under the advice of the persons in control of the said two defendants, to stop payment of the rental due under a lease of a valuable portion of the property of the said two defendants, namely; the so-called Third Avenue Street Railway; and to separate the said Third Avenue Street Railway from the rest of the system of said defendants. Said action will be in direct opposition to the professed object of said suit.

IX.-Your petitioner is informed and believes and avers: That it has been established by the decisions of this Court and of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, amongst others, by the following decisions: Ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 14; Jones & Laughlin's L'd v. Sands, 79 Fed. 913; Credits Commutation Co. v. U. S. 91 Fed. 570, 573; S. C. 177 U. S. 311; Toledo, St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Continental Tr. Co., 95 Fed. 497, 536, that your petitioner has no right to appeal from any of the said orders. Your petitioner, consequently, is enjoined from interfering with the assets and property of his said debtor, the Metropolitan Street Railway Company. He can take no proceedings to collect any judgment or judgments, which he may recover in said actions, except in the said Circuit Court of the United States. In the meantime, the said assets may be depleted by proceeding on the part of said complainants and of said defendant and of said receiver ship, of which he will have no notice, and with which he will have no right to interfere. He has no remedy unless this Court interferes by the writ of mandamus.

Wherefore your petitioner prays, that a rule be made and issue from this Honorable Court, directed to the said Honorable E. Henry Lacombe, Circuit Judge of the United States for the Second Circuit, and directing the said Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue, commanding the said Judge and the said Court, and each of them, to dis miss the bill of complainant in said suit, and all proceedings therein, and to vacate said orders appointing said Receivers, and to vacate said injunetions, and to desist from exercising any further jurisdiction in said suit, except the entry of an order dismissing said suit; or, in the alternative, such a writ commanding him to allow the intervention of your petitioner in said suit; or, in the alternative, that a writ of prohibition may issue from this Honorable Court forbidding the said Honorable Circuit Judge of the United States for the Second Circuit, and forbidding the said [District] Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York from taking any further proceedings in connection with said receiverships; and for such other and further relief in the premises as shall seem just and meet, and your petitioner will ever pray, &c.

JOSEPH KONRAD, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I am the peti tioner above named. The foregoing petition is true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Sworn to before me this 5th

day of November, 1907.

JOSEPH KONRAD.

[NOTARIAL SEAL.]

Notary Public,

N. Y. Co.

MANDAMUS FORM V.-PETITION TO SUPREME COURT OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FOR MANDAMUS.

To the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia:

Your petitioner, Harry S. MeCartney, respectfully shows to this Honorable Court:

1. That the petitioner is a citizen of the United States, born and ever residing therein, and is now a resident of the village of Hinsdale, County of Du Page, and State of Illinois.

Petitioner is by profession an attorney-at-law, is now in active practice, and has practiced that profession continuously for over thirty-eight years, with his office headquarters during all that time (with the exception of a couple of months) in the City of Chicago in said State.

That petitioner has also been for over a third of a century a duly qualified voter at public elections in the various communities in which he has resided during such period; and has also been for that length of time a taxpayer of the various villages, or cities, counties and States in which he has so resided; and he has also regularly paid Federal income taxes for a number of years last past.

2. Petitioner has been advised and believes that there is no seriously controverted question of fact involved in this suit but that the same seriously involves only questions of law; and that hence he is qualified to commence this suit as petitioner and to represent-at least in the first instance the

public interests involved herein and that his duty so to do is as great or as definite and urgent as that of any other citizen, that is, in the absence of any similar petition seeking the same writ and the same relief having been filed prior hereto. That he does not know of and has not heard of any similar petition or suit as having been filed or commenced.

3. Petitioner further avers: That on April 9, 1920, a joint resolution of the Congress of the United States was passed by the House of Representatives by virtue of which the state of war declared by the Congress in the resolution of April 6, 1917, to exist between the Imperial German Government and the United States, and that the state of war declared by the Congress on December 7, 1917, to exist between the United States and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, was at an end.

4. That on May 15, 1920, the Senate of the United States passed said joint resolution with several amendments, the vote on such resolution being as follows: 43 members voting for, 38 members voting against, and 15 not voting.

5. That on May 21, 1920, the House of Representatives of the United States passed the said joint resolution as amended by the Senate, the vote thereon being as follows: 228 members voting for, 139 voting against, and 59 not voting.

6. That although the Court, as petitioner is advised, will take judicial notice of such proceedings and of the terms and import of said joint resolution, petitioner-for convenience-annexes a true copy thereof as "Exhibit A" to this petition.

7. Petitioner avers that the passage of said joint resolution by the Congress aforesaid and by a majority vote of each house thereof, was a valid exercise of power on the part of Congress to declare peace between the nations as aforesaid, and that the said joint resolution is today in full force and legal effect, unmodified and unrepealed.

8. That Bainbridge Colby was at the time of the passage of said joint resolution, has been since, and now is the Secretary of State of the United States. That Henry J. Bryan was at the time of the passage of said joint resolution, has been since, and now is the Editor of Laws of the United States.

