may, it is certain that even though the appellant had by her omissions forfeited her rights before the Industrial Accident Commission, that in itself could not confer jurisdiction upon another tribunal. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Industrial Accident Commission is vested with exclusive jurisdiction of actions such as the one here under consideration, and no neglect or failure upon the part of the employe or his dependents to comply with any provisions of the act can vest the superior court with jurisdiction. The judgment is affirmed. We concur: Nourse, J.; Brittain, J.. NELSON v. LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO., (District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California. 189 Pacific Reporter, 306. MASTER AND SERVANT COMPENSATION INSURER'S SETTLEMENT, BASED ON MISTAKE OF LAW AND FACT, HELD WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. Settlement agreement of insurance carrier with dependent of deceased employee, that payment of a certain amount per week in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Act should be made so long as required by that act, not being based on consideration of forbearance to sue, but on mutual mistake that the employee, though injured while engaged in interstate commerce, was within the scope of the act, was without consideration. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 382.) Appeal from Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco; Bernard J. Flood, Judge. Action by Josephine W. Nelson against the London Guarantee & Accident Company, Limited. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. A. D. Schaffer, of San Francisco (Anthony Podesta, of San Francisco, of counsel), for appellant. Walter H. Linforth, of San Francisco, and Carroll S. Bucher, of Salt Lake City, Utah, for respondent. NOURSE, J. This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant after an order of the trial court sustaining its demurer to plaintiff's complaint without leave to amend. The allegations of the complaint are that on the 12th day of May, 1914, plaintiff's husband, during the course of his employment as a stevedore for the Matson Navigation Company, was killed while loading a vessel of that company in the port of San Francisco, that his average weekly wage at that time was $20, and that plaintiff was his sole dependIt is also alleged: ent. That prior to that time the defendant had entered into an agreement with the Matson Navigation Company, promising to pay to the dependents of employes of that company all sums of money due under the "Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act" arising out of personal injuries, including death, sustained by such employes in the course of their employment. That for a period of 20 weeks subsequent to May 12, 1914, defendant paid to plaintiff the sum of $13 a week, or a total of $260, and that on the 30th day of September, 1914, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement in writing respecting the further payment of compensation to plaintiff, and adjusting the amount and manner of payment thereof. That such agreement provided in part as follows: "The payment of $13 each week in accordance with Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act [Laws 1913, p. 279] will be made so long as required by said act." That said agreement was approved by the Industrial Accident Commission of the state of California, and for a period of 139 weeks subsequent to the 30th day of September, 1914, defendant paid to plaintiff $13 per week, or a total sum of $1,807, and that on the 29th day of May, 1917, defendant notified plaintiff that it had abandoned and repudiated said agreement and that no further payments would be made thereunder. It is then alleged that the sum of $1,053 is still due under the agreement by reason of the terms of the Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act, which called for the payment of three times the average annual earnings of the decedent, and demand was made for judgment in that amount. Respondent justifies its repudiation of the agreement upon the ground that subsequent to its execution the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Industrial Accident Commission of the state had no jurisdiction over accidents occurring upon vessels engaged in interstate commerce in navigable waters. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900. It is conceded that appellant's husband was employed in interstate commerce at the time of the injury. From this it is argued that no liability attached to the respondent for the payment of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act of this state, and that therefore there was no consideration for the settlement agreement made in 1914. The purpose of the settlement agreement undoubtedly was to fix the amount of compensation to be paid on account of the accident and the time and manner of payment. It was not a settlement of any disputed claim or a compromise of a doubtful right, both parties at the time having assumed that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act applied to accidents of this nature, and that the liability of the respondent to pay was fixed by the terms of that act. The liability of the respondent was not disputed at that time, and the right of the appellant to receive compensation in accordance with the terms of the said act was not doubted until after the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States