commerce at the time of the accident. The eastern terminus of the road is at New Orleans, La., and the western terminus at El Paso, Tex. The accident happened at Addis, La., a junction point on the main line, through which pass interstate freight and passenger trains of the defendant company, and where the defendant has extensive railroad yards. This suit was brought by the widow, for herself and on behalf of her children, for compensation under the Employers' Liability Act, the Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended by the Act No. 243 of 1916. Judgment was rendered in favor of the widow and children, giving them compensation at the rate of $8 per week for 300 weeks, and $64.75 for the expenses of the funeral of the deceased employee. The defendant prosecutes this appeal.

[1] Appellant's defense is that the Employers' Liability Act of the state does not apply to an employer engaged in interstate commerce as a common carrier by railroad. It is conceded by the learned counsel or appellee that the statute would not afford a right of action for compensation in this case if the work in which the deceased employee was engaged at the time of the accident was a part of the interstate commerce in which the railway company was engaged. That is because the liability of interstate railroad carriers for compensation for personal injuries suffered by their employees while engaged in interstate commerce is regulated by the federal Employers' Liability Act (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S. Comp. St. 1916, § 8657-8665]); and, as Congress has exercised legislative authority covering the subject, there is no authority for state regulation, even with regard to injuries occurring without fault, as to which the federal law does not afford a remedy. See New York Central Railroad Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546, 61 L. Ed. 1045, L. R. A. 1918C, 439, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139.

[2] Appellee's contention, however, is that the work of the yard foreman was not a part of the interstate commerce in which the railroad company was engaged. There is some doubt on that question, which, however, we have no occasion for deciding; for the fact that the employer was engaged in interstate commerce as a common carrier by railroad is sufficient, in our opinion, to deprive the appellee of a right of action for compensation under Act No. 20 of 1914. Section 30 of the act provides :

"That this act shall not be construed to apply to any employer acting as a common carrier while engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by railroad, which employer, by reason of being engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by railroad, is not subject exclusively to the legislative power of the state of Louisiana, or for which employer and the employee thereof a rule of liability or method of compensation has been, or may be, established by Congress of the United States; nor shall it apply to any employee of such common carrier injured or killed while so employed."

The defendant, being a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad, is not subject exclusively to the legislative power of the state of Louisiana. In fact, legislative control of the road, in some respects, had been exercised by the Congress of the United States before this case arose. The railroad rates, for example, are regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The hours of service for railroad employees are limited by acts of Congress. The railroad equipment must conform to federal Safety Appliance Acts. And the railroad company's liability for personal injuries is regulated by the federal Employers' Liability Act.

[3] We have no doubt that the Congress of the United States has legislative power to establish a rule e liability of railroads engaged in interstate commerce, and to establish a method of compensation for personal injuries suffere the employees of railroad companies so engaged, even as to employees work is not, of itself, interstate com- .

merce, and even as to injuries occurring without fault. On that question the Supreme Court of the United States, in Behren's, Administrator, v. I. C. Railroad Co., 233 U. S. 473, 34 Sup. Ct. 646, 58 L. Ed. 1051, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 163, declared:

"Considering the statutes of the railroad as a highway for both interstate and intrastate commerce, the interdependence of the two classes of traffic in point of movement and safety, the practical difficulty in separating and dividing the general work of the switching crew, and the nature and extent of the power confided to Congress by the commerce clause of the Constitution, we entertain no doubt that the liability of the carrier for injuries suffered by a member of the crew in the course of its general work was subject to regulation by Congress, whether the particular service being performed at the time of the injury, isolatedly considered, was in interstate or intrastate commerce."

[4] And, with regard to the federal Safety Appliance Act (Act March 2, 1893, as amended by Acts April 1, 1896, March 2, 1903, and April 14, 1910 [U. S. Comp. St. 1916, § 8605 et seq.]), in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, on page 41, 36 Sup. Ct. 482, 60 L. Ed. 874, it was said that although it might be conceded, for the sake of argument, that the mere question of compensation for injuries to persons engaged in intrastate commerce was of no concern to Congress, the liability of .interstate carriers to pay such compensation because of their disregard of regulations established primarily for safeguarding interstate commerce was a matter within the control of Congress, and that the right of private action by an employee injured while engaged in duties not connected with interstate commerce, but injured because of a defect in a safety applicance required by the act of Congress to be made safe, was so intimately related to the operation of the act, as a regulation of interstate commerce, that it was within the constitutional grant of legislative authority over the subject.

