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shall not successfully prosecute said writ or said suit he will pay the said award, and the costs of the proceedings in said court. The amount of the bond shall be fixed by any member of the Industrial Board and the surety or sureties on said bond shall be approved by the clerk of said court." Such a bond was filed in this case. These provisions to prevent judgments are made to avoid incumbering the employer's property with accumulative liens that in many cases would not be discharged for many years and might run for the life of the employee. These judgments might accumulate until the defect in the title of the employer's real estate would make it unmarketable. The employee is fully protected by the bond required by the statute. The court in this case had only such power or certiorari as the statute gave, and that was to confirm or set aside the decision of the commission. There is nothing in the statute to authorize a judgment directing the payment of the amount of the award and ordering execution to issue.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter an order confirming the decision of the Industrial Commission. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

HEINZE ET AL.

V.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL. (No. 12639.)*

1. MASTER AND SERVANT—WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT—TEAMSTER. In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, evidence held to show that a teamster's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405 [4].)

3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

ACT-INJURIES "ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT."

If the employee is injured while in the performance of any of his duties, such injury arising out of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment.)

4. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION ACT-CLAIM-EMPLOYERS DOING BUSINESS UNDER TWO

PARTNERSHIP NAMES.

A claim under Workmen's Compensation Act against named individuals, copartners conducting two different lines of business under different partnership names, descriptive of the character of business, is not invalid because made orally to one of them, nor because claim stated they were doing business under such partnership names.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 398.)

*Decision rendered, June 18, 1919. 123 N. E. Rep. 598.

COMPENSATION

7. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S ACT-AWARD-PARTNERSHIP

SONE.

NAME-DESCRIPTIO PER

An award by the Industrial Commission against employers conducting two different lines of business under different partnership names, descriptive of the character of business, is not rendered invalid by the addition of a descriptive partnership name; it being merely descriptio personæ and surplusage.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 416.)

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge. Proceedings by Antonia Krings under the Workmen's Compensation Act for an award on account of the death of her husband, Fred Krings, opposed by Frederick G. Heinze and another, as copartners, employers, and the General Accident Liability Insurance Company, insurer. The Industrial Commission confirmed the findings and award of the arbitrator, and the employers and insurer sued out a writ of certiorari and took the record to the circuit court of Cook county, where the award was affirmed, and the trial judge certified the cause as one proper for review by the Supreme Court. Judgment of the circuit court affirmed.

Edward L. England, of Chicago (Samuel J. Nordorf, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiffs in error.

Shaeffer & Foster, of Chicago (George H. Foster, of Chicago, of counsel), for defendants in error.

DUNCAN, J. Antonia Krings filed an application on November 23, 1916, for an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 48, §§ 126-152i) on account of the death of her husband, Fred Krings, resulting from injuries alleged to have been received by him arising out of and in the course of his employment on June 7, 1916. Frederick G. Heinze and Ernest Weinsheimer, copartners doing business as F. Heinze & Co., were named as defendants in the application. At the hearing before the arbitrator January 18, 1917, upon leave_granted, the application was amended by adding as parties defendant Frederick Heinze and Ernest Weinsheimer, doing business as the Weinsheimer Teaming Company. The arbitrator dismissed as to Frederick Heinze and Ernest Weinsheimer, doing business as F. Heinze & Co., and entered an award against them as co-partners doing business as the Weinsheimer Teaming Company. The Industrial Commission confirmed the findings and award of the arbitrator, and plaintiffs in error sued out a writ of certiorari and took the record to the circuit court of Cook county. The award of the commission was affirmed, and the trial judge certified that the cause, in his opinion, is one proper to be reviewed by this court.

