mistake in the original judgment, if any, being one of law, could and should have been corrected, if at all. upon the original appeal. It was too late thereafter on motion under the section just referred to. In 23 Cyc. p. 866, par. 2, it is said:

"A decision which is wrong in law cannot be corrected on motion, and the allowance of an amendment should never be used as a means of reviewing the judgment on the merits or rectifying judicial errors or mistakes. Thus the judgment cannot be modified or amended because as it stands it is not supported by the evidence, or because the conclusions of law on which it is founded are alleged to be erroneous, or to make it conform to what ought to have been done but was not in fact done. And when a statute authorizes the correction of judgments on the ground of 'mistake', it means mistake of fact. and not of law."

By an extension of this opinon, we could illustrate the conclusion thus noted by quotations from many of the courts, but the law, as stated in the quotation taken from Cyc., seems to be so well and so generally supported that we, in the interest of brevity, content ourselves with citing a few of our own cases in harmony with the text from Cyc. Tynbrug & Co. v. Cohen. 67 Tex. 220, 2 S. W. 734; M. P. Ry. Co. v. Haynes, 82 Tex. 448, 18 S. W. 605; Perkins v. Dunlavy, 61 Tex. 241; Hamilton v. Johachim, 160 S. W. 645:

We conclude that the court did not err in denying appellant's motion to correct the judgment, and this conclusion applies as well to appellee's cross-assignment, complaining of the court's refusal to so correct the original judgment as to award appellee his damages in a lump sum, as provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act for permanent injuries. Judgment affirmed.

McVICAR v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH. (No. 2498.) (Supreme Court of Utah. June 15, 1920.)

191 Pacific Reporter 1089.

1. MASTER AND SERVANT COMPENSATION CLAIMANT'S DEPENDENCY QUESTION OF FACT ON WHICH COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ARE CONCLUSIVE.

The issue of dependency being one of fact, the Industrial Commission's conclusions are like the verdict of a jury, and will not be interfered with, when supported by some substantial evidence, and if the commission erred in its findings of fact and conclusions, the Supreme Court cannot correct the error. Ceo. A. Lowe Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 190 Pac. 934.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 413[7].)

2. MASTER AND SERVANT COMMISSION'S DECISION ON CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION FINAL, UNLESS ABUSE OF 'DISCRETION CLEARLY APPEARS.

Where it does not clearly and indubitably appear that the discretion of the Industrial Commission has been abused, its decision is final and unassailable.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[5].)

3. MASTER AND SERVANT COMPENSATION CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL, RELYING ON STIPULATION TO TAKE TESTIMONY, NEED NOT STATE TO COMMISSION WHAT HE EXPECTS TO PROVE.

The attorney for the applicant was entitled to rely on a stipulation to take further testimony, and for that reason was not required to make a statement to the Industrial Commission of what he proposed to prove by witnesses he desired to produce, and his request wrongly denied.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 415.)

Proceeding by Minnie R. McVicar under the Workmen's Compensation Act for compensation for the death of her son, James Allen McVicar, opposed by the Imperial Lead Mining Company, employer. Award for claimant by the Industrial Commission, and claimant applies for writ of of review to determine its lawfulness. Award set aside, and Commission directed to give applicant an opportunity to introduce further testimony.

George R. Freeman, of Corona, Cal., for plaintiff.

James H. Wolfe, Asst. Atty. Gen., and De Vine, Stine & Gurlliam, of Ogden, for defendants.

WEBER, J. Plaintiff applies to this court for a writ of review to determine the lawfulness of an award by the Industrial Commission. A synoptical statement of the salient facts as found by the commission is:

Applicant (hereinbefore referred to as plaintiff) is a widow, the mother of James Allen McVicar, who was killed on September 12, 1919, while employed by the Imperial Lead Mining Company. in what is known as Death Canyon, Utah. The husband of the applicant died about two months following the demise of the son. For approximately one year prior to the death of the husband he had not been able to earn anything, and had made no contribution toward the support of the applicant, his wife. The deceased son had been discharged from service in the United states navy during the latter part of 1918. He lived with his parents and contributed to their support after he was discharged from the navy and until he went to work in Utah about June 12, 1919. During the time he had been so employed he had contributed to the support of his father and mother the sum of $90. The applicant had no idea, according to her testimony, of what her household expenses were. She had no systematic method of buying supplies for the household, and no way in which to estimate what her receipts from the deceased son were, other than that he contributed everything. The evidence very clearly shows that the deceased did not contribute everything at any time toward the support of the applicant or her husband.

