to such a law that there may be, at the time, only one city in the state which possesses a sufficient population to bring it into one of the designated classes,10 unless it is evident that the legislature merely sought in this manner to evade the constitutional prohibition against special laws. It is possible that there may be other bases for classification beside the relative population, but whatever system is adopted, it must be such as to show clearly the need of differences in powers or governments. "The true principle of classification," says the court in New Jersey, "requires something more than a mere designation by such characteristics as will serve to classify, for the characteristics which will thus serve as a basis of classification must be of such a nature as to mark the object so designated as peculiarly requiring exclusive legislation. There must be a substantial distinction, having a reference to the subject matter of the proposed legislation, between the objects or places embraced in such legislation and the objects or places excluded. The marks of distinction on which the classification is founded must be such, in the nature of things, as will, in some reasonable degree, at least, account for or justify the restriction of the legislation." 17

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

185. In respect to all those matters in which the people of the state generally have an interest or concern, the legislature may require and compel the municipalities to discharge duties, perform works, and if necessary contract debts. But in regard to matters of purely local concern, which are not of importance to the state at large, and which are generally best regulated by the local authorities, the rule of local self-government requires that the municipality should be controlled only by the preferences and determinations of its own citizens.

18 Pac. 413; State v. Hunter, 38 Kan. 578, 17 Pac. 177; Paul v. Gloucester Co., 50 N. J. Law, 585, 15 Atl. 272.

16 State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 S. W. 677; State v. Graham, 16 Neb. 74, 19 N. W. 470; State v. Hudson, 44 Ohio St. 137, 5 N. E. 225.

17 State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. Law, 435.

BL.CONST.L.-28

The double function of municipal corporations requires them to assume a share in the performance of state duties, as the legislature shall apportion the same, and also to regulate matters which concern only the particular community. In respect to the first class of duties, the legislature has the control, and it may grant, modify, or abrogate municipal powers as its wisdom shall dictate. It may also, within the same field, coerce a municipal corporation into the discharge of its proper functions, by laws requiring it to make contracts, issue bonds, or undertake public works. Thus, a city or county may be compelled to maintain local courts or a local police system, to lay out and keep in repair public highways, build bridges, and erect suitable public buildings. But in regard to its own local needs or advantages, the municipality alone is to judge of the desirability of making contracts, undertaking works, or incurring debts, and in these matters it cannot be compelled against its will to adopt the wishes of the state legislature. Thus, in regard to the maintenance of municipal parks, the question of a municipal system of gas or waterworks, and other such private and local affairs, it is not in the lawful power of the legislature to force the municipality into engagements or debts.18

While municipal corporations are subordinate agencies of government, and, as such, subject to the regulation and control of the legislative authority of the state, yet they are also, in some particulars, assimilated to private corporations in respect to their rights and powers. "Over all its civil, political, or governmental powers," says Dillon, "the authority of the legislature is, in the nature of things, supreme and without limitation, unless the limitation is found in the constitution of the particular state. But, in its proprietary or private character, the theory is that the powers are supposed not to be conferred primarily or chiefly from considerations connected with the government of the state at large, but for the private advantage of the compact community which is incorporated as a distinct legal personality or corporate individual; and

18 In regard to these general propositions, see Kimball v. County of Mobile, 3 Woods, 555, Fed. Cas. No. 7,774; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; People v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; Western Sav. Fund Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Park Com'rs v. Mayor of Detroit, 29 Mich. 343.

as to such powers, and property acquired thereunder, and contracts made with reference thereto, the corporation is to be regarded quoad hoc as a private corporation, or at least not public in the sense that the power of the legislature over it or the rights represented by it is omnipotent." 19

And the power of the legislature to control the municipal corporations is also limited by the necessity of preserving the rights of third persons which may in some cases intervene. Thus, the right to interfere with the powers and government of a city cannot be so exercised as to deprive bona fide creditors of the municipality of their remedies against it. The power of taxation, for example, cannot be so abridged that persons who had previously become creditors of the city, relying on its power to levy taxes to pay its debts, shall be deprived of all effectual means of collecting their claims.20

DEBTS AND REVENUE.

