SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

MESSER

MANUFACTURERS' LIGHT & HEAT CO. et al.*

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT "INJURY BY ACCIDENT IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT"-"FURTHERANCE OF BUSINESS OF EMPLOYER." Where engineer during his vacation, but while in pay of and subject to employer's call, at request of its superintendent went to inspect a pumping station, to increase his efficiency as an employee, and was injured in automobile accident on his journey or his way homeward, his widow was entitled to damages for his death as an "injury by accident in the course of his employment" and while "actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer," within Workmen's Compensation Act, art. 3, § 301.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[2].)

(For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment; Second Series, Furtherance of Business. 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S

ACT-FINDINGS-CONCLUSIVENESS.

COMPENSATION

A finding of the referee adopted by the Workmen's Compensation Board is absolutely conclusive upon the Supreme Court.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].)

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Washington County. Proceeding by Frances Messer against the Manufacturers' Light & Heat Company and the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, the insurance carrier, for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. From an order sustaining excptions to decision of Workmen's Compensation Board sustaining an award of the referee, claimant appeals. Reversed, and judgment entered in favor of claimant for the amount of the award.

Argued before Stewart, Moschzisker, Simpson, and Fox, JJ.

Victor Braddock, of Harrisburg, and H. D. Hamilton and Clyde S. Pipes, both of Washington, Pa., for appellant.

John G. Frazer and Reed. Smith, Shaw & Beal, all of Pittsburgh, for appellees.

Fox, J. Hiram Messer, the husband of Frances Messer, the appellant, was an engineer in the employ of the Manufacturers' Light & Heat Company at the pumping station at Waynesburg. He had been so employed for about three years prior to his death. On the 11th day of July, he began his regular vacation of ten days, during which time he was subject to be called for service if needed and was paid his usual salary. Or the 12th of July, William Nester, the superintendent of the company, called him by telephone and requested him to go to the Brave Pump Station, a place about 18 miles distant from Waynesburg, to inspect this *Decision rendered, Jan. 4, 1919. 106 Atl. Rep. 85.

Vol. III-Comp. 41.

station. The purpose of this instruction by Mr. Nester was to increase the efficiency of Messer as an employee of the company and to educate him as to the best method of conducting a pumping station.

Complying with this request, Messer left his home in Waynesburg in his own automobile accompanied by one Loughman, an assistant engineer of the defendant company. While on the road Messer ran his automobile into a bridge over a creek where there is a sharp turn in the road, throwing Loughman against the windshield and injuring him so that he became unconscious. After this accident, Messer continued on the road for a short distance in the direction of the Brave Pump Station, and while attempting to turn his machine in some way lost control and the machine went over an embankment. It turned over falling upon him and crushing him so as to cause his death about 5 o'clock the same day. The appellant filed her petition as claimant for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915 (Act June 2, 1915 [P. L. 736]) and was awarded compensation by the referee, the facts being found as above stated. This award was sustained by the Compensation Board, and, on appeal by the defendant to the court of common pleas of Washington county, the award of the Workmen's Compensation Board was reversed and the case was dismissed. This appeal followed.

[1, 2] The sole question presented for determination is whether, under the facts above stated, Messer, the husband of the appellant, received the injury which resulted in his death in the course of his employment This must be determined under the language of section 301, art. 3, of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915 (P. L. 738), which, so far as it is material to this controversy, is as follows:

"The term 'injury by accident in the course of his employment,' as used in this article, * *shall include all other injuries sustained while the employee is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere."

The finding of the referee, which was adopted by the Workmen's Compensation Board and is therefore absolutely conclusive upon this court, was to the effect that Messer "was called by William Nester, superintendent of the defendant company, and requested to go to the Brave Pump Station and inspect the station at this place, which place was between 14 or 18 miles distant from where the deceased lived, and the purpose of the inspection being for the education of the deceased and the increasing of his efficiency in the service of the Manufacturers' Light & Heat Company; and in pursuance of this request the deceased started on the road to the Brave Pump Station for the purpose of making said inspection."

The referee also found that it was the "policy of the defendant company to have its employees inspect the different plants and various kinds of work for the purpose of education and better fitting themselves for the service of the company whenever they can do so on the company's time, and the request of the deceased on July 12, 1916, by Superintendent Nester was in pursuance of that policy."

Under the language of these findings, we feel that the referee and the Workmen's Compensation Board correctly determined the legal question when they found that the injury sustained by Messer was incurred while he was actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of his employer.

The learned judge of the court below in reversing the finding and refusing to allow the claim holds, first, that, inasmuch as Messer was attempting to turn his machine, this act took him out of the category of engaging in the employment, and therefore there could be no recovery. We cannot sustain this view. The referee does not find as a fact that Messer was actually returning home, nor does he find what the purpose was in returning home. The learned judge of the court below refers

to the testimony of the widow in which she stated that her husband told her that he had broken some part of the machine when he ran against the bridge and that he was attempting to turn the machine in order to go back home. We cannot consider these facts in determining the legal question; but, even had they been found by the referee, it would not change our view of the law. If he found that his automobile was so injured by the first accident that it was necessary for him to return home, he still would have been acting under the orders of his superintendent. It is too narrow a construction of the law to say that, the instant he turned under such circumstances, he was no longer engaged in the furtherance of the business of his employer. In our view the fact that he was on his vacation is of no significance. He was subject to call, he was paid his salary during the time that he was on his vacation, and he received the request from the superintendent of his employer with which he complied. His compliance with this request continued from the time he left his home until he finally returned, and, the fact that he was prevented from actually carrying out his purpose to go on his way to the Brave Pump Station did not alter his legal status. The test to be applied is: Did he go upon this mission voluntarily or because of the request of his superintendent? The referee finds that he went not only at the request of the superintendent, but in pursuance of the policy which the company followed with all its employees. He was therefore practically under orders and in the performance of his duty when he was injured. In the case of Haddock v. Edgewater Steel Co., 105 Atl. (not yet officially reportéd), we held that an engineer, who was sent to Ohio for a similar purpose and was injured on his return to Pittsburgh in the evening about 11:30 while on his way to his residence, must be regarded as still within the terms of the act and actually engaged in the furtherance of business or affairs of the employer. We think the decision in this case is controlling in the present case. For that reason it is unnecessary to discuss cases referred to by the learned judge of the court below in his opinion setting aside the award.

