"regular," describing the "term," appears to have been used by the Legislature in the popular sense of “conformable to law" to distinguish officers included in the exceptions from the workmen and employes in the general class. In this sense the compensation allowed by the district court is not authorized by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The judgment below is therefore reversed, and the claimant's proceeding dismissed. Reversed and dismissed. Letton and Day, JJ., not sitting. WATTS v. DERRY SHOE CO., INC. (Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Rockingham. Dec. 2, 1919.) 109 Atlantic Reporter, 837. MASTER AND SERVANT-DECLARATION FOR NEGLIGENCE CAN BE AMENDED TO ALLEGE NONACCEPTANCE OF COMPENSATION ACT. Under Pub. St. 1901, c. 222, § 8, allowing amendments in matters of substance at any stage to prevent injustice, a declaration in case for negligence to recover for injuries received while in defendant's employ may be amended so as to allege that defendant was within the terms of Workman's Compensation Act, and had not accepted the provisions thereof, which merely gives notice that plaintiff claims the benefits of section 4 of that act, modifying common-law rules of liability in her favor." (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 401.) Transferred from Superior Court, Rockingham County; Sawyer, Judge. Action by Martha E. Watts against the Derry Shoe Company, incorporated. Question of power to grant leave to amend the declaration to allege nonacceptance of Workman's Compensation Act by defendants was transferred from superior court. Case discharged. The declaration alleged the unsafe condition of the floor of the room in which the plaintiff worked as the negligence causing her injury. Subsequently she asked leave to amend her declaration by adding a count in which she alleged her employment by the defendants at work in a factory in connection with machinery operated by steam or other mechanical power, wherein more than five persons were engaged in manual and mechanical labor and that the defendants had not accepted the provisions of Laws 1911, c. 163. Norman F. Watts, of Derry, and Scammon & Gardner, of Exeter, for plaintiff. Hughes & Doe, of Dover, for defendants. PER CURIAM. Amendments in matters of substance may be allowed by the court in any stage of the proceedings when necessary to prevent injustice. P. S. c. 222, § 8. Under chapter 163, Laws 1911, a servant of an employer who has accepted the provisions of the act in case of injury may bring an action against his employer to recover for such injury upon the ground that it was caused by his employer's negligence, or he may seek the compensa tion provided by the act into which the question of negligence does not enter. After election of either remedy the alternative remedy is not open to him. Id. § 4. When, as alleged in this case, the employer has not accepted the provisions of the chapter, the injured employe has no election. His only remedy is an action of case for negligence. By the statute, in certain cases common-law rules of liability are materially modified in favor of the plaintiff against an employer who has not accepted the act. The only object of referring to the statute in the declaration is to give notice of a claim that the case is within these provisions of the statute. The statute regulates the rights of the parties, and must be applied whenever called to the attention of the court, unless upon some ground the plaintiff has estopped himself from claiming its benefits. The proposed amendment gives the defendants seasonable notice, and no ground appears upon which the court can refuse to allow it, or after the notice given by the offer of the amendment deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of the statute. Section 4. c. 163, Laws 1911, has no application. Case discharged. WOODRUFF v. R. H. HOWES CONST. CO. et al. (Court of Appeals of New York. March 19, 1920.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT—EVIDENCE HELD NOT TO SHOW INJURY WAS CAUSED BY "ACCIDENT" UNDER COMPENSATION LAW. In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by a carpenter who bruised the palm of his hand in pressing a screwdriver, the bruise resulting in a felon, the injury cannot be deemed caused by an "accident," an accidental event taking place without foresight or expectation or proceeding from an unknown cause. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Accident.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-EVIDENCE HELD NOT TO SHOW THAT A FELON RESULTED FROM USING SCREWDRIVER. In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by a carpenter who suffered a frog felon in his hand, evidence insufficient to show that the felon resulted from pressing on screwdriver with the palm of his hand. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67) by Emerson H. Woodruff, employee, against the R. H. Howes Construction Company, employer, and the Travelers' Insurance Company, insurance carrier. From an order of the Appellate Term (189 App. Div. 395, 178 N. Y. Supp. 418), affirming an award of the Industrial Commission, the employer and insurance carrier appeal. Reversed, and claim remitted to commission. Amos H. Stephens, of New York City (E. C. Sherwood, of New York City, of counsel), for appellants. Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, of Albany, of counsel), for respondent. ELKUS, J. Claimant was a carpenter, employed by R. H. Howes Construction Company, and engaged in the erection of buildings. The compensation commission found that on December 23, 1918, while Woodruff was engaged in his employment, in using "a screwdriver he bruised the palm of the right hand, which developed into a frog felon, and as the result of which he was disabled." [1] The affirmance of this finding of fact was by a divided court, and we are therefore at liberty to examine the facts to ascertain if there is any evidence in its support. [2, 3] The affidavit of the claimant, verified January 21, 1919, avers that on December 21, 1918, he felt a pain between the first and second fingers in the palm of the right hand, which feeling was very much as though there was a splinter there, but that he did not run any splinter in the palm of his hand, and that the pain increased. Upon the hearing before the commission, he testified that he did not know definitely just what caused the pain or injury, but he believed it was caused by the constant use of a screwdriver, "as is first stated," evidently referring to the statement in his affidavit referred to; that the pain was several days coming on; that at no time did he get a splinter in his hand or any particle of grit or anything that was ground in his hand from the screwdriver, but he thought it was just from its continual