holding that the state commission had no jurisdiction over accidents of that nature. But it appears from the allegations of the complaint that respondent never contracted to make any payments, except of such sums as the Matson Navigation Company might be obligated to pay under the Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act. Under the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Jensen Case, that company was not obligated to pay under the act for injuries to its employes sustained while engaged in interstate commerce; but its liability, if any, was a common-law liability only, which was not covered by respondent's insurance contract. Thus neither the appellant nor the Matson Navigation Company could have maintained an action on the insurance contract for compensation for such injury. The settlement agreement was therefore without consideration. It was in no sense a contract based on the consideration of forbearance to sue, but was based upon a mistake of both law and fact. City Street Improvement Co. v. Pearson, 185 Pac. 962. For these reasons the judgment is affirmed. ADAMS & WESTLAKE CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL. (No. 13119.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. April 21, 1920.) 127 Northeastern Reporter, 168. MASTER AND SERVANT INJURY WHILE VOLUNTARILY OPERATING FELLOW SERVANT'S MACHINE HELD NOT ONE "ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT" WITHIN COMPENSATION ACT. Where a punch-press hand stopped his press after the day's work, and, going to a similar machine of a fellow operator, who had gone out, attempted to operate it, sustaining an injury to his hand, the machine being unguarded unlike his own, the injury did not "arise out of employment," within Workmen's Compensation Act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 375[1].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment.) Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge. Proceedings for compensation for injuries under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Bernard Bassman, the employee, opposed by the Adams & Westlake Company, the employer. Compensation was awarded by the Industrial Commission, the award confirmed by the circuit court, and the employer brings error. Judgment of the circuit court reversed, and award of the Industrial Commission set aside. Charles E. Selleck and George A. Bruegger, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error. A. H. Ranes and Corinne L. Rice, both of Chicago, for defendant in error. THOMPSON, J. This writ of error is prosecuted by leave of court to review a judgment of the circuit court of Cook county affirming a decision of the Industrial Commission awarding to Bernard Bassman, defendant in error, compensation for injuries received while in the employ of the Adams & Westlake Company, plaintiff in error. Bassman was employed by plaintiff in error as an experienced punchpress hand and had been working for it about two weeks before he was accidentally injured. He was 17 years of age. His compensation was determined by the number of pieces punched, with a guaranty of a minimum of 27 cents an hour if his piecework did not amount to that much. During his employment he had not turned out more than the minimum, so it was stipulated that his compensation was $14.58 a week—six ninehour days at 27 cents an hour. The presses of plaintiff in error were equipped with automatic registers, which showed the number of pieces punched by each machine. Bassman was assigned to a press to stamp out cups for lantern tops. About 15 minutes before quitting time on the day of the accident, the register on his machine showed that he had stamped out 8,000 cups. He considered this a full day's work and stopped his press. Johnson, the operator of the machine immediately next to the one operated by Bassman, left his machine and went to the office. Bassman out of curiosity attempted to operate Johnson's machine, but at the first attempt his left hand was caught in the press and his fingers were cut off. The machines were similar, but the die used in the Johnson machine was different from the one used in the machine operated by Bassman. The machine of the latter was equipped with a guard which pro tected the hand, but there was no such guard on the blanking die used in the Johnson machine. Bassman had not been directed to operate this machine and knew that he would receive no extra compensation for whatever work he did with it. The only question presented by this record is whether the injury arose out of and in the course of Bassman's employment. Taking the evidence in its most favorable light, with all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, we think it clear, under the authorities, that an award in this case cannot stand. We discussed at length in Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 11, 116 N. E. 684, Ann. Čas. 1918B, 764, the law on this question, and what we there said is controlling here. It is neither necessary nor advisable to repeat the discussion. We think it cannot be seriously contended that Bassman was doing the work to which he had been assigned or that his work called for the operation of the machine by which he was injured. Whether his attempt to operate the adjoining machine was out of idle curiosity or for some other reason, he was acting upon his own initiative and without the employer's knowledge or consent. Where a servant voluntarily and without direction from the master and without his acquiescence goes into hazardous work outside of his contract of hire, he puts himself beyond the protection of the master's implied undertaking and is not within the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 48, §§ 126-152i). An injury to an employe while engaged in a voluntary act not accepted by or known to his employer and outside the duties for which he is employed does not arise out of his employment. Mepham & Co. v. Industrial Com., 289 Ill. 484, 124 N. E. 540. Unfortunate as this accident is, the law does not justify the award, and therefore the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed and the award of the Industrial Commission set aside. Judgment reversed. CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL. (No. 13093.