The Employers' Liability Act of this state, unlike the statutes of some other states on the subject, is not so worded that a case must come within the provisions of the federal Employers' Liability Act to be excluded from the operation of the state statute. In its precise terms, the state statute does not apply to employers engaged in interstate commerce as common carriers by railroad, because railroads engaged in interstate commerce are not subject exclusively to the legislative power of the state, and because, for them and for the employees thereof, the Congress of the United States has authority to establish a rule of liability or method of compensation for personal injuries suffered by the employees.

Our conclusion is that the Employers' Liability Act of this state, on which alone the plaintiff rests her claim, does not give her a right of action for compensation.

The judgment appealed from is annulled, and the plaintiff's demand is rejected, and her suit dismissed at her costs.

Provosty, J., absent on account of illness, takes no part.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

SUFFOLK.

MARTIN'S CASE.

IN RE EMPLOYERS' LIABILIITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, LTD.*

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT APPEAL FROM DECISION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD.

Where attorney for servant's widow presented to superior court copies of pertinent papers on file with Industrial Board, stating he wished to appeal to Supreme Judicial Court from decision of board, there was no appeal to Supreme Judicial Court; Compensation Act, pt. 3, § 11, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 14, and by St. 1917, c. 297, § 7, providing appeal only from decree of superior court.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 418[3%].) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-APPEAL FROM DECREE OF SUPERIOR COURT—OBJECTIONS TO ENTRY OF DECREE.

Where attorney for servant's widow, desiring to appeal to Supreme Judicial Court, filed in superior court objections to entry of decree confirming order of board, he did not thereby appeal from decree of court to Supreme Judicial Court.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 418[3%].) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION ACT-CONVERSION INTO APPEAL OF OBJECTIONS TO ENTRY OF SUPERIOR COURT'S DECREE.

Where attorney for servant's widow, desiring to appeal to Supreme Judicial Court, filed in superior court objections to entry of decree confirming finding of board, judge of superior court, by noting that he regarded attorney as taking appeal from decree to Supreme Judicial Court, could not convert objections into appeal.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 418[3%].)

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County.

Proceedings for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of Fred Martin, the employee, by his widow, Mrs. Ida Martin, opposed by the Edison Electric & Illuminating Company, the employer, and the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, the insurer, wherein Marcellus Coggan, attorney for the widow, attempts to appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board, confirmed by the superior court, that he return to the widow the sum of $100 paid him by her. Case dismissed.

Coggan & Coggan and Chas. F. Lovejoy, all of Boston, for Marcellus Coggan.

Wilfred B. Keeman, of Boston, for dependent.

RUGG, C. J. [1] This was a proceeding before the Industrial Accident Board. It related to fees to be allowed to an attorney for services

* Decision rendered, Dec. 7, 1918. 121 N. E. Rep. 152.

rendered to the dependent widow of a deceased employee. The attorney presented to the superior court copies of pertinent papers on file with the Industrial Accident Board, together with the statement that "he wishes to appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court from the decision of the Industrial Accident Board." That was not an appeal to this court. The Workmen's Compensation Act makes no provision for an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board to this court, but for an appeal to this court only from a decree of the superior court. St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 3, § 11, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 14, and by St. 1917, c. 297, § 7. Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 372.

[2] The matter was heard in the superior court and a decree was entered in accordance with the finding of the Industrial Accident Board on February 6, 1918. On the same date the attorney filed in the superior court a paper entitled "Objections to Entry of Decree by said Superior Court." The title appropriately describes the contents of the paper, which set forth several grounds as "reasons for his objections and motion for review." It was denied. This paper was not either in form or substance an appeal from the decree.