use; that it bruised the flesh; that at times he fastened a pin in the jamb, and then would set his screwdriver there and hit it with his hand; that his hand felt tender at the time, but that he had never had anything like this. This testimony was insufficient to show that the injury was caused by accident. An accidental event takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of the known cause, and therefore not expected. Paul v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 20 N. E. 347, 3. L. R. A. 443, 8 Am. St. Rep. 758; 14 R. C. L. § 418, p. 1238. It is quite clear that the evidence to which reference has been made was insufficient to establish the conclusion of fact found by the Industrial Commission-that the frog felon resulted from the use of the screwdriver, which bruised the palm of the right hand. Matter of Belcher v. Carthage Machine Co.. 224 N. Y. 326, 120 N. E. 735; Matter of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 540. Under the evidence produced, we do not believe that the commission was justified in making the conclusion of fact which it did. Matter of Eldridge v. Endicott. Johnson & Co., 228 N. Y. 21, 126 N. E. 254. The order of the Appellate Division and the determination of the Industrial Commission should be reversed, and the claim remitted to the commission for rehearing, with costs to abide the event. Hiscock. C. J., and Collin, Hogan, Pound, McLaughlin and Andrews, JJ., concur. Order reversed, etc. FARRINGTON v. UNITED STATES RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION ET AL. (Court of Appeals of New York. March 9, 1920.) 127 Northeastern Reporter, 272. MASTER AND SERVANT ACCIDENT HELD NOT TO HAVE OCCURRED IN "COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT" BY RAILROAD COMPANY. Where a laborer employed by another to unload a car was called by a station agent, not authorized to employ him, to assist him to close the door of a box car near by, just as the laborer was about to leave for home, and was injured in so doing, the accident did not occur in the "course of employment" by the railroad company so as to render it liable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) (For other definitions, see. Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment.) Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department. Proceeding for Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Mary L. Farrington, widow, on behalf of John Farrington, deceased, against the United States Railroad Administration, Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, and the Long Island Railroad. An award by the State Industrial Commission in favor of claimant was affirmed on appeal (190 App. Div. 920, 179 N. Y. Supp. 920), and defendants appeal. Award and order affirming the same reversed. Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered January 3, 1920, affirming an award of the State Industrial Commission made under the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67). Two laborers, of whom claimant's decedent was one, were engaged in unloading screenings for their employer from a car standing on the tracks of the Long Island Railroad. They finished their work and boarded a motortruck of their employer to return to their homes. The station agent of the Long Island Railroad, together with a helper, was then making an effort to close one of the doors of a box car standing near by. The agent called out to the men on the truck, "Come on, fellows, give me a hand to close this door." Both men went over to help move the door, which in closing caught the hand of Farrington and clipped off the end of his finger, with the result infection set in and he subsequently died of the disease of tetanus. Joseph F. Keany, of New York City, for appellants. Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen. (E. Č. Aiken, of Albany, of counsel), for respondent. PER CURIAM. Award and order reversed, with costs against the Industrial Commission, upon the opinion of H. T. Kellogg, J., below. Hiscock, C. J., and Collin, Hogan, Pound, McLaughlin, Andrews, and Elkus, JJ., concur. IN RE HESS. STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v. DOWNER STEEL CO. ET AL. (Supreme Court of New York. Appellate Division, Third Department. May 5, 1920.) 181 New York Supplement, 674. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-DEPENDENCY UNDER COMPENSATION LAW DETERMINED AS OF TIME OF ACCIDENT. Under Workmen's Compensation Law, § 10, dependency shall be determined as of time of accident. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 388.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT MORE THAN DECEDENT'S AWARD TO DEPENDENTS OF Under Workmen's Compensation Law, § 16, subd. 4, award in favor of dependent mother, brothers, and sisters of deceased servant, aggregating more per month than was contributed by deceased to dependents, held authorized. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 386[1].) Appeal from State Industrial Commission. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Florence M. Hess for compensation for death of her son, Martin G. Hess, the employee, opposed by the Downer Steel Company, the employer, and the Zurich Accident & Liability Insurance Company, Limited, the insurance carrier. Compensation was awarded by the Industrial Commission, and the employer and insurance carrier appeal. Affirmed. Argued before John M. Kellogg, P. J., and Woodward, Cochrane, Henry T. Kellogg, and Kiley, JJ. Philip J. O'Brien, of New York City, for appellants. Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, of Albany, of counsel), for respondent. Bernard L. Shientag, of New York City, for State Industrial Commission. KILEY, J. On the 6th day of November, 1918, at 10 a. m. of that day, Martin G. Hess received injuries from which he died within a short time. At the time he was working for the Downer Steel Company, Incorporated, at their plant, located at North Tonawanda, N. Y. This corporation manufactured steel products; the decedent had worked for it 11⁄2 years, was about 20 years of age, and unmarried. His occupation was such as comes under the definition of hazardous in the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67). Jacob Hess, the father of Martin, died August 2, 1918. The claimants are mother and brothers and sisters of the deceased. At the time, and for some years previous, the family, except Martin, had lived on a cheap, hilly farm over the line in the state of Pennsylvania. The evidence abundantly sustains the contention of the claimants that Martin contributed to their suppor and that they were dependent upon him at the time of the accident. The State Industrial Commission so found, and awarded to the mother, Florence M. Hess, $5.77 weekly, and to Harry C., John L., Wallace, |