powers of government in Alsace-Lorraine.1 By virtue of this Imperial law, the Emperor controls the special legislation for Alsace-Lorraine, in so far as it is not exercised by the Imperial legislature itself, and directs immediately the local administration therein.2 The Emperor appoints and dismisses all the officials employed in his ordinary or extraordinary administration ;3 but all of his orders to them or acts in regard to them must be issued in the name of the Empire and require for their validity the signature of the Chancellor - a rule which preserves the irresponsibility of the Emperor. The exception to this general principle is the case of the judicial officers of the Empire. These are appointed by the Emperor, but upon nominations made by the Federal Council; and they hold, as against the Emperor, for life.5 The Emperor's power to appoint the judges rests upon a law made by the Imperial legislature, not upon the constitution. The same is true of his power to pardon. The constitutional provision in reference. to these subjects simply empowers the Imperial legislature to establish the judicial system of the Empire. IV. The Military Powers of the Emperor. In the sphere of military administration, the constitution is more generous to the Emperor. This is both natural and necessary. In the military organization of the state, federalism is out of place. Here the strictest centralization is the true principle of a rational and practical polity. Nevertheless this principle has not yet been fully realized in the German system. 1 Reichsgestzblatt, 1871, No. 25, S. 212: "Die Staatsgewalt in Elsass und Lothringen übt der Kaiser aus." 2 Leoni, Staatsrecht der Reichslande Elsass-Lothringen, in Marquardsen's Handbuch des öffentlichen Rechts, S. 230 ff.; Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts, Zweites Buch, S. 377 ff. 3 Reichsverfassung, Art. 18. 4 Ibid. Art. 17. 5 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, § 127: 'Der Präsident, die Senatspräsidenten und die Räthe werden auf Vorschlag des Bundesrathes von dem Kaiser ernannt.” Ibid. § 6: "Die Ernennung der Richter erfolgt auf Lebenszeit." 6 Reichsverfassung, Art. 4, § 13. I. The constitution vests in the Emperor the command of the army of the whole Empire in time both of war and peace.1 It binds the entire soldiery to render unconditional obedience to the commands of the Emperor.2 It empowers the Emperor to organize the army;3 to appoint all the officers commanding a contingent, or more than one contingent, or a fortification; and makes the appointment of the generals within the contingents by the governments of the respective commonwealths dependent upon the Emperor's approval.4 Officers lower than generals are appointed by the commonwealth governments independently. These are the general rules, but there are exceptions to them in the cases both of Bavaria and of Württemberg. The Bavarian troops form one consolidated component part of the German Army. The Bavarian King appoints all the officers thereof, independent of Imperial ratification. The Bavarian troops are under the exclusive command of the Bavarian King in time of peace, but from the beginning of mobilization for war they come under the superior command of the Emperor and are bound to render absolute obedience to the Emperor from such moment until the reestablishment of peace.5 Mobilization proceeds upon order from the Emperor, but the order must be addressed to the Bavarian King, and issued by him directly to the Bavarian troops. If the Bavarian King should refuse or fail to transmit the Imperial order, the only remedy in the hands of the Emperor is that provided in Article 19. of the constitution, to which I have already referred, viz; coercion voted by the Federal Council and executed by the Emperor. The Emperor has the power and the duty to inspect the Bavarian troops at any time.7 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 63. 8 Ibid. Art. 63. 2 Ibid. Art. 64. Bündniss-Vertrag mit Bayern von 23 Nov. 1870, III. 6 Ibid. The Württemberg troops form one consolidated army corps under the immediate command of the King of Württemberg, but under the superior command of the Emperor in time both of war and peace. The King of Württemberg appoints all the officers of this corps, except the commanders of fortifications, but his appointments of the highest officers of the corps must be ratified by the Emperor. The Württemberg troops owe unqualified obedience to the commands of the Emperor; but, in time of peace, the Emperor has no power to order the Württemberg troops out of Württemberg or other troops into Württemberg, without the consent of the King of Württemberg, except for the