the national government. "The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce, or the postal service known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and circumstance."

The powers of Congress therefore extend to the transportation of newspapers and magazines, and also to the broadcasting of messages over the air. And what Congress may control it may also prohibit, in the interests of public health' and public morals, including whatever has a "harmful tendency."

Other provisions of Congresstitution do not affect the powers of Congress to prohibit alcoholic beverage advertising.

The protections of the first amendment do not extend to commercial advertising-Valentine v. Chrestensen (316 U. S. 51, 54).

"The fifth amendment of the Constitution, United States Code AnnotedConstitutional Amendment 5, does not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. The guaranty of due process merely demands that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be obtained. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (96 Federal Reporter, 2d Series, 687, 692).

"The right of freedom or liberty of contract guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the Federal Constitution does not proscribe the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce in derogation of that right. Tagg Bros. & Moreland v. United States (280 U. S. 420, 50 S. Ct. 220, 74 L. ed. 524). Certiorari denied 305 U. S. 634.

"While it is beyond dispute that the exercise of the commerce power of Congress is subject to the requirements of the fifth amendment, Currin v. Wallace (306 U. S. 1, 14, 59 S. Ct. 379: 83 L. Ed. 441), those requirements are generally satisfied when the means of the regulation of commerce are appropriate to a permissible end: Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed. No. 40 (300 U. S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592, 81 L. Ed. 789). "Even if the prohibition imposed in the exercise of the commerce power results in the destruction of property rights * * *there is no deprivation in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment unless the regulation imposed is unreasonable. Wallace v. Hudson-Duncan & Co. (9 Ar., 98 F. 2d 985). Furthermore alcoholic beverages are in a class by themselves. In Premier-Pabst Sales Co. et al. v. State Board of Equalization et al. (13 F. Supp. 90), upholding a law of California to regulate the size of advertising signs of 4a the court said:

"We need not enter into a discussion of the meaning of due process. It may be conceded that there is an inherent right in every person to carry on a legitimate business, subject, of course, to such reasonable rules and regulations as State governmental bodies, under the police power and general welfare clauses, may enact. It may also be conceded that cases exist where courts have declared invalid enactments prohibiting arbitrarily the use of certain forms of advertising (such as billboards) when no relation was shown to exist between the particular method and any governmental object to be attained *** It is also the rule that where, by Federal law, alcoholic beverages are recognized as legal subject of interstate commerce, the State cannot, even in aid of its own policy of regulation or prohibition, prohibit the free flow of liquor (or other legal articles) in interstate commerce, although it may establish rules of inspection or regulations, as to size of package * * *

"We think the determination of the question involved depends upon certain principles which have been definitely established for a long time.

"Because of the nature of the product sold, courts have taken the view that there is no inherent or natural right to manufacture or sell alcoholic beverages, and no invested right in the business or property with which the business is carried on to prevent its control or entire destruction by legislative process. In Crowley v. Christensen ((1890) 137 U. S. 86, 34 L. Ed. 620), the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Field, said: "There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said, be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority.'

"Through legislative process the business may be regulated or entirely prohibited.

"There being no inherent right to conduct the business of selling alcoholic beverages, that inhibition applies equally to any business in aid of it. There is no inherent right to use signs in advertising the sale of liquor on the establishment where it is being sold."

In the case of Dugan v. Bridges (16 F. Supp. 694) it was stated: "Complainants' objects based on the 14th amendment is that New Hampshire law deprives them of the property without due process of law and denies them the equal protection of the laws. The first claim seems somewhat inconsistent as it was only by virtue of the statute which they now claim is unconstitutional that complainants were able to establish the business which they now say it deprives them of. The answer to this contention is that the business which they say would be destroyed is a mere privilege accorded to them by the State law. They have no inherent right to engage in the traffic in intoxicating liquors. Crowley v. Christensen, supra.

In the case of Crane v. Campbell (245 U. S. 304, 385 S. Ct. 98, 99.62 L. Ed. 304), it is said: It must now be regarded as settled that, on account of their wellknown noxious qualities and the extraordinary evils shown be experience commonly to be consequent on their use, a State has power absolutely to prohibit manufacture, gift, sale purchase, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within its borders without violating the guaranties of thhe 14th amendment.

