employe were then engaged in interstate commerce." This "mixed finding of fact and law" (Mooney v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 261 Pa. 339, 340, 104 Atl 624),from some aspects a pure matter of fact (and so treated in Hancock v. P. & R. R. R. Co., supra), was adopted by the Compensation Board, and the latter's decision was affirmed by the common pleas. On appeal this court, following the McCauley Case, supra, refused to consider testimony, and held that, since there were "no subordinate or underlying findings" as to the character of evidence upon which the ultimate finding rested, we could not enter upon an examination of the correctness of the latter, but would have to accept it as conclusive; hence we affirmed. The Messinger Case, however, differs from the one at bar, in that the referee there found, as a fact, that the accident had happened in the course of interstate commerce, which finding was approved by the board, whereas here the referee erroneously held it to be immaterial whether or not the accident so happened, and neither he nor the board made any finding whatever upon that issue. The court below, under these circumstances, was not in a position to determine the controlling point in the case, nor are we. As a consequence, since this is a purely statutory proceeding in which the relevant acts of assembly contemplate that, all findings of fact shall be made by the compensation authorities, the record must be remanded for that purpose; but, so as to minimize the delay thus entailed we have disposed of this appeal with the utmost expedition, and a like course should be pursued by those fixed with responsibility below.. The assigments of error are sustained, the judgment is reversed, and the record is sent back to the common pleas, with directions that it forthwith remand so much thereof to the Workmen's Compensation Board as was sent up by that body; the latter being ordered to proceed in accordance with the law and proper practice, as outlined in this opinion and the relevant authorities therein cited. SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. McGURRIN V. HUDSON COAL CO.* MASTER AND SERVANT-FINDINGS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BOARD-CONCLUSIVENESS. In widow's proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act for damages for death of her husband, a finding by Workmen's Compensation Board that he died of natural causes and that there was no evidence that there had been "any accident at all” is conclusive upon the court on appeal. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas. Lackawanna County. Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act (Act June 2, 1915 [P. L. 736]), by Mary A. McGurrin against the Hudson Coal Company. *Decision rendered March 24, 1919. 107 Atl. Rep., 687. From an order dismissing an appeal from the Workmen's Compensation Board, which had reversed an award of the referee in favor of the claimant, she appeals. Appeal dismissed. Argued before Brown, C. J., and Stewart, Moschzisker, Frazer, and Kephart, JJ. William J. Fitzgerald, of Scranton, and Roger J. Dever, of WilkesBarre, for appellant. James H. Torrey, of Scranton, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The appellant claims compensation from the appellee on the ground that the death of her husband resulted from an accident which occurred while he was in its employ. The finding of the Compensation Board is that he died from natural causes, and that there was no evidence that there had been "any accident at all." This was conclusive upon the court below, and it properly so held. Poluskiewicz v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 257 Pa. 305, 101 Atl. 638. Appeal dismissed. SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. NEARY PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO* MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INSTRUCTION-REFUSAL OF MEDICAL SERVICES. The words "shown to have resulted from such refusal," in Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, § 306 (e), modify preceding words "injured" and "increase," so that claimant is not deprived of all compensation for his refusal to accept medical services from employer and his employment of a different physician, but only of compensation for an injury or increase of incapacity caused by the refusal, notwithstanding section 301, defining "injury" and "personal injury." (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385 [11].) Appeal from Superior Court. Proceeding by Anthony F. Neary against the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company. From a judgment of the Superior Court (69 Pa. Super. Ct. 562), dismissing an appeal from an order of the common pleas sustaining an award of the Workmen's Compensation Board, defendant appeals. Affirmed.. Argued before Brown, C. J., and Stewart, Moschzisker, Walling and Kephart, JJ. John F. Whalen and George Ellis, both of Pottsville, for appellant. Francis H. Bohlen and Isaac M. Price, both of Philadelphia, for appellee. *Decision rendered, March 24, 1919. 197 Atl. Rep. 696. WALLING, J. This case is under the Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915 (P. L. 736). Plaintiff, while in defendant's employ as car runner, on March 9, 1916, had a finger so crushed as to require surgical and medical assistance, which was reasonably tendered by defendant. However, after accepting such assistance for three days, plaintiff consulted his own family doctor, who thereafter took charge of the case and rendered suitable surgical and medical assistance, so that plaintiff was not injured nor his incapacity increased by the change of physicians. But it is strenuously contended that plaintiff, by his refusal to accept the reasonable assistance so tendered, forfeited all right to compensation for the injury This contention is based on the last clause of paragraph "e" of section 306 of the act (page 743), which states: "If the employe shall refuse reasonable surgical, medical, and hospital services, medicines and supplies, tendered to him by his employer, he shall forfeit all right to compensation for any injury or any increase in his incapacity shown to have resulted from such refusal." The referee duly heard the case, made formal findings, and awarded plaintiff compensation, from which defendant, on the question of law above stated, appealed successively to the Compensation Board, the court of common pleas, the Superior Court, and now to this court. The award was clearly right, as the natural construction of the words "shown to have resulted from such refusal" refer to "any injury," as well as to "any increase in his incapacity." Chairman Mackey, of the Compensation Board, properly interprets this clause as though it read. "If the employee shall refuse reasonable surgical, medical, and hospital services, medicines and supplies, tendered to him by his employer, he shall forfeit all right to compensation for any increase in his incapacity shown to have resulted from such refusal." The manifest purpose is to protect the master from any loss that might result because of the servant's refusal to accept the tendered assistance, not to penalize the latter for exercising the important privilege of employing his own physician. However, by so doing the employee assumes the responsibility for his own treatment, and must bear the loss resulting from neglect or lack of skill therein. If by refusing the tendered assistance the servant forfeits all right to compensation for the injury he has sustained, then the balance of the sentence is meaningless; for if his right to recover for the primary disability is gone, the whole claim is gone and the master has no concern with the question