the road. It is claimed by plaintiff in error that the exceptional liability provided by the Constitution and statutes against corporation stockholders for "labor performed for such corporation" does not include such services as those of Innes. We think this objection is well taken. The Constitution evidently intended to protect those persons who most needed protection and who would be most likely to suffer without it. No doubt the term "labor" in some extended senses will include every possible human exertion, mental and physical, and in that broad signification it would be hard to find any case which would not come within the law. But inasmuch as the provision is manifestly designed to be exceptional, we must apply to it the ordinary meaning which is in common use, and which it must be presumed the people understood when they voted on the Constitution. Doubtless the precise line between what is commonly called labor, and other employment cannot be drawn with absolute precision. But we feel very sure that the position of an assistant chief engineer would never have been classed as that of a laborer, nor his work as labor in the popular sense. It is mostly direction and scientific work, involving much more superintendence than personal exertion in manual labor. He is chosen for his knowledge and not for his muscular capacity, in which latter quality he may or may not be eminent. We can get little aid from authority on any such question. It is not to be decided upon verbal niceties or far-fetched reasoning. We are bound to construe the provision as the ordinary meaning of language would define it, and no extended argument can make it plainer than the words themselves. In our opinion the provision is not ambiguous as applicable to such an employment as that of the plaintiff below. Judgment must be reversed with costs of both courts. JEFFERSON J. GIBSON V. THOMAS CRANAGE, JR. Optional contracts of sale. An agreement was made with an artist for a portrait that need not be taken or paid for if unsatisfactory. Held that however good the picture is, the customer is the only judge whether it suits him or not, and if not, he cannot be compelled to pay for it. Error to Bay. Submitted June 7. Decided June 11. ASSUMPSIT. Plaintiff brings error. Shepard & Lyon for plaintiff in error. A vendor is entitled to a reasonable time within which to replace defective merchandise before the contract of purchase is rescinded, Davis v. Downs, 4 Mich., 531. Scofield & Webster for defendant in error. MARSTON, J. Plaintiff in error brought assumpsit to recover the contract price for the making and execution of a portrait of the deceased daughter of defendant. It appeared from the testimony of the plaintiff that he at a certain time called upon the defendant and solicited the privilege of making an enlarged picture of his deceased daughter. He says "I was to make an enlarged picture that he would like, a large one from a small one, and one that he would like and recognize as a good picture of his little girl, and he was to pay me." The defendant testified that the plaintiff was to take the small photograph and send it away to be finished, "and when returned if it was not perfectly satisfactory to me in every particular, I need not take it or pay for it. I still objected and he urged me to do so. There was no risk about it; if it was not perfectly satisfactory to me I need not take it or pay for it." There was little if any dispute as to what the agreement was. After the picture was finished it was shown 39 MICH.-7. to defendant who was dissatisfied with it and refused to accept it. Plaintiff endeavored to ascertain what the objections were, but says he was unable to ascertain clearly, and he then sent the picture away to the artist to have it changed. On the next day he received a letter from defendant reciting the original agreement, stating that the picture shown him the previous day was not satisfactory and that he declined to take it or any other similar picture, and countermanded the order. A farther correspondence was had, but it was not very material and did not change the aspect of the case. When the picture was afterwards received by the plaintiff from the artist, he went to see defendant and to have him examine it. This defendant declined to do, or to look at it, and did not until during the trial, when he examined and found the same objections still existing. We do not consider it necessary to examine the charge. in detail, as we are satisfied it was as favorable to plaintiff as the agreement would warrant. The contract (if it can be considered such) was an express one. The plaintiff agreed that the picture when finished should be satisfactory to the defendant, and his own evidence showed that the contract in this important particular had not been performed. It may be that the picture was an excellent one and that the defendant ought to have been satisfied with it and accepted it, but under the agreement the defendant was the only person who had the right to decide this question. Where parties thus deliberately enter into an agreement which violates no rule of public policy, and which is free from all taint of fraud or mistake, there is no hardship whatever in holding them bound by it. Artists or third parties might consider a portrait an excellent one, and yet it prove very unsatisfactory to the person who had ordered it and who might be unable to point out with clearness or certainty the defects or objections. And if the person giving the order stipulates that the portrait when finished must be satisfactory to him or else he will not accept or pay for it, and this is agreed to, he may insist upon his right as given him by the contract. McCarren v. McNulty, 7 Gray, 141; Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass., 136: 18 Amer., 465. The judgment must be affirmed with costs. The other Justices concurred. PENNSYLVANIA FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA V. EMMA KITTLE. Forfeiture for additional insurance-Waiver. Where a policy contained a clause of forfeiture for additional insurance, evidence that such insurance was obtained because the insured understood that the original policy was invalid, was held irrelevant in an action on the policy. Breach of a contract is not excused by good faith. But the error of admitting such evidence was held to have been cured by an instruction that the policy was avoided by the additional insurance unless the breach of the condition had been waived. In a suit on an insurance policy it is not error to admit evidence of the basis on which another company from which additional insurance had been obtained, had settled for the loss; such evidence does not prove the extent of the loss as against the defendant company, but shows what has been paid in reduction of its risk. Forfeiture of a policy for additional insurance is waived, where the adjusting agent, with knowledge of such insurance, puts the insured to the expense of making up proofs of loss and requires him from time to time to correct them, without giving him to understand that the company will rely upon the forfeiture. Where an insurance policy requires that in making proof of loss the written portion of any policy for additional insurance shall be set forth, the court cannot presume that the statement actually made does not substantially comply with the requirement, if the later policy is not in proof. D. C. Holbrook for plaintiff in error. An insurance policy is forfeited by taking additional insurance without the consent of the first insurer, where the policy makes it a ground of forfeiture, N. Y. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Watson, 23 Mich., 486; Western Mass. Ins. Co. v. Riker, 10 Mich., 279; Security Ins. Co. v. Fay, 22 Mich., 467; and the reason for taking such insurance is not admissible, Westchester Ins. Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich., 143; Hibernia Ins. Co. v. O'Connor, 29 Mich., 241. Julian G. Dickinson and Theodore Romeyn for defendant in error. A cause of forfeiture of insurance is waived, where although it is known to the company, the insured is put to the expense of making proof of loss, Ins. Co. of N. A. v. Hope, 58 Ill., 75; Webster v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 36 Wis., 67; Wood on Fire Insurance, 837; Dohn v. Farmers' Insurance Co., 5 Lans., 275; McBride v. Republic F. Ins. Co., 30 Wis., 562; Lycoming F. Ins. Co. v. Dunmore, 75 Ill., 14; the question whether the conduct of the insurer did not amount to a waiver is properly given to the jury, Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 12 Mich., 202; Whitwell v. Putnam F. Ins. Co., 6 Lans., 166; Shearman v. Niagara Ins. Co, 46 N. Y., 531; Pelkington v. Nat. Ins. Co., 55 Mo., 172; Viele v. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Ia., 9; Ripley v. Ætna Ins. Co., 30 N. Y., 136; Hayward v. Nat. Ins. Co., 52 Mo., 181; Vroman v. Darrow, 40 Ill., 171; Rohrback v. Etna Ins. Co., 62 N. Y., 613; Pechner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 65 N. Y., 195; Van Schoick v. Niagara Ins. Co., 68 N. Y., 434; Walker v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 56 Me., 371; Gans v. Ins. Co., 43 Wis., 108. COOLEY, J. No question is made in this case upon the policy issued by the plaintiff in error to Mrs. Kittle, |