SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA. BOARD OF COM'RS OF KINGFISHER COUNTY ν. GRIMES ET AL. (No. 9735.)* 2. MASTER AND SERVANT WORKMEN'S LAW-ENGINEERING WORKS." COMPENSATION The term "engineering works" as used in section 2 of article 1, c. 246, Sess. Laws 1915 (Workmen's Compensation Law) refers to establishments or places of business where engineering work is carried on, and does not include or refer to work of an engineer on a public highway. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 361.) Kane, J., dissenting. Appeal from State Industrial Commission. Proceedings by Bishop Early Grimes before the State Industrial Commission against the Board of County Commissioners of Kingfisher County. From an award to Grimes, the Board of County Commissioners appeals. Reversed and remanded. W. A. Mc Cartney, Co. Atty., of Kingsfisher, for appellant. OWEN, C. J. This appeal is prosecuted to reverse an award made by the State Industrial Commission to Bishop Early Grimes on account of an accident sustained while riding in an automobile to the place of work where Grimes was to assist the county engineer in surveying a state highway. The question presented is whether Grimes was engaged in a hazardous employment within the meaning of section 2, art. 1, of the Workmen's Compensation Law (chapter 246, Sess. Laws 1915). It is urged that, since Grimes was employed to assist in doing engineering work, the injury falls within the provisions of section 2, in which it is provided compensation shall be payable for injuries sustained by employe in "engineering works." In the case of Finney v. Board of County Com'rs, 1 Okl. Indus. Com. Rep. p. 102, the commission construed the term "engineering works" to mean any work of engineering, and that case was folowed as authority by the commission in the instant case. In defining "engineering works" as any work of construction, the comission quoted from 15 Cyc. 1049. Reference to the page will disclose the error. The term there used is "engineering work," and not "works." [1, 2] The meaning of a word used in the statute must be construed in connection with the words with which it is associated. 22 Cyc. 1065; 36 Cyc. 1118. Some of the associated words are: "Factories,” gins," "mills," "workshops where machinery is used," "gas works "waterworks," reduction works," "power works-all referring to establishments and places of business rather than character of labor. The word "work," as used here, is defined in Webster's International Dictionary as: *Decision rendered, July 29, 1919. 182 Pac. Rep. 897. Syllabus by the⚫ Court. 'A place where industrial labor of any kind is carried on, as a salt work; the structure, grounds, machinery, etc., of a manufacturing establishment or industrial concern, as iron works, locomotive works, waterworks" In the case of So. St. Joe Land Co. v. Pitt, 114 Mo. 135, 21 S. W. 449, the Supreme Court of Missouri construed the word "works" as meaning an estblishment for manufacturing, or for performing industrial labor of any sort, and including the building, machinery, etc., used in the required operation. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Conroy v. Inhabitants of Clinton, 158 Mass. 318, 33 N. E. 525, construed the word "works" to mean an establishment for manufacturi or for performing industrial labors. The Supreme Court of Pennsylara in Re Pardee's Appeal, 100 Pa. 408, construed the word "works" to have a definite signification, meaning a business of permanent character, as opposed to temporary employment. We are constrained to hold that the term "engineering works," as used in section 2 of the act, refers to establishments or places of business where engineering work is carried on, and does not include or refer to work of an engineer on a public highway. [3] This section of the act also provides if there be or arise any hazardous occupation other than those enumerated it shall come under the act. It is urged that work on the state highway is a hazardous occupation and is included under this provision of the section. This language must be construed, under the rule of ejusdem generis, with that more particularly described by the preceding words of the context. General words do not explain or amplify particular terms preceding them, but are themselves restricted and explained by the particular terms. This general language must be construed to include employments of the same general character, but not embracing every species of employment in which the services of others may be rendered. K. C. So. Ry. Co. v. Reinman, 162 Pac. 726; 36 Cyc. 1119; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 268 Mo. 321, 188 S. W. 88; Black v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 280, 188 S. W. 362; Zucarro v. State (Tex. Cr.) 197 S. W. 982, L. R. A. 1918B, 354. The case of Board of Com'rs v. Barr, 173 Pac. 206, is relied upon, but is not in point. In that case Barr was engaged in doing blasting work on the state highway, but the question presented was not whether that was hazardous employment, but whether he was an employe of the county. The judgment of the commission is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the petition. Sharp, Harrison, Pitchford, Johnson, and McNeill, JJ. concur. Kane, J., dissents. Rainey and Higgins, JJ., not participating. MASTER SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. AND HANCOCK ບ. PHILADELPHIA & R. RY. CO.* SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIONACT-FINDING OF FACT BY WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BOARD-CONCLUSIVENESS. Finding of Workmen's Compensation Board against employer's contention that deceased was engaged in interstate commerce, and to effect that coal cars on which he was working were being moved from mines to different yards in the state for the shipper's convenience, and that the subsequent shipments of cars outside the 'state were made after employe's death, is conclusive on court of common pleas. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].) Appeal from Court of Comon Pleas, Schuylkill County. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Margaret L. Hancock against the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company. From a judgment affirming an award of the Workmen's Compensation Board, and dismissing the appeal therefrom, defendant appeals. Appeal dismissed, and award affirmed. Argued before Brown, C. J. and Stewart, Moschzinsker,. Walling, and Kephart, JJ. George Gowen Parry, of Philadelphia, and John F. Whalen, of Pottsville, for appellant. L. L. Frank, of Pottsville, and R. A. Reick, of Frackville, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The sole contention of the appellant is that at the time the deceased was killed he was engaged in moving interstate commerce cars. This was a gestion of fact, and the finding of the Compensation Board was that the cars of coal in the train upon which the deceased was working were being transported from the mines to different yards within the state. for the convenience of the shippers, and that the subsequent shipments of any of them upon which the deceased had worked to a point without the state were made after his death, and after the train crew with which he had worked had severed its connection with the cars. This finding was conclusive upon the learned court below. Poluskiewicz v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Company, 257 Pa. 305, 101 Atl. 638. Appeal dismissed, and award affirmed. *Decision rendered March 24, 1919. 