by appellant, and that he had left the premises in obedience thereto, before the injury resulting in his death was received by him, and that same occurred after he had returned to the premises upon a personal mission, and consequently did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The relation of employer and employee admittedly existed between the parties on the morning of the accident and up to within a few minutes of the time when Pettit was killed. The commissioner manifestly had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, and also to determine from the evidence whether the relation of employer and employee existed between them, and also whether the injuries for which compensation was sought arose out of and in the course of the employment. An affirmative finding by the commissioner upon these questions of fact, erroneous only, if at all, because against the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence, clearly could not be set aside, in certiorari proceedings upon the ground that same was illegal or in excess of his jurisdiction. Whether, in any case, a finding by the commissioner upon the evidence before him that the relation of employer and employee existed, and that the injury grew out of and in the course of the employment, could properly be set aside in certiorari proceedings, we need not decide, as we reach the conclusion that the finding and award of the commissioner is not against the undisputed evidence upon which same was based [2] "Jurisdiction" is the power to hear and determine questions of law and fact, and, as was said by the Supreme Court of California in Armantage v Superior Ct. 1 Cal. App. 130, 81 Pac. 1033, confers the power to decide wrong as well as right. The jurisdiction conferred by the statutes of this state upon the industrial commissioner is limited to "matters relating to employer's liability for personal injury sustained by employees, fixing compensatron therefor, securing payment thereof," etc. But his authority in matters coming within his jurisdiction necessarily involves the right to decide all questions properly arising out of the controversy before him. The commissioner may well have found from the evidence offered upon the question of Pettit's intoxication that he had been drinking and was to some extent under the influence of liquor, but that same was not the proximate cause of his injury. [3] The commissioner found upon the other questions of fact that Pettit was slightly deaf, that the evidence failed to show affirmatively that he heard the foreman, when he first spoke to him upon the subject, tell him he had better go home and stay until Monday morning and sober up, and that he did not realize or understand, before he left the bridge with Morgan, whose hand had been badly bruised by a heavy block of wood carelessly dropped by Pettit, or until after his return, that he was discharged for the day. This finding has some support in the evidence; whether by the greater weight thereof is a question we cannot determine in this proceeding. The evidence is undisputed that Morgan, a fellow employee, with whom Pettit worked as an assistant or helper, told him when he began work that "he was not fit to work" and that Pettit replied, "Morgan, I am all right," and went to work; that Beabers, an assistant foreman, observing that Pettit had dropped a block bruising Morgan's finger, asked the latter why "he did not send Pettit in if he thought he was not fit to work"; and that the foreman told Pettit that he had better go home and stay until Monday morning; but it does not appear that the latter made any response to this statement. He left the premises with Morgan, who went a short distance from the bridge to have his fingers dressed, and returned with him and attempted to resume work. The foreman, however, seeing him pick up one of the heavy blocks of wood which he had been carrying earlier in the morning, peremptorily ordered him "to go home and sober up." Pettit commenced work on the morning in question about 8 o'clock and was killed something like a half hour later It is the claim of counsel for appellant that, when he left the bridge in company with Morgan, it was in obedience to the order of the foreman discharging him for the day. and that he returned to inquire whether he was finally discharged, and that therefore his injuries were received after his employment had terminated and after he had not only been allowed a reasonable time in which to leave, but after he had in fact left the premises. The record does not show conclusively that deceased left the premises with Morgan because he had been discharged, or that he may not have gone with Morgan on account of his injuries. It may be that the finding of the commissioner is not supported by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence; but we cannot say, upon the record before us, that it is against the undisputed evidence, and proper inferences to be drawn therefrom. It is our conclusion, therefore, that the commissioner did not act illegally or without jurisdiction in affirming the award of the arbitration committee, and that no ground for reversal exists. The finding and judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed. Affirmed. Ladd, C. J., and Gaynor and Weaver, JJ., concur. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION— "CASUAL EMPLOYEE.” Where plaintiff, after finishing a job of shingling a house, and while engaged on a job for another employer, reported to his first employer that the chimney needed a little cement, whcih he would put on for nothing if his employer would get cement, and was injured in coming down from his work, he was a "casual employee" within the exception of the Workmen's Compensation Act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 362.) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Employee.) Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; George Jepson, Judge. Action for damages by an employee against his employer for personal injuries sustained in the course of his employment. At the close of the evidence there was a directed verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Sears & Snyder, of Sioux City, for appellant. Fred W. Lohr and Henderson, Fribourg & Hatfield, all of Sioux City, for appellee. *Decision rendered July 2, 1919. 172 N. W. Rep. 937. EVANS, J. The plaintiff as appellant concedes that his own negligence contributed materially to the injury complained of. In order to avoid the effect of his contributory negligence, he pleaded that his employment was within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1913, c. 147), and that his employer had failed to comply with the requirements thereof, and that he had thereby waived the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The one question in the case is whether the plaintiff's employment came within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, or whether he was a "casual employee" only within the meaning of the exception to such act. It is conceded that the provisions of this act do not apply to a “casual employee"; that is, to one whose employment is of a casual nature. The salient facts involved are that the defendant was engaged in the real estate business and maintained an office. As a part of his business, he looked after the renting of property for others and of collecting the rent therefor and of keeping the same in reasonable repair. He employed the plaintiff to make some repairs in the way of shingling on the house of one of his patrons. While the plaintiff was engaged upon that job, the defendant requested him to fix a screen door and a cellar window at another place at an expense of 50 cents. The plaintiff was under considerable physical disability and was not able to work but a few hours at a time. The agreement as to his compensation for the shingling was that he was to receive $2 for each thousand shingles laid. Under this agreement he did $5 worth of work in four days, which practically finished his employment. It appears, however, that he had discovered that a little cement was needed at the base of the chimney on the roof which he had been shingling which fact he reported to his employer. He proposed that his employer get the cement for him and he would put it on for nothing. He was at that time already at work upon another job for another man. When he received the cement from defendant, he left the other job temporarily and made the repair upon the defendant's chimney. In coming down from his work he received his injury. He testified also that in the course of his conversation with the defendant it was agreed that he would work for the defendant at other jobs as they might arise for 40 cents an hour. It is not claimed that there was any particular job in sight or that the conversation had reference to any particular job. The trial court held that the plaintiff was a "casual employee" within the exception to the Workmen's Compensation Act. We think the holding was clearly right. If this was not a "casual employment," it would be hard to apply the term to any employment. The word "casual" is defined in the dictionaries as "coming without regularity; occasional; incidental;" "coming at uncertain times or without regularity in distinction from stated or regular;" "a laborer or an artisan employed only irregularly." See Webster and Century Dictionaries. We do not find the authorities cited by the appellant as being applicable to the facts disclosed by this record. The following authorities supported the holding of the trial court: Blood v. State Industrial Commission, 30 Cal. App. 274, 157 Pac. 1140; Hill v. Begg, 2 K. B. 802; Bargewell v. Daniel, 98 L. T. N. S. 257; Toombs v. Bomford, 106 L. T. N. S. 823. The judgment below is, accordingly, affirmed. Ladd, C. J., and Preston and Salinger, JJ., concur. SUPREME COURT OF IOWA. JAMES BLACK DRY GOODS CO. ET AL. ข. IOWA INDUSTRIAL COM'R et al. (No. 32245.)* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S -REVIEW. COMPENSATION Under Code Supp. 1913, § 2477m33, decision of the commissioner of arbitration committee on the fact in controversy is reviewable in district court by certiorari, though jurisdictional question is not involved. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417 [3].) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -DEPENDENCY OF SURVIVING SPOUSE-"DESERTION." To constitute "desertion," within Code Supp. 1913, § 2477m16 (c) (1), creating conclusive presumption that surviving spouse is wholly dependent upon deceased employee unless she willfully deserted him, there must be cessation of marriage relation, intent to desert, and absence of consent or misconduct of party alleged to have been deserted. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. §388.) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Desertion.