also of Kershaw's and Cash's regiments. Preston's Twenty-eighth Regiment, of Cocke's brigade, had by that time entered the same body of oaks, and encountered some Michigan troops, capturing their brigade commander, Colonel Wilcox. Another important accession to our forces had also occurred about the same time, at 3 o'clock P. M. Brigadier-General E. K. Smith, with some 1,700 infantry of Elzey's brigade, of the Army of the Shenandoah, and Beckham's battery, came upon the field, from Camp Pickens, Manassas, where they had arrived by railroad at noon. Directed in person by General Johnston to the left, then so much endangered, on reaching a position in rear of the oak woods, south of the Henry house, and immediately east of the Sudley road, General Smith was disabled by a severe wound, and his valuable services were lost at that critical juncture. But the command devolved upon a meritorious officer of experience, Colonel Elzey, who led his infantry at once somewhat further to the left, in the direction of the Chinn house, across the road, through the oaks skirting the west side of the road, and around which he sent the battery under Lieutenant Beckham. This officer took up a most favorable position near that house, whence, with a clear view of the Federal right and centre, filling the open fields to the west of the Brentsville-Sudley road, and gently sloping southward, he opened fire with his battery upon them with deadly and damaging effect. Vaughn's Third Tennessee regiments, and Cash's Eighth, and Kershaw's Second South Carolina, Withers' Eighteenth, and Preston's Twentyeighth Virginia, advanced in an irregular line almost simultaneously, with great spirit, from their several positions upon the front and flanks of the enemy, in their quarter of the field. At the same time, too, Early resolutely assailed their right flank and rear. Under the combined attack, the enemy was soon forced, first over the narrow plateau in the southern angle made by the two roads, so often mentioned, into a patch of woods on its western slope, thence back over Young's branch and the turnpike, into the fields of the Dugan farm, and rearward, in extreme disorder, in all available directions, towards Bull Run. The rout had now become general and complete." In his report, General McDowell thus remarks on the position of the battle: "It was at this time that the enemy's reinforcements came to his aid, from the railroad train, understood to have arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army. They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and opened a fire of musketry upon our men, which caused them to break, and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain." Colonel Porter, commanding the division of Colonel Hunter, thus continues his report: A line drawn through the battle-field to Manassas Junction, would run about due south. The railroad from Winchester to Manassas "Colonel Early, who, by some mischance, did Junction comes in on a southeast course. Connot receive orders until two o'clock, which had sequently, the line above mentioned, and the been sent him at noon, came on the ground railroad, converge, and meet at the Junction. immediately after Elzey, with Kemper's Seventh The Dumfries road, bounding the west side of Virginia, Hay's Seventh Louisiana, and Barks- the battle-field, and running straight south, dale's Thirteenth Mississippi regiments. This crosses the Winchester railroad about two miles brigade, by the personal direction of General from the Junction. Up this road came the last Johnston, was marched by the Holkham house, reinforcements of the enemy, from General across the fields to the left, entirely around the Johnston's command at Winchester. This was woods through which Elzey had passed, and nearer than to proceed to the Junction, and under a severe fire, into a position in line of caused the clouds of dust seen. battle near Chinn's house, outflanking the enemy's right. At this time, about half-past 3 P. M., the enemy, driven back on their left and centre, and brushed from the woods bordering the Sudley road, south and west of the Henry house, had formed a line of battle of truly formidable proportions, of crescent outline, reaching on their left from the vicinity of Pittsylvania, (the old Carter mansion,) by Matthew's, and in rear of Dogan's, across the turnpike near to Chinn's house. The woods and fields were filled with their masses of infantry, and their carefully preserved cavalry. It was a truly magnificent, though redoubtable spectacle, as they threw forward in fine style, on the broad, gentle slopes of the ridge occupied by their main lines, a cloud of skirmishers, preparatory for another attack. But as Early formed his line, and Beckham's pieces played upon the right of the enemy, Elzey's brigade, Gibbon's Tenth Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart's First Maryland, and "All further efforts were futile. The words, gestures, and threats of our officers were thrown away upon men who had lost all presence of mind, and only longed for absence of body. Some of our noblest and best officers lost their lives in trying to rally them. Upon our first position, the Twenty-seventh New York was the first to rally, under the command of Major Bartlett, and around it the other regiments engaged