offered of deliberately correcting the errors in government. Instability has been a prominent and very defective feature in most republican systems. It is the first to be seen and the last to be lamented by a philosophical inquirer. It has operated most banefully in our infant republic. It is necessary that we apply an immediate remedy, and eradicate the poisonous principle from our government. If this be not done, Sir, we shall feel and posterity will be convulsed by a painful malady.

[June 25, Hamilton continuing.]

MR. CHAIRMAN: In debates of this kind it is extremely easy, on either side, to say a great number of plausible things. It is to be acknowledged that there is even a certain degree of truth in the reasonings on both sides. In this situation it is the province of judgment and good sense to determine their force and application, and how far the arguments advanced on one side are balanced by those on the other. The ingenious dress in which both may appear renders it a difficult task to make this decision, and the mind is frequently unable to come to a safe and solid conclusion. On the present question, some of the principles on each side are admitted, and the conclusions drawn from them denied, while other principles, with their inferences, are rejected altogether. It is the business of the committee to seek the truth in this labyrinth of argument.

There are two objects in forming systems of government, safety for the people and energy in the administration. When these objects are united, the certain tendency of the system will be to the public welfare. If the latter object be neglected, the people's security will be as certainly sacrificed as by disregarding the former. Good constitutions are formed upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual with the strength of government; if the tone of either be too high, the other will be weakened too much. It is the happiest possible mode of conciliating these objects to institute one branch peculiarly endowed with sensibility, another with knowledge and firmness. Through the opposition and mutual control of these bodies, the Government will reach, in its operations, the perfect balance between liberty and power.

Sir, the senators will constantly be attended with a reflection that their future existence is absolutely in the power of the States. Will not this form a powerful check? It is a reflection which applies closely to their feelings and interests, and no candid man, who thinks deliberately, will deny that it would be alone a sufficient check. The legislatures are to provide the mode of electing the President, and must have a great influence over the electors. Indeed, they convey their influence through a thousand channels into the general government. Gentlemen have endeavored to show that there will be no clash

ing of local and general interests; they do not seem to have sufficiently considered the subject. We have in this State a duty of sixpence per pound on salt, and it operates lightly and with advantage; but such a duty would be very burdensome to some of the States. If Congress should, at any time, find it convenient to impose a salt tax, would it not be opposed by the Eastern States? Being themselves incapable of feeling the necessity of the measure, they could only feel its apparent injustice. Would it be wise to give the New England States a power to defeat this measure, by recalling their senators who may be engaged for it? I beg the gentlemen once more to attend to the distinction between the real and apparent interests of the States. I admit that the aggregate of individuals constitutes the government; yet every State is not the government; every petty district is not the government. Sir, in our State legislatures, a compromise is frequently necessary between the interests of counties; the same must happen in the general government between States. In this the few must yield to the many; or, in other words, the particular must be sacrificed to the general interest. If the members of Congress are too dependent on the State legislatures, they will be eternally forming secret combinations from local views. This is reasoning from the plainest principles. Their interest is interwoven with their dependence, 1 New York.

and they will necessarily yield to the impression of their situation. . .

It has been remarked that there is an inconsistency in our admitting that the equal votes in the Senate were given to secure the rights of the States, and, at the same time, holding up the idea that their interests should be sacrificed to those of the Union. But the committee certainly perceive the distinction between the rights of the State and its interests. The rights of a State are defined by the Constitution, and cannot be invaded without a violation of it; but the interests of a State have no connection with the Constitution, and may be in a thousand instances constitutionally sacrificed. An uniform tax is perfectly constitutional, and yet it may operate oppressively upon certain members of the Union. The gentlemen are afraid that their State governments will be abolished. But, Sir, their existence does not depend upon the laws of the United States. Congress can no more abolish the State governments than they can dissolve the Union. The whole Constitution is repugnant to it, and yet the gentlemen would introduce an additional useless provision against it. It is proper that the influence of the States should prevail to a certain extent. But shall the individual States be the judges how far? Shall an unlimited power be left them to determine in their own favor? .

Sir, in contending for a rotation, the gentlemen

carry their zeal beyond all reasonable bounds. I am convinced that no government, founded on this feeble principle, can operate well. I believe, also, that we shall be singular in this proposal. We have not felt the embarrassments resulting from rotation, that other States have: and we hardly know the strength of their objections to it. There is no probability that we shall ever persuade a majority of the States to agree to this amendment. The gentlemen deceive themselves. The amendment would defeat their own design. When a man knows he must quit his station, let his merit be what it may, he will turn his attention chiefly to his own emolument: nay, he will feel temptations, which few other situations furnish, to perpetuate his power by unconstitutional usurpations. Men will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change human nature as to oppose the strong current of the selfish passions. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good.