of Franklin, N. Y.; and possibly one or two other papers of small circulation. The repeated and deterinined efforts of the Confederate Government to send agents and ministers to the European courts to advocate their cause, a measure difficult of execution in consequence of the blockade; as also the frequent arrival of those who had been engaged in political or financial negotiations abroad for the benefit of the Southern Confederacy, led the Government to keep a watchful eye on the movements of passengers, and finally to organize a passport system for those who desired to visit Europe, as well as for those returning thence to this country. This at first occasioned some uneasiness, as it had always been our boast that there were no restrictions upon the freedom of transit to or from the United States; but the good effect of the measure was apparent in the arrest by its means of persons who would otherwise have been of great service to the Southern Confederacy. The confiscation act of Congress having authorized the seizure of the property of those who were in rebellion against the Government, when that property was found within the loyal States, money and other personal property, and vessels, belonging to persons identified with the rebellion, were seized to a considerable amount. Ultimately, it having appeared to the Government that in many cases the information on which seizures were based was the result of personal hostility or greed, and that in some cases the seizures had done injustice to parties really loyal, they were discontinued. In no case were money, bonds, or promissory notes retained by Government where it was not evident that they were intended to be used directly for the rebellion; a course of conduct in marked contrast with that of the Confederate leaders, which we have already exhibited. CHAPTER XL Modern Art of War.-Great Wars of Europe.-New Principles.-"Strategy."- THE modern art of war, as perfected by the great captain of the present century, may be said never to have been practised upon this continent previous to the present contest. The old colonies developed their independence after a protracted struggle, under the defensive military genius of the father of his country, operating with rare judg ment on the old maxims of the art. The determined valor, endurance, and devotion of the men of the Revolutionary armies were important elements of success, and in the course of the struggle, much native practical military capacity was evolved. Happily for the country, with the close of the struggle, peace brought with it other pursuits, and the military art fell, if not into disrepute, at least into disuse. The United States were too distant from the powers of Europe to be involved in those cabals, intrigues, and coalitions, which had there prolonged the struggle against Republican France through twenty years of bloodshed, and which were fatal to Poland, and to the independent action of most small powers. So completely isolated was the American Union, that, in accordance with the farewell advice of Washington, it had no "foreign policy." If the Academy at West Point educated a certain number of young men in the theory of war, there was never any field of action for the fruits of those studies to develop themselves. In Europe, on the other hand, during the quarter of a century which followed American independence, war on a grand scale was conducted under the greatest military genius of any age. That he was a graduate of a military academy may, in some degree, have aided his progress. But he was certainly not indebted to the teachings of professors for his wonderful success. On the contrary, they had failed to discover any thing remarkable in the student. The general principles then taught may be said to have been by him reversed. Thus the broad rule that an army occupying a central position between two others, would necessarily be defeated, because exposed to simultaneous attacks on each flank, he demonstrated was only relatively true, and that in fact such a central army occupied the strongest position, if properly handled; concentrating a strong force at the decisive point, it could meet and assail one army, in time to return and overwhelm the other. Following the same principle, France, holding a central position in regard to Europe, instead of being weak in consequence, was strong, so long as her internal connections were open, and her force concentrated. A revolution was also produced in the old maxims in relation to fortified places. Their value fell immensely before the active movements of the French. It was ascertained that they were of themselves not formidable, unless they were the key or gateway to some important district. A mere fort that commanded no necessary route was found to be of little value, and the powerful combination of columns was much more effective than spadework, in the hands of an able commander. These ideas were novel, and he conquered Europe in illustrating them. When the Austrian power held Italy, and he, with forty thousand ill-clad, ill-armed, and ill-provided, but veteran troops, turned the Alps and made his attack at Montenotte, the chances were very far from being in his favor; but genius in conception, power of combination, rapidity of movement, and