trict court of the county which would have jurisdiction of a civil action between the parties." Or as stated in section 3693: "The district court which would have jurisdiction in an ordinary civil case involving a claim for the injuries or death in question." Section 3680 provides the procedure which "either party" may take in case a dispute arises. It seems clear that the submission of the cause to the district court provided for is in the nature of an appeal from an award. This is shown also by the language used in subdivision g, § 29, c. 85, Laws 1917, in which the proceeding is denominated an "appeal." Neither the employer nor the insurance company has a right of action against the employee. While the language used is indefinite and unsatisfactory, we think that, as affecting the question of jurisdiction, the words "either party" (which mean one of two) refer to employer and employee, and the "district court" to whom the cause should be submitted is the one to which the employee would be compelled to resort in a suit for damages for injuries received. In other words, the legislative intent was to leave the forum for an action between the parties the same as it was before the enactment of the compensation law. This would be the county in which the employer resides or in which service could be had upon him-Dodge county. This would be the county where, in nearly all cases, both parties would reside, where the witnesses would reside and the cause be prosecuted with the least expense. This conclusion, of course, will not permit the one appealing to select the forum. If, however, we were to hold that, where the statute uses the words "either party," the insurance company may be one of the two parties in mind (depending upon who is resisting the claim), then it might follow that the insurance company, as appellant, could have the cause submitted in any one of a large number of jurisdictions, for the reason that the insurance company might be sued by the appellee in any one of a large number of jurisdictions. The jurisdiction should be determined as of the time the cause of action arose. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF NEW JERSEY. BUONFIGLIO V. NEUMANN & CO. (No. 37.)* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN,S COMPENSATION ACT-PRESUMPTION OF ACCEPTANCE. Un er Workmen's Compensation Act, § 8, in the absence of statement in writing or written notice that the provisions of section 2 were not intended to apply, master and servant are presumed to have ac *Decision rendered, June 20, 1919. 107 Atl. Rep. 285. cepted the provisions of section 2 and to have agreed to be bound thereby. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 403.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-BINDING FORCE OF PROVISIONS-FATHER AND MINOR SON. A father who received his minor son's wages was bound by the provision of Workmen's Compensation Act, § 2, accepted by the son and himself. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 355.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF REMEDY-ACCEPTANCE OF STATUTE. Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 8, providing the agreement shall be a surrender by the parties of their rights to any other method, form, or amount of compensation, the father of a minor son injured in his employment, having accepted the provisions of section 2 of the act, was subject to the act as prescribing the sole rule of compensation, and had no right of action at common law. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 355.) Appeal from Supreme Court. Action by Felicee Buonfiglio against R. Neumann & Co. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed. Isidor Kalisch, of Newark, for appellant. SWAYZE, J. This action is brought by a father for pecuniary loss to him caused by an injury to his minor son, a lad 16 years of age. The son was in the employ of the defendant, to whose negligence the injury is attributed. [1-3] There was no express statement in writing or written notice that the provisions of section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act April 4, 1911 [P. L. p. 134]) were not intended to apply, and pursuant to section 8 the parties are presumed to havee accepted the provision of section 2, and to have agreed to be bound thereby. That the father was one of the parties so bound in the present case is shown by the fact that he received his son's wages. The question raised is whether the Workmen's Compensation Act furnishes the sole rule of compensation or whether the father has the same right of action he would have had at common law. The question turns on the provisions of the statute. Section 8 enacts that the "agreement shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof than as provided in section 2 of this act." This express language settles the question adversely to the plaintiff. It distinguishes the case from King v. Viscoloid Co., 219 Mass. 420, 106 N. E. 988, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1170. The right of the Legislature to prescribe these implied, or, we should rather say, statutory, contracts, has been settled. American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. Law, 436, 92 Atl. 85, 94 Atl. 85; affirmed 87 N. J. Law, 314, 93 Atl. 1083; Hetzel, Jr., v. Wasson Piston Ring Co., 89 N. J. Law, 201, 98 Atl. 306, I.. R. A. 1917D, 75; Young v. Sterling Leather Works, 91 N. J. Law, 289, 102 Atl. 395. When the plaintiff in the present case permitted his son to work for the defendant without giving notice which he might have given, he accepted the provisions of the statute, and thereby surrendered his right to any other method or form of compensation. The judgment must be reversed to the end that there may be a venire de novo. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY. HERCULES POWDER CO. V. MORRIS COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ET AL.* MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT—“PERMANENT INJURY”—“IMPAIRMENT." Within Workmen's Compensation Aet, § 11, defining a "permanent injury" as one where the usefulness of a member is permanently impaired, or where any physical function is permanently impaired, an injury to an employee which resulted in the loss of one of his testicles held a "permanent injury"; the criterion of disability partial in character and permanent in quality not being limited to loss of earning capacity. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385 [11].