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -DESERTION OF WIFE-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. Evidence held insufficient to show that wife, claiming compensation for death of husband, had deserted him, within Code Supp. 1913, § 2477m16 (c) (1). (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dic. § 405[5].) COMPENSATION 4. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S -RIGHT TO COMPENSATION-DESERTION. Where husband is unable to support his wife, her separation from him with his consent, for purpose of earning wages to support herself and children, does not constitute desertion within Code Supp. 1913, § 2477m16 (c) (1), creating conclusive presumption that surviving spouse of deceased employee is wholly dependent upon deceased, unless it be shown that she willfully deserted him. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. §388.) Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; H. B. Boies, Judge. Appeal from a judgment in certiorari proceedings. This case was originally tried before the arbitration committee, which found for appellee Norma Wright. Thereafter the cause was reviewed by the district court, upon application of plaintiffs, appellants, which court confirmed said finding. The plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. Williams & Clark, of Waterloo, for appellants. *Decision rendered, July 2, 1919. 173 N. W. Rep. 23. PRESTON, J. Appellees filed their petition in the district court for the writ of certiorari on October 4, 1916. Four or five errors are assigned, some of which relate to the admission of evidence and the like before the arbitration committee and the commissioner, and that the trial court erred in holding, under the evidence, that there was no desertion. The principal point in the case, and indeed it was conceded by appellants, at the oral argument on submission, that the only question in the case, was whether or not the appellee Norma Wright had deserted her husband prior to his injury and death, and for that reason would not be entitled to compensation. [1] Appellees contend in this court that certiorari is not the proper method of reviewing the decision of commissioner and arbitration committee, because no jurisdictional question is involved; second, that this court does not enter into a fact of controversy in such cases; and, third. the facts show that appellee Norma Wright did not desert her husband Appellee's husband, George E. Wright, was struck by an interurban car, and killed, on June 1, 1915, at Waterloo, Iowa. He was an employee of the appellant dry goods company. The other appellant is the insurer of the dry goods company. It was admitted that the injury arose out of the employment of deceased by the dry goods company. For rule as to what questions will be considered in such a case, see Des Moines Union Ry. Co. v. Funk, 164 N. W. 648; Griffith v. Cole Bros., 165 N. W. 577-580, L. R. A. 1918F, 923; Goeppinger v. Board of Supervisors, 172 Iowa, 30, 152 N. W. 58; Code Supplement, § 2477m33. Other cases might be cited, perhaps, but the rule seems to be settled. Code Supplement, § 2477m16 (c) (1), provides that the surviving spouse shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon a deceased employee "unless it be shown that the survivor willfully deserted deceased without fault upon the part of the deceased; and if it be shown that the survivor deserted deceased without fault upon the part of deceased, the survivor shall not be regarded as dependent in any degree. No surviving spouse shall be entitled to the benefits of this act unless she shall have been married to the deceased at the time of the injury." Appellants' contention is that the undisputed evidence shows that the appellee Norma Wright had deserted her husband, and that therefore the allowance to her of compensation, as the widow of deceased, was illegal. It seems to be conceded that in such a proceeding we do not pass upon questions of fact, and that if the committee and the commissioner could have found, under the evidence, even though there was a conflict therein, that said appellee had not deserted her husband, then there is no question for this court to pass upon. [2] The cases cited by both parties on the question of desertion are divorce cases, and the same cases, substantially, are relied on by both. In divorce cases, the rule seems to be that there are four elements necessary to constitute desertion: First, the cessation of the marriage relations; second, the intent to desert; third, a continuance of the desertion during the statutory period; fourth, the absence of consent or misconduct of the deserted party. The divorce cases may not be precisely analogous. The divorce statute provides for desertion for a specified time, which is net the case in the statute as to compensation. Otherwise, we think there is but little, if any, difference. It is true in the instant case it is a question of dependence and compensation, rather than a dissolution of marital relations. Under the statute, the dependence is presumed unless there is desertion, where the marriage relation between husband and wife is involved. Both statutes involve the element of willfulness. We think all other elements-that is, the cessation of the marriage relations, the intent to desert, and the absence of consent of misconduct of the party alleged to have been deserted-are necessary to constitute desertion under the compensation statute. Under this rule, we shall refer to the evidence as briefly as may be, particularly the evidence on behalf of appellee Norma |