of increased incapacity, which would be but a part of the claim already forfeited; and the fact that the employer is expressly released from liability for the increased incapacity caused by the employee's refusal to accept the proffered medical assistance is inconsistent with the claim of an entire forfeiture, as the express provision that cer- tain conduct shall constitute a forfeiture of a designated part of the claim implies that the balance remains. Appellant calls our attention to that clause in section 301 of the act (page 738) which provides that: "The terms injury' and 'personal injury' as used in this act shall be construed to mean only violence to the physical structure of the body, and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom." Conceding that such definition applies to the word "injury," as used in the clause in question, it does not change the construction. Malpractice might constitute a violence to the physical structure of the body, and disease or infection might naturally result from refusal to accept the reasonable surgical or medical services tendered to an injured employee. But it is not necessary to anticipate the cases where iniury might result from such refusal. The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed. Vol. IV-Comp. 41. SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. REITMYER COXE BROS. & CO., Inc.* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S. COMPENSATION ACT. The Workmen's Compenstion Act was not intended to confine hiring contracts to express contracts to the exclusion of that class of contracts which arise by implication of law, where circumstances appear which according to the ordinary course of human dealings show a mutual intention to contract. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 361.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S ACT-COMPENSATION-DEDUCTIONS. COMPENSATION In proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act, where it appeared that deceased employee was paid regular weekly wages for about six months, less a deduction for supplies and tools, without objection, the refusal to make any deduction therefor in determining wages as a basis for compensation, on ground that there was no express agreement -in contract of hiring for such deduction, was reversible error. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385 [17].) 4. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-DEDUCTIONS FROM WAGES-QUESTION OF LAW. An implied contract for deduction of a certain amount for deceased employee's tools and supplies, in determining his wages as a basis for compensation, may be inferred from conduct of parties, and is a question of law, to be passed upon by court of common pleas, should ascertained facts be found sufficient therefor, and, if not, to remand, record to Compensation Board, with instructions to find further. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[9].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Schuylkill County. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mrs. Jacob Reitmyer against Coxe Bros. & Company, Incorporated. From an order dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board, confirming an award of the referee, defendant appeals. Reversed. Argued before Brown, C. J., and Stewart, Moschzisker, Walling, and Kephart, JJ. Daniel W. Kaercher, of Pottsville, for appellant. Roger J. Dever, of Wilkes-Barre, and Edw. E. Beidleman, of Harrisbrug, for appellee. STEWART, J. The appeal is from the judgment of the court of common pleas of Schuylkill county, sustaining an award of the Compensation Poard in the matter of the claim of Mrs. Jacob Reitmyer, widow, against Coxe Bros. & Co., Incorporated. In determining the amount of wages earned by the employee as the basis of compensation for the as*Decision rendered, April 21, 1919. 107 Atl. Rep. 739. certainment of the amount of compensation to be awarded, the referee adopted the wage rate agreed upon by the parties, but declined to make any deduction therefrom for or on account of supplies, tools, and other things furnished and paid for by the employer, and which were necessary to the performance of the contract by the employee. The reason assigned by the referee for this conclusion was as follows: "The contract at hiring did not specifically provide that the value of material, supplies, tools, and other things necessary for the performance of the employee's contract should be deducted from the employee's gross earnings, and the contract did not specifically provide that the employer was to furnish them, and that the employee must procure them from the employer and no one else." Appeal was taken to the Compensation Board, with the result that, without further findings, the award of the referee was sustained and appeal dismissed. An appeal followed to the court of common pleas, with the result that the award of the referee and the decree of the board were alike sustained, and the appeal dismissed. The matter now comes before us on appeal from the judgment of the court of common pleas. 'The record of the proceeding from its beginning throughout is unsatisfactory, in that it fails to discover the one and only issue in the case. The effort of appeallant before the referee was to derive the terms from the admitted facts and circumstances, not appearing however, in specific findings of the referee, but which, as appellant insists, are clearly derivable from what the referee styles his "Review." His main reliance to this end was upon these facts: Reitmyer's employment covered a period extending from July 1, 1915, to January 10, 1916, when, on the date last mentioned, he met with the accident which resulted in his death on the same day. His wage earnings were $22 per week, payable semimonthly; the supplies furnished by his employer during the period amounted to $49.33; he was paid during this period his full earnings, less deduction for the supplies furnished as above, without objection or complaint from him so far as the evidence shows, making in all 12 consecutive payments, as appears from the pay rolls of the coal company which were admitted in evidence. The Compensation Board, in its opinion sustaining the referee's award, says: "We have carefully reviewed the testimony in this case, and are of opinion that no such contract of hiring as contemplated by the act was established by competent proof, and the findings of the referee that the cost of supplies, etc., should not be deducted in computing compensation due defendants should be sustained." It will be observed that the referee rested his adverse conclusion upon the ground that "the contract of hiring in this case did not specifically provide that the value of supplies, tools, etc., should be deducted from the employee's gross earnings in making the computation," while the Compensation Board rested its affirmative of the referee's conclusion on the ground that "no such contract of hiring as contemplated by the act was established by competent proof." [1, 2] Both conclusions seem to rest on the idea that the act of assembly contemplates some particular form or kind of agreement of hiring to which all must conform, to be effective in excluding from wage earnings, in ascertaining the basis of compensation, the cost of supplies furnished the wage earner by the employer. To sustain either of these conclusions would be to impute to the legislative mind a purpose to confine hiring contracts with which the act deals to express contracts, to the exclusion of that class of contracts which arises by implication of law where no express contract exists, but yet where cirumstances are shown which, according to the ordinary course of business dealings and |