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. April 21, 1920.) 127 Northeastern Reporter, 80. 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-JURISDICTION OF CERTIORARI UNDER COMPENSATION ACT SPECIAL. In reviewing on certiorari an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act by the Industrial Commission, the circuit courts exercise special jurisdiction conferred by the act, and they cannot maintain such proceeding by virtue of their general powers. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[3].) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT CERTIORARI UNDER COMPENSATION ACT MAINTAINABLE ONLY IN COUNTY WHERE DEFENDANTS OR ONE OF THEM RESIDE. Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 144, par. (f), cl. 1, only the circuit court of a county where some one of the parties defendant shall be found has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to review an award of the Industrial Commission, and a writ issued by a court of a county wherein none of the parties defendant reside is in excess of its jurisdiction. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417 [3].) 4. MASTER AND SERVANT - COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION OF CERTIORARI UNDER COMPENSATION ACT MAY TRANSFER PROCEEDING TO PROPER COUNTY. Though the circuit court of the county which issued a writ of certiorari to review an award of the Industrial Commission under Workmen's Compensation Act was without jurisdiction--because none of the parties defendant resided in the county, the court having issued a writ may nevertheless under Venue Act, § 36, transfer the proceeding to a circuit court of the county wherein some one of the defendants resides and which has jurisdiction. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417 [3].) Error to Circuit Court, Champaign County; Franklin H. Boggs, Judge. The Industrial Commission having rendered an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act in favor of B. L. Kirk, administrator of Jesse Huddleston, against the Central Illinois Public Service Company, employer, the employer brought certiorari to the circuit court and, the writ being quashed, brings error. Reversed and remanded. Vanse & Kiger, of Mattoon, for plaintiff in error. Dobbins & Dobbins, of Champaign, and F. B. Leonard, Jr., of Metropolis, for defendants in error. STONE, J. On August 10, 1918, the Industrial Commission of Illinois, at a hearing to review an award, entered its order affirming the award in favor of B. L. Kirk, administrator of the estate of Jesse Huddleston, deceased, whose death was the result of an injury arising in the course of his employment with the plaintiff in error. At the time of the injury both parties were working under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Illinois. On August 26, 1918, the plaintiff in error filed with the clerk of the circuit court of Coles county a præcipe for a writ of certiorari directed to the Industrial Commission, returnable to the October term, 1918, of said court, and filed its bond in the sum fixed by the Industrial Commission, and the same was approved by the clerk as required by law. On the same day a writ of certiorari was mailed to the Industrial Commission and notice of the commencement of the certiorari proceedings and the return day of the writ was mailed to Kirk the administrator, in care of Dobbins & Dobbins, his attorneys, at their post office address at Champaign, in Champaign county, Ill. Kirk was appointed administrator by the county court of Coles county. He resides in Champaign county and filed with the Industrial Commission his request that all notice of proceedings in this cause be served personally or by registered mail upon B. L. Kirk, administrator of the estate of Jesse Huddleston, deceased. Champaign, Ill., and gave the names and address of his agents or attorneys as Dobbins & Dobbins, of Champaign. Dobbins & Dobbins. acting as attorneys for the defendant in error, wrote counsel for plaintiff in error that Kirk did not reside in or "may be found" in Coles county, and that they would take advantage of such want of jurisdiction of the circuit court of Coles county if an effort were made to have the case reviewed in that court. On October 15, 1918, Kirk, in person limiting his appearance, moved the circuit court of Coles county, to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that under the statute the court had no jurisdiction for the reason that he was not a resident and could not be found in Coles county within the meaning of the statute. Thereupon, on October 28, 1918, the writ of certiorari thus issued was quashed. On November 4, 1918, plaintiff in error filed a motion to set aside the order quashing |