[3] On March 2 there was a "Memo." filed by the judge of the superior court in these words: "I understood and regarded the respondent Coggan as claiming and taking an appeal by this paper." This statement adds nothing to the force of the paper. The judge of the superior court had no power to convert a paper which was in no sense an appeal from the decree into such an appeal. He could not affect the rights of the parties in any such way. Herrick v. Waitt, 224 Mass. 415, 417, 113 N. E. 205; Boston Bar Association v. Casey, 227 Mass. 46, and cases collected at page 51, 116 N. E. 541. No validity was added to the proceedings by the filing by the attorney on March 2, 1918, of further "Objections to Entry of Decree by said Superior Court." That also was neither in form or substance an appeal from the decree of the superior court. An appeal not taken according to law is not rightly before us and cannot be considered. Humphrey's Case, 226 Mass. 143, 115 N. E. 253; Rutland v. Hein, 231 Mass. 242, 120 N. É. 590. Case dismissed.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
WORCESTER.

COURTNEY'S CASE.*

MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT -RIGHT OF SERVANT-PROCEEDING.

Where agreement between injured servant and insurer has not been filed with and approved by Accident Board, under St. 1912, c. 571, § 9, servant cannot, after six months from time of injury (part 2, § 5, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 5), proceed under Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. 3, § 5, as amended by St. 1917, c. 297, § 2, providing that if association and servant fail to agree as to compensation, or disagree as to continuance of payments, either party may notify Accident Board, etc. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 398.)

* Decision rendered, Jan. 2, 1919. 121 N. E. Rep. 426.

Appeal from Industrial Accident Board.

Proceeding for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Thomas Courtney, the employee, opposed by the Worcester Gaslight Company, the employer, and the Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company, the insurer. Compensation was awarded, the award confirmed by decree of the superior court, and from its decree the insurer appeals. Decree reversed.

Alexander H. Bullock and John M. Thayer, both of Worcester, for

insurer.

John H. Reid, of Worcester, for employee.

LORING, J. On November 25, 1916, Courtney met with an accident in the course of and arising out of his employment by the Worcester Gaslight Company. On June 13, 1917, he retained counsel and on July 20, 1917, i. e., at the end of 34 weeks after the accident, he was paid $320 by the superintendent of the Gaslight Company and signed an agreement for compensation which is not set forth in the record. On August 28, 1917, the insurance company notified the superintendent to discontinue further payments and no further payments have been made. On September 28, 1917, the employee "at the suggestion of the Industrial Accident Board" filed a claim for compensation. On October 3, 1917, he was given light work by the Gaslight Company and is still in their employ.The Board found that the employee had reasonable cause for failure to file claim before September 28, 1917, because the insurer through the superintendent of the Gaslight Company, "its authorized agent," "had entered into an agreement in regard to compensation." They also found that the insurance company had declined to make any payments after July 20, 1917, notwithstanding the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1911, c. 751) pt. 2, § 4, as amended by St. 1916, c. 90. The award ended wth a finding that the employee was entitled to $10 a week from July 20, 1917, to October 3, 1917, and to a weekly payment of $2 a week from October 3, 1917, to January 24, 1918, amounting in all to $139.43. Upon this award the superior court made a decree that the insurer pay the employee $139.43 and continue payment of $2 a week "in accordance with the requirements of the act." The employee in this court put his case on the ground that there was evidence justifying the finding that the superintendent of the Gaslight Company was authorized to make the agreement of July 20, 1917, in behalf of the insurance company and "that the filing of the claim for the compensation on September 28, 1918, has no bearing on the case. It was filed at the suggestion of the Industrial Accident Board, the insurer having requested a hearing. The right to compensation had been concluded previous to this time by the signing of the agreements and receipt, and the giving and acceptance of $329." That is to say, in this court the employee has elected to proceed under the latter part of Workmen's Compensation Act, pt. 3, § 5, as amended by St. 1917, c. 297, § 2.† But the plaintiff cannot proceed under that provision of the act because the agreement of July 20, 1917, has not been filed with and approved by the Industrial Accident board in accordance with the provisions of St. 1912, c. 571, § 9.

Part 3, § 5, as amended by St. 1917, c. 297, § 2, is as follows: "If the association and the injured employee fail to reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this act, or if they have reached such an agreement, which has been signed and filed in accordance with the provision of this act, and compensation has been paid or is due in accordance therewith and the parties thereto then disagree as to the continuance of any weekly payments under such agreement, either party may notify the Industrial Accident Board which shall thereupon assign the case for hearing by a member of the board."