upon the agent; the parties must be competent to act; there must be a consideration, and the object to be attained must be legal. As to the form of the agreement, generally, there is no particular form required. I may say to a person, "I authorize you to sell my automobile for a sum not less than $2,000, and in the event of your selling the machine I will pay you 10 per cent of the price." This contract is as binding upon me as if I put it in the most formal writing. It is binding on the agent when he accepts the appointment. It is true the agency may be revoked, but that subject will be considered in another place; while the appointment remains in force it forms the basis of an enforcible contract. Relationship between the parties, such as husband and wife, or parent and child, does not in itself indicate that one may act for the other as an agent. There must be a contract between these parties as between others, and the authority to act for the other must be shown to have been properly conferred.8 11. Consideration.-There must be a consideration in agency, as in all other contracts. It has been tersely put that consideration consists in benefit to the promisor, or in harm, detriment, or inconvenience to the promisee. It may be mentioned, however, that as to third persons the absence of a consideration between the principal and the agent is immaterial. The third person is not always put upon inquiring as to the existence or non-existence of a consideration, especially not in cases where the 8 McLaren v. Hall, 26 Iowa 297; Johnson v. Stone, 40 N. H. 197. principal, by his acts and conduct, estops himself from denying the agency. 12. Who may be principal.-Parties competent to make any other contract may make a contract of agency. A principal who is capable of making any other contract may employ an agent. If he is competent to act for himself, he may act through an agent in respect to the same thing. Sometimes, however, the question arises, "Can an incompetent principal act through a competent agent?" and on the other hand, "Can a competent principal act through an incompetent agent?" It is to be borne in mind that the principal is the real party in interest. He is the one who may enforce or be bound by the acts of the agent, and the contract made through the agent is really his. It is proper to say therefore that any person who is competent to make a contract may be a principal; that is, he may employ an agent and invest him with authority to act on his behalf in any legitimate transaction. One therefore who, owing to disability of any kind, is incompetent to contract in his own behalf may not act through an agent. 13. Same subject-Infant principals.-It has been said that "the only act an infant is incapable of performing as to contracts is the appointment of an agent or attorney." If this proposition were true in all jurisdictions an infant could not be a principal and the act of any agent appointed by him would be void. Infants' contracts, however, are not • Trueblood v. Trueblood, 8 Ind. 195. See also Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124. void, but voidable; that is to say, contracts of an infant may be avoided by him upon the plea of infancy, which is personal to the infant. The general rule on the subject would seem to be that the contract of an infant appointing an agent is to be considered in the same light as all his other contracts, namely: that they are voidable and not void; and that until the infant asserts the defense of infancy the acts performed by the agent on his behalf will be sustained.10 14. Same subject-Insane persons.-Like the contracts of an infant those of an insane person are, generally speaking, not void, but voidable at his option. The lunatic, however, cannot avoid his contract if the other party did not know of his infirmity and had no reason to suspect the lunatic's condition of mind, and acted in good faith, and if the contract has been so far executed that the parties cannot be restored to their original position.11 As between the principal and agent, if the agent at the time of the appointment knows that his principal is an idiot, lunatic, or insane person, there is of course no contract of agency and the agent cannot therefore deal with the property or jeopardize the rights of the lunatic. In considering this question with regard to the rights and liabilities of third persons the courts will invariably inquire whether any benefit has accrued to the insane principal and will always endeavor to adjust matters in an equitable 10 Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. Law 457; Sparman v. Keim, 83 N. Y. 245. 11 Gridden v. Maxwell, 34 Kan. 8; Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 133; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541. manner and put the parties as far as possible in their original positions. 15. Same subject-Married women.-At common law a married woman was incapable of making a binding contract on her own behalf, and could not therefore appoint an agent to contract for her. Under modern statutes, however, the general rule is that a married woman is as free to contract as a man. She cannot, by reason of the marriage relation itself, bind her husband by her acts, without his consent, but with regard to her own affairs and property she may appoint agents for any lawful purpose. She may appoint her husband her agent with regard to her own property and affairs with the same effect as if she appointed a stranger.12 16. Same subject-Corporations.-Corporations are creatures of statute. Their powers are conferred upon them by the state. They must, it is true, act through individual officers and directors, but these officers and directors are not necessarily termed agents. They are in fact the legally appointed and constituted representatives of the corporation and through them the corporation acts. Within the powers granted to the corporation in its charter it is proper for the corporation to appoint agents for any legitimate undertaking, and when the appointment is made through the proper corporate officers having the requisite authority, the corporation is bound.13 17. Same subject-Partnerships.-Each partner 12 Weisbrod v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 18 Wis. 35. is the agent of the partnership within the proper limits of the partnership business. The partnership or any member thereof may appoint an agent to do any act within the scope of the partnership affairs and the act of the agent so appointed is binding upon the firm. Indeed it is usual and necessary that partners should have agents and clerks with authority to represent them, and each partner by reason of his relationship with his co-partner is competent and qualified to appoint an agent or agents in the interest of legitimate partnership transactions.14 18. Same subject-Clubs-Unincorporated associations.-Clubs and unincorporated associations do not come under the rules applicable to partnerships or to corporations. They act through certain officers and committees. These officers and committees may bind the individual members of the club or association who have authorized or assented to the transaction in question. In fixing the liability of the members of these clubs or associations for the act of an alleged agent, it must be shown that the members, sought to be held liable, had duly authorized or assented to the act of the agent. To say that a club or an unincorporated association may be a principal is to aver simply that such an organization may bind itself or its members by a contract made on its or their behalf by an agent when it is shown that the agent was duly appointed for a proper purpose.15 19. Who may be agents.-Any person other than 14 Lucas v. Bank of Darien, 2 Stewart 280 (Ala.); see subject, PARTNER SHIP. 15 Davison v. Holden, 55 Conn. 103. |