Woodbridge, personally, as he states in his letter to the commissioner. It should be said that the insurance company was the agent of defendant. Counsel for appellee point out, too, that the insurance company is not a party to the cause, and though it, and not the defendant, is to pay the compensation, the insurance company is not complaining of the settlement. They say that there was no mistake or misinformation, even on the part of the representative of the insurer of defendant; that both Mr. Woodbridge and Mr. Walters overlooked, and did not think of, the interstate commerce theory for some time after the settlement, and until they had received a letter of inquiry from the insurance company, and then they made the investigation. It is not alleged or claimed by defendant that there was any mutuality of mistake. The mistake must have been mutual in order that relief may be granted, where, as in this case, there is no fraud on the part of the opposite party. Exchange Bank v. Schultz, 167 Iowa, 136, 138, 149 N. W. 99; Wilson v. Wyoming Cattle Co., 129 Iowa, 16, 105 N. W. 338. It is contended by appellee that the defendant does not allege in the answer wherein there was a mistake, nor state under what mistake and misinformation it labored, and that the general allegation that its act in settling with plaintiff was done under mistake and misinformation, will not entitle it to set aside the contract entered into by the parties and approved by the commissioner. On this they cite Hughey v. Smith, 65 Or. 323, 133 Pac. 68; 9 Corpus Juris, 1232, and note. But, passing that, we think there was no mistake in the sense contended for by appellant, and calling for equitable relief. The defendant, the employer, was not mistaken either as to law or fact, and the insurer's representative, to say the most, seems merely to have overlooked, or been unmindful of, the interstate commerce theory, mistake on the part of the agent of the insurer personally. We said in Marshall v. Westrope, 98 Iowa, 324-331, 67 N. W. 257, 259, and Milking Machine Co. v. Galloway, 168 Iowa, 560, 150 N. W. 713:

* *

"The doctrine is settled, that, in general, a mistake of law, pure and simple, is not adequate ground for relief. * The rule is well settled that a simple mistake by a party as to the legal effect of an agreement which he executes, or as to the legal result of an act which he performs, is no ground for either defensive or affirmative relief."

In 2 Pomeory's Equity (3d Ed.) § 842, we find this doctrine: "Where a party, with knowledge of all the material facts and without any other special circumstances, giving rights to an equity in his behalf, enters into a transaction affecting his interests, rights, and liabilities, under an ignorance or error with respect to the rules of law controlling the case, courts will not, in general, relieve him from the consequences of his mistake."

The reasons for the rule are given, and the author states that the most important, perhaps, is the assumption that all persons of sound and mature mind are presumed to know the law. The author continues in the same section:

"If ignorance of the law were generally allowed to be pleaded, there would be no security in legal rights, no certainty in judicial investigations, no finality in litigations."

[7] So it is in the instant case. The parties proceeded under the state Compensation Law, and made their agreement, which was approved by the commissioner. The proceedings were commenced on the defendant's initiative. It was all voluntarily done and without fraud. Later the same defendant, conceiving the law to be different from what it supposed when the first proceedings were had, now comes in and says that the proceedings should have been under the federal law, and asks to have everything set aside. Finally, it is contended by appellee that equitable relief may not be granted defendant because of its lack of diligence, and they cite 2 Pome

roy's Equity (3d Ed.) § 839; Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, 8 N. E. 564, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 114, 117 Am. St. Rep. 224, and other cases. Under the circumstances, we think defendant may not now litigate the question as to whether defendant and deceased were engaged in interstate commerce. We think plaintiff's plea of estoppel is good. The question as to whether the defendant and deceased were engaged in interstate commerce and other questions argued are not passed upon, because, as before stated, we think the two questions discussed are controlling. We are of opinion that the decree of the district court was right, and ought to be, and it is, affirmed.

Ladd, C. J., and Evans, Gaynor, and Stevens, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT OF IOWA.

ELKS
บ.

CONN. (No. 32215.)*

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INSTRUCTION-FAILURE OF EMPLOYER TO COMPLY BY INSURING.

In Code Supp. 1913, § 2477m41, requiring employers subject to provisions of the Compensation Act to comply therewith by taking out liability insurance, and that if the employer neglects to comply shall be liable "under part one of this act," the quoted words must be construed to mean that an employer failing to comply with the insurance provision is not under the Compensation Act.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 358.)

6. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S

ACT-PURPOSE.

COMPENSATION

The Workmen's Compensation Law is intended for the benefit of the workman and should be construed so as to carry out that intent.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 348.)

7. MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT- FAILURE OF EMPLOYER TO INSURE EFFECT.

Where an employer, presumed under Code Supp. 1913, § 2477m, to have accepted the Workmen's Compensation Act, failed to comply with the provisions of Code, §§ 2477m41, 2477m49, requiring him to take out insurance to protect himself against loss, while such failure deprived employer of the benefits of the act, it could not deprive the injured employee of an action at law.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 358.)

Appeal from District Court, Humboldt County; D. F. Coyle, Judge. Action at law to recover damages growing out of personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while in the employ of defendant, while in the con*Decision rendered, May 14, 1919. 172 N. W. Rep. 173.

struction of a drainage ditch. There was a trial to a jury, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff for $4,500. After the verdict and before judgment, the trial court sustained defendant's motion in arrest of judgment, and rendered judgment against plaintiff for costs. The plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Kenyon, Kelleher, Price & Hanson, of Ft. Dodge, for appellant.

PRESTON, J. The petition, filed May 29, 1916, alleged the relationship of employer and employee between plaintiff and defendant, at the time plaintiff was injured, February 11, 1916, and charged defendant with negligence in furnishing plaintiff fuse, used by plaintiff in blasting, which fuse was inferior, old, and defective; that plaintiff was free from contributory negligence; that as a result of the explosion both of plaintiff's eyes were blown out and his sight destroyed, his face wounded and disfigured, his leg broken, and other injuries. It was further alleged that defendant failed to comply with the provisions of chapter 8a of the Supplement to the Code of Iowa, in respect to Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation, and failed and neglected to insure his liability, as by section 2477m41 is required, and that thereby the said defendant rejected the provisions of said act. The answer denies any negligence, and specifically denied that he rejected the terms and provisions of the Compensation Act; says that he never served, or caused to be served, on any person, or posted any notice with any view or intention of rejecting the terms thereof; that he never did any act to indicate that he intended to reject the terms thereof. It also pleaded that the injury of plaintiff was due to contributory negligence of plaintiff, and that plaintiff assumed the risk. At the close of the evidence the court submitted the questions of fact raised by the issues to the jury. No exceptions were taken to the instructions by either party. The court also submitted special interrogatories. The jury found that plaintiff was in the employ of defendant, and that defendant was guilty of negligence, and by a general verdict assessed damages in the sum of $4,500. The motion in arrest, so far as it is now material, is as follows:

"(2) Because the petition of the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against the defendant which is recognized in a court of law, in this. that it fails to show or state what acts or omissions of the defendant worked a rejection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and states only that the defendant rejected the terms of the said act by reason of not taking out workmen's compensation insurance, which act is not a rejection of the act."

[1] It was agreed by counsel for both sides that the court should specify the ground and reasons for the ruling on said motion, in order that the sole question presented might be specificially set forth, and in order that, should this court reverse the lower court's decision, it might be directed by this court to enter judgment upon the verdict without a further hearing or trial of the cause. The court's ruling was based solely upon the ground that the failure of defendant, Conn, to take out insurance, as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law (Code Supp. 1913, §§ 2477m to 2477m51), does not have the same force and effect as the rejection of the said law by the said Conn, and that the failure of Conn to take out such insurance does not take this case out of the workmen's compensation statute, but that the liability of defendant is under the Workmen's Compensation Law. So that the one question presented is as to the effect of the failure of defendant to comply with the provisions of sections 2477m41, and 2477m49. It is admitted in the record that defendant did not comply with the two sections before named, and that no such insurance was taken out, and that he was not relieved by the insurance department and industrial commissioner from the taking out of such

insurance under the provisions of the last-named section. Code, § 2477m, 1913 Supp., provides substantially, without quoting the entire statute, that, except as by this act otherwise provided, it shall be conclusively presumed that every employer, as defined by this act, has elected to provide, secure, and pay compensation, according to the terms, conditions, and provisions of this act, for any and all personal injuries sustained by an employee, arising out of and in the course of the employment, and in such cases the employer shall be relieved from other liability and levy of damages, or other compensation for such personal injury. Then follows the provision that an employer electing to reject the terms is deprived of certain defenses, and that negligence is presumed, and further provides:

"Every such employer shall be conclusively presumed to have elected to provide, secure and pay compensation to employees for injuries sustained arising out of and in the course of the employment according to the provisions of this act, unless and until notice in writing of an election to the contrary shall have been given to the employees by posting the same in some conspicuous place at the place where the business is carried on,"

etc.

Section 2477m41, 1913 Supp., provides:

"Every employer, subject to the provisions of this act, shall insure his liability thereunder in some corporation, association or organization approved by the state department of insurance. Every such employer shall within thirty days after this act goes into effect exhibit on demand of the state insurance department evidence of his compliance with this section; and if such employer refuses, or neglects to comply with this section, he shall be liable in case of injury to any workman in his employ under part one of this act."

