repealed, provides that "Where a party entitled to prosecute a writ of error or to take an appeal is an infant, insane person, or imprisoned, such writ of error may be prosecuted, or such appeal may be taken within two years after the judgment, decree, or order, exclusive of the term of such disability."2 A in prize causes shall be made within thirty days after the rendering of the decree appealed from, unless the court below previously extends the time for cause shown in the particular case: Provided, that the Supreme Court may, if in its judgment the purposes of justice require it, allow an appeal in any prize cause, if it appears that any notice of appeal, or of intention to appeal, was filed with the clerk of the District Court within thirty days next after the rendition of the final decree therein." See The Nuestra Senora De Regia, 17 Wall. 29, 21 L. ed. 596. No appeal from, or a writ of error to, a judgment or decree of a District Court in a suit upon a claim against the United States was allowed on behalf of the plaintiff after ninety days from the entry of the same. U. S. R. S., § 708; 26 St. at L. 505, §9; U. S. v. Davis, 131 U. S. 36, 39, 33 L. ed. 93, 94; nor on behalf of the United States after six months therefrom, Ibid., 26 St. at L., § 505; Butt v. U. S., 126 Fed. 794; Lewis v. Sittel, 165 Fed. 157. "All appeals from the Court of Claims shall be taken within ninety days after the judgment is rendered." Jud. Code, § 243, 36 St. at L. 1087, re-enacting U. S. R. S., $ 708. But see U. S. v. Davis, 131 U. S. 36, 39, 33 L. ed. 93, 94. Formerly no appeal could be taken or writ of error sued out to review a decision of a Circuit Court of Appeals, cf. 39 St. at L. 727, § 6, 26 St. at L. 828, § 6; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bray, 225 U. S. 205, 56 L. ed. 1055; or the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, Jud. Code, § 250, 36 St. at L. 1087. An appeal from the Supreme Court, to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, must be taken within 20 days after the entry of the order, judgment, or decree appealed from, C. C. A., D. C., Rule 10. Supra, § 69. It is not extended by the death of a party. Ex parte Dante, 228 U. S. 429, 57 L. ed. ; unless within one year after the entry of the order, judgment, or decree sought to be reviewed. The same limitation applies to applications to review such decisions by certiorari; The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 110, 41 L. ed. 937. Cf. Panama R. Co. v. Napier Shipping Co., 166 U. S. 280, 41 L. ed. 1004. No such writ of error shall be sued out or granted unless a petition therefor shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the trial shall have been had during the same term or within such time, not exceeding sixty days next after the expiration of the term of the court at which trial shall have been had, as the court may for cause allow by order entered of record." 25 St. at L. 656, § 6. 2 U. S. R. S., § 1008, Comp. St., § 1649. Where the imprisonment or other disability had not begun till after the statute had begun to run, the operation of the statute was not writ of error on behalf of the United States to review a judgment in a criminal case must be taken within thirty days after the decision or judgment has been rendered. "No appeal or writ of error by which any order, judgment, or decree may be reviewed in the Circuit Courts of Appeals under the provisions of this act shall be taken or sued out except within six months after the entry of the order, judgment, or decree sought to be reviewed; provided, however, that in all cases in which a lesser time is now by law limited for appeals or writs of error, such limits of time shall apply to appeals or writs of error in such cases taken to or sued out from the Circuit Courts of Appeals." 4 An appeal from an interlocutory order or decree. granting or continuing or referring or dissolving or refusing suspended pending such disability. McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619, 28 L. ed. 269. 3 34 St. at L. 1246; § 536, supra. 426 St. at L. 829, § 11; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Colorado E. Ry Co., C. C. A., 54 Fed. 22; White v. Iowa Nat. Bank, C. C. A., 71 Fed. 91; Condon v. Central L. & Tr. Co., C. C. A., 73 Fed. 907; Coe v. East & Ir. Co. of Ala., C. C. A., 85 Fed. 489; Old Nick Williams Co. v. U. S., C. C. A., 152 Fed. 925; Painter v. Union Trust Co., C. C. A., 246 Fed. 240. A district court rule fixing the time for taking appeals in admiralty is not such a law; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Chesbrough, 216 Fed. 121. Where a writ of error from the Supreme Court had been dismissed after the six months had expired, it was held that a writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals, sued out within six months after the filing of the mandate of the