The contention that restricting the alcoholic beverage business will lay a basis for restricting legitimate business was answered in :

Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. McNutt (southern District of Indiana) (17 F. Supp. 708, 714): upholding the 21st amendment. The argument was made in the case of James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Company et al. (242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180, 187, 61 L. Ed. 326, L. F. A. 1917 B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 845) with reference to the commerce clause that to permit the State prohibitions of intoxicating liquor to interfere with interstate commerce in this article lays the basis for subjecting interstate commerce in all articles to State control, and therefore destroys the Constitution. In answering that contention, the Supreme Court said: "The want of force in the suggested inconvenience becomes patent by considering the principle which (after all, dominates and controls the question here presented; that is, the subject regulated and the extreme power to which that subject may be subjected. The fact that regulations of liquor have been upheld in numberless instances, which would have been repugnant to the great guaranties of the Constitution, but for the enlarged right possessed by government to regulate liquor, has never, that we are aware of, been taken as affording the basis for the thought that Government might exert an enlarged power as to subjects to which, under the constitutional guaranties, such enlarged power could not be applied. In other words, the exceptional nature of the subject here regulated is the basis upon which the exceptional power exerted must rest, and affords no ground for any fear that such power may be constitutionally extended to things which it may not, consistently with the guaranties of the Constitution, embrace.

The 21st amendment has not restricted the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

In U. S. v. Frankfort Distilleries (324 U. S. 293, 299), the court said: "It is argued that the 21st amendment to the Constitution bars this prosecution. That amendment bestowed upon the States broad regulatory power over the liquor traffic within their territories. It has not given the State plenary and exclusive power to regulate the conduct of persons doing an interstate liquor business outside their boundaries. Granting the States full authority to determine the conditions upon which liquor can come into its territory and what will be done with it after it gets there, it does not follow from that fact that the United States is wholly without power to regulate the conduct of those who engage in interstate trade outside the jurisdiction of the State of Colorado.

In William Jameson & Co., Inc. v. Morgenthau (307 U. S. 171, 83 L. Ed. 1189 (1939)) the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. The Court said: "Here the Federal Alcohol Administration Act was attacked upon the ground that the 21st amendment to the Federal Constitution gives the States complete and exclusive control over commerce in intoxicating liquors, unlimited by the commerce clause, and hence that Congress has no longer authority to control the importation of those commodities into the United States. We see no substance in this contention."

(Thereupon at 12:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman PRIEST. The committee will be in order.

We are just a little rush schedule. Some of the members had duties to perform on the floor and then had to try to get a bite of lunch. They will be coming in to join the committee shortly.

When we concluded the morning session, Mrs. Biddle had finished her testimony. There was no member of the committee who indicated that any questions were desired, so we will proceed with our schedule, and will hear from Mr. Bosley. Mr. Bosley is president of the National Conference of Methodist Youth.

May the Chair make this announcement: Most of the witnesses appearing here today have appeared previously before the Senate committee. You have complied with the request to furnish enough copies of your prepared statements for the committee. Unfortunately there are not enough prepared statements of all witnesses to be furnished all of the members of our audience. They have been divided between the House and the Senate. The witnesses are only required, under the Legislative Reorganization Act, to furnish a certain number of copies for each committee. When there are available supplies, we are always happy to share them with the audience, but you will understand, I am sure, if there are not sufficient copies.

STATEMENT OF PAUL S. BOSLEY, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF METHODIST YOUTH

Chairman PRIEST. You may proceed, Mr. Bosley.

Mr. BOSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee, my name is Paul S. Bosley. My home is Evanston, Ill., and I am a student of Union Theological Seminary in New York City, N. Y. I appear here today on behalf of the National Conference of Methodist Youth, for which organization I have been president for the past 6 months. The National Conference of Methodist Youth is a representative body of nearly 2 million high school and university-age young people in the United States. This conference, and its elected delegates, meets annually as the voice of Methodist youth for the purpose of speaking with clarity of conscience on contemporary issues and the great concerns of the Christian faith.

We are in favor of the Siler bill, I want to take this opportunity for which we are most grateful, to explicate this stand in the light of our

concerns.

Before I do this, I should like to point out that I am prompted in the stand I take by the unanimously passed resolution of delegates of last August's National Conference of Methodist Youth who: One, urged, "immediate support on the part of each individual for congressional bills controlling interstate advertisement of alcoholic beverages," and; two, commended those publishing agencies which have refused to advertise beverage alcohol and encouraged them to continue in this policy.

I am equally prompted by the fact that in the course of past and present considerations the import of the advertisement of alcoholic beverages upon the lives of young people has played a prominent and a serious role. The advertisement of alcoholic beverages, I believe,

has become a moral and practical problem of undeniable significance. The familiar adage that "statistics can be used to prove anything" shatters upon the rocks of the facts in this case.

There are no statistics to offset a Nassau County, N. Y., survey conducted by Better Homes and Gardens, March 1954, which revealed that 90 percent of 29,000 high school students under 18 years of age drank, many of them drinking by the time they were 16 years of age. Nor can the validity of the National Safety Council's book, Accident Facts, be statistically explained away. In 1953 the council reported "In 23 out of 100 fatal accidents a driver or a pedestrian had been drinking, according to the reports from 21 States." If this ratio is applied to the total of 33,000 fatal traffic accidents which produced 38.000 deaths in 1952 then you have a total of 7,590 fatal accidents in which 8,740 persons lost their lives because either a driver or a pedestrian had been drinking.

