age is low and the gaining of residence is subject to no artificial hindrances.

2. The government of the United States is federal gov ernment. By this I do not mean that the central government alone is a federal government. It is true that this term is generally applied to it, but I think this arises from the mistaken assumption that it is the government of a federal state. I think I have shown that there is no such thing as a federal state; that, in what is usually called the federal system, one state employs two separate and largely independent governmental organizations in the work of government. What I mean, therefore, in the proposition that the government of the United States is federal government, is that the whole governmental system is federal and that the central government is one of two governmental organizations employed by the state.

Furthermore, the government of the United States is coordinated government. The constitution establishes a legislative, an executive and a judicial department, distributes the powers of the central government between them,1 and ordains that the local governments shall maintain a corresponding form.2

3. The United States government is elective government. The constitution prescribes the principle of election for the holders of legislative mandate, and for the chief executive officer in the central government, and commands the maintenance of the corresponding form in the local governments. The appointment by the political departments of the subordinates of the chief of the executive department and of the members of the judicial department is no

modification in principle of the elective form of government. It simply removes the holders of such offices one or more degrees from the immediate process of election in the establishment of their tenure. An abstract of the tenure must show, in every such case, that its origin is in election.

ment.

4 The United States government is presidential governThe tenure of the executive is ordinarily independent of the legislature, both in origin and in termination.1 Only upon failure of the regular electors to elect may a branch of the legislature act, and then not as legislature, but as a central board of electors; 2 and only upon the commission of high crime or misdemeanor may the legislature undertake to terminate the tenure. These powers of the legislative bodies over the executive tenure must be regarded as excep tional. The ordinary rule of the constitution is the entire independence of that tenure. It is quite true that a legislature so disposed could take advantage of defects in the ordinary law of election of the executive, and decide that there had been no election in the ordinary manner, and thus secure the power of election to the lower house; but it is not to be presumed that the two houses would unite in any such conspiracy against the intent of the constitution. Neither is it to be presumed that the two would conspire to expel an obnoxious executive from office under the pretext that he had committed a crime or misdemeanor. These provisions were intended to meet extraordinary exigencies; and it is to be presumed that they will never be resorted to except under the direst necessity and in a spirit of patriotic sincerity.

Further, the executive head of the United States government is completely independent of the legislature as to his political policy. His council or cabinet of advisers are his

1 United States Constitution, Art. II, sec. 1, § 2; Amendment XII; Art. II,

sec. 1, § I.

2 Ibid. Amendment XII.

3 Ibid. Art. II, sec. 4.

own agents, responsible politically to him only. The defeat of a proposition made by him, or by any one or all of them, to the legislature, or a vote of censure passed by the legislature upon him or them, do not call for his resignation or their resignations. Nothing of the sort is provided or intimated in the remotest degree in the constitution. The political independence of the executive over against the legislature is complete.

Lastly, the executive head of the United States government is furnished by the constitution with the power to defend his prerogatives against any possible attempt of the legislature to encroach upon them. It is true that his veto power upon the legislative acts is not absolute, on the one side, nor limited to those measures touching executive prerogative, on the other;1 but the majority required to overcome it is so large that the defense is practically complete. If so extraordinary a majority can be united against the executive in the legislature, it is rather to be presumed that the executive is mistaken in claiming that the measure would encroach upon his constitutional prerogative. At the same time, we must consider that the unlimited scope of the veto power gives the executive the means of opposing, and probably defeating, any measure of administrative law or ordinance which he may regard as unconstitutional or useless or impracticable, no matter whether it touches his prerogative or not. This is sufficient to secure the independence of the executive. The veto power in his hands, however, is not limited, either in theory or practice, to the cases above noted. Any act of the legislature which requires the concurrence of the two houses is made subject by the express words of the constitution to the presidential veto. 2 siderate executive will be sparing in its use which neither infringe his constitutional prerogative nor

A wise and conagainst measures

1 United States Constitution, Art. I, sec. 7, §§ 2 and 3.

2 Ibid.

concern the ways and means of administration, but he is not restrained by the constitution from the most lavish and prodigal employment of this power. That is left entirely to his own discretion and his own judgment and sense of propriety.

It is difficult to find a term or a concise phrase to express this representative, limited, federal, co-ordinated, elective, presidential form of government. The qualities of representation, limitation, distribution of powers between independent departments, co-ordination of departments and election must be regarded as the essential elements of what is known as the republican form of government. I think these, when based upon a democratic form of state, constitute the republican form. If then we substitute for these the term republican, I think we shall have brought the phrase which designates the form of the United States government into its most concise wording, viz; the federal presidential republic. This is a thoroughly consistent form. All of its elements belong to one and the same general system of practical political science, viz; the popular sovereignty system. No serious future conflict between these parts need therefore be apprehended.

II. The Form of the Government of France.

1. This government is representative. The state is organized in the constitution as a National Assembly, separate from and supreme over the government.1 It is true that the National Assembly constitutes itself out of the personnel of the legislature, but it organizes that material into an entirely different body from the legislature, a body possessing sovereign power over the legislature and over the whole government.

The French government is, further, practically unlimited representative government. There is not a single immunity from governmental power secured to the individual by the

1 Loi constitutionnelle relative à l'organisation des pouvoirs publics, 25 février 1875, Art. 8.

constitution. There is not a single express limitation of any sort in the constitution upon the powers of the government. There is but a single implied limitation, viz; that the government cannot change the constitution; but the fact that the legislature may, at its own discretion, transform itself into National Assembly,1 i.e. into the body which may change the constitution, makes this implied limitation practically nugatory. Finally, the French government is democratic. Eligibility to office and to legislative mandate is conditioned only upon age and the possession of civil and political rights.2 The required age is moderately low, the suffrage is what is generally considered universal,3 and citizenship is not subject to any artificial limitation.

2. The French government is centralized government. There is no trace in the constitution of a distribution of governmental powers between a central government and local governments; i.e. no such distribution is made by the state. Whatever local autonomy may exist is statutory and may be changed or swept away by the central government at pleasure. The centralization is in principle absolute, and may be so in practice at the will of the government. The French government is, however, co-ordinated government. The constitution establishes a legislative department and an executive department, draws the line of distinction between their functions and prescribes the principles of their correlation.

3. The French government is elective government. The members of the lower house of the legislature are chosen by universal suffrage and direct election. The members of 1 Loi constitutionnelle relative à l'organisation des pouvoirs publics, 25 février, 1875, Art. 8.

2 Loi du 9 décembre, 1884, Art. 4; Loi electorale politique, 30 novembre, 1875, Art. 6.

8 Loi constitutionnelle relative à l'organisation des pouvoirs publics, 25 février, 1875, Art. 1, § 2.

4 Ibid.; Loi electorale politique, 30 novembre, 1875, Art. 1.