in the premises in question was conveyed away by the said plaintiff, and subsequently thereafter reconveyed to him.

And thereupon said plaintiff rested his case.

Whereupon the attorneys for the said The Elizabeth Oil Cloth Company, the defendant, to maintain and prove the said issue on its part, called as a witness John C. Baily, who being duly sworn, testified among other things as follows:

"I was a United States deputy marshal for the district of New Jersey in 1873, under Samuel Plummer, United States marshal, and as such took possession of the premises in controversy, among other things, in the condemnation or forfeiture proceeding brought by the United States against Charles L. Sicher for illicit distilling, in February, 1878, and held such position until the sale of the premises was made by the United States marshal to Edward G. Brown. While in possession of said premises, a gentleman came there whose name and appearance I cannot remember, and told me that he had a claim against the premises.”

Whereupon the counsel for the plaintiffs did then and there insist before the said judge that the said testimony should not be allowed, on the ground that the same was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, and prayed the said court not to admit and allow the same; and the said judge did then and there allow and admit the said testimony to be introduced. Whereupon the counsel for the said plaintiff did then and there propose his aforesaid objection to the ruling of the said court, and prayed that this bill of exceptions might be sealed, and it is sealed accordingly. JNO. T. NIXON, J. [L. S.]

And thereupon under the above ruling the witness further testified: "I told the gentleman that the place for him to go and defend his claim was at Trenton, and told him also of the notice, viz.: the proclamation, which had been set up; I also published that notice in the Jersey City Times.

"I saw the same gentleman on the day of sale. He was with Mr. M. E. G. Brown, and I had conversation with them both there."

And being cross-examined, said:

"I remember that there was an announcement made at the marshal's sale in regard to certain lien claims on the premises. A paper relating to said claims was also served upon me. Mr. Alward appeared as the attorney for the lien claimants on that day."'

And thereupon the counsel for the defendant offered in evidence the following records, viz.:

An exemplified copy of the following deed, viz.: Edward G. Brown and wife, to Charles L. Sicher, war. deed, dated August 20, 1872; received August 20, 1872; in Book 73 Deeds for Union Co., pp. 10, etc., conveys the premises in question.

The record in full of the decree and proceedings in the following case, viz. U. S. District Court, District of New Jersey; the United States of America v. Eighty-nine Hogsheads of Molasses, etc.; (pro ut the same.) And also an exemplified copy of the following deed, viz.: Samuel

Plummer, U. S. marshal, to Edward G. Brown; deed dated May 29, 1873; received June 7, 1873; in Book 81 of Deeds for Union Co., pp. 301, etc.; conveys the premises in controversy under and by virtue of the decree and execution in the last above named case; (pro ut the same).

Whereupon the counsel for the said plaintiff then and there, and in each instance on the production thereof, interposed and insisted that the said evidence so offered to be given by the defendant, to wit, the decree and proceedings on forfeiture and the deed of the United States marshal to Brown thereunder, was not good or admissible at law upon the issue aforesaid, and ought not to be admitted in bar of plaintiff's title to the premises in controversy, for the reason that the plaintiff's title acquired under the mechanic's lien proceedings, as aforesaid, was by law prior to the title of the said defendants acquired under the said condemnation proceedings; also for the reason that the said condemnation proceedings in no wise condemned or forfeited the interests of the said lienors in said premises, and that their said interest had not been affected by said proceedings; also for the reason that by the several acts of Congress, and the supplements thereto under which said proceedings were had and maintained, only the right, title, and interest of the said Charles L. Sicher in the premises could have been seized and condemned to be forfeited, and that the interests of the said lienors could have in no wise been affected thereby, and also as only the interest of said Sicher in the premises had been seized and condemned, said Brown acquired only that interest at the marshal's sale, and took his title, therefore, subject to the mechanic's liens on the premises; also for the reason that as under the laws of New Jersey the title of the said plaintiff to the premises upon the sale to him by the sheriff of Union county reverted back to the date of the commencement of the buildings, viz.: June 25, 1872, long prior to the time when the business of distilling was carried on by the said Sicher on the premises, and long prior to the time when the United States acquired its lien thereto, the same condemnation proceedings were ineffectual to cut off or affect said plaintiff's title; also for the reason that by the acts of Congress, and the supplements thereto, under which said proceedings were had, only the right, title and interest of Charles L. Sicher in the premises, and the right, title and interest of every person who knowingly suffered and permitted the business of a distillery to be there carried on, or who connived at the same, could be forfeited to the United States, and no proof has been made, either in the condemnation proceedings or in the trial of this cause, that the lienors had knowingly suffered and permitted the business of a distillery to be carried on on the premises, or that they had connived at the same, and therefore that the interests of such lienors had not been forfeited to the United States and were not affected by the decree; also for the reason that the district court never had jurisdiction to pronounce the said decree in that the United States internal revenue collector had not seized the said premises prior to the filing of the information; also for the reason that the information did not pronounce in distinct articles the causes of forfeiture, and did not aver that the same were

contrary to the form of the statutes in such case made and provided, and that the allegations therein did not conform strictly to the statutes under which the proceedings were had, and therefore the said decree was void and no title could be acquired thereunder; also for the reason that the said decree was void in that the court in said proceedings did not have proof made of the allegations in the libel of information, and therefore said Brown acquired no title to the premises in question, and also on the ground that by the terms of said deed all that said Brown acquired was the right, title and interest of said Sicher of, in, and to the premises in controversy, and therefore took the same subject to said mechanic's liens.

