CONSTITUTION OF FLORIDA

alls such vacancy by appointment to hold not longer than the end of the next ensuing session of the Senate, and when such next ensuing session of the Senate convenes it is the duty of the Governor to submit appointees to fill such vacancies to the Senate. Advisory opinion to Governor, 45 Fla. 154, 34 So. 571.

When a term of an elective State office is vacant within the meaning of the statute, the Governor has the executive power to fill such vacancy by appointment, but the term of office of such appointee shall extend only to the election and qualification of a successor at the ensuing general election. Advisory opinion to Governor, 65 Fla. 434, 62 So. 363.

Section 8. The Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the legislature by proclamation, and shall in his proclamation state the purpose for which it is to be convened, and the legislature when organized shall transact no legislative business other than that for which it is especially convened, or such other legislative business as the Governor may call to its attention while in session, except by a two-thirds vote of each house.

When the legislature is convened in extra session by executive proclamation, it is the duty of the Governor under the Constitution to transmit to the Senate for its action thereon, appointments to the offices of circuit judge, State Attorney and judge of the Criminal Court of record that had been made since the adjournment of the last session of the Senate. Advisory opinion to Governor, 64 Fla. 16, 59 So. 782.

The confirmation by the Senate of executive appointments to office can not be regarded as "legislative business" within the meaning of section 8 of article 4 of the Constitution. Ib.

Where the Governor actually calls the legislature together under the provisions of the Constitution it is immaterial what he may have thought of his action. Lasseter v State, 67 Fla. 240, 64 So. 847.

Section 9. The Governor shall communicate by message to the legislature at each regular session information concerning the condition of the State, and recommend such measures as he may deem expedient.

Section 10. In case of a disagreement between the two houses with respect to the time of adjournment, the Governor shall have power to adjourn the legislature to such time as he may think proper, provided it be not beyond the time. fixed for the meeting of the next legislature.

Section 11. The Governor shall have power to suspend the collection of fines and forfeitures, and grant reprieves for a period not exceeding sixty days, for all offences, except in cases of impeachment. In cases of conviction for treason he shall have power to suspend the execution of sentence until the case shall be reported to the legislature at its next session, when the legislature shall either pardon, direct the execution of the sentence, or grant a further reprieve; and if the legislature shall fail or refuse to make disposition of such case, the sentence shall be enforced at such time and place as the Governor may direct. He shall communicate to the legislature, at the beginning of every session, every case of fine or forfeiture remitted, or reprieve, pardon or

As amended

at general

commutation granted, stating the name of the convict, the crime for which he was convicted, the sentence, its date, and the date of its remission, commutation, pardon or reprieve.

Under this section the Governor may grant two or more successive reprieves in the same case that in the aggregate exceed sixty days, but no one of them shall exceed a period of sixty days. Advisory opinion to Governor, 62 Fla. 7, 55 So. 865.

The Constitution does not require the Governor to communicate to the legislature at an extra session, the specified data as to every case of fine or forfeiture remitted, or reprieve, pardon or commutation granted. Advisory opinion to Governor, 64 Fla. 21, 59 So. 786.

Section 12. The Governor, Secretary of State, Compelection 1896. troller, Attorney-General and Commissioner of Agriculture, or a major part of them, of whom the Governor shall be one, may, upon such conditions and with such limitations and restrictions as they may deem proper, remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishment, and grant pardon after conviction, in all cases except treason and impeachment, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons.

The power conferred upon the pardoning board to grant pardons after conviction, etc., in all cases except treason and impeachment, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons, is exclusive, and can not be exercised by the legislature. Singleton v State, 38 Fla. 297, 21 So. 21.

The law is settled that, when a criminal accepts a pardon, he accepts it subject to all its conditions, and will be held and bound to compliance therewith. Alvarez v State, 50 Fla. 24, 39 So. 481.