purpose of garrisoning South-German or West-German fortifications. The Emperor has the power and duty to inspect the Württemberg troops at any time.1 2. The constitution vests in the Emperor the superior command of the navy. It empowers him with the authority to organize the navy, to appoint all of its officers, and to require from all the officers and men the oath of obedience.2 3. The constitution confers upon the Emperor the power to establish fortifications within the territory of the Empire,3 except in Bavaria.4 4. The constitution empowers the Emperor, in case of insurrection or rebellion in any part of the Empire, to declare that part in a stage of siege; ie. to govern therein, for the time being, as commander-in-chief of the army and through the officers of the army.5 Bavaria is exempted from the operation of this power. V. The Imperial Chancellor. The Imperial constitution requires that all the official acts of the Emperor, except those of military commandership, shall 1 Militair-Konvention mit Württemberg, von 21 und 25 Nov. 1870, dem Art. 68 der Reichsverfassung zugesetzt. 2 Reichsverfassung, Art. 53. 8 Ibid. Art. 65. 4 Bündniss-Vertrag mit Bayern von 23 Nov. 1870. 5 Reichsverfassung, Art. 68. Bündniss-Vertrag mit Bayern von 23 Nov. 1870. be countersigned by the Chancellor, who thereby assumes the responsibility.1 The Emperor is thus irresponsible and, as I have already stated, from his character as King of Prussia is personally inviolable. To whom the Chancellor is responsible is not declared in the constitution, and no way is provided in the constitution whereby the legislative bodies can enforce any responsibil ity. They are not vested with the power of impeachment, and no one thinks of the resignation of the Chancellor as the necessary result of a vote of distrust. It is provided by the law of the 17th March, 1878,2 that the Emperor may, upon the proposition of the Chancellor, appoint a substitute or representative for the Chancellor, who may countersign the Emperor's acts when the Chancellor is unable to do so. The substitute may be a single person or a number of persons, each taking, in the latter case, the responsibility in a certain branch of the administration. If the substitute be a number of persons, they must be taken from the chiefs of the administrative departments. The Chancellor is, however, empowered by the law to resume his powers at any moment, in whole or part, as he may see fit. This law must be regarded as a constitutional law, since it modifies the constitution. Here may be the beginning of a collegiate organization of the heads of the administrative departments. This law, however, does not necessarily involve any such result. The Chancellor may always prevent it as well as the Emperor. It would require the assent of both. It is evident that parliamentary government and ministerial responsibility no more exist in the German system than in that of the United States. The Chancellor or his substitute, be they one person or several persons, are the servants of the Emperor and practically responsible only to him. 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 17; Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts, Zweites Buch, S. 93. 2 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1878, S. 7. CHAPTER VII. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. I. The Election of the President. The constitution provides that the President shall be chosen by an electoral body composed of the members of the two legislative houses.1 It requires that this body shall be convoked for this purpose at least one month before the legal expiration of any presidential term.2 It does not expressly declare by whom it is to be convoked, but the plain inference is that the President of the Senate in understanding with the President of the Deputy Chamber shall issue the call. In case, however, he should neglect to do so, the constitution provides that the body may form itself, of full right and in full power, for the purpose of the new election, on the fifteenth day before the legal expiration of the current presidential term.3 In case of the death or resignation of the President, the constitution commands the immediate union of the two legislative bodies in the electoral college. If, at the moment when the vacancy occurs, the Chamber of Deputies should be dissolved, the constitution commands the immediate holding of the new elections and the immediate assembly of the Senate.5 The constitution prescribes that, when the two legislative bodies meet in the electoral college, the President of the 1 Loi constitutionnelle du 25 février, 1875, Art. 2, § 1. 4 Ibid. Art. 3, § 3. 5 Ibid. Art. 3, § 4. |