soon gathered their scattered fragments. The battalion of regulars, in the mean time, moved steadily across the field from the left to the right, and took up a position where it held the entire forces of the enemy in check until our forces were somewhat rallied. "The Commanding General then ordered a retreat upon Centreville, at the same time directing me to cover it with the battalion of regulars, the cavalry, and a section of artillery. The rear-guard thus organized followed our panic-stricken troops to Centreville, resisting the attacks of the Confederate cavalry and artillery, and saving them from the inevitable destruction which awaited them, had not this body been interposed." Colonel Burnside, commanding the other brigade of Colonel Hunter's division, which commenced the attack, thus reports this part of the battle: "When the general retreat was ordered, the First Rhode Island passed on to the top of the hill, where it was joined by the remainder of the brigade, and formed into column. Large bodies of stragglers were passing along the road, and it was found impossible to retain the order which otherwise would have been preserved. Yet the brigade succeeded in retiring in comparatively good condition, with Arnold's battery of artillery and Captain Armstrong's company of dragoons bringing up the rear. The retreat continued thus until the column was about emerging from the woods and entering upon the Warrenton turnpike, when the artillery and cavalry went to the front, and the enemy opened fire upon the retreating mass of men. Upon the bridge crossing Cub Run,* a shot took effect upon the horses of a team that was crossing. The wagon was overturned directly in the centre of the bridge, and the passage was completely obstructed. The enemy continued to play his artillery upon the trains, carriages, ambulances, and artillery wagons that filled the road, and these were reduced to ruin. The artillery could not possibly pass, and five pieces of the Rhode Island battery, which had been safely brought off the field, were here lost. The infantry, as the files reached the bridge, were furiously pelted with a shower of grape and other shot, and several persons were here killed or dangerously wounded. As was to be expected, the whole column was thrown into confusion, and could not be rallied again for a distance of two or three miles." Colonel Schenck, stationed at the Stone Bridge, thus reports: "It was not long after this that the unpleasant intelligence came of our army being in retreat from the front across the ford above, and the order was received to fall back on Centreville. The retreat of my brigade, being now in the rear of our division, was conducted in the reverse order of our march in the morning, the Second New York moving first, and being followed by the Second and First Ohio, the two latter regiments preserving their lines in good degree, rallying together, and arriving at Centreville with closed ranks, and sharing comparatively little in the panic which characterized so painfully that retreat, and which seemed to be occasioned more by the fear of frightened teamsters and of hurrying and excited civilians, (who ought never to have been there,) than *Cub Run is a small stream running south and southwest, and crossing the Warrenton turnpike midway between Centreville and the stone bridge over Bull Run. even by the reckless disorder and want of discipline of straggling soldiers. Near the house which was occupied as a hospital for the wounded, about a mile from the battle-ground, a dashing charge was made upon the retreating column by a body of the rebel cavalry, which was gallantly repelled, and principally by two companies of the Second Ohio, with loss on both sides." The reserve, consisting of two brigades under Col. Miles, was stationed at Centreville. The most important of its movements were made by Col. Blenker's brigade, who thus reports these passing scenes: "In this position the brigade remained until about 4 o'clock P. M., when I received orders to advance upon the road from Centreville to Warrenton. This order was executed with great difficulty, as the road was nearly choked up by retreating baggage wagons of several divisions, and by the vast number of flying soldiers belonging to various regiments. Nevertheless, owing to the coolness of the commanding officers and the good discipline of the men, the passage through the village was sucessfully executed, and the further advance made with the utmost precision, and I was thus enabled to take a position which would prevent the advance of the enemy and protect the retreat of the army. The Eighth Regiment took position one and a half miles south of Centreville, on both sides of the road leading to Bull Run. The Twenty-ninth Regiment stood half a mile behind the Eighth, enchiquier by companies. The Garibaldi Guard stood in reserve in line behind the Twenty-ninth Regiment. The retreat of great numbers of flying soldiers continued until 9 o'clock in the evening, the great majority in wild confusion, and but few in collected bodies. Soon afterwards, several squadrons of the enemy's cavalry advanced along the road, and appeared before the outposts. They were challenged, "Who comes here?" and, remaining without any answer, I being just present at the outpost, called "Union forever! whereupon