Mr. Chairman, I do not presume to be an expert in matters of statistics indicating the seriousness of the alcohol problem. I would refer you instead to the testimony of William N. Plymat, attorney and treasurer of the Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, and others, made last year before the Senate subcommittee considering S. 3294, pages 30-38 of the hearing's document. However, I do know from my own personal experience in a North Carolina high school and from extended contacts with teen-age youth since then that the overwhelming majority of teen-agers, even though under the legal age limit of their State, consume beverage alcohol.

The mammoth and ever-growing problem of juvenile delinquency and crime among teen-agers is part and parcel of beer parties, drinking escapades, and most recently of a race riot led by intoxicated fraternity members in an Alabama university.

There is a close relationship, it seems to me, between the advertising and sales of alcoholic beverages and the moral anarchy and number of traffic accidents caused by drinking. I find it interesting that Mr. Clinton M. Hestor, Washington counsel of the United States Brewers' Foundation, was of the opinion that if a bill prohibiting interstate advertisement of alcoholic beverages were to be passed, it would reduce beer sales 50 percent in the United States. Surely this, coming from an authority in the alcohol field, indicates the marked effect that advertising has upon consumption. But it also indicates, as Mr. Plymat has pointed out, that on the basis of National Safety Council figures over 2,000 lives would be saved per year in the United States in traffic accidents alone if 50 percent of the beer sales were to be cut.

We, as young people, are frankly disturbed when the opponents of the bill bandy around the words "teaching moderation", "child training", and "family responsibility", or bring forth the familiar story, "I am one of seven boys. We each grew up to be straightforward men. We had drinks at home, but my wife never saw me coming home drunk. Hence, this proves that it isn't advertising that is detrimental to the family life."

Quite to the contrary, it would seem to us that from the testimony of the alcoholic beverage industry itself, that advertisement has in some cases a 50 percent effect upon sales, and from the highly correlative relationship between the drinking of alcoholic beverages and

traffic accidents, juvenile delinquency, immorality, and overt acts in defiance of the law that alcoholic beverage advertisement is a detrimental factor in these crucial problems facing our young people.

The emphasis upon teaching moderation and family training which we feel to be important, must not blind our eyes because of special interests to the inseparable relationship of alcoholic beverage advertisement to a problem which has become a national problem. The practical consequences of this relationship as born out by police records, divorce courts, and accident statistics, lead us to the conclusion that the Scylla and Charybdis of the problem which the Siler bill raises are beverage alcohol advestisement and moral anarchy.

It has been charged by those opposing this bill that this is an attempt to have Congress legislate on morals. They illustrate this by pointing out that some groups do not eat meat on Fridays, another eats no pork at all, and still another eats no meat whatsoever.

None of these, they say, seek legislation to help them live in accordance to the dictates of their conscience. The opponents of the Siler bill are then classified in this group and challenged on their own grounds for making this request. However, a sharp and valid distinction must be drawn here between practices that promote the general welfare of our citizens and those that do not. The latter, the advertisement of alcoholic beverages is demonstrably harmful to the public welfare; the former practices are not.

Because newspapers, periodicals, newsreels, photographic films, records, and especially television and radio broadcasts are effective means for promoting this detrimental effect, we feel that the proposed restrictions on the use of certain media in the advertisement of alcoholic beverages are a necessity. Advertisement of alcoholic beverages in all its forms, obscures from the young person the very real problems inherent in consumption of alcoholic beverages. For example, television and radio, by dwelling upon the "smoothness of taste," or upon a picturesque description of its origin in "the land of the sky blue waters", or the printed advertisements, with captions such as "Beer belongs," "for men among men", "the golden touch of hospitality", "cultivated tastes insist on", and showing grocery store and home-life scenes, et cetera, all are influential in the lives of young people who find in advertising both the example and precept prompting them to drink. These moral and religious concerns, I believe, lie at the heart of our support of this bill.

The objection has been raised that this is an indirect back door attempt to ban the actual producing and selling of alcoholic beverages; in other words, to reinstitute prohibition. Insofar as I am able, I would like to make clear the objective which I have in mind so that the stand I have taken on this bill might not be misconstrued. I am aware that at this point I part ways with some of my brethern and colleagues in the church, but conscience dictates that I make this stand as clearly as possible. While it is my own opinion, I think it represents the thoughts of a considerable number of those whom I represent, so I give it to you for what it is worth.

I am not a prohibitionist. I believe that the establishment of Federal prohibition of the manufacturing and sale of alcoholic beverages would be a violation of the balance which must be maintained between the freedom of the individual citizen and the authority of the