186. The legislature has power to require and compel a municipal corporation to pay its just debts, even when they are not enforceable by the ordinary processes of law, and to this end it may require the municipality to raise money by taxation.

It matters not that the particular claim is not such as the courts would enforce without further legislative authority. If a moral obligation exists, the legislature may give it legal sanction. A law requiring a municipal corporation to pay a demand against it which is without legal obligation, but which is equitable and just

19 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 66. The state may make a contract with, or grant to, a municipal corporation, which it cannot subsequently impair or resume. "A grant may be made to a public corporation for purposes of private advantage, and, although the public may also derive a common benefit therefrom, yet the corporation stands on the same footing, as respects such grant, as would any body of persons upon whom like privileges were conferred." County of Richland v. County of Lawrence, 12 Ill. 1; Spaulding v. Andover, 54 N. H. 38.

20 Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 4 Sup. Ct. 648; State v. Common Council of Madison, 15 Wis. 30; Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St. 426.

in itself, being founded upon a valuable consideration received by the corporation, is not open to constitutional objection, as being retroactive, or otherwise.21 Thus, the legislature may authorize a municipality to issue bonds for a debt contracted, without legislative authority, for the improvement of its streets.22 But the legislature cannot compel a municipal corporation to pay a claim which it is under no obligation, legal or moral, to pay; nor can it require a court to render judgment on proof of the amount thereof.23

The revenues of a county are not the property of the county in the sense in which those of a private person or corporation are regarded. The whole state has an interest in the revenue of a county, and for the public good the legislature must have the power to direct its application.24

OFFICERS OF MUNICIPALITIES.

187. Officers having to do with municipal corporations are of two sorts:

(a) Those whose functions concern the whole state or its people generally, although territorially restricted.

(b) Those whose powers and duties relate exclusively to matters of purely local concern.

188. Officers of the former class may be appointed or regulated by the state authorities; but the principle of local self-government requires that the choice of officers of the latter class should be left exclusively to the people of the particular community.

21 Lycoming v. Union, 15 Pa. St. 166; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 654. It is competent for the legislature of a state to require a county to pay a just debt after the lapse of such time as would bar it by limitation. County of Caldwell v. Harbert, 68 Tex. 321, 4 S. W. 607.

22 Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Elizabeth, 42 N. J. Law, 235. 23 Hoagland v. City of Sacramento, 52 Cal. 142; Supervisors of Sadsbury Tp. v. Dennis, 96 Pa. St. 400.

24 People v Power, 25 Ill. 169.

"The administration of justice, the preservation of the public peace, and the like, although confided to local agencies, are essentially matters of public concern; while the enforcement of municipal bylaws proper, the establishment of gas works or water works, the construction of sewers, and the like, are matters which pertain to the municipality as distinguished from the state at large." 25 Thus, a municipal board of police is clearly an agency of the state government, and not of the municipality, and therefore belongs to the first class above mentioned.26 But on the other hand, a statute which has the effect of placing in the hands of a board of public works, who are to be appointed by the legislature, the exclusive control of the streets, bridges, police and fire departments, etc., in cities subject to its provisions, without the consent of those to be affected thereby, infringes upon the inherent right of the citi zens to local self-government and is unconstitutional.""

POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

189. The powers vested in a municipal corporation are restricted to the following three classes:

(a) Those expressly granted to it in its charter, or in constitutional or statutory provisions applicable to it.

(b) Those granted by necessary or fair implication from the terms of the same instruments.

(c) Those which are necessary to enable it to exercise its granted powers and effect the objects of its incorporation.

"A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation,

25 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 58.

26 People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44. 27 State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N. E. 252.