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by the presiding officers of the two houses, approved by the President, and deposited in the department of state, cannot be invalidated by the mere fact that the journals of congress do not show that it was passed in the precise form in which it was authenticated and signed.20 Further, it must be observed that, if recourse is had to the journals, their testimony must be taken as absolutely true and unimpeachable. What the journals do affirmatively state cannot be contradicted or modified by any extraneous evidence whatever. And if the enrolled act and the journals together show a compliance with all the requirements of the constitution, no other or further evidence impugning the act can be received. Thus, in such a case, it is not permissible to show by parol that some of the members needed to make up the majority in favor of the bill were not duly elected or qualified.22

21

The legislature may at the same or a subsequent session correct its journals, by amendments which show the true facts as they actually occurred, when it is satisfied that by neglect or design the truth has been omitted or suppressed.23

Bribery of Legislators and Lobbying.

The attempt to bribe a member of the legislature is made a criminal offense, either by the constitution or a statute, in all the states, as is also the taking of a bribe by such member. Moreover, the law sets its face severely against lobbying. In two states this is made a felony by the constitution.24 And in all, the courts refuse to lend their aid in the enforcement of contracts for lobby services, declaring all such agreements to be immoral and void. "A contract for lobby services, for personal [or political] influence, for mere importunity to members of the legislature or other official body, for bribery or corruption, or for seducing or influencing them, v. Bigger, 79 Va. 269; Hunt v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396, 3 S. W. 233; Attorney General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 385, 31 N. W. 203.

20 Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495.

21 U. S. v. Ballin, 144 U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 507.

22 State v. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 348, 7 N. E. 447, and 12 N. E. 829.

23 Turley v. Logan Co., 17 Ill. 151.

24 Const. Cal. art. 4, § 35; Const. Ga. art. 1, §§ 2, 5. The constitution of California, as above, defines "lobbying" as "the seeking to influence the vote of a member of the legislature by bribery, promise of reward, intimidation, or other dishonest means."

for any other arguments or persuasions or inducements than such as bear directly and legitimately upon the merits of the pending application, is illegal and against public policy and void." 25 In a case before the supreme court of the United States it was said, after referring to a number of decisions: "The sum of these cases is: First, that all contracts for a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, or to use personal or any secret or sinister influence on legislators, are void by the policy of the law. Second, secrecy as to the character under which the agent or solicitor acts tends to deception and is immoral and fraudulent; and where the agent contracts to use secret influences, or voluntarily, without contract with his principal, uses such means, he cannot have the assistance of a court to recover compensation." 26 It is even held that a contract stipulating a compensation for services to be rendered in procuring an act to be passed by the legislature for the benefit of the party promising to pay is contra bonos mores, and cannot be enforced, even though no improper means are alleged or shown to have been resorted to by the agent in obtaining the passage of the act.27 And a contract by which one agrees to "use his utmost influence and exertions" to procure the passage of a bill is void as against public policy; for it tends directly to secret, corrupt, and improper tampering with legislative action.28 On the same principle, an agreement by which one contracts to withdraw or withhold his opposition to a pending legislative measure, for a consideration in money or other thing of value, is void.29

But it does not follow that a person interested in pending legislation may not employ agents or attorneys to represent, in a proper manner and at a proper time and place, his reasons for desiring or opposing the passage of the bill. Such contracts are fre quently made, and are valid at law, and perfectly consistent with

25 McKee v. Cheney, 52 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 144. See, also, Sweeney v. McLeod, 15 Or. 330, 15 Pac. 275; Coquillard's Adm'r v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479; 2 Pars. Cont. (8th Ed.) 878; Bish. Cont. § 499.

26 Marshall v. Railroad Co., 16 How. 314.

27 Gil v. Davis, 12 La. Ann. 219.

28 Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543.

29 Smith v. Applegate, 23 N. J. Law, 352. But compare Edwards v. Railway Co., 1 Mylne & C. 650.

the nicest sense of honor.3o "It is allowable," says the court in New York, "to employ counsel to appear before a legislative committee, or before the legislature itself, to advocate or oppose a measure in which the individual has an interest." 31 "We entertain no doubt that an agreement, express or implied, for purely professional services, is valid. Within this category are included drafting the petition to set forth the claim, attending to the tak ing of testimony, collecting facts, preparing arguments, and submitting them orally or in writing to a committee or other proper authority, and other services of like character. All these things

are intended to reach only the reason of those sought to be influenced. They rest on the same principle of ethics as professional services rendered in a court of justice and are no more exceptionable." $

82

LEGISLATIVE POWER OF STATES IN GENERAL.

136. The rightful power of the legislature of a state extends to every subject of legislation, unless, in the particular instance, its exercise is forbidden, expressly or by necessary implication, by the constitution of the United States, a treaty, an act of congress, or the constitution of the state.

Under the system of government in the United States, the people of each of the states possess the inherent power to make any and all laws for their own governance. But a portion of this plenary legislative power has been surrendered by each of the states to the United States. The remainder is confided by the people of the state, by their constitution, to their representatives constituring the state legislature. At the same time, and by the same instrument, they impose certain restrictions and limitations upon the legislative power thus delegated. But state constitutions are not to be construed as grants of power (except in the most general

80 Winpenny v. French, 18 Ohio St. 469.

81 Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 235; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289.

82 Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441. And see Yates v. Robertson, 80 Va. 475; Denison v. Crawford Co., 48 Iowa, 211; Coquillard's Adm'r v. Bearss, 21 Ind.

sense), but rather as limitations upon the power of the state legislature. From these principles it follows that the legislature of a state may lawfully enact any law, of any character, on any subject, unless it is prohibited, in the particular instance, either expressly or by necessary implication, by the provisions of some law which it is bound to regard as supreme: These laws of supreme authority, in which alone are to be sought the limitations of legislative power in the states, are the constitution of the United States, treaties and acts of congress made under its authority, and the constitution of the particular state. No act of a state legislature can be pronounced ultra vires, unless it can be shown to be in contravention of the express terms or necessary implications of one or other of these instruments.33

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

137. The constitution of the United States imposes limitations or prohibitions of two kinds upon the legislative power of the several states, viz.:

(a) Implied.

(b) Explicit.

138. The implied limitations upon state legislative power are divisible into two classes:

(a) Those which grow out of the grant to congress of exclusive power to legislate on certain subjects. (b) Those which are implied from the grant or guar

anty of certain rights or privileges to the citizens of the United States, the citizens of the states, or the states as states.

139. The explicit limitations imposed by the federal constitution upon the legislative power of the states are as follows: No state shall—

(a) Enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, nor, without the consent of congress, enter into

88 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 25, 13 Sup. Ct. 3; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 661, 13 Sup. Ct. 721; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401; Thorpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14; Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251.

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any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power.

(b) Grant letters of marque and reprisal.

(c) Emit bills of credit.

(d) Coin money, or make anything but gold or silver

coin a tender in payment of debts.

(e) Pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.

(f) Grant any title of nobility.

(g) Lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for

executing its inspection laws, unless with the consent of congress.

(h) Lay any duty of tonnage, except with the consent

of congress.

(i) Keep troops or ships of war in time of peace. (j) Engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such

imminent danger as will not admit of delay. (k) Establish or allow slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

(1) Make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.

(m) Deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

(n) Deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

(0) Assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave.

(p) Deny or abridge the right of citizens of the United States to vote, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

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