Supreme Court in the court of first instance, brought up for review only the proceedings subsequent to such mandate; and since it appeared that the proceedings subsequent thereto could not affect the plaintiff in error, the writ was dismissed. Hubbard v. Worcester Art Museum, C. C. A., 196 Fed. 871; Blaffer v. New Orleans Water Supply Co., C. C. A., 160 Fed. 389. "Appeals and writs of error from and to the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico, and from the Supreme Court of the District of Porto Rico whenever by law they can be taken, shall be taken within six calendar months from the time when the right to such an appeal or writ of error accrues, and not afterwards, by filing a claim for the appeal in the registry of the court appealed from, or by suing out a writ of error from the Court of Appeals, or from the court or judge in Porto Rico, as the case may be." C. C. A., 1st Ct. Rule 37. An appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit from the final order, judgment, or decree of the District Court of Alaska, may be taken within one year from the entry thereof. Alaska Code Civ. Proc., § 506, 30 St. at L. 253; Sutherland v. Pearce, C. C. A., 186 Fed. 787. to dissolve an injunction, or appointing a receiver, must be taken within thirty days from the entry of such order or decree.5 Appeals to the Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Courts of the Territories from judgments of the Courts of Bankruptcy adjudging or refusing to adjudge the defendants a bankrupt or allowing or rejecting a debt, or claim, must be taken within ten days after the judgment appealed from has been rendered. Petitions for a revision of the orders of the courts of bankruptcy must be filed within six months from the making of such orders,7 unless the rules of the Circuit Court of Appeals otherwise provide.8 Appeals to the Supreme Court from decrees in suits by the United States under the Interstate Commerce law, or the act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and from the decisions of the Board of General Appraisers to the Court of Customs Appeals,10 must be taken within sixty days after the entry of the decree or judgment. In Alaska and in the insular and other outside possessions of the United States ninety days shall be allowed for making such applications to the Court of Customs Appeals.11 5 Jud. Code, § 129, re-enacting 26 St. at L. 828, §7; 31 St. at L. 660; supra, §§ 300, 304. This rule applies to a decree after a hearing for an injunction and an accounting; Raymond v. Royal B. S. Co., C. C. A., 76 Fed. 465; Morey Linotyping Co. v. Chicago Lino-Tabler Co., C. C. A., No. 2660, 258 Fed. 888. Although it directs the surrender of property for destruction, Puritan Cordage Mills v. Sampson Cordage Works, C. C. A., 232 Fed. 138; Morey Linotyping Co. v. Chicago Lino-Tabler Co., 258 Fed. 888; but where a decree denies an injunction and dismisses the bill, it is final; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37; supra, § 695. It was held: that an order making permanent a temporary injunction restraining a city from adopting a resolution affecting a party's rights In 630 St. at L. 544, 553, § 2. other cases in bankruptcy six months is allowed. Steele v. Buel, C. C. A., 104 Fed. 968; supra, §§ 666, 667. 7 Re Worcester County, C. C. A., 102 Fed. 808; supra, § 668. But see Re Anderson, 23 Fed. 482. 8 See § 668, supra. Jarowski v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 186 Fed. 332. 9 32 St. at. L. 823. 10 Jud. Code, § 198, 36 St. at L. 1087, supra, § 77. 11 36 St. at L. 91, 105, Comp. St. § 1189. These limitations do not apply to writs of error coram nobis.12 The State statutes as to the time of taking appeals and suing out writs of error do not affect the jurisdiction of the Federal courts.13 The time does not begin to run till the judgment, decree, or order is actually entered, or filed, and when the judge's signature is required, not till it is signed, 14 although it is dated 12 Strode v. The Stafford Justices, 1 Brock, 162. See suprà, § 481. 13 Logan v. Goodwin, C. C. A., 101 Fed. 654; s. c., C. C. A., 104 Fed. 490; Siegelschiffer v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., C. C. A., 248 Fed. 226. It has been held: that the clerk may refuse to enter a decree until his fees are paid; and that although left in the clerk's office, it is not effective until such payment. Ommen v. Talcott, 180 Fed. 925. 