That it is the express and legally prescribed duty of said Bryan, as such Editor, to promptly publish and promulgate the laws of the United States; and it is the express and legally prescribed duty of said Bainbridge Colby, as such Secretary of State, to see that the said laws are so promulgated and published.

9. That although said joint resolution of Congress has been in force for almost two months last past, said Bryan has neglected and still does neglect, and, as petitioner is informed and believes, has refused and still does refuse to publicly promulgate or publish the said joint resolution as an existing law of the United States, and so far as your petitioner is informed and believes he has taken no tangible steps whatever so to do; and that said Colby has neglected to cause said joint resolution to be so promulgated and published, and so far as petitioner is informed and be

lieves he has refused and still refuses so to do, and has made no demand upon said Bryan to so promulgate and publish said resolution, nor has he taken any other tangible steps whatever so to do or given directions for having the same done.

10. Your petitioner further alleges that from the fact that the said joint resolution had not been formally promulgated and published as an existing law of the United States it results that the existence of peace between the United States and the late adversary nations of the Republic of Germany, and of the "Governments and Peoples of Austria and Hungary' is not fully recognized and in fact is not even ordinarily recognized by either the officials or the people at large of the United States, nor is it so recognized by the officials or the people at large of said adversary nations.

11. That from the same fact of non-promulgation and non-publication of said joint resolution there has arisen grave doubt in such official circles and in the minds of the people at large of each and all of said nations involved in the late war as to whether or not a state of war still actually and legally exists between them. That such a situation confused as it is and legally undefined by the courts of the United States is inherently potent with national peril and with peril to the public comfort, morale and moral régimé and the normal pursuit of patriotic ideals by the people of the United States as a nation and by its entire citizenship as such. That to a very definite degree such situation affects the lives, liberties, privileges and rights of property of the citizens at large and their inherent right of a normal pursuit of happiness, and if much longer continued is apt to embarrass the United States and its citizenship at large in their claims that ours is primarily a nation of peace and our flag primarily a symbol of peace; and the same will tend to give rise to misunderstandings and embarrassments to the nation at large in the due prosecution of its acknowledged aims to practically and efficiently aid in the cause of a permanent world peace.

12. Your petitioner further avers that prior to the late war the aggregate volume of trade between the people of the United States and the said adversary nations was colossal in extent and that the loss thereof has, to at least some definite extent, affected financially every locality in the United States if not in fact nearly every household therein or in fact nearly every citizen thereof; and that domestic and internal economy throughout the entire domain of the United States has been definitely affected by such loss of trade and is still heavily affected by the non-resumption of full trading privileges between said nations. That, as is evident, such trade is not apt to be restored to its full or natural proportions until the existence of peace between the nations affected by said peace resolution shall be openly, formally and authoritatively recognized by the United States, and its officials and courts. That many public food regulations and restrictions are in existence today in various localities throughout the country, solely by reason of the late war, and many remain unrepealed and unchanged because of the fact that a state of peace has not been so openly, formally and authoritatively recognized.

13. Wherefore petitioner files this petition on behalf of himself as such citizen of the United States and on behalf of its citizenship at large so far as he is able so to do and so far as he appropriately can do so; hereby inviting this Court and any other court to which this case may be appealed to exercise its power and discretion to allow any other citizen or citizens to become co-petitioner herein which citizen or citizens it may find to be the better qualified to represent the public interests endeavored to be represented in this suit; and also to appoint any counsel whom said court may judge the better able to prosecute such petition in the public interest and to the better direct the course of this proceeding, to the end: That all questions of law and all questions of jurisdiction and official duty to act in the premises by the said Colby and Bryan, or other public officials may be thoroughly and judicially found, tested and determined in this proceeding; and that the demands, privileges and interests of the citizenship at large of this nation may be properly, formally and exhaustively marshalled and fairly and fully represented for consideration by this court and for ultimate action and relief in the premises.

14. Wherefore your petitioner, Harry S. Mecartney, the aid of this Honorable Court thus requesting, prays that a writ of mandamus may issue to said Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of State of the United States, directing and commanding said Colby, as such Secretary, to cause to be publicly promulgated and published said joint resolution of Congress, and directing said Henry J. Bryan, Editor of Laws, to publicly promulgate and publish said joint resolution of Congress as a duly passed and legally existing law and declaration of peace; or that upon their failure so respectively to do, or upon the failure of either of them respectively so to do, that they and each of them show cause to this Court why said promulgation and publication should not be caused to be made and made as aforesaid.

And petitioner prays for such other and further relief in the premises as may be legally and justly called for or warranted by the facts and the situation shown hereinabove.

HARRY S. MECARTNEY.

Address: c/o W. C. Sullivan, 410 5th St., Northwest, Washington, D. C.

Harry S. Mecartney being duly sworn on his oath states that he is the petitioner in the above and foregoing cause; that the matters and things stated in the above and foregoing petition are true.

HARRY S. MECARTNEY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of July, 1920.

MORGAN H. BEACH,
Clerk.

By FRED C. O'CONNELL,

Assistant Clerk.