The deceased on the day of his injury was in the employ of plaintiffs in error, Frederick G. Heinze and Ernest Weinsheimer, as a teamster. Plaintiffs in error were engaged in business as commission merchants, and also had teams and wagons with which they did hauling for themselves and also for others. They operated as commission merchants under the firm name of F. Heinze & Co. They did their hauling for others under the firm name of Weinsheimer Teaming Company, kept the hauling account separate from the commission account, and paid all bills of the teaming department with checks drawn on the account of the Weinsheimer Teaming Company, except when there was no one present to sign checks, when payments would be made from the money drawer. Both lines of business were conducted from the same office, the same bookkeeper kept the accounts for both, and the reason the two lines were carried on under different names was to obtain hauling from other commission merchants who on account of business jealousy would not give

them the hauling if they knew F. Heinze & Co. were doing the teaming. The check to pay for the liability insurance covering teamsters and their helpers was drawn against the account of the Weinsheimer Teaming Company and signed "F. Heinze." The teams were owned and the business carried on by plaintiffs in error, and no one else was connected with them. It was the duty of the deceased, as a teamster for plaintiffs in error, to go to firms on South Water Street, Chicago, and pick up business from customers. The injury from which his death resulted was caused by a fall in the doorway of G. W. Randall & Co., commission merchants, who were customers of plaintiffs in error's teaming department, on West South Water street. It was about noon when the deceased fell, having slipped on a runway at the door, having about a foot and a half incline to six feet in length. His kneecap was fractured. He was taken to a hospital, and medical aid was rendered by a physician of his own selection, and later by another chosen by his wife. An infection of the knee made an operation necessary. General septicemia developed, and the deceased died on July 12, 1916. Some time in October, 1916, Mrs. Krings and her attorney, George H. Foster, went to the business quarters of the plaintiffs in error, and the attorney told Heinze that they were making their claim against Frederick Heinze and Ernest Weinsheimer, doing business as F. Heinze & Co. and as Weinsheimer Teaming Company, or in whatever name they were doing business.

[1-3] Plaintiffs in error's first contention is that the injury to and death of the deecased did not arise out of and the in the course of his employment. This contention is without merit. It clearly appears that a part of the business of the deceased was to go to customers of his employers and pick up business; that Randall & Co. were such customers; that he was compelled to go through Randall & Co.'s building to reach Spahns, another customer of plaintiffs in error. The wagon and team that he was using had been left in the alley, and the reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts proven is in complete accord with Weinsheimer, who testified, "I suppose he went back there to see if he could get a load." The record in other striking particulars overthrows the contention made by plaintiffs in error. J. A. Bloomingston, the attorney representing the General Accident & Liability Insurance Company, stipulated on the hearing before the arbitrator that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, and E. C. Ferguson, since deceased, who was then representing plaintiffs in error, agreed to that stipulation and thereby bound plaintiffs in error. Weinsheimer also testified that deceased was in the course of his duties when he was hurt. The rule has been announced and frequently applied that, if the employee is injured while in the performance of any of his duties, such injury arises out of his employment. Mueller Construction Co. v. Industrial Board, 283 III. 148, 118 N. E. 1028, L. R. A. 1918F, 891, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 808. The evidence fairly tends to show that the injury arose out of the employment, and the stipulations of their counsel and the admission of Weinsheimer estop plaintiffs in error from now contending otherwise.

[4-7] It is next insisted that no claim for compensation was made in apt time. This contention is based upon the fact that the application against plaintiffs in error as the Weinsheimer Teaming Company was not made until January 18, 1917, more than six months after the injury and the date of the last payment of compensation, and that no claim had been made against them, as such teaming company, prior to that time. This contention is not supported by the record, but, on the contrary, is overcome by the positive testimony of Attorney Foster to the effect that he told Heinze that they were claiming against them as F. Heinze & Co., the Weinsheimer Teaming Company, or in whatever name they were doing business. The claim for compensation may be made orally, as in this case. Suburban Ice Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 111. 630, 113 N. E. 979; Moustgaard v. Industrial Com., 287 Ill. 156, 122 N. E. 49. The

claim for compensation was against F. Heinze and Ernest Weinsheimer. A partnership is not a legal entity, separate and distinct from the persons composing it (Abbott v. Anderson, 265 Ill. 285, 106 N. E. 782, L. R. A. 1915F, 668, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 741); and it makes no difference that the same parties are engaged in two different lines of business under different partnership names, there is in law but one partnership (Campbell v. Colorado Coal & Iron Co., 9 Colo. 60, 10 Pac. 248). The claim filed against the partners, therefore, was a valid claim, and the words describing the character of business done by them are merely words descriptio personæ and surplusage. For the same reason the contention that the award of the commission and the judgment of the court are erroneous because not against Frederick G. Heinze and Ernest Weinsheimer individually cannot be sustained. The legal effect of the award and the judgment is to bind plaintiffs in error as individuals, and the addition of words descriptio personæ cannot be held to render an award and judgment erroneous.