During the time the son was in the navy he made an allotment for the support of his father and mother of $15 per month, which was increased by an allowance from the government of $10. The amount of any support contributed by the deceased son prior to his entry into the service was not ascertained. His contribution after his return from the navy was not ascertained with any degree of certainty. During the first part of 1919 he was employed by the Riverside Portland Cement Comapny, living in Riverside with his parents, who had apartments there. The rent for the apartment was paid by the applicant. In all probability, during that period the deceased son contributed the entire support of the applicant other than this $25 per month; but it does not appear that the contribution toward the support of applicant at any time amounted to more than $25 per month.

The commission ordered that compensation be awarded. to be paid by the Imperial Lead Mining Company. to the applicant at the rate of $16 per week for a period of 112 weeks and 3 days, but not to exceed $1,800, and that the undertaker be paid the sum of $150.

[1, 2] The record is not without evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the commission. The issue of dependency being one of fact, the commission's conclusions are like the verdict of a jury, and will not be interfered with by this court, when supported by some substantial evidence. If the commission erred in its finding of fact and conclusions. we cannot correct the error., It has the power to determine the degree of dependency. Since it does not clearly and indubitably appear that the discretion of the commission has been abused, its decision is final and unassailable. The principles enunciated in Geo. A. Lowe Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 190 Pac. 934, are applicable here.

[3] If the applicant had been given an opportunity to present all her testimony, the award would be affirmed. The depositions of certain witnesses on behalf of applicant were taken February 18, 1920, and at that time it was stipulated between the attorneys for the parties that a further hearing might be held at the desire of either party. On February 18, 1920. applicant's attorney informed the commission by letter that he desired to take testimony of several witnesses, and that their testimony would relate to the amount of compensation received by James Allen McVicar immediately prior to his death, and also the amount of money sent to his mother; also as to statements made by the son relative to his mother being dependent upon him. On March 13, 1920, counsel for applicant again wrote to the commission, calling attention to his former letter, and saying that he desired to take the deposition of a certain witness. Neither of these letters was answered by the commission. On March 25, 1920, the award herein was rendered. In an application for rehearing, filed in due time, the refusal to permit applicant to introduce further testimony was given as one of the grounds for rehearing; the stipulation and letters being made a part of the application. The application for rehearing was denied May 20, 1920.

In his letters to the commission counsel for applicant did not state what he expected to prove by the witnesses whose testimony he desired to produce. He relied upon the stipulation to take further testimony, and for that reason he was not required to make a statement of what he proposed to prove. He was justified in relying upon the stipulation, and his request to introduce further testimony should have been granted.

The award is therefore set aside, and the commission is directed to give applicant an opportunity to introduce further testimony. Corfman C. J., and Frick, Gideon, and Thurman, JJ., concur.

VAROUKAS v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al.

(No. 3490.)

(Supreme Court of Utah. July 21, 1920.)

191 Pacific Reporter 1091.

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MAY ADOPT REA ONABLE RULES CONFORMING TO COMPENSATION ACT.

The Industrial Commission has power to promulgate rules and regulations to protect the injured employee, the employer, the insurance carrier, and to safeguard the state insurance fund, provided such rules are reasonable and conform to the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 397.)

2. MASTER AND SERVANT INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S RULE HELD UNREASONABLE AND CONTRARY TO COMPENSATION ACT.

Industrial Commission's rule No. 19, requiring injured employee to procure the commission's consent to leaving the locality of employment. and providing for forfeiture of full compensation accruing after employee has left locality without such consent, without any hearing and regardless of whether absence in any way affected his disability, is unreasonable, the commission having no right to forfeit any part of the compensation allowed by Workmen's Compensation Act, except after notice and hearing and for good cause.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 397.)

3. MASTER AND SERVANT COMPENSATION CLAIMANT VIOLATING COMMISSION'S RULE HAS BURDEN OF PROOF. Injured employee entitled to compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act, who has left locality of employment without Industrial Commission's consent, in violation of its rules, has burden of showing that he had good cause for failure to procure consent, and that absence has not prejudiced employer or insurance carrier or state insurance fund. and did not prolong period of disability.