14 Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 6 Wall. 153, 18 L. ed. 762; Del Valle v. Harrison, 93 U. S. 233, 23 L. ed. 892; Polleys v. Black River Imp. Co., 113 U. S. 81, 28 L. ed. 938; Radford v. Folsom, 123 U. S. 725, 31 L. ed. 292; Notley v. Brown, 208 U. S. 429, 52 L. ed. 559. When a decree is entered dismissing a bill with costs, the time to appeal begins to run, although a judgment for costs is subsequently entered. Fowler v. Hamill, 139 U. S. 549, 35 L. ed. 266. When one defendant charged with joint misconduct had demurred and obtained a decree dismissing the bill as to him, and the other defendant had answered, and subsequently obtained a decree dismissing the bill, an appeal taken within two years after the second, but more than two years after the first decree, was held to be in time to bring up both decrees for review. Mendenhall v. Hall, 134 U. S. 559, 33 L. ed. 1012. Where a decree dismissed a bill as to all matters except one which was severable from the rest, as to which a subsequent decree was entered, it was held that the right to appeal from the first dismissal began to run from the entry of the first decree and that this was appealable. Hill v. Chicago & E. R. Co., 140 U. S. 52, 35 L. ed. 331. See also Central Tr. Co. v. Grant L. Works, 135 U. S. 207, 34 L. ed. 97; Richardson v. Green, 130 U. S. 104, 32 L. ed. 872; supra, § 697. The right to appeal from a decree dismissing a cross-bill does not ordinarily exist, nor the time begin to run until the entry of a final decree disposing of the whole matter in litigation. Winters V. Ethell, 132 U. S. 207, 33 L. ed. 339; supra, § 397. The time of an intervenor to appeal does not begin to run until he is allowed to intervene. Louisville, E. St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 501, 34 L. ed. 1023. Where a decree directed that unless a party paid the amount awarded within a specified time, the surety should be required to show cause why it should not be held liable, the surety's time to appeal did not begin to run until a second decree entered upon such order to show cause, Am. Surety Co. v. Jones, C. C. A., 224 Fed. 673. Cross-appeals may be taken and allowed below after an appeal has been taken and the cause removed to the appellate court, provided the original time to appeal has not expired. Farrar v. Churchill, 135 U. S. 609, 34 L. ed. 246. as of a prior day.15 A decision containing directions for a decree is not considered as a decree.16 When the order of judgment or decree is amended, it seems that the time begins to run anew from the date of the amendment.17 If a petition for a rehearing is duly filed or a motion for a new trial duly made, or a motion to set aside the judgment made during the term, the time does not begin to run until the petition or motion has been denied; 18 and an appeal allowed before the petition or motion is made, but not perfected till afterwards, is considered as not pending till it is perfected.19 The day on which the order, judgment, or decree was entered is excluded from the computation of the time.20 It has been held that when the last day of the limited time falls on a Sunday, the writ or appeal cannot be taken on a subsequent day.21 The time to appeal or to sue out 15 Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 6 Wall. 153, 18 L. ed. 762. But see Credit Co. v. Arkansas Cent. Ry. Co., 128 U. S. 258, 32 L. ed. 448. 16 U. S. v. Gomez, 1 Wall. 690, 17 L. ed. 677; Re McCall, C. C. A., 145 Fed. 898. Cf. Marks v. No. Pac. R. Co., C. C. A., 76 Fed. R. 941. But see Silsby v. Foote, 20 How. 290, 15 L. ed. 822; Fairbanks v. Amoskeag Nat. Bank, 32 Fed. 572. 17 U. S. v. Gomez, 1 Wall. 690, 17 L. ed. 677. But see U. S. v. Grant, 110 U. S. 225, 28 L. ed. 127; Standley v. Roberts, C. C. A., 59 Fed. 836, 8 C. C. A. 305. 18 Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 111 U. S. 488, 28 L. ed. 492; Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 238, 11 L. ed. 251; Memphis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 715, 24 L. ed. 244; Aspen M. S. S. Co. v. Billings, 150 U. S. 31, 37 L. ed. 986; Alexander v. U. S., 57 Fed. 828; Re McCall, C. C. A., 145 Fed. 898; Wm. W. Bierce, Ltd. v. Waterhouse, 219 U. S. 320, 55 L. ed. 237; Citizens Bank v. Opperman, 249 U. S. 448; where a statute enacted pending the motion for a rehearing was held to regulate the appeal. 19 Voorhees v. John T. Noye Co., 151 U. S. 135, 38 L. ed. 101. The appellate court, if the record does not show when the petition for a rehearing, which has been denied, was filed, will presume that it was filed in time; Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 111 U. S. 488, 28 L. ed. 492. The time of the pendency of prior appellate proceedings dismissed for want of jurisdiction is not excluded. Darnell v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., C. C. A., 206 Fed. 445. Where there is doubt about the validity of an appeal, the second appeal can be taken before the dismissal of the former; and when the former is dismissed, the second appeal becomes effective. Sutherland v. Pearce, C. C. A., 186 Fed. 787. See Hubbard v. Worcester Art Museum, C. C. A., 196 Fed. 871. 20 Smith v. Gale, 137 U. S. 577, 34 L. ed. 792. 21 Johnson v. Meyers, C. C. A., 54 Fed. 417; Meyer v. Hot Springs Imp. Co., C. C. A., 169 Fed. 628; |