Civil Procedure of that State was then in force and provided as follows: "There is only one form of civil action. The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of those actions and suits have been abolished.

III. They deny, upon information and belief, each and every allegation in the tenth paragraph of said petition. They deny that the judgment, which is described in the eleventh paragraph of said petition, was a judgment at law. They deny, upon information and belief, each and every allegation in the twelfth paragraph of said petition. They deny the allegation, in the thirteenth paragraph of said petition, that said action, which was removed to the Federal court, therein described, was an action at law. They deny that the amended complaint filed by these respondents on January 9, 1901, in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York was an amended complaint at law. They deny that the allegation in said amended complaint, that the petitioner herein had agreed to assume the obligations of the Connecticut Company, therein described, was immaterial. They aver that said allegation was material and was admitted by the defendant, the present petitioner, under the oath of its attorneys, to be true. They deny each and every allegation in the nineteenth paragraph of said petition, which avers that the statement therein quoted from the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals was a dictum, and which avers that the said Court did not notice the facts of the authority therein cited. They deny that the appearance made by the petitioner in its motion for said mandate was a special appearance at law; and they aver that said appearance was a general appearance; and that no leave of said Court to make a special appearance for that purpose was granted to the petitioner. They deny the allegation in the twenty-first paragraph of said petition, that the petitioner appeared specially at law in opposition to the application for leave to reframe the complaint in said action. They aver that the said appearance was general, and that no permission was given to the said petitioner to make a special appearance at that time. They deny the allegations in the twenty-first paragraph of said petition, concerning the form of the bill of complaint as amended, in accordance with the leave then granted. They allege that the substantial allegations of the facts constituting the cause of action averred in said bill of complaint, except those concerning the history of the litigation, were the same as those in the complaint previously filed; and that the only material difference between the two pleadings was that in the last complaint more relief was prayed for than in the former pleadings. They deny the allegation in the twenty-second paragraph of said petition, that no equity process was served on the petitioner. They aver that process, equivalent to equity process, was served upon said petitioner in the State Court before said removal and that said petitioner made a general appearance in said action in said State Court. They deny the allegation in said paragraph of said petition that the petitioner made no appearance whatever in equity. They deny the allegation in the twentythird paragraph of said petition, that the said petitioner appeared special

ly on June 1, 1903. They aver that the appearance then made by said petitioner was a general appearance; and that no permission was ever given to said petitioner to make a special appearance then, nor at any other time in said case. They deny the allegation in the twenty-fourth para graph of said petition, that the answer of the petitioner filed on or about August 4, 1903, did not waive the objection to the jurisdiction previously taken. They deny the allegations in the twenty-fifth paragraph of said petition, concerning the matters which were proved in said case, and each and of all of the same. They deny the allegations in said paragraph of said petition concerning the law of Massachusetts. They deny the allegation in said paragraph of said petition that the omission of words of succession in the promise to Dancel was intentional. They further deny the allegation therein contained that the annuity contract was performed in Massachusetts. They deny each and all of the allegations in the twenty ninth paragraph of said petition. They deny each and every allegation in the thirtieth paragraph of said petition.

IV. This action was commenced by the service of a summons without a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, on October 15, 1900, to enforce a contract for. the payment of $5,000 a year in equal monthly installments to Christian Dancel, during the life of certain Letters Patent. The said contract was dated January 2, 1892, and was then made between said Christian Dancel and the Goodyear Shoe Machinery Company of Hartford, Connecticut, a Connecticut corporation. On March 9, 1893, the said Connecticut corporation transferred all its property to the defendant and petitioner herein, which had been organized for the purpose of accepting said transfer. In consideration of said transfer, the said defendant and petitioner assumed all the debts of the said Connecticut Com pany, and agreed to dissolve the same. The said Connecticut corporation was duly dissolved, and an entry of said dissolution was made upon the books of the defendant. The said defendant furthermore transferred into its books of account all accounts between the said Connecticut corporation and other persons, including the account between said Connecticut corporation and said Dancel; and charged against itself, namely, said defendant petitioner, all debit entries in said accounts. A novation of said contract thereupon took place between said Christian Dancel and said defendant. The said defendant until the death of Dancel paid to him all the installments maturing under said contract; and said Dancel accepted said payments from said defendant. The same defendant paid after the death of Dancel to his personal representatives, the plaintiffs below the respondents here, one installment of said annuity. After the death of said Dancel and about September 1, 1899, the said defendant executed a paper which purported to assign to a corporation named the United Shoe Machinery Company of New Jersey, all of the property of said defendant in the State of New York, and as these respondents are informed and believe in the United States, excepting, however, certain Letters Patent. Said conveyance was made without any adequate consideration, and was in fraud of the creditors of the said Maine corporation, including the plaintiffs below and the re

spondents here. It was made with the intention of preventing the plaintiffs below and the respondents here from enforcing the contract in suit; this action to enforce which was then contemplated and expected by defendant, but had not yet been taken. In return for the execution of said paper, the said New Jersey corporation executed a paper, which as these respondents are informed and believe assumed the debts of the said de-` fendant Maine corporation. At or about said time, or subsequently thereto before the entry of the decree, the name of said defendant was changed to the United Shoe Machinery Company of Maine. After the first decision