(For other cases,see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 403.)

4. MASTER AND SERVANT-COMPENSATION TO EMPLOYEE VIOLATING RULES OR DISOBEYING PHYSICIAN'S ORDERS LIMITED TO DISABILITY ORDINARILY RESULTING FROM INJURY.

Where employee violates a rule of Industrial Commission or disobeys the orders of the attending physician, or otherwise arbitrarily refuses to cooperate with those in attendance upon him, the award of compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act should cover only such a period of incapacity or disability as would usually and ordinarily result from the character of the injury received by the employee.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385[11.)

5. MASTER AND SERVANT COMPENSATION CLAIMANT MUST TAKE NOTICE OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S RULES.

Injured employee, on making application to Industrial Commission for compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act, is bound to take notice of the rules and regulations of the commission affecting the application. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 397.)

Proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act by Louis Varoukas for compensation for injuries, opposed by the Standard Coal Company, employer. Award by Industrial Commiss on of Utah for claimant, and on denial of his application for additional compensation, he presents the record to the Supreme Court for review. Decision of Commission annulled, and cause remanded, with directions.

Stewart, Alexander & Cannon, of Price, for plaintiff.

Dan B. Shields, Atty. Gen., James H. Wolfe, Asst. Atty. Gen., and A. R. Barnes, of Salt Lake City. for defendants.

FRICK, J. Plaint ff, in due time and in due form, made application to the Industrial Commission of Utah, hereinafter styled commission, for compensation under our statute for a disability caused by injuries which

he sustained in the course of his employment while in the employment of the Standard Coal Company of Utah. The commission, after a hearing, awarded plaintiff "compensation for the disability period. January 10, 1919, to Febraury 20, 1919, less the 10 days waiting period," amounting to $54.81. The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the award of the commission, for the reason, as he contends, that the disability period fixed by the commission was for a shorter time than the disability continued, and he asked for a rehearing. In the petition for a rehearing he asked for additional compensation, which additional compensation, however, was denied for the reasons hereinafter appearing. The majority of the commission on the first hearing, after citing the facts, closed its decision as follows:

"From the evidence, therefore, the commission finds that the applicant met with an accident and sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment, and that there followed a total dsability period from January 10, 1919, to February 20, 1919, for which compensation should be allowed. The commission finds that the disability period extended beyond the 20th of February, 1919, but that compensation may not be allowed for this period on account of the violation of rule 19. The commission feels that this is a reasonable rule which must be respected. In this case the evidence shows that the defendant furnished, and was willing to furnish, all necessary medical attention, and it is conceded that where the defendant is willing to do this it should have the right to so do, and this right should not be interfered with by the employee without reason and without notification to any one taking his departure from the locality.

Wherefore it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the applicant be, and he is hereby, awarded compensation for the disability period, January 10, 1919, to February 20, 1919, less the 10 days' waiting period, or 31 days, or $54.81."

In denying the application for additional compensation the commission merely adhered to the reasons originaly given, and the plaintiff presents the record to this court for review.

Rule 19 which is referred to in the decision of the commission, and pursuant to which it refused to allow plaintiff additional compensation, reads as follows:

“An injured employee who desires to leave the locality in which he or she has been employed during the treatment of his or her injury or desires to leave the state, shall report to his or her attend ng physician for examination, notifying the commission in writ ng of such intention to leave, accompanying notice with a certificate from the attending physician, se ting forth the exact nature of the injury, the condition of the employee, together with a statement of the probable length of time disability will continue. After complying with the requirements herein set forth and upon written consent of the commission, the employee may leave the local ty in which he or she has been employed, otherwise no compensation will be allowed during such absence from the locality in with e or she has been employed."

[1] Plaintiff's counsel vigorously assail the findings and conclusions of the commission and further insist that it was without power or authority to adopt rule 19. They contend, however, that if it be conceded that the commission possessed such power, yet said rule is unreasonable. and for that reason the rule is without force or effect. Without pausing now to point out the particular powers that are conferred on the commission with regard to adopting and promulgat ng rules and regulations, we are clearly of the opinion that the commission has ample power to promulgate all reasonable rules and regulations for the protection of those who are injured, and also to protect the rights of the employer, and that of the insurance carrier, and may safeguard