A conditional pardon may provide that upon violation of the condition, the offender shall be liable to summary arrest and recommitment. Such stipulations upon acceptance of the pardon become binding upon the convict. Alvarez v State, 50 Fla. 24, 39 So. 481; State v Horne, 52 Fla. 125, 42, So. 388.

Where a conditional pardon has been granted and accepted, and the convict has fulfilled the conditions, the effect of the pardon becomes the same as though it were by its terms full and absolute. Alvarez v State, 50 Fla. 24, 39 So. 481.

Before delivery and acceptance a pardon may be revoked by the officer or body granting it, but if the pardon is not void in its inception, it can not be revoked by any cause after its delivery and acceptance are complete, for then it becomes a valid and operative act, the benefits of which its recipient can be deprived only in some appropriate legal proceeding. Ib.

In the absence of statute and unless the act constituting the violation of a condition of a pardon is itself a criminal offense, the violation of the condition is no ground for prosecution by indictment. Ib.

For proceedings to test the question whether or not there has been a violation of, or noncompliance with, the conditions of a conditional pardon in the absence of statutory regulations, see Alvarez v State, 50 Fla. 24, 39 So. 481.

Where a prisoner has accepted a conditional pardon and has been released from imprisonment by virtue thereof, but has violated or failed to perform the conditions, the pardon in the case of a condition precedent does not take effect, and in case of a condition subsequent becomes void and the criminal may thereupon be re-arrested and compelled to undergo the punishment imposed by his original sentence. State v Horne, 52 Fla. 125, 42 So. 388; Henderson v State, 55 Fla. 36, 46 So. 151.

Where a conditional pardon contains a provision that upon a breach of the condition upon which the pardon is granted it shall be the duty of the sheriff of any county of this State to immediately arrest the person and return him to the penitentiary to serve the remainder of his term, the reference is to the material terms of the sentence, viz: to the length of imprison

ment fixed by the sentence and not to the particular period of time mentioned in the sentence during which it was to be executed. State v Horne, 52 Fla. 125, 42 So. 388.

The pardoning power may in granting a pardon after conviction, impose any condition, limitation or restriction that is not illegal, immoral or impossible of performance, and the acceptance of the pardon binds the person accepting it to all such conditions. Ib.

The condition of a pardon that requires re-imprisonment for the original sentence of imprisonment after the expiration of the particular period of time fixed by the court within which the sentence imposed should be executed is not immoral or impossible of performance during the life of the convict, nor is it illegal. Ib.

If the condition of a pardon upon which the convict secures his release from imprisonment is violated the pardon becomes void and the convict may be re-arrested to undergo so much of the original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release. Ib.

Where reference is made in a conditional pardon to the sentence to be affected by the pardon, the sentence is to be taken in its legal and proper aspect, without reference to the words. Ib.

In a hearing to determine whether or not a convict has violated provisions of his conditional pardon, the convict is not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right except upon the question as to whether he is the same person who was convicted.. Ib..

When a convict has been released upon a conditional pardon his rearrest and re-commitment can not be had upon the mere order of the board of pardons alone, unless such a course is provided by statute or by the expressed terms of the pardon, but the convict is entitled to a hearing before a court of general criminal jurisdiction in order that he may show cause, if he can, that he has performed the conditions of the pardon, or that he has a legal excuse for not having done so, or that he was not the same person who was convicted. State v Horne, 52 Fla. 125, 42 So. 388; Alvarez v State, 50 Fla, 24, 39 So. 481.

Where one of the conditions of a pardon of a convict for the crime of larceny is that he should thereafter during the term of his natural life lead a law abiding life, and such convict is subsequently tried and convicted of a second larceny, such subsequent conviction is the most conclusive evidence of the violation of such condition in such pardon, and that the same was thereby annuled. Under these circumstances such a conditional pardon could not avail the defendant for any purpose or to any extent upon his trial for such subsequent second offense, either as ground for a new trial or otherwise. Henderson v State, 55 Fla. 36, 46 So. 151.