the officer of the enemy's cavalry commanded, "En avant! en avant! knock him down!" Now the skirmishers fired, when the enemy turned around, leaving several killed and wounded on the spot. About nine prisoners who were already in their hands were liberated by this action. Afterwards we were several times molested from various sides by the enemy's cavalry. At about midnight the command to leave the position and march to Washington was given by Gen. McDowell. The brigade retired in perfect order, and ready to repel any attack on the road from Centreville to Fairfax Court House, Annandale, to Washington." A prompt retreat of the fragments of his army was resolved upon by Gen. McDowell, and while the stragglers had pushed on from the battle-field to Washington without halting, the organized masses commenced leaving about nine o'clock that night. By midnight all but the wounded and the dead of that well-found army which commenced its march from Washington five days previous, proud, exultant, and confident of victory, was panic-stricken, groping its way, under the cover of the darkness of night, to the intrenchments opposite Washington. Never had the flag of the Union trailed so low in the dust before; never was so brilliant a career opened before it as that which commenced on the day after that dreadful night. About six months from that hour the fugitives became victors in every contest, and the triumphant foe were fleeing from every point. Fortunately for the remnants of the Federal army, the Confederate forces did not pursue their flying foe. The reasons for this omission are thus stated by Gen. Johnston in his official report: The apparent firmness of the United States troops at Centreville who had not been engaged, which checked our pursuit; the strong forces occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington, and Alexandria; the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington, with his army of thirty thousand men, sooner than we could; and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation, prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capital. It is certain that the fresh troops within the works were, in number, quite sufficient for their defence; if not, General Patterson's army would certainly reinforce them soon enough." After the affair at Blackburn's Ford on the 18th, Gen. McDowell became convinced that the nature of the country to the left or southward to Manassas was unfit for the operations of a large army, and he determined to move by the right, turning the enemy's left. An examination was made during the next day, and in consequence of the information thus obtained, the following plan of attack was determined upon: (See orders, p. 78.) 1st. A false attack to be made by Richardson's brigade (temporarily attached to Miles' division) on Blackburn's Ford, the rest of that division remaining in reserve at Centreville. 2d. Tyler's division to move from its camp at 2 A.M., (the 21st,) towards the stone bridge of the Warrenton turnpike, to feign the main attack upon this point. 3d. The divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman (in the order named) to leave their camps at 2 and 2 A. M., (they were encamped about two or three miles behind Tyler,) and, following his movement, to diverge from the Warrenton turnpike at the by-road beyond Cub Run, and take the road for Sudley's Spring; or, rather, it was provided that Hunter's division should proceed to Sudley's Spring, and Heintzelman take the lower ford. These matters, however, were to be regulated by circum stances. It was intended that the head of Hunter's division should be at the turn-off at early day light, or about 4 A M., and that it should reach Sudley by six or seven. The two leading brigades of Tyler's had not cleared the road for Hunter to this point until half-past five, and the guide, alleging that a nearer route to the ford would bring the column in sight of the enemy's batteries, led them by so circuitous a way that Hunter did not reach Sudley's Spring until half-past nine or thereabouts. The explanation given by Gen. McDowell for the disasters of the day, although rather lengthy, is entitled to full consideration. He thus reports: "As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for some explanation of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be out of place if I refer in a few words to the immediate antecedents of the battle. When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July, Monday. Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and the heads of the administrative departments, in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to a want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across till eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my even seeing them, and without having been together before in a brigade. The sending reinforcements to General Patterson, by drawing off the wagons, was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the Herculean efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in every way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and the artillery, did not arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move. I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo; and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out, on the 16th, I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence. But I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gathered together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon managers, all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make, on Sunday, the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th, instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court House, beyond Germantown, to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march further. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and a half miles farther to Centreville-in all a march of twelve and a half miles; but the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road, and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the load of light marching order. "We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the fifth division (Miles' and Richardson's brigades) on the left, at Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, and Schenck's brigade of Tyler's division on the left of the road, near the Stone Bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he could which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th, and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had. It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas, I engaged not to have to do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by MajorGeneral Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major-General Butler; and I know every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it would not be because he could be followed by General Patterson, but from causes not necessary for me to refer to, you knew them all. This was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling-stock and his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond, to other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to I cannot say-certainly much more than we attacked them with. "I could not, as I have said, more early push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and the best part of my forces were three-months voluteers, whose term of service was about to expire, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition. On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment of volunteers, and the battery of volunteer artillery of the New York Eighth militia, whose term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment, expressing a request for them to remain a short time, and the Hon. Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days. But in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted, and the next morning, when the army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon. "In the next few days, day by day, I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army. In other words, every day, which added to the strength of the enemy, made us weaker." The loss on the Federal side, according to the official returns, was 481 killed, 1,011 wounded, and 1,216 missing. Among the killed were Col. Cameron, of the New York Seventy-ninth; Lieut.-Col. Haggerty, of the New York Sixtyninth; Col. Slocum, Second Rhode Island; also Major Ballou and Capt. Tower. The artillery lost was as follows: Company D, Second Artillery, 6 rifled guns. Company I, First Artillery, 6 rifled Parrott ten-pounders. Company E, Second Artillery, 2 rifled guns and 2 howitzers. Company Fifth Artillery, 1 rifled gun. Company G, First Artillery, 1 thirty-pounder Parrott gun. Rhode Island battery, 5 rifled guns. To this should be added 180 boxes of small arm cartridges, 87 boxes of rifled cannon ammunition, 30 boxes of old fire-arms, 12 wagons loaded with provisions, and 3,000 bushels oats, a large number of muskets thrown away, and an immense number of blankets and knapsacks.* *The following documents, found in the camp at Manassas after its evacuation by the Confederate troops, contain returns embracing the period of the battle, and extending to the 16th of August ensuing. They correspond so very nearly with the statements of other documents entitled to the highest credit, that they should be considered in estimating the results of this battle. The following is a list of captured Quartermaster's property turned in to the Quartermaster's Department of the Confederate Army of the Potomac up to August 16, 1861: 870 axes, spades, and intrenching tools. 2 sets carpenter's tools and blacksmith's tools. 12 sets harness, 23 extra traces for artillery. 1 platform and other scales. 1,650 camp cooking utensils. 700 camp mess utensils. 302 pairs pants, drawers, and socks. Gen. Beauregard, in his report, states the number of his force on the 18th of July at 17,000 effective men; and on the 21st 27,000, which includes 6,200 sent from Gen. Johnston, and 1,700 brought up by Gen. Holmes from Fredericksburg. The report states the number killed to have been 269, wounded 1,483, aggregate, 1,852. The same report states the number of prisoners taken at 1,460. On the left the Confederate force was commanded by Brig.