unparalleled vigor in execution soon did their work upon the legions of Austria, and the veteran marshals, retiring before the blows of the "sans culotte," exclaimed in disgust, "Who ever saw such tactics!" Up to that time the difference between "strategy" and "tactics" was ill defined. The latter had been as old as the art of war itself. The former was the consequence of dealing in war on a large scale. The master-mind on the broad field of Europe, with numerous armies to move, deduced broader principles from more numerous and ex tended facts. "Tactics" pertains to handling an army in the field; "strategy" projects the campaign, and directs the movement of the armies. "Tactics" fights the battle; "strategy" teaches when and where to fight it, and under what conditions. It remained for the master-mind of Napoleon to apply the doctrine of "long chances" to war; that is, so to arrange and plan his campaign that if of ten battles he should lose seven, yet the results of the three gained would be such as to give him the campaign. The campaign ending at Marengo is an instance in point. While Napoleon was preparing to cross the Alps, Massena held Genoa with an obstinate valor that immortalized his name, with the view of detaining the Austrians in that corner of Italy, until the Grand Army should have gained their rear. This was accomplished, and the French troops were so disposed along the only route between the Alps and the Apennines by which Melas could retreat, that he would require to win six battles to get through, whereas the loss of one was ruin. That one he lost at Marengo. Therefore, when the English historian, Alison, wrote that the charge of Kellermann at Marengo "placed the crown on Napoleon's head," he showed a want of appreciation of the military situation, since the gain of that battle and four others would not have saved Melas from destruction if he had lost the sixth. It is a remarkable fact that in the history of the world there have been but about fifteen battles which drew after them such consequences as decided a war. Such a battle was Austerlitz, which was the result of masterly "strategic" movements which brought the Allies to fight at that place, and of consummate "tactical" skill which utterly destroyed them in the field. When Napoleon sat on his horse that misty morning, surrounded by his generals, with his cold gray eyes fixed with grim satisfaction on the movements of the Allied generals, as with presumptuous fatuity they marched their troops by the flank, from left to right, he quietly restrained the ardor of his lieutenants by admonishing them "never to interrupt an enemy while he was making a mistake." "If," said he, "you stop him now, it will be an ordinary battle; let him complete his movement, and we shall destroy him." The result was, that before the glorious "sun of Austerlitz" had set, the Allied centre was taken, and the victory won. This was but a repetition of what had occurred years before on a smaller scale, on the plateau of Rivoli. An Austrian force had there passed to the left and rear of the French, who looked uneasily over their shoulders at what they thought a danger. "Those people are ours," said the young commander; "we will take them at our leisure." The unerring sagacity with which the required blow was discerned, and the celerity and vigor with which it was delivered, astounded alike friend and foe. When shut up in Mantua, with the immense Austrian armies approaching, Napoleon did not dig and "work i' the earth," but sallied out, chose his battle-field, made the bridge of Arcole famous while the world stands, destroyed his enemies, and returned in triumph. Nevertheless, the ablest generals said he had no plan, and was fighting by hazard. Thus, when the army invaded Spain, and was stopped before the pass of the Somosierra, a steep acclivity, at the top of which the guns of thirteen thousand Spanish troops were in position, the French generals reported the place impassable. Napoleon reconnoitred in person, ordered the Polish legion to charge up the pass, and take the guns. They did so, and the army proceeded. Such a movement was out of all rule, and was pronounced foolhardy. But genius is above all rules. The prompt application of common sense to the exigencies of the moment is a mark of genius. Thus an obvious want of prompt conveyance for men, where the necessity exists, of combining the strongest force on a given point, as well in the "strategy" of a campaign as in the "tactics" of the battle-field, produced continual changes. For this end Napoleon organized the voltigeurs, or regiments of infantry, acting with regiments of cavalry. When required at certain points on the battle-field, the infantry man vaults behind the horseman, and a double force is thus transported with celerity to a given point. This innovation produced great discussion among military martinets and theorists-as to whether an infantry soldier was any better for being taught cavalry exercise. A pamphlet war raged fiercely on the subject, while the real motive of the master-mind that directed the organization was not at all comprehended. The vast strategic abilities of the great captain were not shared by his lieutenants, great as they were as "tacticians." The battle once arranged, each