107 Atl. Rep. 735. SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. REILLY ข. ERIE R. CO.* COMPENSATION 1. MASTER AND SERVANT--WORKMEN'S ACT-INJURY WHILE ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE-FINDING BY REFEREE. In proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, wherein defendant railroad contended that injury occurred while employe was engaged in interstate commerce, referee should have made finding as to whether injury occurred while employe was so engaged. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 416.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY WHILE ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COM- No compensation can be awarded under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, for injury caused while the workman was engaged in interstate commerce. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 365. 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-FINDINGS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BOARD -RECOMMITTAL TO REFEREE. Where referee concluded that it was immaterial whether accident occurred while employe was engaged in interstate commerce, and failed to find whether injury occurred therein, Workmen's Compensation Board, upon appeal, should have held conclusion error, and either have made findings of fact upon a hearing denovo on that issue, or have sent record back to referee, with direction to find thereon. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 416.) 4. MASTER AND SERVANT—WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION' ACT-FAILURE TO MAKE NECESSARY FINDINGS-RĘMAND OF RECORD WITH DIRECTIONS. On appeal from award of Workmen's Compensation Board, only findings and conclusions are before court for review, and where there are no findings upon controlling issues, it should remand record to board, with direction to make findings, instead of itself deciding issues upon the evidence, as Workmen's Compensation Act contemplates that all findings of fact be made by compensation authorities, and not by the courts. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[9].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Susquehanna County. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act (P. L. 736) by Sarah E. Reilly, for herself and children, against the Erie Railroad Company for compensation for the death of claimant's husband. From a judgment reversing the action of the Workmen's Compensation Board, *Decision rendered, April 14, 1919. 107 Atl. Rep. 736. affirming a finding of the referee awarding compensation, claimant appeals. Reversed, and record sent back to common pleas, with direction. JJ. Argued before Stewart, Frazer, Moschzisker, Walling, and Kephart, Thomas A. Doherty, of Susquehanna, for appellant. MOSCHZISKER, J. Sarah E. Reilly, on behalf of herself and children, claimed compensation for the death of her husband, Martin J. Reilly, which occurred April 28, 1916, as the result of accidental injuries in the course of his employment with defendant company. An award was approved by the Workmen's Compensation Board; but, when the record was removed to the common pleas, this was reversed, and the claimant has appealed. [1-3] Defendant has contended from the first that claimant's husband was killed while engaged in interstate commerce; but, without finding any of the facts attending the accident or those essential to a correct understanding and intelligent determination on review of the point thus put at issue, the referee reported the following conclusion: "Whether or not either the decedent or the defendant at the time the accident occurred were engaged in an act connected with interstate commerce, the claimants are entitled to and defendant is liable for compensation to the claimants as provided in article 111 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915." Of course this presents an erroneous view of the law. v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 261 Pa. 336, 337, 104 Atl. 623. Messinger The appeal to the Compensation Board was on two grounds: (1) That the referee erred in the above-quoted conclusion of law; and (2) that he erred in failing to find as a matter of fact that claimant's husband was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident. But the board did not properly pass upon either of these assignments. Instead of so doing, it contented itself with a meager review of the testimony, and the conclusion that the referee had not erred in failing to find "claimant's decedent was engaged in interstate commerce." Theboard should have held that its referee's ruling as to the immateriality of the interstate commerce feature of the case was error, and either found. its own facts, upon a hearing denovo, or sent the record back to the referee, with directions to state all the circumstances attending the accident essential to an understanding of the issues involved, with an ultimate finding, based thereon, as to whether or not injury in the course of interstate employment was shown thereby. Flucker v. Carnegie Steel Ca, 263-Pa. 113, 106 Atl. 192. [4] When the case came to the common pleas, the record was treated by mutual mistake of both court and counsel, as though the evidence was up for review, when, as matter of law, the findings and conclusions only were before that tribunal. McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312, 320, 321, 104 Atl. 617. Since there were no findings, either subordinate or ultimate, upon the controlling point discussed in the opinion of the court below, namely, whether the employer and the employe were engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident, the record should have been remanded to the Compensation Board (Leary v. McIlvain, 263 Pa. 499, 106 Atl. 788), with directions to see that such findings were made and properly stated upon the record (Gurski v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 262 Pa. 1, 104 Atl. 801; Hancock v. P. & R. R. R. Co., 107 Atl. 735, not yet officially reported). In Messinger v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., supra, the referee stated an ultimate finding that, at the time of the accident, the "employer and |