Where a conditional pardon of a convict stipulates that the pardoning board or the Governor, upon being made satisfied, ex parte, of a breach of its conditions, might declare it to be void and order the convicts re-arrest and imprisonment on the original sentence, such stipulation while valid and binding on the convict if accepted by him, does not furnish the exclusive method of adjudging a breach of such pardon and its consequent annulment. Any court of competent jurisdiction may likewise inquire into any alleged breach thereof and may annul it if satisfied of such breach. Ib.

Section 13. The Governor may, at any time, require the opinion of the justices of the Supreme court as to the interpretation of any portion of this Constitution upon any question affecting his executive powers and duties, and the justices shall render such opinion in writing.

The Governor when impeached can not require an opinion of this court upon such question so long as such impeachment is pending. Executive communication, 14 Fla. 289.

The Supreme Court is not authorized to render an opinion to the Governor as to what character of bills, if any, the legislature, at its session of 1887, is denied the power to pass, and when, when submitted to the Governor, it will be his duty for that reason to disapprove. Advisory opinion to Governor, 23 Fla. 297, 6 So. 925.

The Supreme Court is not authorized to render an opinion on the Governor's request as to what is the legal effect of an attempted remission of fines, commutation of punishment, or grant of pardon that may be voted for by a majority of the Board of Pardons, but in which the Governor does not concur. Advisory opinion to Governor, 39 Fla. 397, 22 So. 681.

CONSTITUTION OF FLORIDA

The Supreme Court is not authorized, upon the Governor's request, to interpret statutes or pass upon the constitutionality of statutes that affect the Governor's executive powers and duties. Advisory opinion to Governor, 39 Fla. 397, 22 So. 681; Advisory opinion to Governor, 50 Fla. 169, 39 So. 187; Advisory opinion to Governor, 62 Fla. 4, 57 So. 345.

The Supreme Court is not authorized to render to the Governor an opinion as to the legal meaning and effect of a statutory provision. Advisory opinion to Governor, 54 Fla. 136, 44 So. 756.

This section of the Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to render an opinion to the Governor only in interpreting a portion of the Constitution as it affects an executive power or duty of the Governor. Advisory opinion to Governor, 61 Fla. 1, 55 So. 460.

The provision of the Constitution that "no convention or legislature of this State shall act upon any amendment of the constitution of the United States proposed by Congress to the several states, unless such convention or legislature shall have been elected after such amendment is submitted" does not relate to or affect any executory power or duty of the Governor, and the Supreme Court is not authorized to interpret such provision in an opinion thereon requested by the Governor. Ib.

The Supreme Court is not authorized to render to the Governor at his request an opinion relative to his executive powers and duties in countersigning warrants drawn on the state treasury for the payment of the expense of the publication of legislative resolutions as proposed amendments to the State Constitution. Advisory opinion to Governor, 64 Fla. 1, 59 So. 778. The Supreme Court is not authorized to render to the Governor at his request an opinion as to the effect of statutory enactments. Advisory opinion to Governor, 64 Fla. 1, 59 So. 778; Advisory opinion to Governor, 69 Fla. 632, 68 So. 851.

Where the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is necessarily involved in the consideration of a question affecting the executive powers and duties, the Supreme Court will not give to the Governor at his request an opinion upon such subject. Advisory opinion to Governor, 69 Fla. 632, 68 So. 851.

Section 14. All grants and commissions shall be in the name and under the authority of the State of Florida, sealed with the great seal of the State, signed by the Governor, and countersigned by the Secretary of State.

The commission of a United States Senator appointed by the Governor should be signed by the Governor and sealed with the great seal of the State, and countersigned by the Secretary of State. State v Crawford, 28 Fla. 441, 10 So. 118.

A commission is not complete until it has been signed, countersigned and sealed. Ib.

