O'Brien, opposed by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, employer and self-insurer. From an award of the State Industrial Commission, the employer and self-insurer peal. Reversed, and claim dismissed. Argued before John M. Kellogg, P. J., and Lyon, Woodward, Cochrane and Henry T. Kellogg, JJ. Burlingham, Veeder, Masten & Fearey, of New York City, for appellant. Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen., and Robert W. Bonynge, of New York City, for State Industrial Commission. KELLOGG, J. The deceased was employed by appellant as a watchman at Piers 27, 28, and 29, North River, New York City. These piers were maintained by the appellant for the receipt and delivery of freight from cars ferried across the river upon floats from points in the state of New Jersey. In the rear of the piers, running the whole length thereof, was an open space on West street, commonly known as the "farm." Overflow produce arriving at the piers was placed upon the farm, there to await removal by consignees. The deceased was engaged in acting as watchman for a shipment of potatoes in barrels from the state of Florida, which had arrived at the piers, and had been placed upon the farm, when he was run down by a motor truck and killed. The consignee was entitled to 48 hours' notice before removing the consignment. Before this time had elapsed, and before the consignee had taken possession of the shipment, or paid the freight charges thereon, the accident happened. .[1] Within well-settled principles of law, transportation of the potatoes, which was interstate, had not ended when the accident occurred. McNeill v. Southern Railway Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. 722, 50 L. Ed. 1142; Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis v. Dettelbach, 239 U. S. 588, 36 Sup. Ct. 177, 60 L. Ed. 453; Southern Railway Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632, 36 Sup. Ct. 469, 60 L. Ed. 836; Jennings v. Clyde Steamship Co., 148 App. Div. 615, 133 N. Y. Supp. 298; Chalmers v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 175 App. Div. 239, 161 N. Y. Supp. 577. The case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177, 36 Sup. Ct. 517, 60 L. Ed. 941, is not in disagreement with the cases cited. In that case an employe was engaged in moving coal from the storage tracks of the consignee to the coal chutes of the consignee; the coal being in possession of the consignee at all times during the work which was being performed by the employe at the time of his injury. [2] The deceased in this case having been engaged at the time of the accident in guarding an interstate shipment, the transportation of which had not ceased, an award could not properly be made. The award is reversed, and the claim dismissed. All concur. SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK. TROUTON V. M. J. SHEEHY ICE CO. Et al.* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW-FINDINGS OF INDUSTRIAL BOARD-REVIEW. Notwithstanding Workmen's Compensation Law, § 21, providing that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary it shall be presumed that "the injury did not result solely from the intoxication of the injured employe while on duty," it is not the province of the court, on appeal from an order of the State Industrial Commission, refusing to make an award by reason of intoxication, to consider the facts, except for the purpose of determining questions of law. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW-DEATH-INTOXICATION-EVIDENCE. Evidence held to support a determination of the State Industrial Commission that death resulted solely from the intoxication of deceased, notwithstanding Workmen's Compensation Law, § 21, providing that, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, it shall be presumed that "the injury did not result solely from the intoxication of the injured employe while on duty." (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) Appeal from State Industrial Commission. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Selma Trouton for compensation for the death of Joseph Trouton, opposed by the M. J. Sheehy Ice Company, the employer, and the Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Company, the insurance carrier. From an order of the State Industrial Commission, refusing to make an award of compensation, claimant appeals. Affirmed. Argued before John M. Kellogg, P. J., and Lyon, Woodward, Cochrane, and Henry T. Kellogg, JJ. Myers & Goldsmith, of New York City (Gordon S. P. Kleeberg, of New York City, and Joseph B. Kaufman, of Brooklyn, of counsel), for appellant. Jeremiah F. Connor, of New York City (William Butler, of New York City, of counsel), for respondents. Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen.,,and Robert W. Bonynge, of New York City (E. C. Aiken, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel), for State Industrial Commission. WOODWARD, J. Joseph Trouton, on the 6th of April, 1917, was employed by the M. J. Sheehy Ice Company as a driver of one of its ice wagons. It had a place of business at 132d street, New York, which is located upon a dock adjacent to the Hudson river. On the day in question the decedent took out his wagon load of ice at 6 o'clock in *Decision rendered, May 7, 1919. 176 N. Y. Supp. 45. the morning, and along about 2 o'clock in the afternoon called up the office of the company and reported that he was not in a condition, owing to drink, to complete his deliveries, and asked for a helper. An assistant was sent out to complete the delivery and bring in the team, and the decedent came back to the office and was sent home. He left the office to get his coat from the wagon, and this is the last seen of him until another employe of the company, coming from a small building on the dock, says he saw a pair of feet just disappearing over the edge of the dock, and later in the day the body of the decedent was taken from the river. The State Industrial Commission found the facts warranting the making of an award, except that it was held that the decedent came to his death holly because of his intoxication, and upon this appeal it is urged that this determination of the commission is not warranted by the evidence. [1] Section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67) provides that, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, it shall be presumed that "the injury did not result solely from the intoxication of the injured employe while on duty," but in this case there was such substantial evidence. Indeed, the evidence was preponderating that the decedent was staggering drunk at the very time of the accident, and all of the known facts point to this as the proximate cause of the death. It is not, however, the province of this court to consider the facts, except for the purpose of determining questions of law, for, as Mr. Justice Howard says in Matter of Rhyner v. Hueber Building Co., 171 App. Div. 56, 