of the Circuit Court of Appeals herein, in which decision the contract in suit had been construed, in accordance with the contention of the plaintiffs below and respondents here, said defendant executed a paper which purported to release said New Jersey corporation from its obligations under said indemnity agreement. The said paper purporting to be a release was executed fraudulently for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of said Maine corporation, and for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiffs below and the respondents here. There was no adequate consideration for the paper purporting to be a release. Subsequently to the entry of the decree below, which was entered on or about February 28, 1905, the defendant below and the petitioner here, appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals from said decree; but filed no supersedeas bond, merely filing a bond as security for costs. Executions against the property of said defendant were duly issued under said decree to the marshals of the United States for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and returned unsatisfied. The Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York appointed on or about April 8, 1905, Robert C. Beatty, Receiver of the assets of the defendant in the State of New York. Shortly thereafter, or about said time, said defendant caused to be organized in the State of New York a new corporation by the name of the United Shoe Machine Company of New Jersey. These respondents, upon information and belief, charge: That the formation of such new corporation was for the purpose of making a third fraudulent transfer of the assets of said Connecticut corporation to said New Jersey corporation, in order to prevent the collection of the debt due these respondents; and that a transfer of said assets for said purpose was then contemplated. The Honorable E. Henry Lacombe, United States Circuit Judge, thereupon granted an injunction against the former New Jersey corporation, restraining any transfer by it of said assets, and further enjoining all persons within the Southern District of New York, in whose possession were machines formerly the property of said Connecticut corporation from paying royalties thereupon to the said New Jersey corporation. In order to obtain a vacation of said injunction and of said receivership said defendant finally filed a supersedeas bond to secure the payment of the said decree in case of affirmance by the Circuit Court of Appeals.

Since the petitioner appears to have procured the omission from the

transcript of the first opinion of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals herein handed down on or about December 15, 1902, written by Judge Wallace, a copy of the same is hereto annexed marked A.

Wherefore, these respondents pray that the said petition for a writ of certiorari may be dismissed, with costs; and these respondents will ever pray, &c.

Dated New York, April 25, 1906.

CHRISTIAN DANCEL and MARY DANCEL,
As Administrators of Christian Dancel, deceased.
J. PHILIP BERG,
Solicitor and Attorney for Respondents,
Dancel's Administrators.

CHRISTIAN DANCEL, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I am one of the respondents hereinabove named. I reside in the County of Kings, Borough of Brooklyn, City and State of New York; and I am one of the administrators of Christian Dancel, deceased. Each and every allegation in the foregoing answer is true to my own knowledge except as to the matters therein stated to be alleged upon information and belief; and as to those matters I believe the same to be true.

MARY DANCEL, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I am one of the respondents hereinabove named. I reside in the County of Kings, Borough of Brooklyn, City and State of New York; and I am one of the administrators of Christian Dancel, deceased. Each and every allegation in the foregoing answer is true to my own knowledge, except as to the matters therein stated to be alleged upon information and belief, and as to those matters I believe the same to be true.

Sworn to before me this)

25th day of April, 1906.

CHARLES STEIN,
Notary Public,

N. Y. Co.

MARY DANCEL.

CERTIORARI FORM XXIV.-ANSWER TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI WITH CROSS-PETITION.

To the Honorable the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: The answer and cross-petition of the Cusenier Company respectfully show as follows:

1. It denies that the Order of Carthusian Monks is also known as the congregation of or Order of the Chartreux. It denies that it had maintained almost uninterruptedly for several hundred years its main Chartreuse and it further alleges that said order was an illegal and unauthorized Congregation and had not a right to own any property in the Republic of France.

2. It denies that said Carthusian Monks have carried on a manufacture of a certain liqueur or cordial for several hundred years, and it denies that said liqueur was manufactured in accordance with a secret recipe or formula and that said liqueur is exclusively manufactured by them. It denies that said liqueur is or has been favorably known by reason of the good repute of its makers, and it denies that the word "Chartreuse'' constitutes a tradename, and it alleges that the reputation of said article was due to the peculiar qualities of the herbs which grew in the locality where said liqueur was manufactured, which locality had been known as Chartreuse long before the establishment of the said Monks.

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3. It denies that the establishment at Tarragona referred to in Paragraph 3 of the petition is a continuance of the ancient business of making the liqueur or cordial known as Chartreuse, and it denies that any liqueur called Chartreuse' is manufactured there and that the liqueur manufactured there is manufactured in accordance with any secret recipe or formula; and it denies that identically the same ingredients are used now for the said manufacture as had been used from time immemorial.

4. It admits that the liqueur or cordial manufactured by the monks prior to their expulsion from France has been commonly packed in the bottles and with the designs printed appearing opposite to page 4 of the petition, and it denies that the same are correctly set out in Paragraph 4 of said petition.

5. It denies that the registration referred to in Paragraph 5 of the