Sayward,' a British vessel, duly registered and documented as such, and having her home port at Victoria in the Province of British Columbia, Dominion of Canada, and commanded by one George R. Ferry, a British subject, as Captain and Master thereof, was lawfully and peaceably sailing on the high seas, to wit: in latitude 54° 43′ North, longitude 167° 51' West, fifty-nine miles from any land whatsoever, and then being fifty-nine miles northwest from Cape Cheerful, Oonalaska Island, upon waters between Oonalaska and Prybyloff Islands in Behring's Sea, as more fully appears by the chart in the record of the proceedings of the District Court of the United States in and for the territory of Alaska hereinafter referred to; And whereas said schooner was at said time and place unlawfully and forcibly seized and arrested by an armed vessel of the United States Revenue Marine, to wit, the U. S. Revenue Cutter, "Rush," cruising under instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States for the sole purpose of enforcing the municipal law of the United States, and the said British schooner was thereupon unlawfully, wrongfully, and forcibly detained and seized, and was by force taken by the said "Rush" to the port of Sitka, in the Territory of Alaska, United States of America, and within the Territory of Alaska and the waters thereof and within the dominion of the United States in Behring's Sea; [The petition then recites the proceedings taken in the District Court for the District of Alaska by the United States attorney against the schooner for an alleged violation of § 1956 of the Revised Statutes, the allegations of the libel, and proceeds as follows:-] Without this, however, and the said M. D. Ball, the United States attorney, not in any way alleging, or articulating, that the said seizure was made, or the said killing of seal was done, within any river or bay of the United States, or within a marine league of the coast of any portion of the mainland or any island belonging to the United States, or that the said vessel and her master and crew were subject to the laws of the United States sailing upon the high seas, or that any portion of the high seas beyond a marine league from the coasts of the mainland or adjacent islands was within the jurisdiction of the United States. [The petition then recites the trial, the decision of the District Court against the schooner, the motion made by the petitioner in arrest of judgment, the decree of forfeiture, the appeal taken by the petitioner to the Supreme Court, and concludes as follows:-] And whereas all matters of fact hereinbefore recited and alleged, save and except those of which this Honorable Court takes judicial notice, appear by the record and proceedings of the District Court of the United States in and for the Territory of Alaska; And whereas the said appeal has been dismissed by this Honorable Court on the application of the claimant, appellant, himself, not only because he is advised that there is no appeal given to this Court from the District of Alaska by the laws of the United States, but because he is advised that the District Court, being wholly without jurisdiction, its decree was and is a nullity, and this Honorable Court is fully authorized by Section 688 of the Revised Statutes of the United States to prohibit any proceedings in the District Court for the enforcement of the same. And whereas the said Thomas Henry Cooper is advised that in consequence of the dismissal of his appeal, according to the practice of this Honorable Court, its mandate will issue in due course without further consideration by this Court, which said mandate would, in ordinary course, not only permit, but command the District Court of Alaska to proceed to execute its pretended decree of forfeiture and it is therefore the duty of the said Thomas Henry Cooper, now here, to give this Honorable Court to understand and be informed of all and singular the matters in this suggestion recited and alleged, to the end that this Court shall consider this application for prohibition before issuing its mandate, so that it may either frame a special mandate, or take order that the ordinary mandate shall not reach the District Court before the Writ of Prohibition hereinafter prayed, or a rule to show cause why said writ should not issue, shall be served upon said Court. Wherefore the said Thomas Henry Cooper, the aid of this Honorable Court most respectfully requesting, prays remedy by writ of prohibition to be issued out of this Honorable Court to the Judge of the District Court of the United States in and for the Territory of Alaska to be directed, to prohibit him from holding the plea aforesaid, the premises aforesaid manywise concerning further before him, and to prohibit him from in any manner enforcing the said decree or sentence, or from treating the said decree as a valid sentence for any purpose, or from taking any steps whatsoever in the cause aforesaid as to said decree or any matter or thing remaining to be done in consequence of said decree, and prohibiting him, the said Judge, from making or entering any order, judgment, or decree in and about the certain stipulation exacted and required in the course of said proceedings, and generally from the further exercise of jurisdiction in said cause, or the enforcing any order, judgment, or decree made under color thereof. JOSEPH H. CHOATE, CHARLES STRAUSS, Attorney for Petition. I have read the foregoing petition by me subscribed, and the facts therein stated are true to the best of my information and belief. JOSEPH H. CHOATE. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of January, 1891. [SEAL.] OSCAR LUCKETT, Notary Public. PROHIBITION FORM IV.