Section 15. All officers that shall have been appointed or elected, and that are not liable to impeachment, may be suspended from office by the Governor for malfeasance, or misfeasance, or neglect of duty in office, for the commission of any felony, or for drunkenness or incompetency, and the cause of suspension shall be communicated to the officer suspended and to the Senate at its next session. And the Governor, by and with the consent of the Senate, may remove any officer, not liable to impeachment, for any cause above named. Every suspension shall continue until the adjournment of the next session of the Senate, unless the officer suspended shall, upon the recommendation of the Governor, be removed; but the Governor may reinstate the officer so suspended upon satisfactory evidence that the charge or charges against him are untrue. If the Senate shall refuse

to remove, or fail to take action before its adjournment, the officer suspended shall resume the duties of the office. The Governor shall have power to fill by appointment any office, the incumbent of which has been suspended. No officer suspended who shall under this section resume the duties of his office, shall suffer any loss of salary or other compensation in consequence of such suspension. The suspension or removal herein authorized shall not relieve the officer from indictment for any misdemeanor in office.

The neglect and refusal of the Governor to remove an officer on demand of the sureties on his bond does not relieve the sureties from liability for a subsequent defalcation of the officer. State v Smith, 16 Fla. 175.

The Governor has the power, when acting within the authority conferred, to hear and decide as to the existence of any alleged neglect of duty in office as a ground for suspending an officer. This authority is vested by the Constitution in the Governor and does not appertain to and can not be exercised by the courts. State v Johnson, 30 Fla. 433, 11 So. 845.

The Governor may suspend an officer for neglect of duty in office, without giving previous notice to the officer of the charge made against him, but it is the Governor's duty to notify any officer he may suspend of the cause of such suspension, and give him a hearing on such charges, and reinstate him if the evidence does not sustain the charges. The officer has a constitutional right to such hearing. Ib.

So long as the Governor's action in suspending an officer is within the limits of his constitutional power, the courts can not interfere to arrest his action. He is the exclusive judge, insofar as the courts are concerned, of the sufficiency of the proof, not merely because the courts have been given no power of review, but for the reason that the Senate has been granted such power. Ib.

Where an officer has been regularly suspended by the Governor, for any cause recognized by this section, and the successor of the suspended officer has been commissioned, the latter officer is entitled to the official property of the office, and mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the suspended officer to deliver it. Ib.

A suspension from office and appointment to fill the office under section 15 of Article 4 of the Constitution, do not affect the suspended officer's right to qualify for or exercise the duties of a succeeding term of the same office; nor do they prevent a Governor, succeeding the one who made the suspension, from commissioning the suspended officer for the new term. Advisory opinion to Governor, 31 Fla. 1, 12 So. 114.

An appointment to fill an office, the incumbent of which has been suspended, can not be for a longer period than the remainder of the pending term of the suspended officer, and until the qualification of his successor. Ib.

In the event the Governor should wish to remove one or more of the members of the State Board of Control, it is presumed that he would do so in the way prescribed by section 15 of Article 4 of the Constitution. State Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929.

Removal from office being authorized only for certain causes, the court may inquire into the existence of the jurisdictional facts, that is, whether the facts upon which the removing power acted were legal cause for removal. State v Henry, 60 Fla. 246, 53 So. 742.

The Constitution does not authorize the Governor to suspend an incumbent of the office of county commissioner for an act of malfeasance or misfeasance in office committed by him prior to the date of the begining of his current term of office as such county commissioner. Advisory opinion to Governor, 64 Fla. 168, 60 So. 337.

Under the Constitution long continued illness of a circuit judge rendering him unable to devote his personal attention to the duties of his office does not create a vacancy in the office so as to authorize an executive appointment thereto. Advisory opinion to Governor, 67 Fla. 423, 65 So. 224.

The same acts on the part of an official that will justify his suspension from office will also justify his permanent removal. Advisory opinion to Governor, 69 Fla. 508, 68 So. 450.

The Governor has no power to permanently remove an officer from his office unless it be done by and with the consent of the Senate. Ib.