fulfilled his duties in a masterly manner. Thus of Lannes, the emperor remarked, that he found him a "pigmy, and left him a giant," referring to the ability with which, as a tactician, he could handle twenty thousand men on the battle-field. Soult, he said, was the "only military head" in Spain, under Joseph. He could bring his army into the field, and properly place it, but could go no further. When Napoleon himself was in Spain, driving the English, under Sir John Moore, before him, he heard of the approach of the Archduke Charles, the first general of the Allies, upon Ratisbon, with two hundred thousand Austrians; he hastened to the spot, and found his own immense army so misplaced that he said to Bessières, "If I did not know your friendship, I should think you were betraying me." He spent the night receiving reports, and issuing his orders to the various corps, and thus brought about those marvellous results on the following day which caused Wellington to exclaim, "The art of war was never perfected until now." The same strategic combination directed his armies with fatal effect upon the Allies at Lutzen and Bautzen, when, after the Russian campaign, he was struggling against combined Europe. The several corps fulfilled their orders with the usual vigor, and on the field of Bautzen all that saved the Allies from annihilation, was the hesitation of Ney to follow up his advantage, from a misunderstanding of the "strategical" combination, although Jomini, present with him in the field, advised him to develop his blow. The Allied generals were slow to learn, and unable to compete with the great captain. When prolonged war had weakened the resources of France, and Europe was banded in vast numbers against him, their theory was not to fight, but to elude his grasp. The conquest of Europe under such a leader was effected by lieutenants, each of whom in his own person represented the highest order of some species of military talent, and these talents had been drawn out in a lifetime of camp duty; but very few, if any, of the lieutenants ever arrived at the necessary ability to manage an independent corps of fifty thousand men in the field. Without the master-mind, the vast power of France ceased to be formidable to the overwhelming numbers brought against her. In the early days of the French Revolution, vast numbers of men were sent to the frontiers to defend the country, and these gradually became veteran soldiers of the best description. From their ranks rose the celebrated marshals who were the instruments of Napoleon's glory. But the draft was too great upon the male population of France, and as the struggle was prolonged through the life of a generation, although the genius of the emperor remained, the material of execution began to fail, and disaster closed the wars of the empire. The United States have now reached a position where not only have armies and military ability become necessary to the safety of the nation in its integrity, but Europe has been brought nearer to us by steam, and other empires are becoming consolidated to the continent, in such a manner as to make a foreign policy necessary, as well in regard to Canada, Mexico, and South America, as to Europe. The great conflict between the North and the South, like the revolution of France, has had the effect of calling over a million of men from peaceful pursuits to the camps, and experienced foreigners agree that no nation ever presented finer material for soldiers. The difficulty at the outset was not a want of officers who had studied the military theory, but of those who had so constantly applied the principles of science to actual warfare, as to have them all at command to apply with prompt energy at the critical moment. It is evident that a man who, twenty years ago, read medicine for a few months only, and then went into some other pursuit, is not a physician to be compared to him who has employed his life in continual practice at the bedside. The military science, equally with all others, requires practical experience. The greatest writers on the science in Europe were very indifferent commanders in the field. It is for these reasons that with such unequalled material for troops, and such lavish resources, patience became the chiefest of public virtues. General Scott, it is true, performed a brilliant, short, and effective campaign in Mexico, but it will be remembered that he was a life-long commander, of considerable natural skill, and that his command, composed of regular troops mostly, was, after all, but a trifle in numbers as compared with any of the corps now in the field. In relation to the "tactical aspects" of the contest, it will be observed that the Union troops at the commencement of the war occupied an immense line, running from the Potomac to the Mississippi, and another running on the Atlantic coast down to the Gulf of Mexico; while the enemy held the centre of the region enclosed by these lines, which, as we have seen of France in respect to Europe, is the strong position. The law of strategy in this case requires the party occupying the circumference to close his circle, and gradually contract it. But no commander or nation ever before had so vast a circle to close. The enemy, in accordance with the same, |