is no doubt that there are periods in the life of a state when it is most advantageous that the legislature and executive should agree in political views and policies. The active, creative epochs require, we might almost say, this relation. There are, however, periods in the life of the state when such agreement would not be advantageous. After an active, creative period, a season of comparative rest is natural, in order that new institutions, laws and policies may make their cycle and prove their qualities. In such periods, a more deliberate movement of government is advantageous. During such periods, difference of political view between the legislature and executive is more likely to prove beneficial than sameness of view. In systems where both the legislature and executive are elective, we may fairly expect that the same party will possess both branches of the government in active and critical periods of development; while in the ordinary periods of rest, there is some likelihood, at least, that this will not be the case. In systems where the executive is hereditary and the legislature or the popular branch thereof is elective, the same results may occur. It is probable that they will occur. The hereditary executive has certainly as great an interest in keeping himself in sympathy with the people at large as the elective executive. That he shall do so is, in most cases, the prime condition of his continued existence; and the hereditary executive is usually as awake to his own interest as the elective executive. On the other hand, if he is not in accord with the people, and if he persists in antagonizing the legislature upon subjects in regard to which the legis lature represents the popular view, he may not be so easily overcome as the elective executive. His term may not expire so soon. It may, on the other hand, expire sooner; and history certainly shows that the successor by inheritance may differ as widely as the successor by election from the political views of his predecessor.

Again, even though the executive should be of the same

political party with the legislative majority, the political independence of his administration over against the legislature will, at least during the normal and tranquil periods in the growth of the state, be more advantageous than its subjection to the legislative majority. It may also be more advantageous during the active periods of that growth. No legis lature possesses infinitude of wisdom. A politically friendly executive may arrest many an unwise project of law, provided he have the independent power to do so.

If, finally, the executive should be of no political party, as is possible in the case of the hereditary executive, the political independence of his ministry may be of the highest value to the state, not only in imparting greater wisdom to legislation, but in protecting the rights of the minority against the possible tyranny of the legislative majority.

I cannot, therefore, conclude that the system of the hereditary executive requires, in the modern state, the political responsibility of the ministry to the legislature, any more than that the system of the elective executive requires it. In fact, of the two states under consideration in which the ministry is responsible, one (France) presents us with the elective executive; while of the two systems having an irresponsible ministry, one (Germany) presents the hereditary executive. It must be said, however, that the influence of the hereditary executive over the legislature is likely to be greater than that of the elective executive, although the powers possessed may be the same in both cases. This, in all probability, makes parliamentary government under the hereditary executive more conservative than under the elective executive; i.e. makes it, in general, safer and more practicable.

What, then, are the conditions which require the political responsibility of the ministry to the legislature, or the popular branch thereof, or which make this relation advantageous?

We have now two distinct questions which require distinct

answers. I can conceive of nothing requiring this relation except the permanent incapacity of the executive head, or irrational persistence on his part in an unpopular policy, or such evidence of a treacherous disposition as to make it impossible that he shall be trusted. On the other hand, ministerial responsibility to the legislature will be advantageous when the electorate and the legislature are of so high character intellectually and morally as to be practically incapable of forming an erroneous opinion or of doing an unjust thing. The checks and balances of double or treble deliberation by independent bodies will then be no longer necessary, will be rather hurtful than necessary. The natural age of compromise will have been passed. Until something like this condition shall arrive, however, the responsibility of the ministry to the legislature for governmental policy tends to the production of crude measures, and, in general, makes government radical. I do not think that parliamentary government stands in such high favor with political scientists as it did a decade or more ago. Based upon the narrow English electorate of twenty-five years ago, its working seemed to vindicate most thoroughly its principle, but the recent great extension of that electorate has revealed dangers hardly suspected before, and has shaken the faith (once orthodox) in its perfection and in its adaptability to every condi tion of political society. I have no hesitation in saying that to me England, as well as France, now appears to need a greater independence of the executive power over against the legislature.

I have pointed out one distinction between the principle of ministerial responsibility contained in the English system, and that contained in the French, viz; that while the former is collective only, the latter is both individual and collective. The latter seems more complete upon paper, but it works very badly in practice. It divides responsibility where it should be concentrated. It promotes dissension and discord

in the ministry. It permits the more crafty members of the ministry to make scapegoats of their weaker (and sometimes of their more honest) colleagues.

III. As I said at the beginning of this comparison, the difference in the four systems is not so marked in regard to the executive powers as in regard to the executive tenure and the relation of the executive to the legislature. In all four, the chief executive powers, viz; diplomatic representation, commandership-in-chief of the armed forces, superintendence of the execution of the laws, and appointment of the officials are very nearly identical. The powers of the executive over legislation in the different systems, though differing in character, appear roughly equivalent in degree. Where a general veto power is lacking, some compensation seems to be afforded by the power to initiate legislation and to dissolve the legislature. These latter powers, however, are not worth much unless the executive (or the ministry. through which he acts) is independent of the legislature in Where the ministry is but a committee of one house of the legislature and entirely responsible thereto, this appearance of executive control is more or less delusive; and where the executive must also have the consent of one of the houses for the dissolution of the legislature, the control is reduced practically to nothing.

tenure.

There is, however, one very important point of difference in these four systems as regards the executive powers. It is this that while in the constitutional system of the United States the residuary powers of government, i.e. those powers not forbidden to the government by the state and not disposed of specifically by the state, are left in the commonwealth legislatures, and in that of Germany in the commonwealth executives, and in that of France in the legislature, in that of England they remain in the Crown. The causes which have produced and which still sustain this difference are, undoubtedly, the centralization of government in England,

and the preservation of the Crown as government, after it has ceased to be sovereign. But for the Federal system of government in the United States and in Germany, the resid uary powers of government would undoubtedly be in the general legislatures of these states; and but for the overthrow of the Crown, in the revolutions out of which the present systems of the United States, Germany, and France have proceeded, these powers would undoubtedly still be found in the Crown.

This is certainly the most essential difference which we have found in the four executive systems subject to our examination. It gives the English Crown a much stronger position than it would otherwise have. It gives it a general constitutional ordinance power upon all subjects not regulated by statute or common law, which none of the other three executives has. The ordinance powers of the President of the United States, of the German Emperor, and of the President of France, are almost wholly statutory and specific. These powers are given, in these cases, by the respective legislatures, and may be withdrawn by statute. Now the ordinance power does its most valuable service to the state when employed to meet unforeseen exigencies which require immediate action. A sound political science would therefore approve the principle of a general residuary governmental power in the executive. Such a power should be constitutional in its source, but it need not be guaranteed by the constitution against legislative encroachment, i.e. it need not be made exclusive to the executive. The reason for its existence does not require this. When the legislature can act in this general residuary sphere, it should be permitted by the constitution to do so; but when it cannot, many advantages will accrue to the state should the constitution allow the executive to act.

It is manifest from the preceding comparison of these four executive systems, that, while there is not so wide a divergence in their construction and powers as appears upon first