A VERY rare genius was this young West Indian, who at fifteen years of age broke away from a clerk's desk and came to New York to enter King's College (now Columbia). A brilliant scholar, an omnivorous reader, a cogent writer, he entered at once into the political interests of the time, published essays on colonial rights, urged the people to arms in public speech, and himself entered the Revolutionary army as a captain of artillery. He soon attracted Washington's attention, and became his aide-de-camp and secretary through the war, at times being intrusted with active military duties. His talents seemed equal to any emergency, and he rapidly rose in rank. HAMILTON was essentially aristocratic in nature, feeling, and opinion, and, naturally, of the highest ambition. He took foremost part in the construction of the new Constitution, with urgent conviction of the need of a strong central government. He made several effective speeches in the Convention itself, and others in the New York Ratification Convention, which is here given, · and wrote most of the famous papers of "The Federalist," in advocacy of ratifying the Constitution. He was Washington's first Secretary of the Treasury, his financial policies winning him wide fame. He went to New York, and there stood the acknowledged head of the bar. one of In every relation of life, HAMILTON showed wisdom, skill, prudence, energy, and unequaled capacity. Capable soldier, brilliant lawyer, comprehensive legislator, great financier, gifted with personal attractiveness, clear-minded, logical, and persuasive with pen and tongue, he used his remarkable intellect and all his powers in the service of America. And rightly America holds his memory as a precious legacy. THE FEDERAL SENATE1 I AM persuaded, Mr. Chairman, that I in my turn shall be indulged in addressing the committee. We all, in equal sincerity, profess to be anxious for the establishment of a republican government, on a safe and solid basis. It is the object of the wishes of every honest man in the United States, and I presume I shall not be disbelieved, when I declare, that it is an object of all others, the nearest and most dear to my own heart. The means of accomplishing this great purpose become the most important study which can interest mankind. It is our duty to examine all those means with peculiar attention, and to choose the best and most effectual. It is our duty to draw from nature, from reason, from examples, the best principles of policy, and to pursue and apply them in the formation of our government. We should contemplate and compare the systems which, in this examination, come under our view; distinguish, with a careful eye, the defects and excellencies of each, and discarding the former, incorporate the latter, as far as circumstances will admit, into our Constitution. If we pursue a different course and neglect this duty, we shall probably disappoint the expectations of our country and of the world. In the commencement of a revolution, which received its birth from the usurpations of tyranny, nothing was more natural than that the public mind should be influenced by an extreme spirit of jealousy. To resist these encroachments, and to nourish this spirit, was the great object of all our public and private institutions. The zeal for liberty became predominant and excessive. In forming our Confederation, this passion alone seemed to actuate us, and we appear to have had no other view than to secure ourselves from despotism. The object certainly was a valuable one, and deserved our utmost attention. But, Sir, there is another object, equally important, and which our enthusiasm rendered us little capable of regarding: I mean a principle of strength and stability in the organization of our government, and vigor in its operations. This purpose can never be accomplished but by the establishment of some select body, formed peculiarly upon this principle. There are few positions more demonstrable than that there should be in every republic, some permanent body to correct the prejudices, check the intemperate passions, and regulate the fluctuations of a popular assembly. It is evident, that a body instituted for these purposes, must be so formed as to exclude, as much as possible, from its own character, those infirmities and that mutability which it is designed to remedy. It is therefore necessary that it should be small, that it should hold its authority during a considerable period, and that it should have such an independence in the exercise of its powers as will divest it as much as possible of local prejudices. It should be so formed as to be the center of political knowledge, to pursue always a steady line of conduct, and to reduce every irregular propensity to system. Without this establishment, we may make experiments without end, but shall never have an efficient government. It is an unquestionable truth, that the body of the people in every country desire sincerely its prosperity; but it is equally unquestionable, that they do not possess the discernment and stability necessary for systematic government. To deny that they are frequently led into the grossest errors by misinformation and passion, would be a flattery which their own good sense must despise. That branch of administration especially, which involves our political relations with foreign states, a community will ever be incompetent to. These truths are not often held up in public assemblies; but they cannot be unknown to any who hear me. From these principles it follows, that there ought to be two distinct bodies in our government: one, which shall be immediately constituted by and peculiarly represent the people, and possess all the popular features; another, formed. upon the principle, and for the purposes before |