a specialist, testified that a minor operation, involving no risk, would greatly benefit him. The others testified that the disability then present amounted to approximately twenty-five per cent. of total disability of his left foot at the ankle, and all agree that his condition would improve with proper treatment. The insurance company then offered to provide claimant with one month's treatment, involving the minor operation above mentioned, free of cost to him. The commission ordered this treatment and directed that compensation should cease until such time as Johnson had undergone such operation, to which he refused to submit, and thereupon and on October 20, 1917, the commission entered its findings and award by which claimant was found to have sustained a twentyfive per cent. total disability of the use of his left foot at the ankle, and that he was then able to work. The amount fixed by law to be paid for such disability having been already exceeded, no further compensation was awarded. The claimant, without applying for a rehearing, filed a motion in the same suit previously filed by him in the district court, to reopen the case, and to require the return of the files of the commission to the district court. This motion was sustained and claimant was permitted to file a supplemental or amended complaint. To this a demurrer was interposed, which was overruled. The insurance company then answered, and by stipulation the answer of the commission to the original petition was allowed to stand as its answer to the amended complaint. On February 26, 1918, a hearing was had upon the issues as made. No further evidence was taken, but the court found that the order entered by the commission was not supported by its findings of fact and entered judgment as hereinabove stated. It is urged that the district court had no jurisdiction to enter any order in the cause, because the proper procedure was not followed in taking the case before it, and that, in any event, the award is in conflict with the findings of fact of the commission. The claimant contends that the circumstances of this case made the procedure 'adopted by him necessary, as the only way open to bring the case before the district court. It is not necessary to determine this case upon a question of procedure, as it conclusively appears from the record that in entering the award the district court absolutely ignored and refused to recognize the findings of fact of the commission, and reached a conclusion and rendered judgment contrary to and plainly inconsistent with such findings. After an exhaustive hearing, continued from time to time in order to give the claimant every opportunity to substantiate his claim, the commission found that he had sustained an injury to his left foot, which resulted in permanent disability of that member amounting to twenty-five per cent. of the total loss of the foot at the ankle, and further found that in other respects he was at that time able to do ordinary work. There is ample competent testimony to support and uphold these findings. In fact, the evidence as to the physical condition of the claimant is practically uncontradicted, and no other findings could be logically adduced or result from the testimony. This court, in Passini v. Industrial Commission et al., 171 Pac. 369, in discussing the effect of findings, of fact by the commission, at page 370, said: "This court may consider only the legal question of whether there is evidence to support the findings, and not whether the commission has misconstrued its probative effect. The award is conclusive upon all matters, of fact properly in dispute before the commission, where supported by evidence, or reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom." And further, on page 371, it is said: "The purpose of the act is to confine the settlement of compensation cases to the commission itself, so far as is consistent with justice." As there is manifestly nothing in the record to justify the setting aside of the findings of the commission the judgment of the trial court will be reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to the trial court to approve, and accept, the findings of the Industrial Commission, and enter judgment accordingly. Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with instructions. SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. BAUM INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL. (No. 12543.)* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURIES ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT. While there must be some causal relation between the employment and the injury for which compensation is sought, it is not necessary that the injury be one which ought to have been foreseen or expected. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 374.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S ACT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. COMPENSATION Where a workman voluntarily performs an act during an emergency, which he has reason to believe is in the interest of his employer, and is injured thereby, he is not acting beyond the scope of his employment. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY “ARISING OUT OF AND IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT." Where an assistant cutter in a shirt waist factory was fatally wounded by strikers, while trying to save his employer and other employees from injury, the injury arose "out of and in the course of his employment," within Workmen's Compensation Act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) (For other definitions see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment.) 4. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY. In a proceeding before the Industrial Commission to recover compensation for the death of an employee killed by strikers it was error to prove by parol the contents of a letter received by deceased from the union, demanding that he sign up to prevent the strike. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 404.) 5. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S -REVIEW-HARMLESS ERROR. COMPENSATION In a proceeding before the Industrial Commission to recover compensation for the death of an employee killed by strikers, error in proving by *Decision rendered, June 18, 1919. 123 N. E. Rep. 625. parol a letter from the union demanding that deceased sign up was harmless, in view of other competent evidence showing the existence of the strike. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[8].) 6. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S -HARMLESS ERROR-EVIDENCE. COMPENSATION In a proceeding before the Industrial Commission to recover compensation for death of an employee killed by strikers, it was not prejudicial error to admit opinions that deceased was protecting the employer's life and property; where there was sufficient competent evidence. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417 [8].) 7. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -REVIEW-POWERS OF CIRCUIT COURT-MONEY JUDG MENT. Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 19, it is error for the circuit court, on affirming award by Industrial Commission, to direct payment of the award and order execution thereon. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[9].) Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Constance Tomecyk to recover compensation for the death of Edward Tomczyk, opposed by Simon M. Baum, employer. The award of the Industrial Commission was affirmed by the circuit court, and the employer brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions. John Clark Baker, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error. Joseph L. Lisack, of Chicago (John H. McAuliffe, of Chicago, of counsel), for defendant in error. THOMPSON, J. This writ of error is brought to review a judgment of the circuit court of Cook county confirming an award by the Industrial Commission against Simon M. Baum, plaintiff in error, of compensation for the death of Edward Tomczyk, who died February 25, 1917, from injuries received February 16, 1917, in a difficulty caused by some strikers raiding the factory where deceased was working. The questions raised are whether the death of Edward Tomczyk arose out of his employment, whether there was error in the admission of certain evidence, and whether the circuit court, in confirming the award of the Industrial Commission, erred in entering a money judgment and ordering execution. Deceased was employed by plaintiff in error, doing business as the Nora Shirt-Waist Company, as an assistant cutter in his factory located at Milwaukee avenue and Oakley boulevard, in the city of Chicago. The workroom of the factory is triangular in shape, there being about 5,000 square feet of floor space in the room. The entrance to this workroom is from Milwaukee avenue through an outer door, down a passageway, and through a second door. At the right of the passageway between the avenue and the workroom was Baum's office. At the time of the difficulty there were employed in the workroom 2 men and about 25 women. Plaintiff in error manufactured wash dresses, shirt waists and other like wash garments. As assistant cutter it was the duty of deceased to lay out goods and cut same with a knife or a power-driven machine. It appears that on January 13, 1917, plaintiff in error received a letter from the International Garment Workers' Union, demanding that he sign up with the union to avoid a strike and other difficulty. On February 14 a strike was called by this union, which strike was more or less general throughout the city of Chicago. None of the employees of plaintiff in error were members of this union, and there was no strike at this factory, and no trouble existed between employer and employees. Two days later, at about 11:45 a. m., 20 or 30 striking members of this union, men and women, rushed through the passageway, past the office, and into this workroom, calling upon the employees of plaintiff in error to strike. Plaintiff in error was in his office at the time, and when he saw the crowd rushing into his factory he ran to the rear of his office and tried to prevent the crowd from entering his workroom. He seized a hammer, which was taken away from him by the strikers. He then tried to reach his telephone to call the police, but was prevented by the strikers. As the crowd forced its way past plaintiff in error, Tomczyk walked around from his cutting table, where he was working, and tried to hold them back. The plaintiff in error was standing about 4 feet away from Tomczyk, and there were about 6 male strikers standing between them. The remaining strikers, men and women, were crowded around plaintiff in error, Tomczyk, and the forelady, all the women employees of the factory having fled in a panic. In the course of the riot Tomczyk was stabbed, and cried out, "Baum, I am cut." It was from this wound that he died. The strikers left immediately, throwing bricks through the plate glass windows as they went. The first question is whether Tomczyk's injury, which was received in the course of his employment, arose out of his employment. The words "arising out of" have reference to the cause or origin of the accident, and seem to indicate that the accident must happen out of the transaction of the business in which the workman is engaged. That would include any accident which might naturally result from the manner in which the business is carried on and which would be considered incidental to the employment itself. The injury was clearly a mishap, occurring outside of the usual course of events, and was an emergency which arose while Tomczyk was engaged in his work. It is well argued that such a situation could hardly have been contemplated by either the employer or the employee when Tomczyk entered the employment of plaintiff in error. On the other hand, when plaintiff in error failed to sign the agreement with the union, it was certain to cause the members of the union to use some measure to compel compliance with their