-RULE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY WRIT OF PROHIBITION SHOULD NOT ISSUE AGAINST ADMIRALTY PROCEEDINGS. [From record in Ex parte Fassett, Collector, 142 U. S. 479. Motion granted, writ denied.] Supreme Court of the United States. No. 10, Original. Ex parte: IN THE MATTER OF JACOB SLOAT] FASSETT, Late Collector of the Customs of the Port of New York, Petitioners. On consideration of the petition of Jacob Sloat Fassett, late Collector of Customs of the port of New York, It is now here ordered by the court that cause be shown by the Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York before this court, at Washington on the 2nd day of November next, at 12 o'clock noon of that day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, whereby a writ of prohibition should not be granted as prayed in said petition. October 19, 1891. PROHIBITION FORM V.—MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS TO PREVENT PROCEEDINGS IN EQUITY. [Motion denied, May 10, 1903, not reported. The author was counsel in opposition.] To the Honorable the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States and to the Court: And now comes Goodyear Shoe Machinery Company of Portland, Maine, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Maine, and upon the showing made by the accompanying petition for a writ of prohibition and for a writ of mandamus to the honorable the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York and to the said court, wherein it is shown that the said court by its order made and filed on the 2d day of March, 1903, in a cause at law, wherein Christian Dancel and Mary Dancel, as administrators of the goods, chattels, and credits of Christian Dancel, deceased, were plaintiffs and said Goodyear Shoe Machinery Company of Portland, Maine, was defendant, did grant leave to said plaintiffs to reframe their complaint into a bill in equity and file the same as a continuation of the said cause at law, without the service of any new process upon said defendant, and wherein it is shown that pursuant to the leave granted by said order, the said plaintiffs did on the 2d day of April, 1903, file in said court a bill in equity against said defendant, and that by the terms of said order said bill in equity will be taken pro confesso against said defendant unless it appears in equity and pleads thereto on the May, 1903, rule day, and wherein it is shown that no equity process has been served upon said defendant, and that it has made no appearance in equity, and wherein it is shown that said order cannot be reviewed by appeal or writ of error, and that it was made by said court without authority of law and without jurisdiction or power to do so and in violation of the Constitution of the United States; and moves this honorable court for leave to file the accompanying petition for a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus, and that the said writs issue as in said petition prayed for, and that your petitioner have such other and further relief in the premises as to this honorable court may seem just and right and in accordance with law; or that a rule issue on the honorable the judges of the circuit court of the United States, in the second circuit, and on the said circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, in the second circuit, directing them and it on a day to be named in said rule to show cause before this honorable court why a writ of prohibition should not be issued restraining them and it from continuing the said cause at law as a suit in equity, and restraining them and it from taking equity jurisdiction of the person of the defendant in said cause without service of equity process upon it, and why a writ of mandamus should not be issued directing them and it to strike the said order and the said bill in equity from the files of said court, and why your petitioner should not have the relief prayed for in said petition, and such other and further relief as to this honorable court may seem just and right and in accordance with law, and directing that in the meantime and until the hearing and determination of said motion that all proceedings in equity in said cause be stayed. Dated April 1903. EDWARD H. CHILDS, Attorney for Petitioner. PROHIBITION FORM VI.-PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS TO PREVENT PROCEEDINGS IN EQUITY. [Motion for leave to file petition denied, May 10, 1903. Not reported. The author was counsel in opposition.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF GOODYEAR To the Honorable the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the That whereas, by the Constitution of the United States of America, in article III, section 2, thereof, it is provided that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to cases both "in law and equity;" And whereas, by virtue of the said constitutional provision and the laws of the United States, law and equity are recognized, preserved, and administered in the courts of the United States as two separate and distinct systems of jurisprudence; And whereas the courts of the United States have no power to combine the two systems, or to administer them both in a single cause; And whereas the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, in the second circuit, has in a cause duly pending therein as a cause at law, wherein Christian Dancel and Mary Dancel, as administrators of the goods, chattels, and credits of Christian Dancel, deceased, were plaintiffs, and Goodyear Shoe Machinery Company of Portland, Maine, was defendant, granted leave to the plaintiffs therein to reframe the complaint at law into a bill in equity, and to proceed in equity against the defendant therein without the service of any new process and as a continuation of the cause commenced at law; And whereas the said circuit court has assumed to have equity jurisdiction over the person of said defendant by virtue of the jurisdiction obtained in the cause at law, and is about to take jurisdiction of the said cause as a suit in equity, and as a continuation of the action at law without the service of any new process; And whereas said defendant is advised that said court has no power |