by the receiver, and that the fact must be averred in the bill. See, also, National Bank v. Colby, 21 Wall., 609. Receivers, however, can sue in the circuit courts, without reference to their citizenship. Id.; United States v. Babbit, 1 Black., 61.

And a receiver of a national bank appointed by a comptroller of the currency, under the national banking act, may sue for demands due the bank, in his own name or in the name of the bank without an order of the comptroller of the currency. Bank v. Kennedy, 17 Wall., 19.

A national bank may be sued in any State, county or municipal court, in the county or city where it is located, having jurisdiction of similar cases, for the recovery of a claim against it, which has been disallowed by a receiver, duly appointed under the act of June 3, 1864, $50. Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioque, 14 Wall., 383.

In Cadle v. Tracy, 11 Blatch., C. C., 101, it was held, that, under §§ 8 and 57 of the national bank act of 1864 (§ 629, Sub. 10 and 11 of Rev. Stat.), a receiver of a national bank, duly appointed, must be sued in the circuit courts, and cannot be sued in any others, and, therefore, that a State court had no jurisdiction of a suit by a creditor instituted against the receiver, after the insolvency of the bank, to recover a debt alleged to be due from the bank to him. See, also, In re Manufacturers' Bank, 5 Biss., 499.

But in cases not within the special provisions of the banking act, a national bank may be proceeded against in the same manner as any other person or corporation. And the power of the comptroller, to wind up the affairs of a national bank in certain contingencies, does not exclude the authority of a competent tribunal to appoint a receiver in other cases. Irons v. Manufac turers' Bank, 6 Biss., C. C., 301. National banks may sue in the circuit courts, if citizenship, as in other cases, gives jurisdiction. Manufacturers' National Bank v. Baac, 2 Abb., U. S., 232.

A national bank could not be sued in the federal courts outside the district where located, under the act of 1864. Main v. Second National Bank of Chicago, 6 Biss., 26.

But under the act of March 3, 1875, extending the jurisdiction of the circuit court to "controversies between citizens of different States," it is no longer necessary that one of the parties be a resident of the State where the suit is brought. Osgood v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 6 Biss., 330.

National banks are to be deemed residents of the State and district where they are located and established, Id.; Day v. Newark Ind. Rub. Man. Co., 1 Blatch., 628; Pomeroy v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 4 Id., 120; Commercial Bank v. Simmons, 10 Alb., L. J., 155.

The 10th subdivision of Sec. 629, does not give exclusive jurisdiction to the circuit courts; their jurisdiction is concurrent with State courts. Pittilon v. Noble, 7 Biss., 450.

Jurisdiction to enjoin.-The circuit court has jurisdiction at the suit of a stockholder, to enjoin the officers of a national bank for any misapplication of its funds which might result from an act not warranted by its charter, or which would amount to a breach of trust. Shoemaker v. The Mechanics' National Bank, 2 Abb., U. S., 416; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How., 341.

But it has no jurisdiction of a suit by a private person to restrain, interfere with, or control the treasurer of the United States, or the comptroller of the currency, in the dicharge of their duties, in respect to bonds deposited with the Treasurer to secure the redemption of the circulating notes of a bank. Van Antwerp v. Hulbard, 6 Blatch., 426.

In a suit brought by a citizen of New York, against the comptroller of the currency, and the treasurer of the United States, claiming by assignment the title to certain bonds, deposited with said treasurer to secure the circulation of a national bank; and in his bill set forth that the comptroller of the currency and treasurer refused to recognize his rights to the bonds or their proceeds; that the comptroller had appointed a citizen of New York as receiver of said bank, and that the receiver claimed an interest in said bonds, adverse to the plaintiff; it was held, that the bill presented a question of property between the plaintiff and the receiver, but as they were residents of the same State the circuit court had no jurisdiction. Van Antwerp v. Hulbard, 8 Blatch., 282.

A national bank may sue in the federal courts, and enjoin the collection of State and county taxes levied on its capital stock. First Nat. Bank of Omaha v County of Douglass, 3 Dill., C. C., 298; City Nat. Bank v. Paducah, 3 Cent. L. J., 347.

Suits to enjoin the comptroller of the currency.— Eleventh. Of all suits brought by [or against] any banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under the provisions of Title, "THE NATIONAL BANKS," to enjoin the comptroller of the currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided by said title. [See ? 5237.] 3 June, 1864, c. 106, ss. 50, 57, v. 13, pp. 115, 116. 18 Feb., 1875, c. 80, v. 18, p. 318.

The words in italic stricken out by amendment of Feb. 18, 1875.

Suits for injuries done under laws of the United States. -Twelfth. Of all suits brought by any person to recover damages for any injury to his person or property on account of any act done by him, under any law of the United States for the protection or collection of any of the revenues thereof, or to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote in the several States.

2 Mar., 1833, c. 57, s. 2, v. 4, p. 632; 13 July, 1866, c. 184, s. 67, v. 14, p. 171; 28 Feb., 1871, c. 99, s. 15, v. 16, p. 438; 31 May, 1870, c. 114, v. 16,p. 140.