The Thirty-Seventh General Assembly, after plaintiff was injured, and after the bringing of this suit, by section 20, chapter 270, amended the last-named section by striking out the words, "part one of this act" at the end of the section, and inserted the following:

"The common law as modified by statute, and in the same manner and to the same extent as though such employer had legally exercised his right to reject the compensation provisions of chapter 8a, title XII, Supplement to the Code, 1913."

It is appellant's contention that the language, "part one of this act" creates an ambiguity, and a doubtful meaning, when applied to the facts of the case at bar, which require a judicial construction of this act, and that said words should, by judicial construction, be stricken therefrom, and that in lieu thereof there should be inserted the language before set out, in the amendment by the Thirty-Seventh General Assembly. The question in regard to the ambiguity in the statute was suggested in Sylcord v. Horn, 179 Iowa, 936-940, 162 N. W. 249, but was not determined. In Paucher v. Enterprise Coal Mining Co., 164 N. W. 1035-1037, the question arose as to the construction of the words now under consideration. In that case the defendant had not taken out insurance, and the trial court held that under the entire act, construed together, it requires the employer to take out this insurance, or be subject to the liabilities of one having rejected the act. Because of other controlling questions in that case, the point was not determined, but we did say that we were inclined to the view of the district court. The question is now presented for determination, and we are of opinion that the words referred to should be construed to mean that one failing to comply with the insurance provision is not under the provisions of the Compensation Act, though it may not be necessary to put it in the exact language contended for by appellant, and as used in the act, passed by the Thirty-Seventh General Assembly. Such is the substantial effect of it. The Legislature having amended the law renders the determination of the point of little value as a precedent for cases arising after the passage of the amended statute.

[2-4] I. Statutes are, as a rule, given a prospective application, unless a contrary intention appears, and, conceding that the intention of one Legislature is not binding upon another, and that the act of the Thirty-Sev-eth General Assembly is not binding upon the courts in interpreting the words under consideration, still, the fact that the Thirty-Seventh General Assembly did, in effect, give the words in question the interpretation contended for by appellant is a circumstance properly to be considered by us. As bearing somewhat upon this proposition, see 36 Cyc. 1142. The act of the Thirty-Seventh General Assembly does not, by the language used, purport to give a construction to the act of which it is amendatory, but it is apparent that it was the purpose and intention of that Legislature to remove the ambiguity of the former act. We said in Slutts v. Dana, 138 Iowa, 244-250, 115 N. W. 1115, 1118:

"While a legislative construction of an act is entitled to due consideration from the courts, it is by no means binding; and whenever it appears that the so-called construing act may have been passed simply for the purpose of removing doubt from previous acts the courts should so consider it. And such was, in our judgment, the purpose of the chapter."

Code, § 3446, provides:

“The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. Its provisions and all proceedings under it shall be liberally construed with a view to promote its objects, and assist the parties in obtaining justice."

It must, of course, be conceded that there is an ambiguity in regard to the words and statutes heretofore referred to. This being so, it is the duty of the courts to give effect to the language used, and all parts of the statute, whenever it can be consistently done, and to so construe the statute as to give it force and effect, and in such a manner as to best accomplish the evident intent of the Legislature. To do this we resort to certain established rules of construction.

[5] This intent is to be determined by means of the rules of inter pretation, and not alone from the abstract and permissible definition of the terms used. The statute should be construed with reference to its general purpose, and aim, and this involves the consideration of its subjectmatter, the change in, or addition to, the law. It is proper to take into consideration the law as it was before the mischief sought to be remedied, and the nature and the reason of the remedy. The several sections of an act are to be construed as parts of a connected whole, and harmonized, if possible. Appellant cites authority to these propositions that if the intention of the Legislature cannot be discovered, it is the duty of the court to give the statute a reasonable construction, consistent with the general principles of law; that the reason of the law will prevail over its letter, especially where the literal meaning would work an injustice; words may be accordingly rejected and others substituted; that every statute must be construed with reference to the object intended to be accomplished by it. In order to ascertain this object, it is proper to consider the occasion and necessity for its enactment, the difficulties or evils in the former law, the remedy provided by the new one, and the statute ought to be given that construction which is best calculated to advance its object and suppress the mischief and secure the benefits intended. 36 Cyc. 1108, 1109, 1110.

[6] Section 2477m2 of the Compensation Act is "that the rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee on account of injury shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employees; * * and all employees affected by this act shall be conclusively presumed to have elected to take compensation in accordance" therewith, etc. Appellant contends that if an employer has taken all the steps required by the act to adopt the compensation principle, the only remedy of an employee who has also come under the act, as against the employer, is to take compensation, and employers are brought under the act by presumption that if