But his honor, the said judge, held and affirmed that the said evidence so offered to be given by the defendant, as aforesaid, was good and admissible in law, and thereupon the same was read and given in evidence. To which ruling of his honor, the said judge, the plaintiff then and there prayed a bill of exceptions, and his honor, the said justice, sealed the exception accordingly.

JNO. T. NIXON, J. [L. S.]

And thereupon the said defendant, further to prove and maintain the said issue on its part, offered in evidence certain, records and mesne conveyances by which the title to the premises in controversy passed from said Brown and became finally vested in the said defendant; and thereupon the said defendant, further to prove and maintain the said issue on its part, called as a witness

Edward G. Brown, who, being duly sworn, testified, among other things, as follows:

"I have heard the testimony of the witness, John C. Bailey, in reference to the gentleman who was present with me at the marshal's sale; that gentleman was Frederick L. Heidritter, a son of the plaintiff.''

was in

Whereupon the counsel for the plaintiff then and there objected to the admission of the said testimony, for the reason that the same 'competent, immaterial, and irrelevant, and the said judge did then and there allow and admit the said testimony to be introduced.

Whereupon the counsel for the said plaintiff did then and there propose his aforesaid objection to the ruling of the said court, and prayed that his bill of exception might be sealed, and it is sealed accordingly. JNO. T. NIXON, J. [L. S.] Thereupon, under the above ruling, this witness further testified, and being cross-examined, said:

"I remember a paper being read at the sale; Mr. Alward was pres ent; the paper was in regard to certain lien claims on the seized premises; also had a conversation with said Frederick L. Heidritter in relation to the liens; I knew at the time I purchased the premises, at said sale, of the existence of the liens."

And thereupon the defendant, further to prove and maintain the issue on its part, called

James Ray, who, being duly sworn, testified, among other things, as follows:

"I am a government storekeeper, and remember the seizure of the premises in controversy. I saw Mr. Frederick L. Heidritter at the distillery shortly after the seizure.''

Whereupon the counsel for plaintiff did then and there object to the admission of the testimony, and insisted that the same be not allowed in evidence, for the reason that it was incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant, and his honor, the said judge, then and there admitted and allowed the said testimony to be introduced.

Whereupon the counsel for the said plaintiff did then and there propose his aforesaid objection to the ruling of the said court, and prayed that his bill of exception might be sealed, and it was sealed accordingly. JNO. T. NIXON, J. [L. S.] Thereupon under the above ruling, the witness testified further, as follows:

"Said Heidritter said he had a claim against the building, and that he thought his claim came in ahead of the government. He wanted permission to put a paper on the building, and he did post such a paper." And being cross-examined, said:

66
'That paper was the same as was read at the sale.''

And said defendant, further to prove and maintain the issue on its part, called as a witness

Frederick L. Heidritter, who, being duly sworn, among other things, said:

"I reside and do business at Elizabeth; I am a lumber dealer, and am now a partner of my father, the plaintiff in this case. I have been connected with my father's business for fifteen years last past, and was in business with him at the time of the seizure, and was then his managing clerk.''

Whereupon the counsel for the plaintiff did then and there interpose and object to the admission of said testimony, for the reason that the same was immaterial and irrelevant, and the said judge did then and there allow and admit the said testimony to be introduced.

Whereupon the counsel for the said plaintiff did then and there propose his aforesaid objection to the ruling of the said court, and prayed that his bill of exception might be sealed, and it is sealed accordingly. JNO. T. NIXON, J. [L. S.]

And said witness, being cross-examined, said:"The building seized was the same for which the materials were supplied by my father, and mentioned in the lien claims.''

And thereupon the defendant closed its case, and this concluded the testimony in the case.

APPELLATE FORM XVIII.-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

[Judgment reversed, 262 Fed. 680.]

[Title in District Court with name of trial Judge.]

New York, January 6, 1919.

APPEARANCES:

ROGER FOSTER, Attorney for Plaintiff.

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, Attorneys for Defendant CROMWELL, Executor, &c., Clarke M. Rosecrantz, P. L. Miller, of Counsel.

EDGAR T. BRACKETT, Attorney for Defendant CRAMER, Executor, &c., Edgar T. Brackett, Hiram C. Todd, of Counsel.

A jury was impanelled and sworn.

Opening for plaintiff.

[Here insert abstract of testimony exhibits and proceedings on trial prior to verdict, together with exceptions as noted in stenographers' minutes.]

The foregoing bill of exceptions contains all the evidence received upon the trial of this action or relating to the foregoing exceptions.

The attorney for the plaintiff in error, the plaintiff below, having thereupon tendered this as the plaintiff's bill of exceptions to the rulings of the Court upon the trial of this action and having requested that the signature and seal of the Trial Judge aforesaid should be annexed to the same pursuant to the statute in such case made and provided; and forasmuch as none of such matters and exceptions so offered and made to the rulings and directions of said judge, and none of the evidence and other things do appear upon the record of said case, the said Judge pursuant to said request did put his signature and seal to this bill of exceptions this 1st day of April, 1919, and orders the same on file.

AUGUSTUS N. HAND,

(Court Seal)

Trial Judge.

APPELLATE FORM XIX.-PRAECIPE INDICATING PORTIONS OF THE RECORD TO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE TRANSCRIPT UPON APPEAL.

[232 Fed. 35.]

[Title in District Court.]

Sirs: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the appellant's statement of the evidence in this cause was this day lodged in the office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for your examination; and that on the 23rd day of March, 1915, in the United