58, 156 N. Y. Supp. 903, 904: * "It is not well for this court to fall into the habit of discussing the facts, even for the purpose of showing that the findings of fact are reasonable and meet with our approbation. We cannot, except by usurpation, invade the realm of facts, for it was the clear intent of the Legislature that the 'decision of the commission shall be final as to all questions of fact.' * The commission is the sole judge and the 'final' judge of the facts, and this court is not only forbidden to trespass upon the jurisdiction of the commission in this field, but, by section 20 of the act, it is circumscribed even in its review of questions of law. It was the purpose of the Legislature to create a tribunal to do rough justice-speedy, summary, informal, untechnical." Matter of Tirre v Bush Terminal Co., 172 App. Div. 386, 389, 158 N. Y. Supp. 883; Uhl v. Guarantee Construction Co., 174 App. Div. 571, 573, 161 N. Y. Supp. 659; Matter of Dale v. Saunders Bros., 218 N. Y. 59, 63, 112 N. E. 571, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 703. [2] There is evidence in this case supporting the determination of the State Industrial Commission, and the order should be affirmed. COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF TEXAS. 1. MASTER AND BEAUMONT. AMERICAN INDEMNITY CO. V. DINKINS. (No. 449)* SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -"COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT." Petition alleging that deceased, employed as an electric engineer, registered out for the day at the entrance gate, and started for home to secure rest, and had gotten a short distance, when he was struck by an automobile, was demurrable because it showed that injury was not sustained in the "course of employment," within Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Law, pt. 1, as that term is defined by section 1, pt. 2. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[2].) (For other dfinitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW-INSTRUCTIONS The terms of the Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Law should be construed with the utmost liberality of which they are legally capable. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 348.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S -"COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT." COMPENSATION Injuries sustained by deceased, three-quarters of a mile from refinery where he was employed as electric engineer, after he had registered out for the day and started for home to secure rest, did not occur while he was engaged in the furtherance of the affairs of his employer, within Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Law, pt. 2, § 1, defining the phrase "injury sustained in the course of employment.' (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[2].) 4. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -REFUSAL TO FIND UNDISPUTED FACTS. In suit under Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Law, held, under the undisputed evidence, that court erred in refusing to find as a fact that employe was injured after he had punched the time clock and after he had been relieved for the working day. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 402.) 5. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -REFUSAL TO FIND UNDISPUTED FACTS. In suit under Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Law, held, under the undisputed evidence, that court erred in refusing to find that the injury occurred on one of the main public roads, which was not the only road leading to and from the plant of the employer. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 402.) *Decision rendered, April 15, 1919. Additional Findings of Fact, April 30, 1919. 211 S. W. Rep. 949. 6. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -BURDEN OF PROOF. Parties who base their right of recovery on the Workmen's Compensation Law must show that they are entitled to compensation within the terms of the act, in view of part 2, § 5, providing that the rights and liabilities of parties shall be determined by the provisions of the act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Déc. Dig. § 402.) COMPENSATION 7. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S -INJURY RECEIVED IN THE "COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT." To come within the term "injury received in the course of employment," as defined by Workmen's Compensation Law, pt. 2, § 1, it must be shown that the injury originated in the work, and, further, that it was received by the employe while engaged in the furtherance of the affairs of the employer. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 371.) 8. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION --RELATION OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE-TERMINA TION. Although an employe's employment may continue for an interval after he has ceased working, there must be a line beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue, and the question where that line is to be drawn in each case is to be determined by the facts themselves. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; A. E. McDowell, Judge. Suit by Mrs. A. P. Dinkins, for herself and as next friend for her two minor children, Jack Dinkins and Emma Marie Dinkins, against the American Indemnity Company, to recover compensation under Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Law. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and judgment rendered for appellant. Minor & Minor and Sam C. Lipscomb, all of Beaumont, for appellant. Jas. A. Harrison, of Beaumont, for appellees. BROOKE, J. This suit was instituted by Mrs. A. P. Dinkins for herself and as next friend for her two minor children, Jack Dinkins and Emma Marie Dinkins, against the American Indemnity Company to recover workmen's compensation under the provisions of the Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation Law of the State of Texas, as embodied in chapter 103, p. 269, General Laws of 1917 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, arts. 5246-1 to 5246-91). Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant issued a policy of insurance to the Magnolia Petroleum Company, insuring employes working at the Magnolia refinery at Beaumont against injuries resulting in death and received and sustained in the course of employment, and that the policy so issued was to insure the liability and pay the compensation provided for in said Employers' Liability and Compensation Act; that the Magnolia Petroleum Company employed more than 1,500 persons, and had insured its employes with the defendant, American Indemnity Company; that A. P. Dinkins on September 30, 1917, was an employe of the Magnolia Petroleum Company as an electrical engineer at its refinery at Beaumont, Tex., and had been continuously in the service of said Magnolia Petroleum Company in such capacity for several |