The judgment is reversed, and judgment is here entered in favor of the claimant for the amount of the award of the Workmen's Compensation Board entered April 16, 1917, together with the costs of this appeal.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

PATER
V.

SUPERIOR STEEL CO.*

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-CONSTRUCTION.

The Workmen's Compensation Act is a remedial statute and is to receive a liberal construction.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 348.)

*Decision rendered, Jan. 4, 1919. 106 Atl. Rep. 202.

2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S

ACT
ARM."

COMPENSATION CONSTRUCTION-EXTENT OF INJURY-"LOSS OF

Where injury necessitated amputation of arm below the elbow resulting in employee's permanent loss of use of his arm, he was entitled to compensation for loss of the arm, rather than for loss of hand, under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 306, which includes all cases of permanent loss of members mentioned therein without regard to point of amputation as well as in case of loss from injury not requiring amputation.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385[12].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Loss of Limb.)

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County,

Proceedings for compensation by Elmer Pater against the Superior Steel Company. From a judgment sustaining an order of the Workmen's Compensation Board affirming the award of a Referee, defendant appeals. Appeal dismissed, and award affirmed.

JJ.

Argued before Brown, C. J., and Frazer Walling, Simpson, and Fox,

George Bradshaw and Charles F. Patterson, all of Pittsburgh, for appellant. Allen Davis, of Pittsburgh, for appellee.

BROWN, C. J. The right arm of Elmer Pater, an employee of the Superior Steel Company, was caught in one of its rolls and badly crushed. Amputation followed, about an inch or three-fourths of an inch below the elbow. The referee found that

"On account of the amputation of the forearm so near the elbow joint and from the restricted motion of the elbow due to infection and interference with the muscles that move the joint the claimant has lost the permanent use of the right arm for all practical purposes."

Under this finding he was awarded compensation for 215 weeks. From the award an appeal was taken, on the ground that the compensation should have been but for 175 weeks, for the loss of a hand. The award was affirmed by the compensation board. An appeal followed to the court below, and from its order, affirming the award, there is this appeal by the steel

company.

[1,2] The question before us depends upon the proper construction of the following clauses in section 306 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736.

* * *

"For all disability resulting from permanent injuries of the following classes, the compensation shall be exclusively as follows: For the loss of a hand, fifty per centum of wages during one hundred and seventy-five weeks. For the loss of an arm, fifty per centum wages during two hundred and fifteen weeks. Amputation between the elbow and the wrist shall be considered as the equivalent of the loss of a hand, and amputation between the knee and ankle shall be considered as the equivalent of the loss of a foot. Amputation at or above the elbow shall be considered as the loss of an arm, and amputation at or above the knee shall be considered as the loss of a leg. Permanent loss of the use of a hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye shall be considered as the equivalent of the loss of such hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye."

The contention of appellant is that, as the arm was amputated between the elbow and wrist, the claimant lost only a hand under the statute, and was therefore entitled to compensation for but 175 weeks. The act is reme

dial and is to receive a liberial construction. Quinn v. Fidelity Beneficial Ass'n, 100 Pa. 382; Poor District of Huntingdon Township v. Poor District of New Columbus Borough, 109 Pa. 579; Commonwealth v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595, 64. Atl. 797; Jones v. Beale, 217 Pa. 182, 66 Atl. 254. But aside from this under the fact found by the referee, the express words of the statute called for the award made to the claimant. He had permanently lost the use of his arm. While the act declares that amputation at any point between the elbow and wrist shall, ipso facto, be considered the equivalent of the loss of a hand, it further provides, in the same clause, that permanent loss of the use of an arm shall be equivalent of its loss. This can have but one meaning, and that is the permanent loss of the use of an arm, with or without amputation, resulting from injuries sustained by a workman, shall be the equivalent of the actual loss of the arm. If in the present case there had been no amputation, but the arm had been so crushed as to hang permanently, useless at the side of the claimant, could his right to compensation for 215 weeks, be questioned? The finding of the referee is that, as the result of the injuries which he sustained in the course of his employment, he has permanently lost the use of his arm, and the amputation which necessarily followed is not a determining factor in fixing the basis upon which compensation is to be allowed. This was the correct view of the learned court below, as exprèssed in the following construction which it placed upon the words of the statute:

"They were intended to cover or include all cases wherein there is a permanent loss of the use of the entire member mentioned in the act, without regard to the point of amputation, as well as cases wherein such loss is sustained from injuries not requiring amputation."

Appeal dismissed, and award affirmed.

ACT-RECEIPT OF BENEFITS FROM RELIEF ASSOCIATIONS-EFFECT.

Workmen's Compensation Act, June 2, 1915 (P. L. 736) art. 2, § 204, providing that, contracts to the contrary notwithstanding, receipt of benefits from relief associations shall not bar recovery of damages by action at law, applies only to accidents happening after January 1, 1916, as it materially limits substantive rules of law applicable to personal injury from negligence and announces a new public policy.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 349.)

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Butler County.

Trespass by James Lesile Riddell, by his next friend, James B. Riddell, against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to recover damages for *Decision rendered, Jan. 4, 1919. 106 Atl. Rep. 80.