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Permanent Injury; Second Series, Impairment.) Certiorari by the Hercules Powder Company to the Morris County Court of Common Pleas and others to remove an award made under the Workmen's Compensation Act in favor of an injured servant. Award affirmed. Argued February term, 1919, before Parker and Minturn, JJ. King & Vogt, of Morristown, for prosecutor. MINTURN, J. No question as to the quantum of the award is made in this case, if the fundamental inquiry be affirmatively conceded, that the nature of the loss resulted in a permanent injury within the contemplation of the statute. P. L. 1913, p. 304 (C. S. Supp. p. 1644). As the result of an explosion, while employed in the defendant's service, and arising out of his employment, the injured defendant lost one of his testicles. The inquiry presented is whether such a loss is equivalent to a permant partial impairment. The statute, section 11, concedes the awarded compensation (1) "where the usefulness of the member is permanently impaired," and (2) "where any physical function is permanently impaired." The language of a statute designed as was this must be of necessity in many respects generic in verbiage, and in this instance while previously having specified particular incidents of disability, partial and total in character, as a basis for compensation, it provides that, "in all other cases in this *Decision rendered, June 24, 1919. 107 Atl. Rep. 433. class" as above indicated, the award shall be made upon the basis of a permanent partial impairment. It must be manifest that, whatever its character as to the individual impairment, the loss in this instance is permanent. But it is contended that, conceding the permanency of the loss, the functional impairment does not follow, and medical testimony is invoked to support the argu ment. The lower court found that as a result of the injury, the defendant's morale, courage, and martial efficiency were lessened. Whatever view medical experts may entertain upon that phase of the case, the indisputable fact remains that the injured defendant has suffered the loss of a portion of his anatomy, which nature implanted in the human organism, as a dual reservoir of complete efficiency equally with eyes, ears, and limbs, and that to deprive him of one of these natural attributes is to take from him a component portion of the perfect genus homo, ani to that extent at least impair the physical attributes of his manhood. This impairment may not prove to be so conspicuous in the ability to produce wages, in the industrial world, but there are other spheres for the employment of human energy, talents, and the possession of physical attributes besides the industrial world into the activity of which the defendant is entitled to bring, possess, and enjoy all the physical attributes with which nature endowed him. In harmony with these considerations, it has been held that the sole criterion of a disability, partial in character and permanent in quality, under the statute, is not limited to the loss of earning power. De Zeng Co. v. Pressey, 86 N. J. Law, 469, 92 Atl. 278, affimed 96 Atl. 1102; Burbage v. Lee, 87 N. J. Law, 36, 93 Atl. 859. In the recent selective draft, for military service, no little attention was paid to physical imperfections, which might be deemed to lessen human stamina and individual staying power. Nor can it be denied that in any computation or contest, based upon consideration of the physically perfect specimens of the race, the defendant would be at a disadvantage Certain it is that in a state of human excellence man has been, in English literature, termed "the paragon of animals," and one cannot doubt that in our social environment, permeated by the atmosphere of the classics or the renaissance, the defendant would be debarred as a figure for the discriminating chisel of a Phideas, the heroic pen of a Horace, or the exacting brush of a Michael Angelo. Tested by the definition Webster gives to the word, the defendant has suffered an impairment which is equivalent "to diminish in quality, excellence or strength." Its Latin root indicates "a mak worse, a lessening," while the Italian derivation "imparare" indicates "a loss or diminution." Whether, therefore, we consider the physical status of the injured defendant as lessened by the loss of a physical attribute, which serves to constitute the perfect genus homo, or as possessed of a dual entity which in natural, and moral law he had a right to retain, as a reserve factor in the cosmic dispensation, the loss he sustained was a permanent impairment of his physical entity, under the provisions of our statute, and was properly compensated for as such by the award of the common pleas. The award will be affirmed, with costs. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY. LESKO LIONDALE BLEACH DYE & PRINT WORKS.* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-MINOR EMPLOYED IN VIOLATION OF LAW. Where a minor under 16 years of age was employed to operate a laundry machine in violation of Factory Act, § 7, as amended by P. L. 1914, p 525, § 4, the common-law liability of employer was not affected by the Workmen's Compensation Act, for that act applies only where the contract of hiring is a valid one. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 366.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-ESTOPPEL OF INFANT SERVANT. A minor by misrepresenting his age when employed to operate a laundry machine in violation of Factory Act, § 7, as amended by P. L. 1914, p. 525, § 4, forbidding employment of minors under 16 for such work, is not estopped from asserting that the employment was unlawful. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 95.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-ASSUMPTION OF RISK-UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT. As Factory Act, § 7, as amended by P. L. 1914, p. 525, § 4, forbids the employment of minors under 16 years to operate laundry machines, a minor so employed cannot be held to assume the ordinary risks of the employment, the Legislature having declared minors under 16 too young to appreciate such risks. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 204 [2].) Action by Meri Lesko, guardian of Andrew Kline, against the Liondale Bleach Dye & Print Works. On defendant's rule to show cause after verdict for plaintiff. Rule discharged. Argued November term, 1918, before Gummere, C. J., and Swayze and Trenchard, JJ. King & Vogt, of Morristown, for the rule. GUMMERE, C. J. The defendant company operates a large laundering plant at Rockaway in this state. Some time in 1916, Andrew Kline, the ward of the plaintiff was employed by the company, and in June of that year was put to work upon a washing or laundering machine. His specific work was to keep the edge of the goods which were run through the machine from curling or getting folded, as it passed over the rollers. His hand apparently became entangled in the machinery, was drawn in between two of the rollers, and crushed. At the time of the accident, Kline was under 16 years of age; but this fact was not known to the de *Decision rendered, June 17, 1919. 107 Atl. Rep. 275. |