-Gens. Evans, Jackson, and Cocke, and Col. Bartow. The centre was under Gens. Jones, Longstreet, and Benham. On the extreme right was Gen. Ewell. Early in the day an order was sent to him by Gen. Beauregard to attack and attempt to turn the left flank of the Federal force. The messenger was killed, and the orders were not received. It is manifest that this battle was well fought. In the fore part of the afternoon the Confederate troops were nearly outflanked. At three o'clock the Federal force believed they had the victory; and that, indeed, they had, and would soon have reached and obtained possession of the railroad leading to Winchester. These prisoners represent themselves as belonging to forty-seven different volunteer regiments, nine regiments of the regular army, and the marine corps. Besides these regiments, in the reports and orders of the enemy are mentioned by name, one regiment of volunteers, and companies from two regiments of regulars, in Hunter's Division; six volunteer regiments in Mill's division, and Runyon's entire division of at least five regiments from New Jersey, from which we have neither prisoners nor wounded. E. P. ALEXANDER, Capt. Engineers, General Staff. Returns of captured ordnance and ordnance stores turned into Ordnance Department, Army of the Potomac, up to August 16, 1861: 130-pounder Parrott gun, with 300 rounds ammunition. 8 12-pounder brass howitzers, with 100 rounds each. 37 caissons. 6 travelling forges. 4 battery wagons, splendidly equipped. 64 artillery horses, with harness, &c. 500,000 rounds small arms ammunition. 4,500 sets of accoutrements, cartridge-boxes, &c. 4,000 muskets. No accurate returns of drums, swords, pistols, knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, saddles, bridles, &c., can be obtained. One six-pound gun and one twelve-pound howitzer were found spiked, but they were easily withdrawn. One of the enemy's caissons was exploded on the field in addition to those captured. E. P. ALEXANDER, General Staff, Captain Engineers, C. S. A. The report of General Beauregard states the number of field-pieces captured as follows: "Twenty-eight field-pieces of the best character of arm, with over one hundred rounds of ammunition to each gun, thirty-seven caissons, six forges, four battery wagons, sixty-four artillery horses completely But the arrival of four fresh regiments, who entered the field with great spirit and energy, changed the result. At the session of the Confederate Congress, held at Richmond on the next day, the 22d, the following despatch was read: MANASSAS JUNCTION, SUNDAY NIGHT. The night has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were victorious. The enemy were routed, and precipitately fled, abandoning a large amount of arms, knapsacks, and baggage. The ground was strewn for miles with those killed, and the farm houses and grounds around were filled with the wounded. Pursuit was continued along several routes towards Leesburg and Centreville until darkness covered the fugitives. We have captured many field batteries and stands of arms, and one of the United States flags. Many prisoners have been taken. Too high praise cannot be bestowed, whether for the skill of the principal officers, or the gallantry of all our troops. The battle was mainly fought on our left. Our force was 15,000; that of the enemy was estimated at 35,000. JEFFERSON DAVIS. Great indignation was manifested against Gen. Patterson in consequence of the successful movement of Gen. Johnston from Winchester, by which he was enabled to reënforce the Confederate army at Manassas. On the 16th he equipped, five hundred thousand rounds of small arms ammunition, four thousand five hundred sets of accoutrements, over five thousand muskets," &c., &c. HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, August 23, 1861. COLONEL: In accordance with your request, I send you a list of the regiments actually in the battle of the 21st of July, 1861: Jackson's brigade, consisting of the Second Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Col. J. H. Allen commanding. Fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Col. James F. Preston commanding. Fifth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Col. Kerton Harper commanding. Twenty-seventh Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Gordon absent, Lieutenant-Colonel Echols commanding. Thirty-third Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Col. A. C. Cummings commanding Under General Bee, consisting of a part of his own and a part of Colonel Bartow's brigade Seventh Regiment Georgia Volunteers-Bartow's. Tenth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Elzey. BATTERIES IN ACTION. Colonel Pendleton's-four pieces. Lieutenant Beekham's-four pieces. CAVALRY. Colonel J. E. B. Stewart, with twelve companies. I cannot furnish the strength of the regiments, companies, &c. Respectfully, your obedient servant, THOMAS G. RHETT, Acting Adjutant-General. Colonel THOMAS JORDAN, Acting Adjutant-General, First Corps, Army of the Potomac. This statement of the Confederate force in action evidently does not include the reenforcements brought by General Johnston. Neither does it mention the Fourth South Carolina, known to have been badly cut up, or Hampton's Legion. The loss of the North Carolina Sixth was stated at home to have been as follows: Killed, 15; wounded, 58; missing, 1. The cannon captured at Bull Run were twenty-five pieces. The report of the Captain of Engineers makes the number turned over to the Ordnance Department of the Potomac Army to the 16th of August, at twenty-seven pieces. |