For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

OTIS ELEVATOR CO.

V.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL. (No. 12542.)*

2. MASTER AND

SERVANT-WORKMEN'S

—NOTICE AND CLAIM OF INJURY.

COMPENSATION

In view of Workmen's Compensation Act, § 24, requiring notice of accident to be given within six months after the injury or cessation of payments, and section 8, par. (d), giving an employee who has returned to the employment wherein he was injured 18 months after his return to give notice of injury, an employee, who does not return to his former service within 6 months after the injury or cessation of payment, and who does not within such time claim compensation, can claim no benefit under paragraph (d), as by failing to claim compensation he has waived his rights thereto.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 398.)

3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION ACT-TIME FOR MAKING CLAIM FOR INJURY-RETURN TO EMPLOYMENT-STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION. Workmen's Compensation Act, § 8, par. (d), giving an employee, who has returned to his employment wherein he was injured, 18 months to make claim for injury, cannot be construed as applying only to those employees who remained in their former employment for a period of 18 months, or as meaning that, in case they cease to be so employed within that time, their claims must be filed within 6 months of the date of which such employment ceased.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 398.) *Decision rendered, June 18, 1919. 123 N. E. Rep. 600.

5. MASTER AND

SERVANT-WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION -REVIEW ON CERTIORARI—ENTRY OF MONEY JUDGMENT.

On review by certiorari of a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the circuit court has authority only to affirm the findings and award of the Industrial Commission, or to set it aside and enter a decision justified by law, or to remand the case for further proceedings in view of Workmen's Compensation Act, § 19, but it cannot enter a money judgment and order execution to issue thereon.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[9].)

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Frnest J. Wayner, opposed by the Otis Elevator Company, employer. An award was confirmed by the Industrial Commission, affirmed by the circuit court on certiorari, and the employer brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

John Clark Baker, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William R. Jordan, of Chicago, for defendant in error.

STONE, J. The circuit court of Cook county affirmed the award of the Industrial Commission of Illinois in favor of the defendant in error, Ernest J. Wayner, for injuries received by him while in the employment of the plaintiff in error.

The material facts in the case are stipulated by counsel for the respective parties In interest, to the effect that both parties were under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 48, §§ 126152h) and subject to its provisions, and that the injury on August 11, 1913, arose out of and in the course of the employment; that Wayner was under total disability, on account of said injury,, from August 11, 1913, until March 15, 1914, at which time he returned to work for the plaintiff in error and continued to work thereafter for 6 weeks, at which time he was discharged; that compensation as provided by said act was paid by the plaintiff in error for such disability to March 15, 1914; that after Wayner's return to work he was unfit and unable to perform his usual services, and for that reason was directed to do other kinds of work during said 6 weeks; that at the end of the 6 weeks following March 15, 1914, Wayner had not fully recovered. Formal claim for compensation was filed with the Industrial Commission July 23, 1915, which date is within 18 months after Wayner's return to work for his original employer, the plaintiff in error. An award was made by the arbitrator in his favor in the sum of $1,500 for a period of total and a period of partial disability, which was confirmed, on review, by the Industrial Commission. The circuit court of Cook county on certio.ari affirmed the award, entered judgment therefor, and directed the issuance of an execution for its enforcement,

It is contended by plaintiff in error that the claim for compensation, having been filed more than 6 months subsequent to the last payment of compensation, is barred by the limitation of the Workmen's Compensation Act; that the claimant was not continuously in the employment of the plaintiff in error for 18 months subsequent to his return to work, and therefore the limitation provision of the statute is not applicable under the facts in this case; that the circuit court erred in entering judgment on the award and directing that execution issue thereon. It is contended by the defendant in error, Ernest J. Wayner, that having returned to work for the original employer, even though at a different kind of work, the provisions of paragraph (d) of section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act apply to this case, although claimant did not continuously remain

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