p. 134, as amended by Laws 1913, p. 309) is not limited to that for the loss of an arm, since a "total and permanent disability" may exist without loss or injury to any specific member. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec Dig. § 385[18].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Totally and Permanently Disabled.) The Chancellor and Williams and Taylor, JJ., dissenting. Appeal from Supreme Court. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by William Simpson, opposed by the New Jersey Stone & Tile Company, employer. Judgment for petitioner, and employer appeals. Affirmed. On appeal from the Supreme Court in which the following per curiam was filed: "This is a workman's compensation case, and the main point raised relates to the finding by the trial court of total and permanent disability. "The original injury was a very bad fracture of the arm, which was compound, and became infected and discharged pus for a long period. Amputation was seriously considered, but the arm was saved. There was, however, a poor recovery, and the patient had several abscesses, and at the ti of the hearing was suffering, as the court found, with a severe neuritis caused perhaps by minor nerves being involved with the callous of the fracture, which, in the opinion of his physician, made him totally unfit for work, and there was evidence to support the finding that this condition would continue indefinitely unless the arm were amputated. "Prosecutor's claim is that the award cannot exceed that authorized for the loss of an arm, but to this we do not agree. Cases are readily conceivable in which total and permanent disability exists without the loss of or injury to any specific member. If the physical conditions in the present case as the court found them to exist at the time of the hearing created a total disability which was permanent unless the arm were amputated (and we think the evidence justified a finding of such a condition), the case of Feldman v. Braunstein, 87 N. J. Law, 20, 93 Atl. 679, controls. Petitioner is not required to undergo a serious operation such as amputation of the arm at the shoulder. The court therefore properly dealt with the condition as actually existent. "Another point is made: That the order permits review within one year, whereas the act says review may be had after one year. This looks like a mere slip of the pen. The conclusions of the judge properly follow the statute, but the judgment does not. If necessary, the case may be remanded for correction of the judgment, which is merely an amendment to conform to the statute and the court's conclusions. In other respects the award is affirmed." Clarence L. Cole, of Atlantic City, for appellant. PER CURIAM. The judgment under review will be affirmed for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court. The Chancellor and Williams and Taylor JJ., dissent. : SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK. BONNANO ET UX. V. METZ BROS. CO. ET AL.* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-DEPENDENCY-EVIDENCE. Evidence held insufficient to show that a deceased employee's parents living in a foreign country were dependent upon him, within Workmen's Compensation Law; there being nothing to show that his brother and sister, who asserted that he sent money to his family, knew any of the facts, and no corroborating circumstances. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405 [5].) COMPENSATION 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S -DEPENDENCY. In the matter of dependency, it is necessary to establish by competent evidence that claimants stood in that relation to decedent. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[5].) 3. EVIDENCE-RECORDATION OF BIRTHS-CERTIFIED COPY. Statement of "officer in charge" as to birth of decedent and claim of dependency by alleged parents is not competent evidence of the existence of decedent's parents; a certified copy of the record being essential, in view of Code Civ. Proc. §§ 956, 957. (For other cases, see Evidence, Dec. Dig. § 158 [15].) Appeal from State Industrial Commission. Claim by Antonino Bonnano and wife for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law for death of Vincenzo Bonnano, opposed by the Metz Bros. Company, employer, and the Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Company, Limited, insurance carrier. From an award of the State Industrial Commission, the employer and insurance carrier appeal. Award reversed, and proceeding remitted. Argued before John M. Kellogg, P. J., and Lyon, Woodward, Cochrane, and Henry T. Kellogg, JJ. Alfred W. Andrews, of New York City (John N. Carlisle, of Albany, of counsel), for appellants. Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel), for State Industrial Commission. WOODWARD, J. On the 6th day of February, 1917. Vincenzo Bonnano, while in the employ of Metz Bros. Company, Buffalo, received injuries from which death resulted. The only question on this appeal is whether the father and mother of the decedent, living in Italy, were dependent upon him at the time of his death. [1] There is no evidence in the record that the father and mother are living. There is a certificate, signed by "J. Parini, Officer in Charge," that "on the 21st day of January, 1859, Bonnano Antonino, *Decision rendered, June 30, 1919. 177 N. Y. Supp. 51. son of Salvatore and of Schifano Giodanna, was born at Roccapalumba, as it is shown in the record of birth registered in the Bureau of Vital Statistics," and a similar certificate is made of the birth of a female, who is supposed to be the mother of the decedent, as the former is assumed to be the father of the decedent, and a like certificate of the birth to these two of a son by the name of the decedent in 1902, and the claim of dependency upon this child, who was born on the 10th of January, 1902, and was killed on the 6th of February, 1917, when he was approximately 15 years and 1 month of age, is crowding the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67) about to the limit. There is no evidence that this child of 15 years of age had "supported, either in whole or in part, for the period of one year prior to the date of the accident," either the father or the mother; the general allegation of a brother and sister that "when my brother Vincenzo died in consequence of an accident received in Buffalo, N. Y., on the 6th day of February, 1917, was alive, periodically sent money to his family for support, they being in straitened circumstances," not amounting to such evidence. There is nothing to show that this brother and sister knew of any of the facts which they assert; there is no date fixed, and no amount is stated to have been sent at any time within the limits fixed by section 17 of the Workmen's Compensation Law. [2, 3] In Matter of Belcher v. Carthage Machine Co., 224 N. Y. 326, 328, 120 N. E. 735, the court held squarely that hearsay evidence, without any corroboration by facts, circumstances, or other evidence, was not sufficient to sustain an award, where the question was as to the injuries; and we are of the opinion that in the matter of dependency it is necessary to establish by competent evidence that the claimants stood in that relation to the decedent. Here we do not have any competent evidence of the existence of the parents of the deceased; the statement of "J. Parini, officer in charge," that the Bureau of Vital Statistics in a town or village in Italy shows certain facts, is not competent evidence of the fact; we should have a certified copy of the record. Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 956, 957. The statute requires competent evidence, not difficult to procure if the facts exist, that the deceased has "supported, either wholly or in part, for the period of one year prior to the date of the accident," the person making the claim under the provisions of section 17 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, and anything less than this cannot be accepted as "just as good." If this child of 15 years of age, working in America, has been supporting his parents for one year before his death, either wholly or in part, it is no hardship to have that fact proved in the manner required by law. This record does not disclose these facts, and the award ought not to stand. The award should be reversed, and the proceeding remitted to the State Industrial Commission. All concur. SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK. 1. MASTER AND FOLTS ROBERTSON ET AL.* SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -CAUSE OF DEATH-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. In proceedings involving issue of whether the remote cause of employee's death from lobar pneumonia and traumatic gangrene of the lungs was an injury from lifting, evidence held to sustain award, in view of presumption under Workmen's Compensation Law, § 21. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) COMPENSATION 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S -NOTICE OF DEATH. Where employer received immediate notice of accident, kept in constant touch with employee during his last sickness, had actual notice of employee's death upon day thereof, shortly thereafter discussed compensation with widow, and an autopsy would not have shown cause of death, failure to give notice of death was not prejudicial. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 398.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -NOTICE OF DEATH-INSURANCE CARRIER. Notice to or knowledge of employer as of employee's death is notice to and knowledge of the insurance carrier. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 398.) Appeal from State Industrial Commission. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Barbara B. Folts for compensation for herself and minor children for death of her husband, Daniel M. Folts, opposed by William S. Robertson, employer, and the -Ætna Life Insurance Company, insurance carrier. Award by the State Industrial Commission for claimant, and the employer and insurance carrier appeal. Affirmed. Argued before John B. Kellogg, P. J., and Lyon, Woodward, Cochrane, and Henry T. Kellogg, JJ. William H. Foster, of Syracuse, for appellants. Charles D Newton, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel), for respondent. McKelvey & Stenacher, of Saratoga Springs (George H. Stenacher, of Saratoga Springs, of counsel), for claimant. LYON, J. Daniel N. Folts suffered injury March 7, 1917, and died April 18, 1917. He was employed as the driver of a lumber sleigh. His claim, made April 13th, stated his injuries as follows: "How did the accident happen? I was lifting the rear end of sleigh I was drawing lumber on. Runners stuck and suddenly gave way, *Decision rendered, June 30, 1919. 177 N. Y. Supp. 34. throwing me off my balance and causing me to fall to my knees with weight of sleigh on me. "State fully nature of injury. My left side was hurt above the hip, so that I could not lift left arm or use left shoulder, and I could not breathe freely or without severe pain in that side." The defendant claims that it is not liable to make compensation to the claimants under the principles of law laid down in Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 540, Belcher v. Carthage Machine Co., 224 N. Y. 326, 120 N. E. 735, and Tucillo v. Ward Baking Co., 180 App. Div. 302, 167 N. E. 666, upon the ground there is no competent evidence that the deceased received an accidental injury in the course of his employment. There was no external sign of injury. Whether or not there was tenderness to touch is uncertain. Dr. Varney, who was the attending physician, stated June 8, 1917, "Tenderness to touch not present," and in his testimony on August 11, 1917, he says the statement was signed with full knowledge of facts in the case and is true. In the preceding attending physician's report of date May 5, 1917, he says in answer to the question: "Give an accurate description of the nature of the accident and of the injury. Nothing to be seen; examination reveals tenderness lower part of lung on left side; developed pneumonia, lobar gangrene of lung." In order to get an understanding of the case, it will be necessary to review the facts in detail. Upon the day of the accident Folts notified the employer of the nature of the injury. He also told a fellow employee at the time. Upon going home, he complained that he had strained his side in lifting the sleigh. He was unable to lift a weight with his left arm. He bathed his side with liniment. On the following day, Thursday, he went to work. On Friday he was obliged to stop work before noon. His wife put a mustard paste on. On Saturday, which was a busy day, he took his oldest boy and went to work. On the following day, Sunday, he was in bed. On Monday he was unable to work. On Tuesday, the 13th, he called the family physician. The doctor found him suffering from tenderness of the lower part of the left lung. He placed adhesive strips upon him, and left him cough medicine. In answer to the question: "When did he tell you anything about this injury? You went to him March 13th, strapped him up and told him to go to bed? He must have told me the same day, or I would not have strapped him up.” His temperature was 101 or 102 degrees. He sat bolstered up in a chair supported by a pillow. Dr. Varney saw him again March 17th. His cough kept growing worse and pneumonia developed. Counsel was called in, and he appeared better until about April 14th. He was apparently improving, when he was suddenly taken worse and died on April 18th. The doctor diagnosed his ailment as: "Pleurisy, followed with lobar pneumonia, and traumatic gangrene of the lungs." The claim is resisted mainly upon two grounds: The first is the failure of proof of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment; and, secondly, that the employer and insurance carrier were prejudiced by the failure to give notice of the accident and to give notice of death. In Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., supra, there was introduced the testimony of persons who were present at the time the accident was claimed to have been received, who testified that no cake of ice slipped and struck the decedent. Thus the presumption created by section 21, Workmen's Compensation Act. (Consol. Laws, c. 67), was |