demands. It was generally known that there was a strike in the city of Chicago, and this fact was known to the plaintiff in error. Unfortunately, during the course of a strike, and in the excitement of events which occur during a strike, trouble quite frequently arises. In view of the general conditions and events that were happening in the immediate vicinity of the factory of plaintiff in error, it can hardly be said he should not, as a reasonable person, expect some difficulty with the strikers. [1, 2] While there must be some causal relation between the employment and the injury, it is not necessary that the injury be one which ought to have been foreseen or expected. It must, however, be one which, after the event, may be seen to have had its origin in the nature of the employment. Such was our holding in Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Com., 285 Ill. 31, 120 N. E. 530. Where a workman voluntarily performs an act during an emergency, which he has reason to believe is in the interest of his employer, and is injured thereby, he is not acting beyond the scope of his employment. It is conceded that Tomczyk was a peaceable and law-abiding citizen. It is also conceded that the strikers rushed into the workroom without any warning and that plaintiff in error tried to eject them. The evidence shows that there was great excitement in the workroom, and that the women employees fled, screaming, to the back of the room. Nothing was said between the plaintiff in error and Tomczyk. Tomczyk, seeing his employer and his fellow employees in apparent danger, came to the rescue. He was assisting his employer in the defense of his person and his property, and was acting in defense of his fellow employees, all of whom were women. We have held that it is the duty of an employee to do what he can to save the lives of his fellow employees when all are at the time working in the line of their employment. Dragovich v. Iroquois Iron Co., 269 Ill. 478, 109 N. E. 999.. That the fellow employees of deceased were not actually in danger of losing their lives cannot change the rule. The danger was clearly apparent to Tomczyk. He acted as any man would have acted under the circumstances. The rioters had rushed in without warning and threw the women employees into a panic. It was up to deceased to act, or to abandon the workroom and its occupants to trespassing strangers, apparently bent upon doing damage to whatever came in their path. The situation was an unusual and unforeseen one, and called for quick action. From every point of view it was the duty of deceased to defend himself and his employer, and to assist his employer in defending the persons of his women coworkers. Where the trouble arises out of the employer's work, and as a result of it one of the trespassers injures an employee who is defending his employer's business, it may be inferred the injury arose out of the employment. [3] An assault arises out of one's employment in a case where the duties of the employee, under the particular situation, are such as are likely to cause him to have to deal with persons who, under the circumstances, are liable to attack him. Ohio Building Vault Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ill. 96, 115 N. E. 221. Such was the situation in this case. Deceased was assaulted, not for anything he had done, but because he was in the employ of the plaintiff in error, who was in bad favor with the union on account of not having complied with its demands. We are therefore of the opinion that the injury, which occurred in the course of the employment, arose out of the employment. [4-6] It appears that plaintiff in error received a letter from the union demanding that he sign up with them to prevent a strike. It was attempted to prove the contents of this letter by oral testimony. This was error. When an arbitrator hears evidence, it must be evidence that is competent and legal, as tested by the usual rules for producing evidence in any legal proceeding. Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 II. 11, 113 N. E. 173, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 627. There was, however, competent evidence showing the existence of the strike, and no damage was done plaintiff in error by this ruling. Neither was there any damage done when the plaintiff in error expressed the opinion that deceased was protecting the employer's life and property. He had testified as to what was being done by deceased, and there was sufficient competent evidence to sustain the finding of the commission. [7] It is contended by plaintiff in error that the circuit court erred in entering a judgment, which not only confirmed the award of the commission, but also directed the payment of the amount of the award and ordered execution. The proceedings in cases of this character are purely statutory, and it is a settled rule that the requirements of the statute must govern and control them. These proceedings were under paragraph (f) of section 19 of the Compensation Act (Laws 1913, p. 349), and the only authority of the court under this paragraph is to confirm or set aside the decision of the Industrial Board. From a consideration of the whole act, it would appear that the Legislature intended that the employer might protect himself against a judgment for payment of the award by performing certain optional conditions. Paragraph (g) of the same section provides that when the proceedings are under that section "no judgment shall be entered in the event the employer shall file with the said board its bond with good and sufficient surety in double the amount of the award, conditioned upon the payment of said award in the event the said employer shall fail to prosecute with effect proceedings for review of the decision or the said decision upon review shall be affirmed." Paragraph (f) of the same section (the one under which these proceedings are brought) provides that the writ of certiorari shall not issue until the employer has filed with the circuit clerk "a bond conditioned that if he |